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Abstract 
The Independent Labour Party (I. L. P. ) during the nineteen thirties is remembered only 
for its 'stupid and disastrous' decision to disaffiliate from the Labour Party in 1932 and 
for its subsequent rapid decline. This 'suicide in a fit of insanity' has been frequently 
used as a cautionary tale for subsequent left-wing activists. Yet, beyond casual 
references, the Party during the decade has scarcely been studied. Drawing on a wide 
range of previously unstudied archival materials this thesis presents the first full-length 
study of the decline of the I. L. P. It examines the way in which, through the decade, the 
I. L. P. sought to attract socialists by presenting itself, locally and nationally, as the Party 
of militant working-class activity as well as advancing an ideology distinct from the 
Labour and Communist Parties. In some localities such an approach was successful as 
the I. L. P. carved out a political niche for itself. The focus of the thesis is on examining 
the reasons why the I. L. P. failed to transform these local political spaces into a national 
political presence. This discussion is structured around the differing political spaces 
available for the Party to exploit: in localities, in elections, and in formulating policy. It 
also examines the I. L. P. 's relationship with the major competitors for this political 
space, the Labour and Communist Parties. This information is combined with a detailed 
understanding of the internal politics of the Party, factional and organisational. From 
this overall picture a contrast is drawn between those areas where the I. L. P. succeeded, 
and the Party failures. The resulting analysis seems to suggest that the electoral and 
organisational niches available at the local level where the I. L. P. succeeded, could not 
be transformed to the national arena. Thus, the concept of political space can give some 
indication of why the party failed in its attempt to build a significant socialist alternative 
in Britain. 
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Preface and Acknowledgements 
This thesis attempts to address an argument to an audience with a variety of political 
positions. Inevitably, the argument, in some places more than others, bears the mark of 
a'situated author. ' Yet the set of questions and answers with which I began this project 
have shifted as my knowledge of the I. L. P. and the labour movement developed. I owe a 
significant debt to those within the Socialist Party of Great Britain, Adam Buick, Dan 
Greenwood and in particular Toby Crowe, who taught me much about both myself and 
socialism. With them I spent much time discussing and debating, and acting on, 
socialist principles. When I went to the University of York to study for a Masters 
Degree in Political Philosophy it was to develop and defend this position. It was during 
this year, especially in arguing with Sam Wallinger, that I realised that whilst I knew 
something about the theory of socialism, outside of the history of the SPGB, I knew 
little about the history of the working-class movement. I chose to study the I. L. P. during 
the 1930s, known to me largely through my treasured back copies of the Socialist 
Standard, not to challenge my preconceptions but as a route into a broader 
understanding of British political history. However, in coming to know more about the 
I. L. P., I found myself increasingly questioning my own politics. There were differences 
between the Socialist Party position and the I. L. P., but I found I was arguing that policy 
was mainly of significance for internal cohesion rather than recruitment. Further, 
appreciation of the values, motivations, ideas and successes of the I. L. P. led me to 
revisit long-held doubts about the SPGB's claims to have the answers which had eluded 
other 'socialist' organisations. At the root of these doubts was the failure of the I. L. P., 
much better situated than the Socialist Party, to build a democratic socialist party of 
significant size. Given the reasons I was discovering for its failure, I found I could not 
give myself a satisfactory affirmative answer to the 'nice idea, but do you really think 
it'll ever happen? ' question I had previously fielded so often. I came to realise that where 
previously I had had an answer to every question, I now had a series of unanswered 
questions. These doubts I worked through in long discussions with fellow York 
graduate student Keith Gildart, as I slowly reached the conclusion that I had become 
that most hated of individuals, 'a reformist. ' 
That this personal journal, these doubts and musings, ever became transformed into a 
thesis is largely due to the help and critical guidance given to me by my supervisor, 
Professor David Howell. It was he who gave me the confidence to search for evidence, 
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and to follow the logic of an argument to its conclusion, even if it ran against 
preconceived ideas. Subsequent discussions with Kevin Morgan, Andrew Flinn, John 
Mclllroy and Alan Campbell, all of whom have provided me with further primary 
material and ideas about the I. L. P., have reinforced similar points. 
Without the grant provided by the British Academy, this research would have been 
impossible. I have also relied extensively on the hospitality of friends Thomas Schmidt, 
Marek Dalibor and particularly the unending warmth of Greg Davies and Magdalene 
Vierra-Marie. I cannot stress too much the debt to my parents who gave me the values, 
if not the politics, which motivated me. Through both the excitement of discovery and 
the long trawl of writing up my wife Sarah has been a constant inspiration. She has put 
up with endless discussion of the niceties of the politics of the 1930s and somehow 
maintained an interest in my research in both intellectual and practical ways. Yet the 
final motivation to finish the thesis comes from someone I cannot yet name. It is to 
Sarah and our unborn child that this thesis is dedicated. 
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1. Introduction 
During the Second World War, MI5 placed a plethora of Trotskyist groups under tight 
surveillance and attempted to disrupt their activity. As the War drew to a close the 
Secret Service panicked. Their observations had ignored the Independent Labour Party 
(I. L. P. ). The I. L. P. was, they suggested, a group with much firmer roots in the British 
Socialist tradition than any Trotskyist organisation. They surmised that the Party's 
history, combined with an anti-war stance, meant that the I. L. P. posed a significant 
threat to national security. An officer was dispatched to investigate and, in the finest 
traditions of British intelligence work, returned with a three page summary of Fenner 
Brockway's then recently published book Inside the Left. No significant further action 
was taken against the party. ' 
Whilst this thesis utilises a greater range of sources than the M15, it is motivated, in 
part, by a similar question; that of why a party with such extensive roots in the British 
Labour Movement failed to create a viable socialist alternative during the 1930s. When 
the I. L. P. disaffiliated from the Labour Party in July 1932 its membership was over five 
times a great as the membership of the Communist Party of Great Britain. In the 1931 
elections the Party had returned more candidates than the Labour Party in Scotland. It 
had an extensive organisation at both national and local level, a well regarded national 
journal supplemented by many more local publications. Many I. L. P. ers at the time 
believed they had prospects of building a powerful and influential movement. Yet 
subsequent commentators have widely accepted that disaffiliation was a 'stupid and 
disastrous error' and that the Party rapidly disappeared into immediate 'irreversible 
decline. i2 The I. L. P. 's failure has become the standard cautionary tale for subsequent 
Labour left-wings presented repeatedly to show that there is no prospect for a non- 
Communist left-wing outside the Labour Party. 3 
This thesis seeks to examine the political realities which lie behind this verdict, 
establishing a nuanced assesment of why the Party actually declined. In doing so it has 
been necessary to grapple with a number of problems. First, it has been difficult to 
gauge the exact extent of the Party's decreasing fortunes. The existing literature 
overplays the speed and extent of the I. L. P. 's decline. In order to obtain a more realistic 
assessment of the Party during the period it has been necessary to reconstruct the Party's 
influence at both local and national level. Yet the sources available are limited; it is 
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perhaps indicative that there is more information on the I. L. P. in this period in the 
archives of the Communist Party of Great Britain than in the I. L. P. 's own archives. 
Further, there is the danger of producing a picture which in fact reflects the limited 
viewpoint of the Party's leadership. This problem is particularly acute given the extent 
to which Fenner Brockway produced or processed much of the source material. 4 Such 
considerations further extend the reasons for looking beyond the national picture to 
examine regional and local variations. Yet, it is necessary, particularly in these crucial 
searches for diverse local pictures, to avoid over romanticising these fragments of often 
mundane and occasionally corrupt political processes. 5 
Beyond these difficulties, one central problem remains. In order to address the question 
of why the party declined it is necessary to understand why people left the organisation. 
Some reasons can be deduced from an analysis of high-profile defections or from the 
party's responses to such problems. Some individuals appear later in the records of 
Labour or Communist Parties. A little more can be inferred by the tentative application 
of generalised political reasoning. Yet the majority of those who left the Party did so 
without trace disappearing permanently from the historical record. Statements about 
their motivations necessarily remain tentative. 
The initial two chapters of the thesis present the necessary background to the more 
substantive argument. This chapter presents an analysis of the literature, an overview of 
the period and the organisational and theoretical background to the argument. The 
second chapter provides the necessary historical background, giving a detailed 
understanding of the dynamics of the disaffiliation decision. The more substantive 
analysis of the I. L. P. 's activity during the post-disaffiliation period then takes place in a 
thematic discussion structured around the concept of political space. Thus, the thesis 
looks at the differing arenas in which the I. L. P. attempted to create political space - 
localities and elections, policy and international affairs. The thesis also examines the 
Party's relationship with major competitors for political space, the Labour and 
Communist Parties. By a comparison between those areas where the I. L. P. was 
relatively successful and those where the party most obviously failed it is possible to 
reach some tentative conclusions about the conditions that facilitated the party obtaining 
influence and thus gain some indication of why the party failed in its wider goals. 
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1.1 The I. L. P. in History: A Literature Review 
Images of the post-disaffiliation party, whilst often self-contradictory, are almost 
universally unhelpful in creating a nuanced study of the politics of the I. L. P. during the 
1930s. One popular viewpoint suggests the I. L. P., the original 'party within a party', was 
increasingly of the intransigent left and dominated by the legacy of 'Red Clydeside'. 6 
Another equally popular image is of an organisation which had lost all contact with its 
old working class roots and became dominated by middle-class eccentrics, the 'bearded 
fruit juice drinkers', to become the 'happy hunting ground of the crank'. 7 Still another 
view suggests the party could be identified solely by its pacifism, which by the later part 
of the 1930s condemned it to irrelevance. 8 The cumulative effect of such images is to 
suggest a party without significance or influence, at the margins of political activity, an 
organisation scarcely worthy of study. 9 
Whilst each of these images has some basis in fact, such views are seriously misleading, 
emerging largely from politically motivated commentary. Study of the post-1918 I. L. P. 
has been affected by a dominant Labour historiography that focuses on the I. L. P. in the 
pre-war period when it fits most neatly into the picture of a'forward march of Labour. i1° 
In 1918, the Labour Party adopted a 'socialist goal' and allowed individual membership. 
With the I. L. P. 's two major contributions to the rise of Labour completed, with its 
'historical mission' achieved, there has been much less interest in the study of the post- 
1918 I. L. P. 11 The neglect of the party after 1932 has been even greater. The isolation of 
the I. L. P. from action of importance, as defined by the teleology of the 'forward march' 
thesis, increased further. Most commentators explicitly or implicitly agree with the 
verdict of Keith Middlemass that 'because they had very little political power the main 
history of the I. L. P. should end in 1932. '12 
Such a characterisation mainly serves as a partial explanation of the absence of a 
significant body of work dealing with the disaffiliated party. However, the dominant 
influence of the 'forward march of Labour' on Labour history is also fully consistent 
with the view of the I. L. P. presented in the most popularly cited work on the post- 
disaffiliation I. L. P., R. E. Dowse's Left in the Centre. His survey of the post- 
disaffiliation I. L. P., in the last chapter of his book on the I. L. P. from 1893-1940, also 
presents the I. L. P. as an organisation doomed to failure by the post-First World War 
reformed structure of the Labour Party. This explanation, presented by Dowse, is 
seriously flawed. Perhaps most importantly this is because his sympathies clearly lay 
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with those within the I. L. P. who wished to see it develop into a purely propagandist 
organisation. There is little attempt to empathise with, or even to explain the attitudes of 
those with alternative perspectives. These problems become particularly acute in 
examining the post-disaffiliation party, which precisely refused to define itself in such 
terms. However, there are further problematic aspects with this study, which this thesis 
aims to redress. Perhaps most obviously Dowse attempts to work not 'as a local 
historian but as a social scientist', which seems to require in his view a neglect of the 
local for the national. This is particularly problematic given that the regional 
differences, which he resolutely refuses to study, turn out to be one of the major factors 
which he identifies as explaining the decline of the party. 13 
Alongside this must be placed a number of other works which seek to place the I. L. P. 
within the wider context of the inter-war left. James Jupp's The Radical Left in Britain 
1931-1941 presents the most significant attempt to place the I. L. P. within the 'left', 
which he defines in terms of 'an opposition to existing policies and institutions' that 'had 
come to mean dedication to rapid socialisation of the economy whether through 
parliament or revolutionary means. ' 14 The book presents the best existing analysis of the 
relationship between the I. L. P. and Communist Party as the latter moved from Class- 
against-Class through United to Popular Front policies. Nevertheless, it has serious 
limitations, not least because the book has a strong tendency to depict 'the left' as a 
constant, its identity agreed upon by all significant political parties. The constant mantle 
of'the left' is picked up at one moment by the I. L. P., at the next by the Communist Party 
and at the next it is shared by the two organisations. This attitude takes for granted that 
'the controversy between the Communists and the I. L. P. or Trotskyists was a 
controversy within narrow limits. Had there been no acceptance of a common fund of 
ideas and a common field of action there could have been neither discussion nor co- 
operation. ' It was a controversy over agreed territory. However, at no point during the 
1930s could such a position be taken for granted within the I. L. P. Co-operation, and 
even dialogue with the Communist Party remained controversial. 15 In presenting the 
I. L. P. as one component of the 'left' Jupp places the I. L. P. unquestioningly in a 
framework which was deeply contested at the time. 
Ben Pimlott's Labour and the Left in the 1930s presents an alternative conception of 'the 
left' primarily rooted within the Labour Party. The I. L. P. is rather marginal in his 
discussion, which is based in his understanding of the behaviour of a 'reasonable left 
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wing', stemming largely from his understanding of the Constituency Party Movement. 
His argument revolves around the characterisation of the left's demands as 
organisational and not political. The I. L. P. and Pimlott's main target, the Socialist 
League, both intrinsically had political objectives. Thus, the comparison of these 
organisations with the Constituency Party Movement, and the consequent implied 
criticism within Pimlott's work is difficult to sustain. Nevertheless, his focus on a quite 
different left wing to that presented by Jupp serves to highlight the contested nature of 
the term. 16 
The self-assessment of the I. L. P. 's leadership has been central to these traditional 
verdicts on the Party during the 1930s. Yet received wisdom, from participants in the 
events has often been shaped to serve later political needs and justify subsequent 
political choices. Indeed, as political views and priorities change over time, so too do 
the emphases which participants such as Fenner Brockway and Jennie Lee place on 
different aspects of their I. L. P. experience. 17 Whilst the accounts of these individuals, 
and others such as John Paton, provide an invaluable source, the excessive reliance of 
some later commentators on such accounts has led to the regurgitation of an in-built 
political slant not necessarily endorsed by a more careful study. The problems of 
biography of the I. L. P. leadership are even more acute, especially with regard to the 
contrasting assessments of James Maxton. His iconic status within the British Labour 
movement and the hagiography of some early commentators has affected subsequent 
assessment. Even the best of the work on Maxton is unable to engage seriously with the 
I. L. P. 's post-disaffiliation politics. 18 
The major historiographical alternative to the focus on the Labour Party in this period 
has come from a Communist historiography. The weakness of the Labour Party in the 
immediate period after 1931 has given many such historians the opportunity to present 
the 1930s within an alternative version of the teleology of the Labour movement, with 
its telos in the wartime alliance against fascism. 19 Such discussions place the 
Communist Party at the centre of every element of the working class struggle. There is 
little room for discussion of alternative centres of radical thought and action. In addition 
the harsh opposition between the I. L. P. and the Communist Party following the tragedy 
of the Spanish Civil War has generated apologetics in some histories of the Communist 
Party. This further ensures that there is no place for the I. L. P., as an independent, active 
and dynamic organisation within such a narrative. 20 
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British Trotskyists have developed a narrative account of the British labour movement 
in direct opposition to the Communist Party's analysis. Their attempts have focused on 
developing an understanding of the Trotskyist movement as opposed to the Communist 
Party, which it is contended stands on the 'right' of the labour movement 21 The early 
British Trotskyist movement developed largely within the framework of the I. L. P. in the 
1930s and 40s. 2 Thus, within such narratives, it is inevitable that the I. L. P. takes on an 
increased importance. However, the I. L. P. continues to be understood by such authors 
in terms of Trotsky's own characterisation of the I. L. P., as a centrist party, a party which 
attempts to stand between 'Marxism and Reformism. 23 This focus on the followers of 
Trotsky means that there is little attempt to understand the complexities of the politics 
of the I. L. P. except as they relate to the development of Trotskyism in Britain. 
However, the lack of serious consideration of the I. L. P. 's politics has been evident even 
when those sympathetic to the Trotskyist position choose the I. L. P. as their main focus. 
This is the major problem with G. N. R. Littlejohns's MPhil thesis The Decline of the 
Independent Labour Party. Littlejohns repeatedly characterises the I. L. P. as 'wholly 
empirical' in contrast to the Trotskyists' 'struggle for a Marxist programme'. Such a 
framework assumes, rather than demonstrates that the I. L. P. 's politics were 'unstable, 
moving towards one pole or the other' of Marxism and Social Democracy. 
24 
The disaffiliated I. L. P., thus, fits uneasily into any of these established strands of labour 
history. Interest in the Party, has largely been confined to those who have looked to it 
because of its supposed pacifism and attitude to war. It was such an interest which, 
apparently, motivated the chronological span of Peter Thwaites's 1976 PhD The 
Independent Labour Party 1938-56, which despite its title is mainly based on the period 
1938-45. Thwaites's analysis is generally well-researched, and presents some useful 
material on the I. L. P. at local level following disaffiliation. It does however, suffer from 
a failure to deal with the party in a dynamic way. Indeed, policy is treated as a relatively 
static continuation of Socialism In Our Time from 1926-56. Given the importance 
within the party of developing a new revolutionary policy in the period surrounding 
disaffiliation such a contention is particularly problematic. 
In many ways more significant for the study of the post-1932 I. L. P. has been a changing 
emphasis within labour history itself. The teleology of the 'forward march' of Labour 
has increasingly come under explicit attack. 25 Alongside this there has been a renewed 
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emphasis on studies of the I. L. P. which are sensitive to regional variation and a 
widening of the themes addressed and the chronology studied. 26 These trends, amongst 
other things, have made it possible for some recent authors to begin to address the 
nature of the I. L. P. in the 1930s in some detail and to analyse the regional variations 
within the post-disaffiliation party. 27 At the same time there has been a renewed 
emphasis on the I. L. P. in relation to some of the key events of the decade, most notably 
in its activities during the Spanish Civil War. 28 
The disaffiliated Party frequently drew analogies between the I. L. P. of the 1930s and 
the party of the 1890s. In particular, some emphasd the similarity between the two 
attempts to forge an influential organisation against a dominant labour establishment. 
Whilst the differences between the 1890s and the 1930s are evident, some of the 
conceptual framework utilised in the most illuminating studies of the early I. L. P. also 
enlightens the study of the disaffiliated Party. In particular the notion that the party can 
be seen as struggling for political space, geographically, conceptually, organisationally 
and electorally in a hostile political environment, used effectively by David Howell in 
his study of the early I. L. P. can effectively be applied to the Party after 1932.29 
Despite these recent trends and renewed emphases on the I. L. P. in general and the Party 
in the 1930s there remains no serious study of the party nationally during this period 
which goes beyond the brief and problematic contribution of Left in the Centre. This 
thesis aims to correct this serious gap in the literature by presenting a detailed and 
nuanced account of the disaffiliated I. L. P. 
1.2 Chronological Overview 
The new constitution of the Labour Party in 1918 left the I. L. P. with a problematic 
legacy. Individual membership and an avowedly 'socialist goal' for the larger party 
meant the I. L. P. had to rethink its position. The resulting shift in the smaller 
organisation's emphasis, towards becoming a socialist 'think-tank' for the Labour 
movement, was particularly problematic when the Labour Party ignored its advice. 
Conflicts between Labour and the I. L. P. grew through the 1920s and came to a head 
during the 1929-31 Labour Government when the parliamentary I. L. P. came to be seen 
as a real problem for the minority Labour Government. During this period, the I. L. P. 
began to seriously consider terminating its affiliation to the Labour Party. There were 
two major reasons for such a course of action. First, the disputes within parliament, 
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where the Parliamentary Labour Party's Standing Orders prevented the I. L. P. from 
opposing the Government, began to have a widespread effect on Party activity. Second, 
with the deteriorating economic situation many within the I. L. P. felt the Party needed to 
adopt a 'new revolutionary policy', and to assert its independence from the 'gradualist' 
Labour Party. Those who focussed on this second point formed themselves into a 
'Revolutionary Policy Committee' (R. P. C. ) during 1931. At a conference in Bradford in 
July 1932, primarily because of the Standing Orders dispute, but also influenced by the 
R. P. C., the I. L. P. famously disaffiliated from the Labour Party. 
Disaffiliation had a significant effect on the Party; approximately one-third of the 
party's membership was lost, with Scotland, where the I. L. P. was particularly strong, 
worst affected. The Party was actively involved in working-class activities such as the 
Lancashire cotton strike and the national hunger march during 1932. However, as Hitler 
came to power in Germany, the Party considered it necessary to attempt to form a 
United Front with other working-class organisations. When the Labour and Co- 
operative parties refused the I. L. P. 's invitations the Party found itself working with a 
Communist Party only just moving out of its hostile Class-against-Class phase, when it 
had launched vicious attacks on the I. L. P. as a party of 'social-fascism'. 
At the same time the I. L. P. was developing its own 'new revolutionary policy', first 
through the decisions of the Party's 1933 Derby conference and then in a detailed 
statement by the N. A. C. The policy, which represented a considerable victory for the 
R. P. C., was based on a neo-syndicalist workers' councils programme. It also endorsed 
working to form a United Revolutionary Policy with the Communists and approaching 
the Comintern to enquire about the conditions for sympathetic affiliation. The R. P. C., 
increasingly dominant within the I. L. P. in London, sought to build on this success and 
the I. L. P. took a leading role in the organisation of the 1934 national hunger marches. 
However, the Committee's leadership was not dynamic enough for some C. P. - 
sympathising R. P. C. members and a Committee for Affiliation to the Comintern was 
established on the direct orders of the Communist Party. On the other hand, the 'new 
revolutionary policy' and the activities of the R. P. C. alienated large sections of the Party 
who were committed to a more parliamentary approach. These members in London, 
East Anglia and especially Lancashire formed a 'Unity Group' to oppose the R. P. C. and 
to overturn the 'new revolutionary policy'. 
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When the Unity Group failed in its bid to overturn party policy in 1934 its leadership 
decided to resign from the I. L. P. and form a new Independent Socialist Party (I. S. P. ), 
taking the majority of the Lancashire Division with them. However, despite the failure 
of the Unity Group to get the Party to accept its ethical socialist policy, the R. P. C. was 
on the retreat. R. P. C. policy including affiliation to the Comintern was firmly rejected at 
the I. L. P. 's 1934 York Conference. Then, the Comintern Affiliation Committee, its 
connection to the Communist Party quickly exposed, was wound up. Further opposition 
to the R. P. C. came from the Trotskyists who joined the I. L. P. from the Communist 
League and formed themselves into a further faction, the Marxist Group. 
By the end of 1934 it was clear the party was in some difficulty. Factional fighting 
continued and membership was still declining fast. The Party had performed below 
expectations in three by-elections, in Kilmarnock, Upton and Merthyr. During 1935, 
despite a further clarification of policy the Party's problems continued. The Party's 
youth section, the Guild of Youth, voted to affiliate to the Young Communist 
International, just as the adult party was moving away from such associations. Then the 
Abyssinian issue further divided the party. Some sought to promote workers' sanctions 
against Italy, others argued that the workers' should not take sides in 'a struggle between 
rival imperialisms' whilst a third group, centred on the R. P. C. supported the League of 
Nations, following the C. P. line after its adoption of a Popular Front line in 1935. 
However, the R. P. C. was internally split on the issue. Unable to resolve the disputes, 
and with its authority within even its London stronghold under attack, the R. P. C. voted 
to join the Communist Party in November 1935, immediately before the 1935 General 
Election. 
The I. L. P. performed well in its strongholds in the 1935 Elections, but was unable to 
make significant progress elsewhere. This electoral failure combined with the departure 
of the R. P. C. nudged the I. L. P. back towards the Labour Party. Further, despite active 
participation in the 1936 national hunger march and Unity campaign, relations with the 
Communist Party, which was after 1935 pushing a non-class based Popular Front 
policy, were also becoming increasingly tense. The Spanish Civil War saw active 
fundraising and campaigning from the I. L. P. The Party also rejected outright pacifism 
and sent a unit to fight for the Republicans. Following I. L. P. reaction to the Barcelona 
uprising there came the final break with the Communist Party which resulted from the 
bitter disputes over the conduct of the struggle. Thus, by the end of the decade the I. L. P. 
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leadership was largely committed to a return to the Labour Party. However, the 
outbreak of war saw the likely decision to rejoin the Labour Party postponed until after 
the Second World War. The I. L. P. during the 1930s had been shaped by the struggle to 
find electoral, regional, policy and organisational spaces. The decline of the I. L. P. is 
best explained with reference to the political circumstances of the 1930s and not to the 
fundamentally different political spaces available during the immediate post-war period. 
1.3 Leadership, Organisation and Finance 
Studies of the early I. L. P. have begun with an analysis of the basis of I. L. P. support 
before moving on to look at the national organisation. 30 However, there are two 
compelling reasons for reversing the order of study in the examination of the post- 
disaffiliation party. First, the surrounding political situation had changed, improved 
communication and transport and a changing party system meant a much greater 
nationalisation of politics in the 1930s than in the 1890s. Second the situation of the 
I. L. P. had fundamentally changed. As the party sought to reconstruct its membership 
and policy after disaffiliation it was not building an organisation from scratch but rather 
had the weight of a past organisational and decision making structure to contend with. 
Only by first outlining the overall national dynamics of leadership, membership, 
organisation and finance can the more nuanced local and regional battles for political 
space be understood. 
The leadership of the Party took diverse forms, at local level leadership was often 
removed from national trends and policies. Further, it was possible for those who stood 
outside the formal leadership structures of the Party to have a significant influence on 
policy. However, leadership was important. The National Administrative Council 
(N. A. C. ) had a role and responsibility which went well beyond simple administration. 31 
For example, the already wide-ranging powers of the N. A. C. to influence policy 
through control of the annual conference agenda were enhanced in 1935 when 
conferences were restructured to revolve around an N. A. C. policy statement. Thus, to 
understand the trajectory of the Party during the 1930s it is crucial to understand the 
composition of the N. A. C. 
The structure of the N. A. C. remained unchanged through the 1930s and largely based 
on the decision of the Party's 1905 conference. It consisted of chairman, secretary, 
treasurer, four national members and members from each of the nine regional 
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divisions. 2 The chairman, treasurer and national members were elected at annual 
conference. The secretary was a paid party official whilst the divisional members were 
selected at divisional conference. 33 However, especially with the turmoil caused by 
splits and factional fighting in the period 1932-5 there was a high turn over of members 
outside these regular elections. In 1932, E. F. Wise was elected as one of the national 
members, and Pat Dollan as the Scottish Division's N. A. C. representative. Both left the 
I. L. P. after disaffiliation to remain with the Labour Party. Wise was replaced on a 
national poll by C. A. Smith a London supporter of the embryonic 'new revolutionary 
policy. ' The Scottish Division at a special divisional conference selected John 
McGovern, the controversial Glasgow MP to replace Dollan. Both McGovern and 
Smith were later to act as Party chairman. Further turmoil ensued as John Paton 
resigned as General Secretary at the end of 1933 in response to the political line of the 
party. This prompted a wholesale reorganisation of the N. A. C. leadership, without 
consultation of conference, as Brockway, previously the Party chairman moved to 
become secretary and Maxton, previously one of the four national members was 
elevated to the position of chair. Protests were raised, but if the recipient of the 
chairman's post had been anyone other than the iconic leader of the Parliamentary group 
then the discontent would have been greater still. Further changes outside of conference 
were necessitated by factional resignations. Bob Edwards replaced his father-in-law 
Elijah Sandham, the Unity Group leader, as the Lancashire representative in 1934. John 
Aplin, scourge of the R. P. C., replaced Jack Gaster, the R. P. C. 's representative on the 
34 N. A. C. after he joined the Communist Party in 1935. 
In other ways there were considerable continuities on the N. A. C. over the period. The 
position of chairman was held by only two men, Fenner Brockway and James Maxton, 
who shared much in terms of political outlook. Fred Jowett, remained treasurer for the 
entire period. Members of the Parliamentary group also played a continuous role, not 
only Maxton, but also John McGovern and Campbell Stephen were continuously on the 
N. A. C. until disputes over the Munich agreement came to a head in 1939. Further, Tom 
Stephenson represented the North-East and Percy Williams represented Yorkshire from 
1932. George Johnson sat for East Anglia from 1934 and Kate Spurrell was the South- 
West representative until 1938. 
These continuities in part demonstrated failures in the representative process. Vacancies 
at divisional level were frequently uncontested even where serious policy issues were at 
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stake. 35 Women were also under-represented on the N. A. C. In the period 1932-9 only 
three women held seats on the committee: Jennie Lee as one of the national members 
from 1933-5, Kate Spurell the South-West representative for most of the decade and 
Dorothy Jewson, the East Anglia member until 1934. Such problems were particularly 
acute given the decision of the Women's National Advisory Committee to wind itself up 
shortly after disaffiliation j thereby ending the separate machinery for women's 
organisation within the I. L. P. These problems combined with the manipulation of senior 
positions in times of crisis indicate that the N. A. C. was not in any straightforward way 
reflective of the Party's membership 36 
The I. L. P. had deep financial difficulties, which dated from the levels of expenditure 
established under the Chairmanship of Clifford Allen in the mid-1920s. When middle 
class support for the I. L. P. had drifted off as the Party moved to the left in the later part 
of the decade donations had also dropped significantly. The increase in unemployment 
had also had a major impact in reducing income from affiliation fees. By the time of 
disaffiliation the financial situation was acute. The Party was making a regular loss of 
£10-£20 per week on the New Leader a figure which was only marginally reduced by 
the frequent changes of the journal's format over the decade. This short-fall was not 
covered by affiliation fees, which, according to Party sources, fell even more 
dramatically than membership. However, the monthly losses, although problematic 
paled into insignificance compared to the debts of the Party. Fred Jowett, the Treasurer, 
reported in July 1933 that the Party was insolvent and the New Leader 'hopelessly 
insolvent' with a net liability of £5,356. In such a situation the Party had looked to 
establishing new ways of collecting money. In 1933 the Party introduced the the 'Power 
for Socialism Fund' normally referred to as the Power fund, an outgrowth of the '1933 
special effort fund. ' It required the active co-operation of the branches, divisions and 
federations in collecting money for the central organisation of the party. However, even 
with the 'Power Fund' the shortfall was growing. As the Treasurer, Jowett commented 
later in the year, the 'only substantial saving possible lies in reduction of personnel. i37 
This created one set of motivations for organisational change. 
However, some of the impetus for organisation change came not from the financial 
incentive but from the new 'revolutionary' role, which the party was developing for 
itself. The R. P. C. in particular, argued that the structure of the party needed to be moved 
towards democratic centralism. Their concern was that in an emergency situation the 
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party would have no decision making structures. By 1935 the combination of political 
and financial motivation meant that the Party had restructured its organisation. 
The changes to the Party organisation had no effect on the election and makeup of the 
N. A. C.; instead the Party established a separate Executive Committee and Inner 
Executive, elected from the ranks of the Administrative Council. N. A. C. meetings were 
made less frequent and were based around an agenda and report decided upon by the 
Executive. The Inner Executive met even more frequently and was intended to make 
decisions which were meant to be of limited political importance and restricted to the 
relatively uncontroversial realm of finance, organisation and in some cases discipline. 38 
But the impact of these decisions was substantial. The Inner Executive became 
dominated by the Parliamentary Group and was used to push their own political agenda 
within the Party, most notably over Abyssinia. If the N. A. C. has been portrayed as an 
oligarch, the Inner Executive was seen by its opponents as a 'dictatorship'. 39 
However, the reforms of 1935 were promoted as primarily affecting organisation at 
branch level. A full consideration was given to the position of the party in terms of 
branches, federations and divisions. Whilst the divisions were left intact concern was 
expressed at the fact that only Scotland had a full time paid organiser. At branch level a 
new set of structures were introduced, larger branches were to establish a greater degree 
of internal organisation including sets of committees responsible for particular activities 
and they were asked to establish workplace and residential committees where possible. 
Federations were requested to increase their input into party organisation and to look for 
ways to expand co-ordination of activity. A central Industrial Organiser was established 
and each division was also expected to appoint an Industrial Committee and make 
moves towards the appointment of a divisional Industrial Organiser. 40 
The changes of central organisation and the new stress on industrial activity had a 
significant effect on party activity. However, the financial situation continued to 
deteriorate. In 1934/5 the financial deficit for the year was at the relatively low level of 
£13. However, in private the assessment of the financial situation was very negative, 
and the problems of the early 1920s with an excessive reliance on donations were still 
evident. Each year the party made a desperate appeal for funds to maintain operations. 
In 1935 the appeal was for £1,000 by the following year the amount requested had risen 
to £3,000 despite the fact that they had failed to reach their target the year before. In 
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mid-1937 the Party decided to employ John McNair on a part-time basis to work on 
trying to improve the financial position of the party especially in regard to affiliation 
fees. However, by the end of 1937 there was a further deterioration in income, and 
despite increases in Yorkshire, East Anglia and Lancashire, affiliation fees fell by £14. 
The annual conference had predicted income of £1,900 and expenditure of £2,040 but 
the budget committee was forced to concede that the actual figures were more likely to 
show a shortfall of £1,055. Thus, in order to sustain itself the party was forced to 
repeatedly borrow money from its Bilbao Fund. Indeed it was not until the outbreak of 
war that things began to turn round financially. In 1939 the party managed to reach its 
fund raising target of £1,000 for the first time. Then by the end of 1940 the treasurer 
was able to declare that Party finances could be 'considered as being very satisfactory. ' 
Indeed the accounts showed an interim surplus of £279. However, those involved in 
planning for the future of Party finance had always maintained the desire to be able to 
sustain the party on affiliation fees alone. Even in 1940 such a dream remained as far 
away as ever. It was renewed donations that made the difference whilst affiliation fees 
were well down the list of income falling far below even other sources of income from 
branches such as income from the Power Fund. 4' 
Additionally, salaries for Party officials were always low and this frequently caused 
problems. At the beginning of 1936 Brockway felt that his finances were going to force 
him to resign his post as Party secretary. 42 However, he changed his mind and withdrew 
his resignation shortly before the 1936 Keighley conference. Then the following year 
the National Union of Journalists threatened to remove Brockway's membership as he 
was not paid for editing the New Leader. The problem was solved by transferring his 
salary to the job of editor and increasing his salary on the understanding that he would 
pay the party back the increased amount. Nevertheless, there was an acute awareness of 
the low salary levels paid to party officials and as soon as the finances appeared to be 
straight the salary of the General Secretary was raised. 43 
Further to these problems, throughout the period the New Leader was making a loss of 
about £20 per week which forced the N. A. C. to advance the journal £500 per year over 
the period 1937-9. By the outbreak of war it had become necessary to seriously consider 
turning the New Leader into a monthly magazine. Frequently the editorial board was 
forced to launch appeals for funds at the expense of other more political appeals. In 
1937 the paper had to take on a new format to save £ 10 per week and the party made 
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repeated appeals to its membership to increase sales through branches. Indeed league 
tables and inter-branch competition in sales of the New Leader became a regular feature 
of the Party's paper. 44 
1.4 Membership 
The I. L. P. 's membership lies at the heart of any study of the Party, yet it remains the 
hardest element to determine with any certainty. Central issues remain the composition 
in terms of class, gender, occupation and location. Before disaffiliation some indication 
on such matters was given in conference reports. After disaffiliation, perhaps, afraid of 
revealing the scale of decline, the Party ceased publication of information such as 
branch affiliation fees and occupational breakdown of conference delegates. Only once, 
in 1937, was a Trade Union breakdown of conference delegates given. This information 
indicates a party which valued union membership but also notable is the fact that the 
largest occupational group was a middle class one, teaching. However, a comparison 
with the equivalent figures for 1931 shows that delegates from the middle-class 
occupations had declined more steeply than some skilled working-class trades. 
Trade Union/Occupational breakdown of delegates to I. L. P. conferences 1931 
and 1937: 
Occupational Category 1931 1937 
Clerks 27 8 
Woodworkers 6 
Building Trade 5 
Engineering and Metal 26 8 
Teaching 23 12 
Miners 9 8 
Printing 8 
Distributive 8 
Housewives (all Co-op members) 17 6 
Unemployed 6 
Transport 11 
Textile 6 5 
General Workers 7 
Boot and Shoe operatives 4 
Journalists 5 
Artists 4 
Doctors 3 
Labourers 4 
Ineligible for Trade Union membership 6 
Total respondents to questionnaire 134 98 
Source: Report of 1931 I. L. P. conference (I. L. P. microfilm archive 1931/24); 
New Leader, April 9 1937 
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More detailed breakdown of trends, occupational and otherwise of Party members are 
rare. Indeed, the major source of information for commentators on the social make-up 
of the 1930s Party is the impressionistic and unreliable comments of contemporaries, 
both Party members and opponents. Non-members and opponents in particular stress 
the middle-class nature of Party, especially in London. Party members, although not 
necessarily contradicting this view of the London I. L. P., emphasise the working-class 
composition of the Party outside of the capital. 45 Such partial comments often reveal 
little outside of the immediate circle in which such individuals moved and even then are 
coloured by the political point being made. Indeed, not only is there no real evidence to 
assess the social composition of the party during this period, there is considerable 
uncertainty about more basic questions. 
Crucially, there are no readily available membership figures of the party covering the 
1930s. All central estimates of party membership were based on affiliation fees paid to 
head office. 46 Over the period the party became increasingly aware that fee payment 
was not a particularly good estimate of membership, and claims of membership from 
branch and divisional sources are uniformly higher than the level of affiliation fees paid. 
By 1935 the central party organisation was becoming increasingly aware of the need to 
have a more realistic and accurate picture of what was going on at branch level within 
the party. The intended survey was never completed, but from fragmented reports it is 
possible to reconstruct approximate membership levels in a manner comparable with 
pre-existing membership estimates and further to gain some insight into how the party 
operated at divisional and local level. 47 The results show that the membership of the 
I. L. P. in the years after disaffiliation appears to have dropped sharply until 1935 and 
then continued to drop less steeply until 1939. At the outbreak of war the downward 
trend of the 1930s was overturned due to an influx of members into the party because of 
its anti-war policy and tradition. 
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Division Branches 
(post-disaffiliation) 
Branches 
(1935) 
Loss of Branches 
1932-1935 
Scotland 122 91 21 
North East 36 21 15 
Yorkshire 40 24 16 
Midlands 37 22 15 
East Anglia 8 5 3 
London and South 88 56 32 
South West 19 15 4 
Wales 28 21 7 
Lancashire 72 24 48 
Total 450 284 166 
Source: N. A. C. minutes 
Overall the losses in terms of branches were heaviest in Lancashire where the departure 
of the I. S. P. had had such a major impact. The decline in London was also troubling for 
the Party and although the departure of the R. P. C. was a factor the longer term problems 
caused by factional divisions were felt to be a more significant problem. However, there 
had been a decline in the number of branches across the whole party, no division was 
immune. The losses were least significant in the smaller divisions and particularly East 
Anglia, where the growth in the Norwich and Great Yarmouth branches more than 
offset the loss of small branches with little or no real existence. 
However, the biggest problems lay not so much in the loss of membership but in the 
loss of active membership. Surveys of branch activity in 1935 and 1938 showed that 
25 
this was a continuing problem. In 1935 only 100 of the 284 branches performed the 
three basic functions of party activity; paying fees, operating the Power Fund and 
selling the New Leader. Whilst most branches at least were involved with the selling of 
the party paper 25 branches had no real contact with head office and performed none of 
the functions. By the middle of 1938 the situation had deteriorated still further and out 
of the 220 branches only 124 had bothered to pay any affiliation fees. 49 
Clearly from such evidence it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions. However, 
tentatively it would seem that the I. L. P. 's social composition was if anything slightly 
more working-class in the 1930s than the 1920s. Losses in membership were far from 
uniform across the country, for example the East Anglian Division, despite the fall in 
branches, was able to actually increase its membership. However, the Party's problems 
in terms of membership were acute and added to the significant financial and 
organisational problems. It is against this difficult background that the study of the 
I. L. P. during the 1930s must take place. 
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2. Disaffiliation, Revolution and Standing Orders 
2.1 Introduction 
In July 1932 the Independent Labour Party (I. L. P. ) disaffiliated in the most important 
left-wing split in the history of the Labour Party. However, the characterisation of the 
I. L. P. 's motives and expectations in this decision remains ambiguous. The failures of the 
I. L. P. outside Labour have provided a cautionary tale for subsequent left-wing sections 
within the Labour Party, serving to keep them within the Party. ' Yet received wisdom, 
from participants in the events has often been shaped to serve later political needs. 
Commentators have then used this narrative to substitute caricature for proper analysis. 
As a result, the most significant reasons for the departure and decline of the I. L. P. have 
remained largely neglected. 2 
The I. L. P. 's role in the formation of the Labour Party, and the iconic status of its early 
leaders, most notably Keir Hardie, gave the smaller organisation enormous prestige 
within the wider movement. This early image showed great persistence but was 
modified as the I. L. P. provided a focus for radical and socialist thought in opposition to 
the First World War. 3 During the 1920s the I. L. P. began to define a clear strategy and 
policy of its own, formulated independently of the official Labour Party. The I. L. P. 
continued through the decade as by far the largest socialist society within the federal 
structure of the Labour Party. Moreover, in 1931 the I. L. P. claimed a membership of 
16,700, more than five times the size of the Communist Party. Many of those members 
held a loyalty to the I. L. P. beyond the wider Labour Party. The Party had a national 
organisation including its own long established journal, a central organisation spreading 
out at divisional, federation and branch levels. In certain geographical areas the I. L. P. 
even dominated the local Labour Party organisations and seemed to have the potential 
to provide the focus for a strong left-wing grouping within the larger Party. However, 
instead of constructing such a group, during 1932 the I. L. P. departed from the Labour 
Party and then tore itself apart in bitter factional disputes. By the end of the decade the 
Party occupied a fringe position on the left outside the Labour Party. 
Given the failure of both the I. L. P. and the rest of the left during the 1930s, many who 
participated in the decision of the I. L. P. to disaffiliate from the Labour Party in 1932 
came to regard it as a huge mistake. 4 Historians have tended to agree with this verdict. 
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I. L. P. disaffiliation has been characterised as 'suicide in a fit of insanity. '5 Such a verdict 
is misleading. First, 'suicide' makes overly simple connections between the Labour 
Party and the I. L. P. The larger party pushed the smaller towards its death, and must bear 
some responsibility for its fate. Thus, the suggestion of suicide provides a misleading 
explanation of ways in which decline came about. Secondly, the charge of 'insanity' 
suggests that there is no reasoned way to make sense of the disaffiliation decision. In 
reality there was more than one way in which disaffiliation made sense. Reconstructing 
these differing logics of disaffiliation allows an understanding of both the decision itself 
and of the decline of the I. L. P. because the factional fighting that decimated the Party 
after 1932 directly resulted from these divergent reasons for disaffiliation. 
2.2 A Revolutionary Break? 
The decision to end I. L. P. affiliation to the Labour Party was taken at a specially 
convened conference in Bradford on 30 July 1932. After the conference the I. L. P. 
chairman Fenner Brockway explained his understanding of the decision. He argued that 
working-class unity could only be expected behind the 'red banner of revolutionary 
Socialism, ' and thus the I. L. P. needed to break with reformism. Since the Labour Party 
was neither democratic nor socialist, this demonstrated the need for a truly independent 
I. L. P. with a new revolutionary policy. 6 A clear similarity existed between Brockway's 
position and the line which was currently being developed within the London Division 
of the I. L. P. by the self-styled 'Revolutionary Policy Committee'. The R. P. C. had been 
formed under the leadership of Dr Carl Cullen of Poplar and Jack Gaster of Marylebone 
with the intention of bringing together left-wing I. L. P. members. Initially, however, it 
had no clear policy or programme. What united its members was a general disgust with 
the second Labour Government and a commitment to 'revolutionary Marxism' as the 
way forward for the I. L. P. By January 1932 the R. P. C. had produced a tentative policy 
statement. However, the main rallying point of the R. P. C. prior to July 1932 was 
disaffiliation from the larger party. They argued that the basis for the split should be 
clearly defined as the I. L. P. 's rejection of the Labour Party's gradualist politics. 7 
The similarities between Brockway and the R. P. C. were most apparent at the Special 
Conference in Bradford where the only issue on the agenda was whether to disaffiliate 
from the Labour Party. The stage was set for a stark showdown between the Labour 
Party loyalists, led by Frank Wise, ex-civil servant and former I. L. P. MP, and Pat 
Dollan, leader of the Glasgow Labour Movement, and the disaffiliationists, including 
31 
Brockway, Cullen and Gaster. After a debate, centred on issues such as the nature of 
revolution, class and party and the historic position of the I. L. P., the disaffiliationists 
won by a vote of 241-142. At Bradford those who argued for disaffiliation stood 
together in calling for revolutionary Socialism and in their condemnation of the Labour 
Party. 8 The positions of Brockway and Gaster seemed united in their victory over the 
affiliationist position of Dollan and Wise. 
Thus Brockway and the R. P. C. used very similar 'revolutionary' language to justify the 
disaffiliation decision. This has led some to equate the positions of Brockway and the 
R. P. C. and to suggest their 'revolutionary fervour' was the primary cause of 
disaffiliation. 9 However, such an analysis places too much weight on revolutionary 
feeling as an explanatory factor. First of all there was not a united body of revolutionary 
opinion within the I. L. P. Moreover, it is necessary to note that the 'agreement' between 
Brockway and the R. P. C. in July 1932 was partly an illusion. Differing meanings lay 
behind the same rhetoric. Further, even as far as there was an overlap in viewpoints it is 
important to understand that although similar ideological positions might have been 
occupied, the trajectories by which the positions were reached were very different. It 
thus becomes problematic to assume that this overlap explains much outside the specific 
context of the Bradford Special Conference of 1932. Understanding how the ideological 
stances were reached is as important as recording what the positions were. 10 
An analysis of the Bradford Conference shows that revolutionary feeling alone cannot 
explain the disaffiliation decision. The National Administrative Council (N. A. C. ) of the 
Party supported by Brockway and the majority at the conference, defeated an R. P. C. 
motion to define the break with the Labour Party in definitely revolutionary terms. At 
the same time, the affiliationists did not seek to oppose revolutionary Socialism, rather 
they suggested that a real revolutionary policy should come from within the Labour 
Party. Indeed, following the split, the members of both the Socialist League and the 
Scottish Socialist Party (the two organisations formed to accommodate I. L. P. 
affiliationists within the Labour Party) were prepared to endorse forms of revolutionary 
Socialism. " The implication is clearly that 'revolutionary feeling' cannot, by itself, 
explain why the I. L. P. chose to disaffiliate from the Labour Party. The 'revolutionary' 
label in fact indicates very little of ideological significance within the context of the 
1930s I. L. P. 
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2.3 Rejection of Gradualism 
The widespread use of revolutionary language in the debates of 1932 was unsurprising 
given the dramatic events of the previous year. Following August 1931 gradualism, the 
supposed alternative philosophy based on an evolutionary and educational socialism 
bent on making industry more efficient, had been tainted by its association with Ramsay 
MacDonald. 12 The crisis of 1931 was as much a crisis for the Labour movement as it 
was for the national economy. During the 1920s the Labour Party built up an identity 
largely around the dominant figure of Ramsay MacDonald. In 1931 MacDonald 
deserted the Party which had idolised him. He not only became head of the National 
Government but also joined with the Conservatives and many Liberals as they 
decimated the Labour Party in the general and local elections later that year. The hero of 
Labour's rise was turned overnight into villain, so that the self-image and official history 
of the Labour Party were in need of a rapid reconstruction. 
The easy answer, taken by many Labour Party members, was to personalise failure. The 
I. L. P. believed itself to have policies more pertinent than these simplistic suggestions, to 
the necessary rethink, but its relationship with the larger body was at an all time low. 
During the term of the Second Labour Government the I. L. P. 's Parliamentary Group had 
consistently criticised the economic policy of MacDonald and his financially orthodox 
chancellor Philip Snowden. Under the leadership of James Maxton and, until his death 
in May 1930, John Wheatley, the Group argued there was an urgent need for the 
implementation of radical policies, especially on reducing unemployment and the 
treatment of the unemployed. This had brought the I. L. P. into direct conflict with the 
Labour Party in a manner that could not be side-stepped. However, the roots of the 
I. L. P. 's development of a revolutionary policy in 1932 lay earlier than its opposition to 
the 1929-31 Labour Government. 
The relationship between the Labour Party and the I. L. P. had long been problematic. 
The Labour Party had been founded as a federal organisation, but it had no clear 
mechanism for resolving disputes between its constituent parts and the central 
organisation. At times this scarcely mattered to the I. L. P., but after the First World War 
such considerations became increasingly important. The I. L. P. had opposed the War, 
which had brought it into conflict with the larger Party. Then the Labour Party's 
introduction of a `socialist goal' and individual membership in 1918 had started a small 
but steady drift of members of the I. L. P. into the Labour Party. 13 This seemed to rob the 
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I. L. P. of much of its identity and had sparked the suggestion, that the I. L. P. should wind 
itself up. 14 Those who felt closest to the Labour Party thus left the I. L. P. leading to an 
increasing proportion of the smaller party who felt frustrated with the mainstream of the 
Labour Party. This created an interesting dynamic for as the I. L. P. was moving 
gradually away from the mainstream, its former leaders such as Philip Snowden and 
MacDonald took the reins of leadership of the larger organisation. However, it was 
when Labour was in power that these tensions were most evident. 
The first Labour Government of 1924 led to a significant cooling of the relationship 
between the Labour Party and the I. L. P. There were disputes within the I. L. P as to 
whether the larger party should take office whilst not in a majority. The I. L. P. 's then 
chairman, Clifford Allen, a close friend of MacDonald, formulated the Party's position 
on this question. He argued that if the Labour Party were forced to form a minority 
Government they should make a determined effort to push through Socialist legislation. 
This would force the Liberal Party either to oppose or support the Government on the 
basis of Socialism, which would clarify political choices for the electorate. In the latter 
case socialism would be the result, although, the former case was more likely. 15 
However, the bold initiative suggested by Allen never happened and within the I. L. P. 
there was much disappointment with the 1924 Labour Government. Additionally, the 
smaller party felt vindicated because of their belief that the only real success story of the 
Government had been a member of the `left' I. L. P., John Wheatley, at the ministry of 
health. 16 
Thus, 1924 left a legacy of very real tensions between the leadership of the two 
organisations, as MacDonald communicated to Allen: 
What disturbs me most about the [I. L. P. ] is a nasty small spirit that seems to be growing up in it. I 
am constantly coming against vanity and jealousy with not a little malice. On the other hand, I am 
accused I hear of cutting myself off. Heavens, I wish they would shoulder my burdens. ... Were I 
to say that from the moment I took office to now I have not had a particle of support from the 
I. L. P. I should be unfair, but it would only be an exaggeration and not an invention. ' 
Under Allen the I. L. P. had developed the role of a Labour Party 'think tank', but the 
problems arose when the larger party rejected the proposals they produced. The idea had 
been to strengthen the Party's purpose after 1918, but the effect was to increase the 
potential for a breach between the two organisations. These problems were to grow in 
the ensuing period. Whatever their strategic disagreements Clifford Allen as chairman 
of the I. L. P. had maintained a close personal relationship with Ramsay MacDonald. '8 
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However, under the pressure of ill-health and due to protracted conflict with James 
Maxton and others on the N. A. C. Allen resigned as chairman of the I. L. P in September 
1925.19 Fred Jowett temporarily replaced him as chairman, until the Party's Whitely 
Bay conference in 1926 when James Maxton was elected chairman by a huge majority. 
The election of the charismatic left-wing leader of the Parliamentary I. L. P., represented 
a significant moment in the distancing between the I. L. P. and the Labour Party. In 
accepting the Chairmanship Maxton spelt out some of the ground which was later to 
prove important in separating the I. L. P. and the Labour Party. For Maxton the Labour 
Party, in emphasising the need for obtaining power was losing sight of what its real 
goals should be. The duty of the I. L. P. was thus to make sure that the larger party and 
the wider working-class did not lose sight of the need for socialism: 
The more the Labour Party becomes absorbed in the responsibilities of Parliamentary life and the 
more the responsibilities the Labour Party has to undertake, either as the official opposition or as 
the Government, the more will the tendency be for them to be entirely taken up with the 
immediately practicable which always creates a tendency to lose sight of the ultimate ideal. The 
I. L. P. 's duty is to keep the ultimate ideal clearly before the working-class movement of the 
country. Political success for the Labour Party is a certainty, but political success is itself a poor 
end unless, behind the Parliamentary majority, there is a determined revolutionary Socialist 
opinion. It will be part of my duty to try to make as far-reaching as possible this feeling which I 
believe is the feeling of the party. 20 
The 1926 conference also saw the adoption of the 'Socialism in Our Time' programme, 
based on Hobsonian under-consumptionist theory. This programme was in part a 
continuation of the work of Allen in terms of the preparation of a coherent, practical and 
radical policy, but it, along with the underlying Living Wage doctrine, was capable of 
more than one interpretation. Maxton argued strongly that the programme be interpreted 
in a left-wing manner as a practical and rapid strategy for socialist transformation and 
that every effort be made to implement the programme at the earliest opportunity. Thus 
under Maxton the political programme of the I. L. P. became almost entirely separate 
from that of the Labour Party. 21 
Over the following two years the potential problems between the two parties were 
exacerbated still further. First, in 1927 the I. L. P. reconsidered its official attitude 
towards MacDonald. He held the post of treasurer of the larger Party and his nomination 
for this position had traditionally come from the I. L. P. Despite the growing breach 
between them, this practice continued up to the 1927 I. L. P. annual conference. 
However, the I. L. P. chose that event to make explicit the divisions between the 
leaderships of the two parties as the delegates decided not to re-nominate him. 22 
Nevertheless, the debates within the I. L. P. revealed that Maxton did not completely 
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dominate the party because there were many I. L. P. ers who remained loyal to 
MacDonald and the Labour Party. 
In the following year tensions between the I. L. P. and the wider labour movement were 
further heightened by the Cook-Maxton manifesto and campaign. The manifesto, 
initially influenced by leading members of the Communist Party, was a joint effort 
between Maxton and the controversial miners' leader A. J. Cook. It was a denunciation 
of the politics of class collaboration that Maxton and Cook saw in both MacDonald's 
leadership of the Labour Party and the Mond-Turner talks of 1927-9, where the TUC 
and influential employers considered possibilities for industrial co-operation. The 
manifesto launch was to be accompanied by a speaking tour and campaign, but despite 
both men's oratorical reputation it was not a great success, in part perhaps because the 
strategic significance of the campaign was obscure. 23 However, the open attack on 
gradualism and the politics of the Labour movement widened the rift between the I. L. P. 
leaders and the Labour Party. It also created further problems within the I. L. P. 
Maxton had not informed the I. L. P. of his intentions with regard to the campaign, an 
omission that caused ill feeling even where the campaign's aims were not disputed. It 
was especially difficult for many to understand how Maxton could reconcile his 
chairmanship of the party with keeping the I. L. P. in the dark over the manifesto. The 
I. L. P. General Secretary John Paton, broadly a supporter of Maxton's anti-MacDonald 
line, considered resignation over the matter, but decided against when he `was satisfied 
that there was no conscious breach of Party or personal loyalty. '24 Much more aggrieved 
were those who did not share the sentiments of the manifesto and campaign. At the 
special N. A. C. meeting called to discuss the manifesto on 30 June 1928, Shinwell, Wise 
and Dollan were all hostile. Dollan moved a motion that there should be no co-operation 
with the Cook-Maxton campaign. The motion was only narrowly defeated 7-5 and in 
the end a relatively weak motion was passed, which urged support for the campaign. 
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Thus the campaign received reluctant support from most of the I. L. P. divisions. 
Significantly the Scottish Divisional Council refused to give any support. They argued 
instead that the object of increasing working-class backing for the 'Socialism in Our 
Time' programme `can best be accomplished by working through the I. L. P. and 
affiliated organisations. 26 Personal relations between some of the I. L. P. leaders were 
highly strained and the dispute left Maxton and Scottish I. L. P. chairman Dollan barely 
speaking to one another. 27 
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The manifesto and the subsequent campaign had two important effects on the 
relationship between the I. L. P. and the Labour Party. First, it widened the rift between 
the Labour Party leadership and the I. L. P. Secondly, and perhaps as importantly, it 
increased the tensions within the I. L. P., cementing the growing division between those 
whose primary loyalty was to the Labour Party leadership and those who sought to 
develop an independent role for the I. L. P. 
2.4 The Reaction to the Second Labour Government 
The potential for a rupture between the I. L. P. and the Labour Party was in place well 
before the second Labour Government, but it was during the period from 1929 to 1931 
that the split became a distinct likelihood. The 1929 election returned the Labour Party 
to parliament as the single largest party for the first time but without an overall 
majority. Superficially the I. L. P. appeared strong; the Party had sponsored 37 successful 
parliamentary candidates and a further 123 MPs were card-carrying members of the 
I. L. P. 28 However, this parliamentary group was politically very diverse, covering almost 
the entire range of opinion within the labour movement. Thus, there was considerable 
disagreement about the function of the group and its appropriate relationship to the 
I. L. P. outside parliament. 
The majority of the I. L. P. members of parliament was not active in the I. L. P., either 
inside or outside parliament, and had therefore a limited interest in the decisions of that 
body. Nevertheless, some MPs considered that they had an important political affiliation 
to the I. L. P. These members can broadly be split into two groups. On one side there 
were those such as Maxton and Wheatley, who held that their affiliation to the I. L. P. 
took precedence over their attachment to the Labour Party. On the other, those such as 
Shinwell and Salter, although having an important attachment to the I. L. P. were, 
nevertheless, 'Labour' before they were 71 p. '29 The conflict between the former group 
and the Parliamentary Labour Party was to prove the primary reason why the I. L. P. 
disaffiliated from the Labour Party. 
The criticisms of MacDonald by some I. L. P. MPs, and his stinging and often unjustified 
rebukes in reply to them had created a tense atmosphere within the I. L. P. parliamentary 
group even before the 1929 election. 30 Nevertheless, the Maxton group of MPs was not 
prepared to stem its criticism of Labour just because they were now the party of 
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Government. Their attacks began immediately with the criticism of the King's Speech 
by Wheatley and Maxton. They argued that the Labour Party was not attempting to 
carry through its election promises, suggesting as the I. L. P. had done in 1924, that a 
bold policy would bear electoral dividends. These points were amplified through the 
columns of the I. L. P. 's weekly journal the New Leader, where Brockway was editor. 
Over the course of the Government the main disagreement between this I. L. P. group 
and the Labour Party continued to be the unemployment benefits insurance system, and 
the lack of a coherent policy to eradicate unemployment. 31 Maxton was able to gain the 
backing of the I. L. P. Parliamentary group for critical amendments to the Government's 
Unemployment Insurance proposals at an initial meeting on the 21 October. But 
Maxton's idea of direct criticism was opposed by many who themselves had 
reservations about the Government. This group largely consisted of Trade Union MPs 
who regarded the I. L. P. approach as counter productive and preferred a less 
confrontational approach of 'loyal criticism'. When a further and larger meeting of the 
I. L. P. Parliamentary Group was called the following week, with about 80 MPs present, 
Maxton's position was decisively defeated by 41 to 14. During the meeting Maxton 
pointed to the sovereignty of the I. L. P. conference and refused to accept that he, or 
others, should be bound by a majority decision of the group. In keeping with this, 
neither he nor his associates refrained from trying to amend the unemployment 
legislation. However, the majority of the Parliamentary I. L. P. remained behind 
MacDonald and opposed to Maxton, with 66 I. L. P. MPs signing a pro-Government, and 
implicitly anti-Maxton, declaration of support for the Government. 32 
Neither Maxton, nor much of the I. L. P. outside parliament, agreed with the legitimacy 
of MPs who had only nominal connection with the I. L. P. should be able to block the 
implementation of I. L. P. conference decisions. At the 1929 I. L. P. conference the party 
decided that proposed candidates supported by the I. L. P. would have to give an 
undertaking that they accepted I. L. P. policy. The 1930 conference increased the 
pressure when it passed, by an overwhelming majority, a resolution instructing the 
N. A. C. `to reconstruct the I. L. P. parliamentary group on the basis of acceptance of the 
policy of the I. L. P. as laid down by decision of annual conference, and interpreted by 
the NAC, and to limit endorsements of future I. L. P. candidates to nominees who accept 
this basis. '33 Those who did not accept the official interpretation of the 'Socialism in 
Our Time' programme were no longer eligible either for membership of the I. L. P. 
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parliamentary group or for I. L. P. endorsement in future elections. Only eighteen out of 
the 160 I. L. P. MPs accepted these conditions. 34 
2.5 The Dispute Over Standing Orders 
A large majority of the Parliamentary Labour Party disagreed with the I. L. P. opposition 
to its policy. They reacted by tightening the Standing Orders that governed the conduct 
of the P. L. P. The key change was that under no circumstance were members allowed to 
vote against a decision of the Parliamentary Party, although the longstanding 
commitment to allow members to abstain on matters of conscience was maintained. 35 
Clearly this precluded the I. L. P. from tabling regular amendments to Government 
policy, and frequently voting against the Government. The reformed I. L. P. group, under 
the leadership of Maxton, was equally determined to ignore the dictates of the Standing 
Orders. 
The issue of Standing Orders has been presented by some commentators as being of 
relatively minor importance to the disaffiliation of the I. L. P. 36 Yet it is clear that to 
contemporaries within the I. L. P., especially the parliamentary I. L. P., the issue was 
fundamental. Perhaps the most concerned amongst those members was a former 
chairman of the Labour Party, the I. L. P. veteran and Labour Party N. E. C. member, Fred 
Jowett37 He argued against the requirement that MPs never vote against the Labour 
Party on the grounds that this was both impractical and unprincipled. That it was 
impractical was evident from the record of the `loyal' Labour MPs who opposed the 
I. L. P.: 126 out of the 287 Labour MPs had voted against the Government on at least one 
occasion during the Second Labour Government. 38 Indeed, as Jowett argued, the 
freedom of the I. L. P. to vote for socialist policies was a necessary part of the 
compromise that had enabled the formation of the Labour Party. 39 That it was 
unprincipled came from his understanding of the connection between the 
responsibilities of representative Government and his idea of political honesty. He 
argued that individual MPs were responsible to the men and women who elected them. 
During elections, promises would be made to the electorate and their subsequent votes 
in Parliament would show whether they were acting as promised. It was up to the MP to 
recognise that the membership of a political party would restrict the way in which they 
would be able to vote. Therefore MPs should not promise those things which were not 
part of the Party's programme, although they may suggest that they will try and see 
39 
them implemented 40 He argued that the PLP Standing Orders illegitimately interfered 
with this relationship between MP and electorate: 
[The Labour Party] insists on every one of its Parliamentary candidates signing a pledge to obey 
regulations which may penalise a member for seeking to give effect to the decisions of the Annual 
Conference of the Labour Party; may prevent him from honouring the Socialist principles he 
professes, and which may restrain him from fulfilling pledges into which he may have entered 
with his constituents even when those pledges are in conformity with Labour Party Conference 
decisions.... That is why [the I. L. P. ] cannot agree to obey the present Standing Orders of the 
Parliamentary Labour Party. The answer to those who demand it must surrender the freedom of its 
MPs to fulfil their pledges honestly made in accordance with the principles and policy advocated 
officially by the Labour Party for election purposes is - NO - NO - Never. 
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Jowett's concerns over Standing Orders were reinforced by the nature of the issues, such 
as unemployment benefit and the Means Test, on which there had been conflict. `In all 
instances the [I. L. P. Parliamentary] Group had championed working-class claims 
... surely something must 
be wrong with Standing Orders! '42 
This was not just a pedantic point about political theory, rather it affected the way in 
which the I. L. P. in parliament conducted itself. Given the strategy of the I. L. P., with its 
history of parliamentary representation, the identity of the I. L. P. was at stake. To accept 
the Standing Orders of the Labour Party would have been to present great problems in 
carrying out the wishes of the I. L. P. conferences, especially in the event of another 
Labour Government. However, the impact of the Standing Orders dispute reached much 
further than the I. L. P. MPs initially affected. The Labour Party responded to the I. L. P. 's 
decisions in 1929 and 1930 by tightening its own rules on the selection of parliamentary 
candidates and decided that in order to be officially endorsed, all prospective 
parliamentary candidates would have to make a declaration that if elected they would 
accept the standing orders of the PLP. Such conditions were unacceptable to those who 
associated themselves with the Maxton group. The issue came to a head when Tom 
Irwin was selected to fight the marginal Tory seat of East Renfrewshire. Irwin openly 
declared that he would sign the statement of loyalty required by the 1930 I. L. P. 
conference, and the Labour Party's executive responded just nine days before the by- 
election poll with a decision to refuse Irwin Labour Party endorsement. 43 The I. L. P., 
riled by the perceived injustice, made a considerable point of campaigning for Irwin 
with its leaders all making the trip up to the constituency. Their efforts had little impact 
as the Tories retained the seat. Considerable resentment on both sides flared over the 
result and such feelings were increased by the refusal of Labour Party endorsement to a 
number of other I. L. P. candidates, most notably in Chorley. There were also selection 
disputes in Clapham, Kelvingrove and Camborne. 44 
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It was events such as these that moved Standing Orders from an issue only affecting the 
I. L. P. MPs to one of real concern to I. L. P. activists around the country. Increasingly, 
I. L. P. members were prevented from taking the active role in the electoral politics of the 
Labour Party that they desired and had previously taken. The point was underlined in 
the 1931 elections where nineteen I. L. P. candidates stood, unendorsed by the official 
Labour Party. The Labour Party refused to countenance support for the I. L. P. ers in 
those nineteen seats despite the fact that some unendorsed members fought campaigns 
that were virtually indistinguishable from the mainstream of the larger Party. This 
prevented normal working relations between the activists of the two organisations in 
those areas. In the event five of the I. L. P. candidates were elected, whilst Labour Party 
representation was reduced from 287 to 46 seats. 45 Wherever the I. L. P. had a 
substantial presence the tension between the two parties was evident. 
2.6 Regional Attitudes 
By the beginning of 1932, the conflict between the I. L. P. and the Labour Party showed 
little sign of abating. Nevertheless, as the I. L. P. met in its nine divisional conferences in 
early 1932 a clear majority still preferred continued affiliation to the Labour Party. The 
debate was impassioned as six of the nine divisions, representing 80 per cent of the 
party's membership, decided that they wished to remain within the party in whose 
foundation the I. L. P. had played such a decisive role. 
The most organised opposition to disaffiliation came from Scotland, the largest and 
most important division, containing 250 branches. 6 In Scotland the I. L. P. was closer to 
the heart of Labour politics than anywhere else in Britain and dominated the movement 
in many areas. Disaffiliation would bring about ruptures in local political structures that 
would destroy the hopes for local political power and influence. These issues were most 
acute in Glasgow where the I. L. P., with the Labour Party which it dominated, held real 
hopes of obtaining a majority over the Moderates on the City Council. Their leader was 
Patrick Dollan, the Scottish representative on the I. L. P. N. A. C. His motivations for 
remaining within the Labour Party were strong and unequivocal, as were his feelings 
that those who sought to remove the smaller organisation from the Labour Party simply 
did not understand the I. L. P. 's history or strategy. As he repeatedly pointed out, the 
main calls for disaffiliation came from those areas where the I. L. P. played a relatively 
small role in Labour politics, such as London and the South West. 
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Dollan's views commanded significant support, especially as he was backed up by 
many important figures, such as Thomas Johnston, the influential editor of Forward, the 
weekly Scottish Labour newspaper, who was appointed to the cabinet in 1931. The 
division was, however, far from unanimous in its support of Dollan's position. The 
I. L. P. dissident group in parliament, although reduced to five, contained four Clydeside 
MPs: James Maxton, John McGovern, George Buchanan and David Kirkwood. 
Moreover, Maxton the most charismatic and important, was a personal opponent of 
Dollan. Maxton's politics required that he be granted the freedom of action in 
parliament denied to him by the PLP's Standing Orders. Of the remaining Scottish MPs 
who had refused to sign the PLP's documents, only David Kirkwood regarded 
disaffiliation as a step too far. Whilst Buchanan followed the lead of Maxton in 
supporting disaffiliation, McGovern had additional motivations. He had been selected 
as candidate for the Shettleston seat after the death of I. L. P. leader John Wheatley in 
May 1930 just as relations between the Labour Party and the I. L. P. were deteriorating. 
After McGovern had been selected local opponents made allegations of malpractice in 
his selection, although they accepted that no difference had been made to the end result. 
There was little indication that McGovern and his supporters had done anything outside 
of the customary practices in Glasgow Labour politics. Nevertheless, his election caused 
a serious deterioration in relations between the two organisations. With the heightened 
tensions inside the Labour Movement, and given McGovern's chequered past in the 
anarchist and far left socialist movement, his actions were brought to the attention of the 
Glasgow Borough Labour Party (BLP) and from there to the Labour Party's NEC. 47 
McGovern was declared unfit to be a Labour MP and was expelled, as were the three 
branches of the Shettleston I. L. P. who later supported him when he was opposed by an 
official Labour Party candidate in 1931.48 
The situation in Shettleston meant that an important section of the I. L. P., and one of its 
MPs already stood irretrievably outside the Labour Party during the disaffiliation 
debates. Feelings ran high during the Scottish Divisional Conference and both sides had 
much at stake. However, Dollan's views were ascendant. The conference as a whole 
voted against disaffiliation by 88-49, giving a clear message of opposition to 
disaffiliation from the largest I. L. P. division. This was reinforced by convincing 
majorities in four other divisions: Lancashire, the Northeast, Yorkshire and Wales all of 
which supported continued affiliation to the Labour Party. The Midlands Divisional 
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Conference, the only place where the Standing Orders issue was directly considered, 
voted for continued affiliation on the condition that matter was 'satisfactorily resolved. ' 
These decisions, however, did not necessarily signal a complete gulf between 
affiliationists and disaffiliationists. Both sides were highly critical of the record of the 
Labour Party, and were prepared to make declarations which claimed to recognise a 
'rapidly approaching revolutionary situation. '49 
Although the deliberations of the six divisions. showed there was a majority for 
continued affiliation, a changing mood was evolving within the Party. Never before had 
three divisions voted to leave the Labour Party. However, the reasoning in each case 
was complex, and the significance of the disaffiliation vote was different in each of the 
three divisions. Only in the relatively large London and the South division could the 
vote for disaffiliation be taken to indicate a definite desire to break with the traditional 
policy of the I. L. P. There, the key factor was the influence of the R. P. C. and the ideas of 
its leaders Cullen and Gaster. In early 1932 the R. P. C. was still a relatively loose 
organisation representing a wide spread of opinion drawing on a generation of young 
London based members who had joined the I. L. P. in the mid to late 1920s having been 
radicalised by the experiences of the General Strike. 50 Although many of the ideas of 
the R. P. C., such as the belief that capitalism was collapsing, could strike a broad 
resonance with the mainstream of the Party there were other less popular propositions. 
Most importantly the R. P. C. was committed to abandoning the Party's focus on 
Parliament and elections, preferring instead to move towards affiliation to the 
Communist International and working with the Communist Party. On the basis of a 
platform centred on its disaffiliation position but incorporating these other policies, by 
the end of 1931 the R. P. C. had gained widespread influence in London and dominated 
the Divisional Council . 
51 The decisions at the London and Southern Counties Divisional 
Conference for disaffiliation, and for working to join the Comintern thus represented 
votes for a definite rupture with the traditional position of the I. L. P., for a new 
revolutionary policy, and for the R. P. C. Nevertheless, there was still a substantial vote 
for continued affiliation to the Labour Party showing there was a considerable 
opposition to the R. P. C. even within this most revolutionary of divisions. 52 
The two other divisions that voted in favour of disaffiliation early in 1932 were the 
South West and East Anglia. It is notable that these were the two smallest divisions in 
the I. L. P. East Anglia reported only ten branches to the 1931 I. L. P. conference whilst 
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the South West had twenty-one. 53 The size of those divisions precluded their decisions 
from having the same importance as the London vote. Yet both votes had significance, 
although the meaning of the disaffiliation decisions was quite different from that in 
London. In the South West, despite the fact that the R. P. C. was less evident than in 
London, the decision to leave the larger Party was a compromise between the R. P. C. 
and more traditional I. L. P. elements. An R. P. C. member, Robert Rawlings of Taunton 
seconded the disaffiliation motion which was passed with only three dissidents. The 
conference also supported, by a smaller margin, the R. P. C. policy of leaving the Labour 
and Socialist International and joining the Comintern. 54 
The contrast with London was more acute in East Anglia, where the conference was 
dominated, as always, by the overwhelming size of the Norwich branch, whose 
membership easily exceeded that of the rest of the division put together. The Norwich 
I. L. P. had been particularly annoyed by the attitude of the Labour Party towards the 
I. L. P. over the Standing Orders issue. There was a history of I. L. P. parliamentary 
candidacies in the dual member seat in Norwich, and the Norwich I. L. P. had put 
forward Dorothy Jewson as their candidate in 1931. In the campaign Jewson had met 
with considerable hostility from the endorsed Labour Party candidate, W. R. Smith, as a 
result of her unendorsed status. Further, the Norwich Labour Party had responded to the 
crisis which led to the formation of the National Government by announcing an 
electoral truce with the Liberal and Conservative Parties in the council election of 1931. 
Such an approach was an anathema to the I. L. P. position and therefore the Norwich 
I. L. P. argued that membership of the Labour Party was obstructing progress towards 
socialism. Consequently, they proposed disaffiliation. This was passed at the divisional 
conference by a vote of 12-8.55 However, the division showed no desire to approach the 
Communist Party and the Third International. Further, whilst the division did vote for a 
`revolutionary' policy, this meant something quite different from the suggestions of the 
R. P. C. in London, being based on the 'ethical Marxism' of influential Norwich I. L. P. er 
and literary critic John Middleton Murry. These differences were further clarified after 
disaffiliation when there was considerable hostility and an eventual split between East 
Anglia and the R. P. C. 56 
A number of points are raised by the decisions of the nine divisional conferences. They 
highlight the disagreements within the Party over the correct attitude to take towards the 
Labour Party. These differences did not follow sharp divisional lines, rather each 
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division contained a significant proportion of its membership on either side. 
Nevertheless, across all divisions a large majority of the I. L. P. preferred the option of 
remaining within the Labour Party. It is also evident that this commitment to remain 
within the larger party did not seem to many to be incompatible with a revolutionary 
attitude. However, some individuals did oppose disaffiliation on the basis of their 
hostility to revolutionary politics, or alternatively on the basis of scepticism about the 
increasingly common view that capitalism was about to collapse. This suggests that the 
disaffiliation debates were not reducible simply to attitudes towards revolutionary 
policy. Rather questions of theory, tactics, parliamentary strategy and morality crosscut 
each other in a complex manner. Further evidence that this was the case was to be found 
at the 1932 annual conference in Blackpool. 
2.7 No Solution to Standing Orders 
The Standing Orders question had not only brought about the immediate dispute 
between the I. L. P. and the Labour Party but it was also the direct cause of the 
considerable ill-feeling between the two parties in important I. L. P. centres such as 
Glasgow, Liverpool, Norwich, Nelson and Bradford. The divisional conferences early 
in 1932 showed that if the issue could be settled, there was no serious chance of the 
I. L. P. voting for disaffiliation. Most members of the I. L. P., especially those who 
favoured continued affiliation, believed that it would prove easy to find a compromise 
acceptable to both sides. In reality things were significantly more complicated, so much 
so that no realistic solution to the Standing Orders problem was ever feasible. 
Extended discussions took place between the two parties through the period from 1930 
to 1932. The principal negotiators for the I. L. P., Maxton, Brockway and Paton clashed 
with successive chairmen of the PLP, first with Arthur Henderson, a long term advocate 
of 'loyalty', and then with the left-wing pacifist and ex-I. L. P. er George Lansbury. 57 The 
Labour Party NEC had established a committee whose prime task was to deal with the 
crisis with the I. L. P. Its aim was to stamp out the lack of discipline that the NEC 
considered to have hampered the work of the Parliamentary Party and to have weakened 
the Party after 1929.58 Parallels were drawn with the allegedly corrosive impact of the 
Minority Movement on the trade unions after 1926 whilst the dissident grouping of the 
I. L. P., Mosley and eventually MacDonald were brought together under the common 
anathema of 'intellectuals. ' On the other hand the I. L. P. 's primary concern was to allow 
its MPs to oppose measures that it considered to be anti-working-class. The I. L. P. 
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wanted to retain its freedom of action and the NEC wanted to take it away. Whilst the 
discussions addressed the issue of the I. L. P. 's revolutionary position, the central 
question was to whom an MP was primarily responsible: their sponsoring body, the 
Labour Party, the Labour Party Conference, the I. L. P. Conference or the electorate. 
There was no prospect of a settlement. The Labour Party would never accept a 
formulation that would allow the repeated attacks of a 'party within a party' and the 
I. L. P. would not be prepared to sign Standing Orders which prevented them from 
openly expressing their socialist convictions. No formula could be found to mask the 
differences. This was recognised immediately prior to the Blackpool conference when 
the Labour Party assistant secretary, J. S. Middleton, sent the I. L. P. General Secretary 
John Paton, a letter quoting an NEC decision to the effect that the Labour Party was not 
prepared to reconsider the Standing Orders issue. 59 By the time of the Blackpool 
conference it was indeed obvious that there could be no solution to the Standing Orders 
dispute. 
2.8 Blackpool: Postponing The Inevitable 
The divisional conferences had demonstrated a feeling that the majority of the I. L. P. 
wished to remain in the Labour Party, but they only determined the agenda for the 
annual conference. The actual decision which counted as policy was that of the I. L. P. 
annual conference, held in March 1932 in Blackpool. The N. A. C. had decided to leave 
three options open to the conference spanning the range of opinion within the Party: 
disaffiliation, unconditional affiliation or conditional affiliation. Brockway, the party 
chairman, began the debate by ensuring that all were aware of the full consequences of 
each possibility. Disaffiliation would lead to preparations being made for a new 
constitution, policy and campaign of action outside the Labour Party. Unconditional 
affiliation would mean that the I. L. P. 's parliamentary candidates would again be entitled 
to sign PLP Standing Orders. The third alternative of conditional affiliation would mean 
the I. L. P. attempting to re-open negotiations with the Labour Party N. E. C. and, if no 
solution could be found, the N. A. C. would report back to a further special conference. 
Brockway, on behalf of the N. A. C., made clear that the leadership of the I. L. P. 
considered unconditional affiliation an unacceptable option. 60 
The debate began with a statements proposing resolutions from each of the three points 
of view. Dr Cullen, the R. P. C. chairman, pushed for disaffiliation. Jim Garton of Rugby, 
the Midlands Divisional Representative on the N. A. C., argued for conditional 
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affiliation. Pat Dollan, the Glasgow power-broker, made the case for remaining within 
the Labour Party without qualifications on the constitutional issue. When Cullen 
stressed the difference in philosophy between the Labour Party and the I. L. P., the 
response from Dollan was bitter. He ridiculed the status of the R. P. C. and the London 
Revolutionaries suggesting their revolution would start from the centres of the 
disaffiliation resolution (Winchester, Truro, Westminster and Norwich). For them a 
revolution would involve taking over the cathedrals and appointing the bishops to lead 
the workers. His argument rested on the suggestion that the I. L. P. could only make a 
real difference to the working-class by working within the Labour Party. 61 Garton, 
moving conditional affiliation, had perhaps the hardest job. The correspondence 
between the ILP and the Labour Party had been presented to the delegates before the 
disaffiliation debate began. It made clear that there was no prospect of reaching a 
compromise settlement with the Labour Party. Garton, perhaps expecting a leftward 
moving Labour Party to become more receptive to the I. L. P. 's ideas, was left to simply 
express a hope that the delegates would not be moved by the letters, instead suggesting 
that the important question was whether staying in or leaving the Labour Party would 
lead to a speedier advance to Socialism. He suggested that if the Labour Party really 
was wedded to gradualism then the conditional affiliationists would be ready to go 
62 outside, but every avenue within the Labour Party must first have been explored. 
A few things were notable about the Blackpool debate. First, there was an overlap of 
attitudes between the sides in the debate, particularly over the need for the Labour Party 
to accept well-defined socialist policies. However, there were also differences between 
the affiliationists and the disaffiliationists. The former were keen to stress the 
importance of the traditional educational and democratic values of the I. L. P., whilst the 
disaffiliationists pointed to the need to develop new policies and attitudes given the 
perceived potential for a total collapse of the capitalist economic system. The arguments 
for conditional affiliation tended to closely resemble the arguments that could be used in 
favour of both affiliation and disaffiliation. Perhaps the most notable feature of the 
debate at the Blackpool conference was the number of leading figures within the I. L. P. 
who came out openly in favour of disaffiliation, many for the first time. In doing so they 
were expressing their frustration at the Labour Party and in particular the treatment of 
the Parliamentary I. L. P. A prominent example was the General Secretary, John Paton. 
He had long been opposed to disaffiliation but his negotiations with the Labour Party's 
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N. E. C., combined with the long term problems of the I. L. P., convinced him that an 
effective future for the I. L. P. could only be secured by disaffiliation. 63 
The rapidly changing attitude of I. L. P. ers towards the Labour Party following the 1931 
election meant that no one could be certain about the result of the voting. Brockway and 
Paton were hopeful that the Party would accept their disaffiliationist line, whilst Dollan 
was confident that the party would feel its future lay with the Labour Party. Voting was 
a tense affair. To the shock and disgust of some, unconditional affiliation was defeated 
by a resounding vote of 214-98. Following this the motion for immediate disaffiliation 
was defeated by a relatively small margin of 183-144. Eventually, the conference came 
to a decision in favour of conditional affiliation. By 250-53 the Blackpool conference 
voted to reopen negotiations with the Labour Party over Standing Orders. 64 
Attitudes of the two parties and the correspondence between Paton and Middleton had 
shown that the vote at Blackpool was a vote for an option that had already been closed 
off. However, the membership of the I. L. P. was reluctant to take the decisive step of 
leaving the Labour Party, the majority in the divisional conferences had shown a strong 
desire to remain in the Labour Party. Nevertheless, many of the same individuals 
resented the way in which the Labour Party had treated the Parliamentary Group of the 
I. L. P., and the refusal of the Labour Party to endorse the nominations of I. L. P. 
candidates at elections. These conflicting factors explained support for the position of 
conditional affiliation at Blackpool. But the Blackpool vote was a temporary victory for 
the politics of Micawber. Many members of the I. L. P. were hoping against hope that 
some compromise could be found that would allow their principles to be maintained 
whilst remaining within the Labour Party. Such hopes were unrealistic, as John Paton 
retrospectively explained: 'It was obvious enough, however, to those who knew the 
Labour Party's firmness on the matter in dispute that this was merely postponing the 
inevitable. 65 
2.9 Conclusion: Disaffiliation, Revolution and Standing Orders 
By the beginning of June 1932 it was evident that there was not going to be an amicable 
solution to the Standing Orders dispute. Despite the importance of the issue there was 
really very little left to be said on the matter at the Bradford Special conference in July. 
Thus, the I. L. P. had effectively decided to disaffiliate from the Labour Party in 
Blackpool, but at Bradford some tried to give the formal decision to disaffiliate a 
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revolutionary twist. Support for disaffiliation was for some based solely on 
'revolutionary policy'; for others, opposition to disaffiliation was based on an opposition 
to the same 'revolutionary policy'. Neither group, however, had a clear definition of 
exactly what a revolutionary policy actually entailed. This left a significant middle 
ground for whom the commitment to the nebulous idea of a 'revolutionary policy' was 
more unambiguous. For this group, which probably constituted a majority of the I. L. P., 
there were questions about how far the party ought to be committed to a revolutionary 
policy and there were questions about what being a revolutionary party really meant. An 
answer to these questions would still not have given the I. L. P. a ready-made position on 
its relationship to the Labour Party. As Brockway pointed out, in his Chairman's 
address, to the Blackpool conference although he desired a break with the gradualist 
policy of the Labour Party this did not necessarily imply a break with the machinery of 
the Labour Party, that was a further, tactical question. 66 
Given the subsequent prominence of the R. P. C. within the I. L. P. it is important not to 
neglect the impact that the increasingly revolutionary policy of the I. L. P. had on the 
dispute between the two parties. Further, Henderson had told Brockway that the details 
could be sorted out if the I. L. P. would commit itself to non-revolutionary methods. 67 
However, it is doubtful that such a commitment would, by itself, really have satisfied 
the Labour Party's N. E. C. Thus, it was the Standing Orders dispute that played the 
major role in the decision to disaffiliate. The divisional conferences and the Blackpool 
vote shows that the majority of the membership would rather have remained within the 
Labour Party if this issue could be resolved. Further, the support of most leading 
members of the party for disaffiliation stemmed from their belief that the dispute could 
not be settled. The clearest example of this position was the veteran Jowett, who 
supported the moves towards disaffiliation on the basis of maintaining his principles 
over Standing Orders. However, Jowett was not alone amongst the I. L. P. leadership in 
making Standing Orders the primary reason for disaffiliation. Both Brockway and 
Maxton can be placed within this camp. 
It is only by understanding the way in which these issues were contested, and 
appreciating the gulf which lay between the positions of the leadership of the I. L. P. and 
the R. P. C., that the dynamics of disaffiliation can be understood. It is true that the I. L. P. 
was seeking a new and more revolutionary outlook in 1932, but Standing Orders lay 
behind the disaffiliation decision. However, following disaffiliation the differing 
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reasons sprang to the forefront as they generated contrary expectations of the 
development for the party. Opposing factions clustered around the differing points of 
view and each was able to present a coherent account of itself in the post-disaffiliation 
" party in which all sides could gain sizeable followings. Thus, the real problem for the 
I. L. P. was not its 'insanity'; on the contrary divergent, but reasoned, arguments enable us 
to make sense of disaffiliation as a reaction to the I. L. P. 's situation in 1932. Rather part 
of its tragedy lay in the very divergence of those reasons for disaffiliation. Each implied 
a different course of action for the disaffiliated Party. When these expectations were 
dashed, factional fighting increased and ripped the party apart. To understand the 
decline of the I. L. P. it is crucial to realise that disaffiliation was not insane but appeared 
to many both justified and logical. 
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3. On the Ground: Divisional Policy, Membership and Activity 
3.1 Introduction 
The I. L. P., it is claimed, 'grew from the bottom up: 'its birthplaces were in those 
shadowy parts known as "the provinces. "" Thus, study of the early I. L. P. has 
increasingly focused on local and regional initiatives. 2 Despite centralisation as the 
I. L. P. became a national party, study of regional and branch activity also pays 
significant dividends in the examination of the I. L. P. in the period after disaffiliation. 
Nine of the sixteen members of the N. A. C. continued to be elected by the divisional 
conference. Conferences could frequently be swayed by the concerted effort of branches 
which pushed a policy hard enough. Thus, local opinion continued to be an important 
force within the I. L. P. even as the party moved, in the mid-1930s, towards a greater 
degree of democratic centralism. However, even as the policy making culture of the 
party changed in theory, in practice divisions and branches retained considerable 
autonomy. 
Indeed, for many I. L. P. members it was the local experience of the party and not 
national policy or profile which provided the primary reason for remain in, or joining, 
the I. L. P. during the 1930s. The structure of the party, which was incorporated into nine 
regional divisions with considerable political power, provided space for considerable 
influence to be exerted at a local level. The majority of this chapter is dedicated to an 
examination of the politics and activity of each of these nine divisions, with particular 
emphasis on those divisions which were nationally most important to the Party in terms 
of membership and policy, especially Scotland, London and Lancashire. 
This more localised political picture is important in developing an understanding of the 
I. L. P. as an organisation and explaining its successes and failures in exploiting available 
political spaces. However, even such a local focus, which centres on political thought 
and activity cannot capture the full depth of commitment which people frequently 
expressed to the Party. E. P. Thompson in his seminal essay 'Homage to Tom Maguire' 
speaks of the importance of those who had got socialism 'inside of themselves' within 
the early I. L. P. 3 David Howell similarly suggests the importance of 'living socialism', a 
'religion of socialism' which was gradually pushed aside by electoral politics. 4 However, 
even in the later period for many'the I. L. P. was not so much a party as a way of life. ' As 
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Barry Winter, the secretary of the Independent Labour Publications in 1993, the party 
centenary year, insisted 'they did not give up because for them the I. L. P. embodied a 
unique socialist and moral vision which they wanted to see live. i5 
Such common assessments of the Party necessitate that before studying the politics of 
the party at local and then national level the culture of the party must be considered. Yet 
with differing circumstances, the lived experience of being a party member varied 
enormously. The Hayle branch in Cornwall had nine unemployed and ailing members 
struggling against the odds to raise money for the cause making blackberry and 
elderberry wine (picking was free) and hatching a batch of 'I. L. P. chickens'. 6 In 
Glasgow exuberant party meetings, addressed by the ever-popular James Maxton, as 
much for raising members' spirits as 'making socialists', could frequently pack 3,500 
into a hall. Inevitably the culture of the I. L. P. was a much varied thing. ? 
Yet there were certain constants. Everywhere selling (or giving away) the New Leader 
appeared as a central plank of party activity. Frequently members told of how a freezing 
evening spent chalking the streets with slogans from Friday's issue of the New Leader 
could cement their relationship to the party. In 1936 the party introduced the idea of 
social and discussion groups, New Leader fellowships, centred on subscribers and 
increased emphasis on membership rather than newsagent sales saw an enthusiastic 
response to sales competitions. 8 Indeed, in the tiny fishing village of Ferryden on the 
East Coast of Scotland just outside Montrose, by 1936 under the leadership of 
councillor John West the local branch was so focused on the paper that it had ensured 
that all of the 850 strong population had a copy in their house. 9 Still the New Leader 
stressed its distance from the populist, capitalist press: 
We are not attempting to make the paper worth buying according to the standards set by capitalist 
newspapers. We shall have no bribes to offer, no competitions and prizes, no insurances, no muck- 
raking, and no so called spicy news. 1° 
Party education also remained of central importance. The Party's famous Summer 
Schools continued to be well-attended and were supplemented by further events of 
political education organised by both the national party and by divisions and local 
branches. The emphasis on education was already strong in the early 1930s. 11 Then in 
the later 1930s C. A. Smith, a teacher and an academic, sought to increase the 
educational focus of the party. 12 
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The connection to Socialist Sunday Schools, often a feature of the I. L. P. of the 1890s, 
remained in some areas through to the 1930s. So too did other, more social aspects of 
the party's existence. Clubs and party buildings remained an important focus for I. L. P. 
activity. A good social club could make a branch. This was most obvious in Norwich. 
The I. L. P. club, had been assessed in a 1910 social survey as the only place in Norwich 
'to which a man can take his wife and child and enjoy a sober glass of beer under 
respectable circumstances. '13 The club and the associated Keir Hardie Hall attracted a 
significant membership to the Norwich branch. After disaffiliation membership was 
always over 500 and in the immediate post-war period it rose to 900. In 1947 when the 
club, for apparently political reasons, severed its links with the I. L. P., the membership 
of the Norwich I. L. P. fell overnight from 700 to 9.14 However, in many ways the 
traditional focus of the party on large, independent social clubs was declining. In 
Nelson, one of the areas of greatest party strength, the I. L. P. club in Vernon Street failed 
in 1934 after years of losses, and the premises were sold to the Labour Party. The 
failure of the Nelson I. L. P. club perhaps also represented the dwindling of other I. L. P. 
traditions. The club, in contrast to Norwich refused to sell drink. Perhaps it is not a 
coincidence, that the other alcohol free political organisation in Nelson, the Liberal 
club, was also in trouble. 15 
Yet as some traditional forms of Party activity disappeared, others were maintained. 
Rambling and cycling continued to be mainstays of I. L. P. activity. As Nelson's premises 
in town disappeared, their countryside 'Clarion House', continued and even now over 
one hundred years after its foundation remains a centre for walkers and cyclists in the 
Lancashire hills. 16 Similarly the outdoors gave a focus to much of the Scottish I. L. P. 's 
activity. The Glasgow Party in the 1930s, under the leadership of Jack Taylor the 1937 
Scottish amateur cycling champion, ran a 'Cycling Corps' which cycled out every 
Saturday to sell the New Leader in the areas surrounding Glasgow. '7 Images of health 
and freedom that came from such outdoor activities also made rambling a central party 
of the social life of the I. L. P. 's youth section. Most youth camps held by the party, 
alongside the sense of unity given by the red-shirted uniform of the Guild, placed a 
heavy stress on sports and rambling. ' 8 
Holidays and outings also played an important role in I. L. P. activity. Some sections of 
the Party liked to holiday together, perhaps taking up on the regular adverts in the New 
Leader for socialist-vegetarian or food-reform guest houses. Others saw a break at the 
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sea-side as the ideal opportunity to sell the New Leader to a whole new holidaying 
audience. However, one of the real strengths of the Party was its ability to organise day- 
breaks for its members who would otherwise rarely be able to escape the hardships of 
everyday life. But, especially in the poorest working-class districts, opportunities for a 
break could be an important reason for maintaining or joining the party. Outings were 
often as simple as a visit to the zoo, but the response of some branches was more 
innovative. 19 In Glasgow the Party used the space available on the regular sewage boat 
up the river to enable members and their children to get away from Glasgow for the day 
on a regular'Sludge boat outing'. 20 
I. L. P. ers were also anxious to utilise the increasingly popular form of media. Party 
members often had a great interest in films. This gave a focus to party activity in some 
areas where the I. L. P. was instrumental in establishing Workers' Film societies and the 
New Leader regularly advertised Soviet Films. This film-going came together with an 
abiding political interest in the Soviet Union. The showing of such films could give 
members an important sense of purpose, as could the organised trips to the theatre to see 
working-class plays. 21 Alongside these more unusual events were the staples of I. L. P. 
activity: the whist drives and the socials with food and a band, the dances and dancing 
classes, the pageants. Together such a strong social basis made the Party a strong force 
in many people's lives. Such a community feeling was especially important given the 
enduring emphasis by much of the Party on an 'ethical socialism' which saw the 
necessity of creating a party which contained the core of socialism within itself. 
However, through the 1930s much of this emphasis declined. Many who stressed this 
ethical socialism were contained within the elements of the Lancashire division who 
formed the Independent Socialist Party. 22 As factional activity removed those who most 
stressed the community aspects of the I. L. P. it also removed much of the Party's 'inner 
spirit. ' Factionalism at conferences could be met with humour, as the I. L. P. 's satirists at 
the 1934 conference predicted in a mock weather forecast: 'A large number of 
disturbances have been moving North from London and the Midlands and are now 
centred over York. Further outlook - very unsettled. #23 Yet there is little doubt that 
factional divisions, expulsions and splits undermined the almost revivalist spirit of some 
I. L. P. gatherings, as demonstrated by the London Divisional Conferences of 1935 where 
social events were cancelled to make way for further discussion of policy. Thus, it is 
necessary to consider the electoral and the political as well as the cultural aspects of the 
I. L. P. at local and divisional level during the 1930s. 
57 
3.2 Local Elections 
In terms of national visibility for the I. L. P., Parliamentary representation was of crucial 
importance. However, traditionally the I. L. P. had seen its role very differently. I. L. P. 
activity had shown considerable local flexibility, and the local council and municipal 
elections were as much a focus for I. L. P. activity as parliamentary elections. This form 
of electoral activity was particularly badly affected by disaffiliation. For example, in 
Nelson, where in 1932 all of the Labour Party members on the council were I. L. P. ers, 
and where the I. L. P. branch voted by a substantial majority for disaffiliation, none of 
the councillors left the Labour Party. Even in the I. L. P. stronghold of Glasgow where 40 
of the 44 Labour councillors were I. L. P. ers, only seven could be persuaded to 
disaffilate. Overall, the Party lost one third of its membership, but it lost virtually all of 
its elected representatives. 
Whilst disaffiliation removed the vast majority of elected officials from the Party it did 
not rule out the desire to carve out a local role for the I. L. P., and municipal elections 
were central to that endeavour for many Party members. I. L. P. ers, especially of the 
older generation, discussing electoral prospects would frequently make a comparison 
between the situation of the disaffiliated I. L. P. in the 1930s facing the Labour Party 
machine at local level, and the I. L. P. in the 'early days' opposing Liberalism. The 
situation in reality was substantially different. The political space which the early I. L. P. 
managed to find for itself had largely been filled by the Labour Party. The I. L. P. ran 
vigorous campaigns at local level, based on but not limited to their national programme 
of increasing health, housing, unemployment and education spending by means of a 
municipal income tax. 24 Most voters, however, did not appear to distinguish between 
the Socialism of the I. L. P. and that of the Labour Party. Nevertheless, in some areas 
I. L. P. candidates did find success in local government elections. However, the meaning 
and significance of their success depended on the local context, and in particular on the 
relationship with the Labour Party locally. 
In a small number of cases the I. L. P. was able to take on and defeat the Labour Party in 
a contest for the majority of the working class vote even at local level. This was most 
notable in Glasgow, where the I. L. P. group on the council grew from the seven who 
disaffiliated in 1932 to a peak of 13 in 1935. By the middle of the decade the I. L. P. was 
completely dominant in local politics in some areas of Glasgow. The six local seats in 
the Shettleston constituency were all held by I. L. P. ers, as were four of the six in the 
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Bridgeton constituency. These gains, especially in the period 1932-3 were made against 
Labour Party opposition. However, after 1933 when the Labour Party, with the support 
of the I. L. P., controlled the council and in the wake of an electoral pact between the 
Moderates and the Protestant League, the two parties reached an electoral agreement. 25 
However, the I. L. P. /Labour pact only covered seats which were already held by one of 
the two parties. Where the Moderates were in control the two working-class parties still 
found themselves in opposition, frequently denying each other of victory. 26 During the 
period up to 1936, and the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War the I. L. P. was in places 
able to out-poll the Labour Party in opposition to the Moderates and to make significant 
challenges to Moderates. 27 
During 1936-7 the I. L. P. suffered a number of electoral set-backs. First, the Party's 
stand on the Spanish Civil War prompted the Catholic elites to withdraw support from 
I. L. P. candidates in the Glasgow. This was widely accepted as the explanation for the 
loss of John Heenan's previously safe I. L. P. seat in Shettleston in November 1936. 
Second, led by Joseph Payne, some of the I. L. P. councillors, to the disgust of the rest, 
launched a series of attacks on the Glasgow tramwaymen. This alienated a large section 
of the T&GWU and led to a series of serious internal disputes within the Party. 
Eventually Payne, whose outspoken criticism of the tramwaymen had led to the one 
break in the Labour/I. L. P. electoral pact in 1934, was suspended from standing as I. L. P. 
candidate for the council. With the I. L. P. weakened by the removal of a section of 
Catholic support and the internal disputes that removed some of its most well known 
council candidates, the Labour Party saw its chance to destroy the I. L. P. stronghold in 
Glasgow and withdrew from the 1934 electoral pact. The I. L. P. on Glasgow Council did 
not immediately disappear, but its ability to stand up to a Labour onslaught had been 
seriously reduced. The Party lost one seat in 1936, a further two seats in 1937 and 
another one in the final Glasgow municipal elections before the Second World War. In 
the early 1930s the I. L. P. in Glasgow had been able to present itself as a viable electoral 
alternative to the Labour Party. It managed this largely because, in its areas of greatest 
strength, it was the I. L. P. and not the Labour Party which presented the greatest 
possibility of defeating incumbent Moderate Councillors. 
In Bradford the I. L. P. 's base of support was narrower, confined to a number of wards in 
East Bradford, but the situation was in some respects comparable to Glasgow. In the 
early period after disaffiliation, despite considerable bad feeling caused by the 
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disaffiliation decision the two I. L. P. ers serving on the council chose to sit with the 
Labour Party in the hope of obtaining positions on committees. The Labour Party 
initially made no moves to oppose these I. L. P. ers in what were considered 'I. L. P. 
wards. ' However, in 1934 further disputes arose surrounding the question of whether the 
Labour Party would oppose Jowett in the 1935 election. This resulted in the I. L. P. 
launching an attack on the Labour Party in a leaflet 'Workers' Rights v. Party Dictators'. 
The Labour Party used this to justify reopening the assault on I. L. P. As leading 
Bradford Labour personality, and former MP, William Leach put it 'the I. L. P. as we 
know it today is a brand-new party with no claim whatever to the forty-year-old name it 
bears. i28 As a result of this increased tension the Labour Party opposed the I. L. P. in the 
East Bowling municipal elections, yet the I. L. P. held off the challenge of the 
Conservatives by 400 votes with Labour coming bottom of the poll. 29 
This result, showed the difficulties for the Labour Party in contesting 'I. L. P. wards. ' In 
the ensuing period the I. L. P. attempted to negotiate a electoral pact with the Labour 
Party for both Parliamentary and municipal elections. The Labour Party refused on both 
counts, but from 1935-7 made no attempt to oppose the I. L. P. candidates in 'I. L. P. 
wards' which allowed the Party to increase its representation on the council to four. 30 
The I. L. P. maintained this level of representation until the war. However, the Labour 
Party continued to refuse I. L. P. requests for an electoral agreement and in 1938 moved 
to oppose the I. L. P. in the Tong ward . 
31 The I. L. P. thus ran a further seven candidates in 
addition to its sole realistic electoral chance in Tong Ward. Despite the discontent 
within the Labour Party at the decision to oppose the I. L. P. the smaller party polled 
badly everywhere apart from Tong. Nevertheless, in that 'I. L. P. ward' the I. L. P. polled 
well, although the split cost the I. L. P. the chance to win the seat from the Conservatives, 
who retained the seat with 1,518 votes against I. L. P. er G. E. Wilson with 1,129 and 
Labour 748 votes. 32 In Bradford, as in Glasgow the I. L. P. retained vitality as an 
electoral force, which the Labour Party found difficult to destroy. 
Outside of the small number of areas where the I. L. P. had a very strong electoral 
tradition the smaller Party's electoral opportunities were even more dependent on the 
Labour Party. For example in Derby, where the I. L. P. had maintained a group of three 
councillors following disaffiliation, the prospects for continued electoral success were 
almost completely dependent on the Labour Party, two of the I. L. P. group lost their 
seats as soon as opposed by the larger organisation. Of the original group only Tom 
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Markland of the NUR seemed to have sufficient support in his ward to fend off a 
Labour Party assault, although he never had to face the challenge. 33 The group was 
bolstered when Harry Cheshire, who had been elected as a Labour candidate joined the 
I. L. P. group in 1934, after being expelled from the larger organisation for working with 
the I. L. P 34 Thus, whilst the I. L. P. could maintain a group on the council its 
maintenance was heavily dependent on the lenient attitude of the Labour Party. 
Similarly, the fortunes of the I. L. P. in Norwich depended on a complex and changing 
relationship with the Labour Party. Initially relations between the I. L. P. and Labour in 
Norwich were extremely hostile. The two parties opposed each other in four wards in 
the 1932 municipal elections with the intervention letting in the Liberals in Catton 
ward 35 The smaller party was initially unrepentant, with Alf Nicholls the defeated 
I. L. P. candidate in that ward arguing that: 
He was pleased he had been the instrument by which the Labour candidate was kept out in the 
Catton ward... [as] he preferred to see a successful Anti-Socialist who in a straightforward fashion 
declared his position... rather than the underhand tactics of the Labour Party locally and 
nationally. 36 
However, after the initial acrimony the two parties came to a working arrangement for 
conflicting candidatures to be avoided. In 1933 the smaller party won two seats, and the 
combined forces of the I. L. P. and Labour Party were sufficient to take control of the 
Council. The smaller organisation added council members in each of the following two 
years with the co-operation of the Labour Party as part of an attempt to develop the 'best 
possible working relations'. These cordial relations with the Labour Party continued 
right up until the war. 37 However, there were important differences between the 
situations in Derby and Norwich. In Derby the I. L. P. 's strength on the council depended 
largely on the personality of Tom Markland, his ward Labour Party arguing 'that 75 per 
cent of the people who vote were not interested in the I. L. P., but... would vote 
Markland as a working-class candidate. ' In Norwich the I. L. P. vote, especially in the 
Catton Ward where by the end of the decade all three councillors were I. L. P. ers, was 
much less dependent on personality. Instead it reflected the considerable local activity 
in the ward where the I. L. P. had a considerable following and the Labour Party had no 
ward organisation at all. 
In Glasgow, Norwich and Derby the Labour Party was engaged in a delicate and 
ongoing battle with the more conservative elements for control of the council. In other 
places such concerns were irrelevant, either because the Labour Party was completely 
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dominant or because it had no significant presence at all. The I. L. P. could find 
something of a niche in either situation. The former case existed in Merthyr, in 1935 for 
example Labour held 22 of the 34 council seats, with only six 'independents' 
representing the more conservative elements within the town. Here, as in the 1935 
General Election the I. L. P. could oppose the Labour Party without serious fears of 
handing power to the 'independents'. Within the town the I. L. P. managed to build up an 
electoral base in the Plymouth Ward, a by-election victory in 1934 adding to the 1932 
and 1933 municipal election successes to give the party three of its four councillors, a 
level which they maintained until the outbreak of the Second World War. 38 However, of 
equal significance was the way in which the Party built up significant opposition to 
leading Labour figures elsewhere in Merthyr, for example in 1933 they came within 89 
votes of defeating the retiring Labour Candidate, a former mayor with twenty-five years 
of experience as a Councillor. 39 The absence of a significant right-wing challenge to the 
Labour Party left the I. L. P. freer to build up its own political space in the district. 40 
At the other extreme the I. L. P. could also make progress in areas where the Labour 
Party had virtually no electoral influence. In some such places the I. L. P. could advance 
by presenting itself as the party of working class interests, as in the Maxton's family 
home of Barrhead, where it was the I. L. P. not the Labour Party which began and 
maintained the process of winning representation on the council during the 1930s. 
However, more usually, if the I. L. P. played an active role at all in these 'backward' 
places it was in tandem with the Labour Party. In such places any electoral competition 
between the two parties claiming to represent working class interests could be extremely 
damaging. For example in Great Yarmouth competition and acrimonious relations 
between the I. L. P. and the Labour Party split the vote and prevented the first Labour 
gains in the town . 
41 By repairing the relations and developing an electoral pact between 
the two parties both parties were able to maintain a substantial electoral presence. 
Indeed, by the end of the Second World War the I. L. P. group on the council numbered 
seven, and combined with a Labour Party group of fifteen was nearly sufficient to gain a 
42 majority in the council. 
In diverse ways the I. L. P. during the 1930s managed in some areas to build up its 
electoral base at local level. As in the early days of the party some Party members found 
opportunities to find political spaces in which to operate and to rise to positions of local 
prominence. However, the difficulties the party faced were substantial. First, nowhere 
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outside Glasgow did the I. L. P. manage to transform this local influence into the credible 
prospect of a parliamentary seat. The 1935 elections showed that such a transformation 
would be nearly impossible without some level of support from the Labour Party, but 
even when the Labour Party locally was amenable to such a relationship, as in Norwich 
after 1935, the Labour Party nationally refused to countenance such arrangements, 
threatening to disaffiliate the Norwich Party if it followed this course of action. The 
increasing nationalisation of politics made it extremely difficult to capitalise on local 
election success. Second, and perhaps more significant was that the instances of I. L. P. 
electoral success were few and far between. It normally proved impossible to transform 
areas with significant levels of Party activism into wards which would vote for an I. L. P. 
candidate. These two problems combined meant that whilst the I. L. P. could firmly 
establish itself in some wards for a limited period of time, in the longer run they were 
always vulnerable to a strong Labour Party challenge during moments of weakness. 
Once dislodged, and especially if defeated by a Labour Candidate, it was virtually 
impossible to re-establish a ward as an 'I. L. P. seat. ' 
3.3 Scotland: Policy 
During the immediate period after disaffiliation the Scottish Division was relatively 
unaffected by the serious debates over the new revolutionary policy of the I. L. P. that 
occurred in other divisions. In part this was because important elements within the 
division placed limited emphasis on the new policy and effectively ignored it in their 
operation and propaganda. Indeed, towards the end of 1934 the I. L. P. 's Executive 
Committee had to organise a meeting to discuss and encourage the implementation of 
the new policy in Scotland. 43 However, the main question that divided the I. L. P. 
nationally, working with the Communist Party, also divided the Scottish I. L. P. 
The Scottish Divisional Conference of 1934 firmly opposed the activities of the 
Revolutionary Policy Committee, and was largely uninterested in questions of 
International Affiliation in the immediate period after disaffiliation. The Conference, 
however, voted to maintain and extend the United Front, despite problems of operating 
it in a number of areas. 44 The Scottish Divisional Council (SDC) and James Carmichael, 
its Chairman, were opposed to working in a systematic way with the Communist Party 
and in this they were joined by Jennie Lee, who argued that the United Front had done 
'infinitely more harm than disaffiliation' in the mining areas of Scotland, pointing in 
particular to the dual unionism in Fife which 'allowed the C. P. to use United Front 
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speakers to draw I. L. P. ers into the C. P. unions. ' However, the Scottish N. A. C. 
representative, John McGovern, previously and subsequently a strong opponent of the 
Communist Party, was in favour of continued work with the Communist Party. 
McGovern's active participation in the local Unemployed March movement had by June 
1933, at least in the short term, rather changed his attitude towards the Communists as 
he argued that the Communist Party and the N. U. W. M. were playing 'a straight game. '45 
None of the factions; Unity Group, R. P. C. or Trotskyist, was able to gain a significant 
foothold in the Scottish division. 46 Despite their lack of membership the factions were 
nevertheless vocal at divisional conferences. At the 1934 and '35 Scottish Divisional 
Conferences the debate was influenced by substantial elements from both the R. P. C. 
and the Trotskyists. For both groups international affiliation was the key question. 
However, R. P. C. and Trotskyist amendments, despite taking up a significant proportion 
of the agenda received relatively little support. The 1935 Conference reaffirmed by a 
vote of 67 to 14 the need for continued co-operation with the Left Socialist Parties and 
this line on International affiliation was maintained through the decade. In 1937, despite 
widespread objections to the criticism of the Soviet Union, the Division also voted for 
an independent commission to assess the Moscow Trials. As the Second World War 
approached some concern was expressed about the role of the Parliamentary Group of 
the Party. This was centred on their conduct in support of Chamberlain's Munich 
agreement and a reference back b their activity was moved at the 1939 Divisional 
Conference only to be defeated 64 votes to 12. However, in 1935 when the MPs had 
caused outrage in much of the rest of the Party with their declarations refusing to take 
sides against the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, the Scottish I. L. P. scarcely even found 
the matter worthy of discussion. The role of the MPs and their iconic status was an 
important factor within the Scottish Division. 
However, the most important issue which was raised at every conference in the latter 
half of the 1930s and increasingly came to dominate proceedings was the relationship 
between the I. L. P. and the Labour Party. In 1935, Bridgeton proposed a resolution, that 
the I. L. P. could not afford to completely isolate itself from the Labour Party whilst, a 
proposal from Barrhead suggesting electoral pacts with the Labour Party was only 
defeated by 39 votes to 28. The conference also accepted, by a close vote, the need for 
I. L. P. members of the Co-op to pursue a common line of action with each other. 47 
However, from 1936-9 the conference rejected moves for closer co-operation with the 
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Labour Party by large majorities. Thus, in 1936 the Scottish Divisional Conference 
accepted John Heenan's argument: 
Recent experiences have shown us that the [Labour Party] machine has become more refined in its 
detestation of the I. L. P. The I. L. P. has for its genesis a united working class, and the I. L. P. has 
striven for a united working class, but the I. L. P. cannot consider merging itself in the Labour 
Party, since that Party's tendencies are diametrically opposed to what the I. L. P. exists to fight, 
namely, class collaboration. 48 
Nevertheless both Heenan and the Conference, in preparation for the Unity Campaign 
made clear that they were prepared to co-operate with all sections of the working-class 
movement. An amendment from Falkirk for reaffiliation was defeated with only three 
voting for it. The issue arose again at the following Divisional Conference when in the 
debate on the Unity Campaign, Govanhill moved that the Party rejoin Labour with a 
speech which included a vicious attack on the leadership of the I. L. P. who, it was 
claimed, were undemocratically forcing a united front on the party. This, it was 
suggested, smacked of fascism 'with Maxton playing the part of Hitler and Fenner 
Brockway of Goebbels, and the N. A. C. as "yes men". ' The motion was decisively 
rejected and was countered by an equally unpopular resolution from the other extreme 
from David Gibson's Alexandria branch that the Party should not even co-operate with 
the Unity campaign. The issue of re-affiliation was again on the agenda at the 1938 
Scottish Divisional Conference when Mosspark moved for an immediate approach for 
re-affiliation to the Labour Party on condition that 'our organisation, our platform and 
the right to publish our independent literature be maintained. ' Again the conference was 
strongly opposed to any such moves and the motion was defeated by 88 votes to 6. 
Indeed it was only in January 1939 as the rest of the Party was deciding, albeit 
somewhat reluctantly, for re-affiliation, that the Scottish Division showed any real 
support for renewing links with the Labour Party. A motion for re-affiliation obtained 
18 votes, including those of I. L. P. MPs Stephen and McGovern. Support for affiliation 
on the condition that the party retained freedom of action received a further 11. 
However, unlike the majority of the rest of the Party, the Scottish Division, remained 
firmly against and the motion proposing the maintenance of independence won a 
comfortable majority with 60 votes. 49 Despite the lack of commitment from the Scottish 
I. L. P. for the new revolutionary policy of the I. L. P. the Division was, more than 
anywhere else in the country opposed to considering rejoining the Labour Party. 
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3.4 Scotland: Activity 
Prior to disaffiliation the I. L. P. had been the central element in the Labour Party in 
many areas of Scotland. Consequently disaffiliation had a substantially larger impact on 
the Labour Party there than anywhere else. 50 However, the Scottish I. L. P. was worse hit 
by disaffiliation than the Labour Party, losing 128 of its 250 branches. 51 As Katherine 
Glasier commented the I. L. P. split had 'worked a temporary havoc' in the Labour 
Movement in areas of Scotland 'separating even families with the futile bitterness of its 
"Wee Free" self-righteousness. '52 The Party found it increasingly difficult to compete 
with the Labour Party for political power. Despite holding rallies and major 
membership drives in July 1937, February 1938 and June 1939 the party gradually lost 
support, especially away from its Glasgow base. 53 Nevertheless, following disaffiliation 
the Scottish Division remained, in terms of membership and branches, the most 
important I. L. P. division. 
Glasgow and Clydeside had always been the centre of the I. L. P. 's Scottish operations. 
The impact of disaffiliation was to further enhance the dominance of the area, as some 
other areas of I. L. P. significance were massively reduced. In particular the largest and 
most important I. L. P. branches in Edinburgh voted for continued affiliation to the 
Labour Party. 54 Throughout the decade the 'I. L. P. managed to keep a very high profile 
within Glasgow politics which allowed the party to present itself in many ways as a 
viable alternative to the Labour Party. In part this was because from October 1931 the 
I. L. P. had more Glasgow MPs than the Labour Party. However, I. L. P. activity in 
municipal politics was also important. Throughout the decade the Party maintained a 
sizeable group on Glasgow Council, rising from seven in 1932 to a peak of fourteen 
after a by-election in 1936. 
On Glasgow Council in the period from disaffiliation to November 1933, despite 
electoral opposition, the I. L. P. and the Labour Party had a perhaps surprisingly close 
relationship, standing together in opposition to the Moderates. After the 1933 Municipal 
elections, Labour and the I. L. P. combined were able to command a majority on the City 
Council, and those within both parties who felt they should be working together on the 
council were in a majority. The smaller party warmly welcomed the result and pledged 
general support for the Labour Party. Indeed, the Labour Party relied on the I. L. P. for its 
majority until the outbreak of the Second World War. 
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However, within the I. L. P. there was also a strong group opposed to this co-operation, 
who felt the I. L. P. should stand in clear opposition to the Labour Group. Some of this 
feeling had been evident before November 1933, when I. L. P. Councillor Dr Simon 
Bennett had joined with John McGovern in repeatedly alleging corruption within the 
Labour Group on the Council. 55 After, the Labour Party came to power the feeling of 
opposition between Labour and I. L. P. on the council grew. In declaring their support for 
the Labour Party ruling group the I. L. P. had retained the right to oppose them when 
they believed working class interests to be at stake. 56 By the end of the decade the two 
parties were in fierce opposition which on occasion threatened to spill out into violence 
in the council chamber. 57 
The smaller group relished the major occasions, which would allow them to point out 
the deviance of the Labour leadership from 'socialist principles. ' Disputes arose over the 
level of relief scale for able-bodied unemployed, over the conditions prevailing at 
working camps for the unemployed, over the failure to use co-operative workers for 
council projects, over the wage levels to be paid to council workers, over the accession 
to the throne and the Coronation, and over the League of Nations. 58 The accusation, as 
at the coronation, was that Labour's Council leader, Patrick Dollan, was playing games 
of electoral politics at the expense of socialism: 
Dollan may be convinced that his way of working at a time of manufactured hysteria has big 
electoral advantages. He may even be right. One thing we do know is that he is not making 
Socialists s9 
In 1938 Dollan was appointed the first Catholic Lord Provost of Glasgow, but with the 
increasing power of the 'Labour fixer' so came increased I. L. P. hostility. They launched 
increasingly personal assaults on him arguing that he suffered from 'a temperamental 
weakness of exhibitionism which shows itself in a desire to appear before as many 
audiences as possible and display himself in the regalia of pomp and influence. ' Indeed 
the I. L. P. group suggested that the Dollan's running of the Glasgow Council could 
largely be explained as the actions of a frustrated megalomaniac: 
The Lord Provost has been engaged so much recently in appearing cap in hand before the powers 
that be in London that he has had little opportunity for exercising his own power impulse. So like 
the man who must obey outside his home and then acts like a tyrant to his own family; P. J. Dollan 
compensates himself for his servility in London by trying to use the mailed fist when dealing with 
the members of the Council over which he presides 60 
With this growing enmity between Labour and I. L. P. the smaller party pushed its own 
agenda. The Scottish Divisional Conferences forbade Party members from accepting 
positions as magistrates or convenors unless there was an I. L. P. majority on the 
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Council. 61 With this avenue of influence closed the I. L. P. was reliant on winning 
support for its proposals in the Council chamber. In order to be successful in this 
context the I. L. P. had to either win the support of the Labour leadership, of a significant 
number of dissident Labour Councillors or gain the support of the Moderates. 
On occasion the I. L. P. did succeed in getting the support of the Labour Leadership for 
its proposals. Thus, the Labour leadership and hence the council voted for a municipal 
bread supply, to reassess the role of Palacerigg work colony, for the recognition of the 
N. U. W. M., for the occasional free use of public baths, for the building of a new hospital 
and for detaching Officer Training and Cadet Corps from High Schools. 62 However, 
such moments of influence on the Labour leadership were extremely rare. 
The I. L. P. could more readily obtain the support of Labour Councillors for procedural 
points. For example, after Dollan had used Council regulations to prevent instructions to 
keep council rents low being passed from the Council to the housing committee, the 
I. L. P. launched a vigorous protest. Dollan achieved the expulsion of David Gibson and 
William Park, the two leaders of the I. L. P. protest, but the smaller party was able to get 
considerable sympathy for its right to mount the protests against what the I. L. P. termed 
Dollan's 'dictatorial methods', and the second expulsion was only carried by 21 votes to 
20 with 90 members present. However, the I. L. P. was only occasionally able to obtain 
the support of even a small number of 'renegade' Labour Councillors for its positive 
proposals. For example, they persuaded six Labour councillors to vote for increased 
unemployment allowances during the winter of 1935 
The I. L. P. 's other option, working with the Moderates, was even more problematic. 
There was virtually no shared political ground between the Moderates and the I. L. P. 
They could only vote together to oppose the Labour Party, as in 1937 when they 
famously combined to remove Dollan from his post as Treasurer. 63 However, the 
'success', of as Labour termed it, an 'unholy alliance' was easily used by the larger group 
to portray the I. L. P. as working in the Moderates interests. 
The I. L. P. 's chances of implementing its own legislative programme were thus 
extremely limited and the Party was largely restricted to blocking some of what it saw 
as the more 'reactionary' aspects of Labour policies. These tactics were most 
dramatically seen in November 1936. Then the I. L. P. opposition to new police powers 
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designed to prevent sectarian activity brought a series of Press articles declaring the ILP 
group to be 'obstructionists' and labelling them 'ace talkers' and the 'go slow group'. The 
I. L. P. objected because they felt that the measures against bands, flags and emblems 
could be used against working class organisation as well as sectarian groups. The 
Labour Party and Moderates combined to suspend standing orders to prevent the protest 
so the I. L. P. resorted to moving line by line amendments on every item. This tactic, 
which the Labour Party had at times used against the Moderates, took the council sitting 
into a second day and it was only after four hours of further debate that the group 
decided to suspend its disruption claiming it had demonstrated that the majority 'could 
i6a not expect to ride rough-shod over small but constitutionally elected minorities. 
Thus, over the decade the I. L. P. was able to see only a small number of its proposals 
passed through the Council, with most of its suggestions defeated by the Labour 
leadership. Even when the smaller party did succeed in passing proposals against the 
Labour leadership the larger party was able to suggest that this was because the I. L. P. 
was effectively engaging in an anti-Labour alliance with the Moderates. 65 This 
weakness on the council was a substantial problem for the I. L. P. in presenting itself as a 
viable opposition to the Labour Party. However, to this the I. L. P. added further self- 
made problems. 
First, the I. L. P. was divided over the position it should take in exercising political power 
without a majority. Divisional conference decisions in 1932 and again in 1937 forbade 
I. L. P. councillors from accepting positions of authority without a majority on the 
council. However, whilst most councillors were prepared to accept the dangers of taking 
positions of authority whilst in a minority, it was more difficult for them to accept a 
Labour controlled authority as hostile. Thus, when the I. L. P. Group on Glasgow 
Council, following the I. L. P. 's conference decisions, decided not to accept any positions 
of authority, it cost them two Councillors, Alex Munroe and Kate Beaton. 66 
However, even more serious for the Party's presentation of itself as a viable opposition 
to the Labour Party in Glasgow, was the bitter factionalism within the Council group 
which lasted from disaffiliation to 1938. The two groups represented a power struggle 
between two different parts of the Party's Scottish structure. One group led by Joseph B. 
Payne, held positions in the Glasgow Federation. The other, largely younger members, 
69 
including Tom Taylor, held positions on the executive of the Scottish Divisional 
Council. 
The Executive of the SDC regarded the Management Committee of the Glasgow 
Federation (MC) with disdain, and considered that they were incompetent and seriously 
mismanaging the Glasgow I. L. P. As James Carmichael, Secretary of Scottish Divisional 
Council, wrote to Tom Murry, the secretary of Glasgow Federation of the I. L. P. about 
their activity 'while we are trying to build a Socialist Movement with a revolutionary 
purpose we tend to leave the impression that we are village pump parish scale 
protectors. ' 67 This situation was combined with a further set of problems connected 
with a leading member of the MC, Councillor J. B. Payne. 68 It was suggested by those 
opposed to Payne, that he was not working according to a 'consciously revolutionary' 
socialist programme. However, in practice the dispute was about the day to day running 
and control of the Glasgow I. L. P. 
Payne had become almost obsessed with the minutiae of the Tramways system and in 
particular the conduct of the tramwaymen. As far as the Scottish Divisional Council 
were concerned his attacks on the tramwaymen were in no way connected with a 
socialist purpose and a number of its members including fellow Councillor Tom Taylor 
launched a series of public attacks on Payne. Indeed, much to the amusement of the 
other parties the disputes were often played out inside Glasgow's Council Chamber. 
Under successive Chairmen of the Council group first one and then the other faction 
had been in control. In 1937 the situation reached new heights when Payne decided to 
take Taylor to court. The SDC responded by launching an investigation into the affairs 
of Payne and the MC. However, the Management Committee did not take kindly to 
being investigated and systematically blocked the SDC attempts to gather information. 69 
By August 1936 the situation had become so strained, and the SDC investigation so 
bogged down, that John McGovern drew it to the attention of the N. A. C. 7° When the 
situation continued to drag on through 1937 the N. A. C. was forced to take over and 
launch its own investigation. The inquiry found that the dispute was mainly due to 
clashing personalities. In so far as there were policy differences it was because the SDC 
took a more 'consciously revolutionary' view while the MC concentrated on 'the 
immediate grievances of the working class'. They declared that the situation required the 
federation to recognise the supervisory rights of the SDC. The N. A. C. laid the main 
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blame on the Management Committee, declaring that 'The federation has done useful 
routine work but during the past two years meetings held under its auspices have often 
been a hindrance rather than a help to the party. ' It was decided that the Scottish I. L. P. 
was in need of a wholesale reorganisation. The main positions in the SDC went to non- 
Glasgow figures, the leading protagonists, Payne, Taylor and Carmichael were removed 
from official positions and Payne was barred from holding public office for the party for 
a year. 7' 
During the dispute the Labour Party made the most of the situation. The Daily Herald 
lost no opportunity to highlight the problems and to report that Glasgow I. L. P. members 
were thinking of rejoining the Labour Party. Whilst there was no mass defection, the 
problems continued. For example, against the recommendations of the enquiry, Payne 
did stand in the 1937 municipal elections. Although unsupported by the Cowcaddens 
branch and most of the rest of the Glasgow I. L. P., to their annoyance his candidature 
accidentally appeared in the New Leader. 72 There can be little doubt that the situation 
was highly damaging for the Glasgow I. L. P. reducing their efficiency on the council, in 
electoral terms, especially in the Cowcaddens ward and in terms of their relationship 
with the unions especially the Transport Workers. Such high profile disputes also 
affected the party's ability to be seen as a united revolutionary force capable of 
challenging both Labour and the Communist Party in Glasgow. 
However, the limitations of the I. L. P. in municipal politics also reflected a renewed 
focus on non-electoral politics. Throughout the period from 1932-9 the I. L. P. was 
particularly active in the organisation of demonstrations and rallies in Glasgow. In the 
early part of the decade, the organised protests focussed on unemployment. The I. L. P. 
was active in the organisation of the 1934 Hunger March in Glasgow. 73 The Party was 
also active across Glasgow and the West of Scotland in the organisation of other 
unemployed activities such as setting up united action and agitation against the 
Unemployment Relief Cuts. 74 
Later in the 1930s the main subject of protest moved from unemployment to Spain and 
especially in the early period of Civil War the I. L. P. was active in raising money and 
organising marches in Glasgow to assist in the struggle. 75 In addition to these more 
focussed protests the I. L. P. also participated in the organisation of May Day 
celebrations. During the early part of the decade the I. L. P., together with the 
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Communist Party, attempted to organise separate 'Socialist May Day' celebrations. 76 
However, by 1937 the parties were co-operating in a joint May Day demonstration with 
all working class organisations which it was claimed was the 'largest in Glasgow since 
the war. '77 The 1937 campaign also emphasised that even in Glasgow the I. L. P. 's 
position was being eroded and the Communist Party appeared to be gaining some 
ground, as Forward noted that for perhaps the first time at a joint event in Glasgow, the 
Communist Party presence seemed stronger than the I. L. P's. 78 
The I. L. P. in Glasgow was also an important focus throughout the period for those who 
were engaged in disputes with the official Labour movement. Thus, in December 1936 
the unofficial dispute of the Glasgow Corporation Bus workers led the strikers to turn to 
the I. L. P. for support. 79 Then, early in the following year, many of the men who had 
been involved in that unofficial action decided because of their dissatisfaction with their 
union to form a new Transport and Allied Workers' Union in Glasgow based on workers 
within the Glasgow Corporation. Shortly after the formation the secretary of this new 
organisation approached the Glasgow Federation of the I. L. P. for assistance. However, 
the District Council of the T&G. W. U. also approached the I. L. P. 's Glasgow Federation 
to try to ensure that they did not give support to the breakaway group and after 
consideration the I. L. P. decided as a matter of principle not to support union 
8° breakaways. 
The I. L. P. was also involved in supporting the Beardmore Parkhead Forge workers in 
1937 over pay and conditions. The strikers made an appeal to the Party for four specific 
types of help: to make the facts of the strike known, to provide halls and committee 
rooms for the strikers, for financial support and finally for help to win official trade 
union support. As the strike committee acknowledged the I. L. P. played its role as 
requested placing the I. L. P. in a favourable position in the eyes of the men when there 
were further disputes at the outbreak of war. Indeed when Parkhead AEU called all 
political organisation to a conference to discuss the formation of a Vigilance Committee 
on the Emergency Powers Act just after the declaration of war they chose to meet at the 
I. L. P. Carling Place. 81 
The I. L. P. thus retained an important place within the Glasgow Labour Movement 
through the period after disaffiliation. However, it would be extremely misleading to 
suggest that within Scotland the I. L. P. was only relevant on Clydeside. Indeed in some 
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other areas of Scotland the I. L. P. found it was able to consolidate or even improve its 
position. The focus for the non-Glasgow I. L. P. was Renfrewshire, Ayrshire and 
Lanarkshire. For example in Maxton's birthplace, Barrhead, the I. L. P. maintained an 
important presence in the labour movement. The council was dominated by Moderates 
and in the first half of the 1930s there was no representation from the working-class 
parties on the council at all. In the second half of the decade it was the I. L. P. and not the 
Labour Party who launched a concerted electoral assault on the Moderates, winning five 
seats by 1937. The Barrhead I. L. P., although dealt a serious blow in March 1939 when 
Councillor Beckett, the branch chairman died, was increasingly at the forefront of 
Scottish I. L. P. politics as Annie Maxton and McQuarrie respectively took over the roles 
as chairman and secretary of the Scottish Divisional Council as the result of divisions in 
Glasgow. 82 
In Ayshire the I. L. P. kept a presence on the county council winning seats in 1932 and 
1938. In Galston I. L. P. er A. Crosbie defeated Moderate and Labour opposition to win a 
place on the local council in 1934 and 1937. However, their presence was not restricted 
to electoral politics and in Catrine David Meikle used his position as chairman of the 
Ayrshire I. L. P. Federation to attain the chairmanship of the Catrine Tenants' Rights 
Committee. The situation brought him into public prominence following an extended 
and acrimonious dispute with the police over their practice of entering homes without a 
warrants. 83 
A similar situation prevailed in Lanarkshire where in some areas, such as Dykehead and 
Carluke East the I. L. P. could regularly poll above the Labour Party. Whilst Moderates 
took victory over the divided labour movement in the County Council elections the 
I. L. P. could maintain a significant presence on the Dykehead District Council. 
Argument and bad feeling within the labour movement were not restricted to electoral 
politics for example there was a sharp division of opinion in Motherwell over the 
relationship between I. L. P. ers and the S. S. P. in the NCLC. However, the divisions 
within the movement were not always the result of local rivalries, often they were due to 
instructions from the centre. For example in Airdrie where there was a close connection 
between the I. L. P. and the Tenants' Association, the I. L. P. and local Labour Party came 
to an electoral agreement before the 1938 municipal elections. However, Arthur 
Woodburn the Scottish Labour Party organiser intervened and forced the local Labour 
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Party to oppose the I. L. P. Nevertheless, Tom Connor of the I. L. P. gained First Ward 
from the Labour Party. 84 
Whilst the bulk of the I. L. P. 's presence in Scotland was in Glasgow and the numerous 
small branches in the West of Scotland the party did have a number of significant 
branches in Clackmananshire and along the East Coast. Perhaps most importantly was 
Perth where through the influence of William Ballantine in the NUR the party was a 
major force. In the second half of the 1930s the Party in Perth was closely associated 
with the Labour Party and came to a long term electoral understanding after the I. L. P. 
agreed to withdraw Ballantine in favour of the Labour candidate in the municipal 
elections. Indeed the local party came in from some heavy criticism from the Scottish 
Divisional Council for reaching such an agreement without consultation with the 
divisional officers. 85 
In Fifeshire the I. L. P. maintained a presence in Cowdenbeath and Lochgelly. In 
Cowdenbeath following disaffiliation the branch entered into vigorous activity, 
developing joint activity with Communist Party, holding weekly joint meetings with the 
C. P. and N. U. W. M. it also began seriously contesting municipal elections which saw 
the party win two council seats in 1934-5. The results were promising for the branch, 
which managed to double its membership in the seven months following disaffiliation. 86 
In Lochgelly the party was an important force in the Post Office Workers' Union with 
Jennie Duncan achieving national prominence. I. L. P. er David Adamson was also 
elected to the council in November 1937 along with four moderates on a working class 
ticket consisting of two I. L. P. ers, one Labour and one Communist, of which the two 
I. L. P. ers polled in the top two places. 87 In Clackananshire I. L. P. er T. R. Miller, chairman 
of the Sauchie Branch, maintained his place as Councillor on Clackmannan County 
Council. His activities on behalf of the working class were widely acknowledged and 
the Alloa Journal describing him as the 'stormy petrel' of the council, praised his 
energy, debating power, sense of humour and his championship of the cause of the 'have 
nots'. 88 
In Dundee the I. L. P. maintained a place within the labour movement working with the 
Communist Party and N. U. W. M. in the organisation of demonstrations, which led to 
some conflict with the Labour Party in the period up to 1936.89 However, the real 
conflict between the I. L. P. and the Labour establishment in Dundee took place within 
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the Dundee Jute and Flax Workers' Union. At the end of 1937 as a result of considerable 
activity a member of Dundee I. L. P. was elected onto the executive of the Union. 
However, the agitation, centred on the lack of support that Dundee workers had given to 
Indian Jute Workers striking for a shorter week, not only brought a scathing attack from 
John Sime, the secretary of the Union but also resulted in Labour Party membership 
being made a condition of membership of the Union executive. 90 
In Aberdeen the acrimony between Labour and the I. L. P. prior to the 1935 election was 
replaced with bitter warfare between the I. L. P. and the Communist Party towards the 
end of the decade. The I. L. P. had managed to maintain its two members on the council 
and despite the lack of an official arrangement between the I. L. P. and the Labour Party 
no conflicting candidatures actually happened. 91 However, in 1938 its attempts at unity 
with the C. P. were turned down on the basis that the I. L. P. had been inactive in 
supporting the Spanish Workers and because they had supported the "Trotskyist" 
POUM. The I. L. P. countered with the accusation that in fact they had done the lion's 
share of the work in the Aberdeen Spanish Aid Committee and had ensured that the 
committee was kept open when the C. P. wanted to close it after an ultimatum from the 
Scottish Labour Party. 92 Elsewhere on the East Coast the I. L. P. had a presence in some 
surprising places such as in the small fishing village of Ferryden where the party 
claimed to have achieved the delivery of the New Leader to every worker and were 
publishing a local news-sheet on a flat duplicator. 93 
Although badly damaged by disaffiliation the Scottish I. L. P. maintained a significant 
presence in the Scottish Labour movement through the 1930s. In some places such as 
Barrhead, the party was able to build up its local profile. However, in its Glasgow 
stronghold, divided and under attack from the Labour and Communist Parties, the 
party's membership and influence declined sharply especially during the second half of 
the decade. The politics of the Scottish division were thus significantly different from 
the rest of the party. More influential in working class politics than elsewhere there was 
little concern with the 'new revolutionary policy' of the party and little enthusiasm for 
the factions which dominated the party's other major centres in Lancashire and London. 
Nevertheless, the Scottish I. L. P. was the most forceful in declaring the need to maintain 
an identity separate from the Labour Party. 
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3.5 London and the Southern Counties: Policy 
Although the London Division in the period after disaffiliation was deeply divided by 
factional disputes, at one level there was much agreement within the division. All 
discussion of policy could begin from the assumption that the Socialism In Our Time 
policy was outdated and that there was a need to develop a new revolutionary policy. 
There was also widespread agreement that it was important to develop working 
relationships on a day to day level with the N. U. W. M. and the Communist Party. 94 This 
basic position reflected the line of the R. P. C., under the leadership of Jack Gaster and 
Dr Carl Cullen, at a time when the Committee was gaining significant levels of 
influence within the Division. Indeed, in early 1933, when Gaster was selected as 
divisional N. A. C. representative many saw the R. P. C. and the London Divisional 
Council as synonymous. However, within the division there were others who stood on 
the 'left' of the party; who accepted this need for a new revolutionary policy, and argued 
for stress to be placed on developing Workers' Councils, yet stood apart from the R. P. C. 
The most notable of these members were C. A. Smith, Divisional Chairman from 1933- 
5, and John Aplin, Divisional Organiser. Behind the apparent unity of the London 
Division lay this fault line. 
R. P. C. organisation in London became increasingly effective in the twelve months 
following disaffiliation. Regular R. P. C. organisation conferences were held and a 
unified line was then presented at divisional meetings. R. P. C. delegate meetings were 
also increasingly well attended. 95 By unified voting the R. P. C was able to effectively 
control the machinery of the London Division Council. Initial concerns about the 
committee were raised by John Aplin shortly after the formation of the R. P. C. however, 
on the instructions of the Party leadership the Committee had been left undisturbed. 96 
Opposition to the R. P. C. had then come largely from outside the London Division. 
Inside the division the most prominent opposition to the R. P. C. came only from the 
opponents of the I. L. P. 's 'new revolutionary policy' such as ex-London divisional 
chairman and N. A. C. representative Allen Skinner. He argued that the organisation of 
the R. P. C. was destroying the London Division: 
Before the London and Southern Counties Divisional Conference a Conference of delegates 
representing branches in sympathy with the "R. P. C. " was called. To this conference proposals for 
an alternative Party constitution were submitted and amendments invited. The results of the 
deliberations were placed upon the agenda of the Divisional Conference in the name of the 
Divisional Council (after possibly some negotiation with the Council following the unofficial 
Conference). The result was that the proposals so placed on the agenda- covering every paragraph 
of the constitution were carried without a single amendment. The official Divisional Conference 
had become a redundancy. 
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However, the overlap between the R. P. C. and a'left' outside the R. P. C. including Smith 
and Aplin had led to an apparent consensus on a range of important issues. Skinner's 
concerns about the R. P. C. were ignored, as he was part of a marginalised 'right wing' 
within the division who disagreed with the new revolutionary policy. 
The cracks in the Smith-Aplin/R. P. C. 'divisional consensus' were first apparent on the 
question of International affiliation. The R. P. C. argued that the I. L. P. should approach 
the Comintern. Smith and Aplin, on the other hand, wished the I. L. P. to maintain its 
association with the International Bureau for Revolutionary Socialist Unity (IBRSU). 
The R. P. C. position won out at the 1933 Divisional conference. However, the concerns 
raised about R. P. C. activities in the wake of the 1933 National Annual I. L. P. conference 
weakened the committee's position and at the 1934 divisional conference the IBRSU 
position triumphed after a lengthy and acrimonious debate. 97 
These political disagreements were further evident at the 1935 divisional conference. 
This conference had the largest agenda on record for a divisional conference with thirty- 
three items on it, including a forty-seven-page long policy statement issued by the 
R. P. C. dominated Divisional Council which included one hundred and fifty five 
amendments. 98 At the centre of the debates again was the question of International 
Affiliation. The Divisional Council and R. P. C. were supporting moves to approach the 
Comintern, John Aplin was arguing for the IBRSU, whilst the Trotskyists, who were 
beginning to play a more important role in the division, were arguing for a Fourth 
International. The weakness of the R. P. C. position was demonstrated by a large 
majority in favour of Aplin's IBRSU position. 
However, on other areas of policy the outcome was less straightforward. The 
R. P. C. /Divisional Council analysis of the political situation, was passed despite being 
opposed in its totality by the Trotskyists who described it as 'loose phrases strung 
together; the stock in trade of pseudo-revolutionaries. ' The Divisional Council's section 
on street work, work in Trade Unions and factories was also carried, although against 
strong opposition. However, the crucial sections of the Council's report on Parliament, 
elections and the attitude to the Labour Party were not passed whilst all other options 
were also rejected. The situation which left branches to individually consider this aspect 
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of their work, clearly went against the aim of the conference which was to present an 
overall unifying strategy for the party. 
The increasing dissatisfaction with the level of factional organisation within the 
Division, and the R. P. C. control of the Divisional Council, evident through the 
proceedings of the conference was also raised explicitly. It was only because the 
Trotskyists and the R. P. C. joined forces that a resolution against allowing members of 
unofficial groups to hold office within the Party, was defeated by four votes. 
The proceedings of the conference showed that factionalism was a major influence on 
the politics of the London Division. Both the R. P. C. and the Trotskyists could command 
a considerable degree of support in London. However, perhaps as significant was the 
growing number of members within the division who were dismayed by the activities of 
the various organised groups and wanted to see an end to the factional fighting. 99 
These tensions, evident in London at the 1935 divisional conference, were a major part 
of the I. L. P. 's 1935 Annual Conference in Derby. The national conference expressed 
disapproval of factional activity and rejected the R. P. C. 's policy proposals. 
Nevertheless, following the Derby conference the R. P. C. continued to use London 
Divisional Council machinery to push R. P. C. policy rather than official party policy. In 
this situation the concerns which Skinner had first raised about the organisation of the 
R. P. C. in 1932 were raised by opponents of the R. P. C. including C. A. Smith and John 
Aplin. 
The issue of factionalisation came to a head following a speech Jack Gaster gave on 
Soviet Foreign Policy, as the London Division's fraternal delegate to the London 
District Congress of the Communist Party. In that speech he set out the perspective on 
Soviet Foreign Policy that the R. P. C. had had rejected at the Derby Conference. 1°° In 
addition the R. P. C. through the London Divisional Council had started using 
Communist Party speakers as propaganda and educational instructors for training I. L. P. 
lecturers. The Committee had also taken to making public its dissatisfaction with Party 
policy. Thus, the Divisional Council refused to appoint a speaker for a meeting because 
'it could not appoint anybody from the London Division who could be expected to speak 
on behalf of the N. A. C. ' In a similar vein the Propaganda and Education Section, which 
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had been co-operating with C. A. Smith in the preparation of leaflets, refused to continue 
its assistance because of'differences of opinion. 'lol 
In this situation leading non-R. P. C. members of the London Division, having seen their 
policy victories at the Derby conference ignored by the R. P. C., forced a showdown in 
the division. Following Gaster's speech John Aplin resigned his office as London 
Divisional Organiser in order, he said, 'to begin the task of organising divisional opinion 
against the Revolutionary Policy Committee and the group system. ' The London 
Divisional Council, dominated by the R. P. C. denied the charges of acting in 'group 
interests' and claimed that Aplin's problems were not really with the group system but 
with his approach to Soviet Foreign Policy. 102 
Nevertheless, the I. L. P. 's Inner Executive agreed with Aplin and ruled that the 
Divisional Council had failed to accept the Party policy on Soviet Foreign policy laid 
down at the Derby Conference. The Inner Executive decided that 'the influence of the 
London leadership is weakening faith in the Party and its policy in the Division. ' 103 
However, whilst the 1935 Derby Conference had passed the resolution condemning 
group activity it had rejected the disciplinary resolution which had been attached to it. 
The N. A. C. was only able to issue a statement calling on loyal members of the Party to 
cease participation in unofficial groups. '°4 
Aplin continued his activities, attempting to mobilise support for the ending of group 
activity within the division. At a divisional conference held in October a resolution 
confirming the value of unofficial groups within the party was only carried by the 
casting vote of the chairman. '°5 Opinion was beginning to move against the R. P. C. in 
the London division. However, the Committee still retained control of the Divisional 
Council. It was the splits within the R. P. C. and their failures at national level rather than 
the divisional onslaught which provided the most significant reasons for the group's 
decision to join the Communist Party in November 1935. 
Following the departure of the R. P. C., in February 1936 the Divisional Conference 
voted to abolish group activity, looking to establish other means of securing internal 
discussion on theory and policy. The division also voted to maintain association with 
the International Bureau for Revolutionary Socialist Unity and urged a concerted effort 
to build up industrial activity through trades unions and the co-operative movement. 
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However, the continuing problems of the division were indicated by the existence of a 
significant Trotskyist minority indicated by one third of the conference voting for a 
continuation of group activity and one quarter voting for breaking the I. L. P. 's 
International associations. 106 
By the beginning of 1937 the bulk of the Trotskyists had departed the party. However, a 
small and much less disruptive Trotskyist group remained in the London division and 
followed the line of opposition to the Unity Campaign at the divisional conference in 
January. By 1938 the division's agenda had turned towards the question of reaffiliation 
to the Labour Party, although those proposals were rejected by an overwhelming 
majority. The division also sought to ensure that a considered position was adopted on 
the question of Trotskyism and the Communist International, calling for a proper 
analysis to be made of the question and rejecting a position of unconsidered sympathy 
to the C. I. However, the most contentious issue at the 1938 divisional conference was 
the appropriate attitude to take towards Air Raid Precautions with the division equally 
divided between demanding working class protection and presenting resolute opposition 
to all precautions as 'a sham and delusion. ' 1 07 
The following year, after four years of preoccupation with discipline and factions within 
the ranks of the London Division, the actions of the Parliamentary Group over Munich 
were the focus of concern. The calls of Croydon and Clapham branches, both with a 
history of Trotskyist influence, for the expulsion of the Parliamentary Group were easily 
defeated. However, the conference refused to endorse the actions of Maxton, 
McGovern, Buchanan and Stephen and suggested that immediate steps were needed to 
bring the group within the discipline of the Party. The 1939 conference also dealt with 
the issues raised the previous year. On the ARP the conference overwhelmingly 
defeated the view that we should participate 'on the Marxist basis of utilising every 
situation that arises to arouse the workers effectively against Capitalism, ' and endorsed 
the view that 'the workers while taking advantage of every opportunity afforded them 
under Capitalism in order to safeguard their interest and lives must whenever possible 
oppose ARP preparation and under no circumstances must they volunteer for this work. ' 
However, the main question on the National conference agenda, that of reaffiliation to 
the Labour Party received little attention at the Divisional Conference and when the 
proposals were considered the reaffiliation motion was heavily defeated. ' 08 
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3.6 London and the Southern Counties: Activity 
London was one of the Divisions least affected by disaffiliation. At the 1932 annual 
conference the Division reported 89 Branches. Leaving the Labour Party caused the loss 
of only one branch, whilst eight new branches were formed. 109 However, during the 
period of R. P. C. ascendancy within London, from 1933-5, membership fell sharply, 
indeed affiliation fees declined by one third in the year before the departure of the 
R. P. C. During this period the focus of I. L. P. activity was on working with the 
Communist Party, and in particular on the establishment of workers' councils, such as 
those set up in Camberwell and Wimbledon. "" The Party also undertook a range of 
other joint activities with the Communist Party. This included not only high profile co- 
operation as in the Reception Committee for the 1934 Hunger March but also more 
localised activity such as the Fulham I. L. P. 's organisational work 'against exorbitant 
rents' in St. Olafs Road in June 1934.111 
The departure of the R. P. C. had its greatest effect on the machinery of the London 
Division which was in need of almost total reconstruction, including the need to replace 
R. P. C. leader Jack Gaster as N. A. C. representative. Gaster's position on the N. A. C. was 
filled by the most obvious candidate for the post, John Aplin who was also elected as 
divisional chairman and leader of the 'anti-group' movement in the division. However, 
the remaining problems within the division were highlighted by the support given to the 
two other candidates, R. E. Fitzgerald and the Trotskyist candidate Sid Kemp, which 
showed the continued strength of group organisation in the London area. 112 The 
divisional reorganisation, included the appointment of a new divisional organiser, 27 
year old Frank Gant of Plymouth. ' 13 Over the first eighteen months of his term Gant 
made a determined effort to reinvigorate and reorganise the division at local level. He 
spent his time visiting the branches and composed weekly reports on his findings in 
each area. His overall impression at the end of this period was hardly encouraging. 
Branches, he felt, were generally very badly organised, where active they were normally 
dependent upon one or two individuals. There was, as in areas like Southend, a notable 
lack of contact with the Trade Unions. He also observed the distinct difficulty in 
generating activity in dormitory areas like Wimbledon and Sidcup. These problems 
were exacerbated by the difficulty in persuading members to take an interest in local 
affairs. This he suggested was probably due to the fact that generally the keenest 
members were those who were newcomers, with others often disillusioned with 
working class political apathy. "4 
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As the R. P. C. became more threatened, and eventually left the I. L. P., the Party moved 
towards organisation independent of the Communist Party in the London area. It was in 
this vein that the Party mobilised in London against the Unemployment Act in March 
1935, with a series of meeting organised by the divisional chairman Bert Hawkins. 
These meetings brought to London the most prominent I. L. P. leaders of the campaigns 
from around the country-' 15 Subsequently the London Division kept planning campaigns 
within the capital. For example in 1936 they organised a series of concurrent meetings 
focussing on U. A. B. regulations and the War Danger. 116 However, as the Communist 
Party moved further towards a popular front position the I. L. P. found it harder to get its 
voice heard and its policy implemented in any joint activity. Thus in the London May 
Day Campaign conference in January 1937 the I. L. P. found its proposals sidelined. 117 
Instead the focus of I. L. P. activity in London moved towards the anti-war movement 
and in September 1938 the I. L. P. called a conference which formed the Socialist Anti- 
War front which operated from the I. L. P. head office, but nevertheless claimed to 
represent all sections of the working class movement. 118 
In some other respects the London I. L. P. did have a degree of success in interactions 
with the rest of the Labour movement. It was heavily involved with blocking the 
Mosley marches through the East End of London and in other anti-fascist action. 
Further the Party had a number of representatives on London Trades Council and, a 
number of prominent members were also active in the Co-operative movement. Most 
notable of these was Jack Hammond, a member of the Political Committee of London 
Co-operative Society and an active anti-fascist who was arrested for his activity. As part 
of the drive to improve the industrial side of the party in May 1938 the N. A. C. 
appointed him the National Co-operative Officer of the Party. 119 
At local level the I. L. P. could only maintain a limited profile in London, although the 
I. L. P. was instrumental in establishing Finchley Trades Council. Indeed the I. L. P. 's 
profile was higher in a number of towns within the division outside of the Capital. Some 
of this activity was based on strength which the Party had built up before disaffiliation 
which persisted for a time after 1932. This was clearest in Welwyn Garden City. 
In Welwyn, disaffiliation robbed the Labour Party of almost all of its most influential 
members. 120 The Welwyn I. L. P. was able to outpoll the Labour Party in a number of 
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UDC elections early in the decade, and secure two councillors. However, the split in 
votes cost both Labour and I. L. P. electoral victories. After two years of the I. L. P. 
seeking an agreement the Labour Party agreed to allow one space on its slate for an 
I. L. P. er in 1936, after the I. L. P. /Labour Party combined vote was sufficient to allow the 
group control of the council. 121 The I. L. P. /Labour Group, found it was possible to come 
to a basic agreement on the council and were essentially able to dominate affairs much 
to the frustration of the Conservatives who demanded that party politics be kept out of 
local government affairs. 122 However, as the I. L. P. found more accommodation with 
the Labour Party on the council its role seemed increasingly compatible with the 
membership of the larger Party. The I. L. P. remained locally active, but its contribution 
was educational and the holding of debates. 123 
In Welwyn I. L. P. influence had been largely a remnant of pre-disaffiliation strength. In 
other places, such as Slough and Hastings, the I. L. P. was able to develop a new profile 
for itself in the later half of the 1930s. 124 The Communist Party had significant influence 
within the Slough Labour Party, and the fortunes of the Slough I. L. P. were heavily 
dependant on their relationship with the C. P. During the mid-1930s the I. L. P. and C. P. 
in Slough built up a tenants defence league. 125 Then with the support of the Labour 
Party the I. L. P. gained a council seat on Slough UDC in April 1937.126 The I. L. P. 
councillor, Ruth Harrison, enabled the I. L. P. to extend its work amongst the 
unemployed. 127 However, following the breakdown in relations between the I. L. P. and 
Communist Party after the Barcelona uprising, the I. L. P. became marginalised. The 
electoral agreement with the Labour Party broke down. 128 I. L. P. influence on the Home 
Counties Federation of Trades Councils and on the Slough Trades Council was also 
disturbed when the Communist Party's representatives accused an I. L. P. member sitting 
on the executive of being a 'Trotsky-Fascist. ' The Communist vote combined with right 
wing support removed him from the Home Counties Executive, replacing him with a 
delegate who supported the 'Black Circular'. A similar manoeuvre on Slough Trades 
Council was defeated by the combination of I. L. P. and Labour loyalists. 129 
In Hastings, the I. L. P. perceived the Labour Party as organisationally weak and the 
Communist Party as 'out of the picture'. 130 The party established an unemployed group 
which was briefly successful. 13 1 The Hastings Party also made a failed foray into 
electoral politics. 132 However, it was in union activity and particularly within the 
G&MWU that the Hastings I. L. P. was able to have greatest impact. In 1934 one 
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Hastings G&MWU branch, under I. L. P. pressure, urged the formation of a United Front 
and then the branch passed a political resolution calling for opposition to war: 
That the Trades Council take immediate steps to organise all organisations with a view to 
determining what policy shall be pursued in view of European War danger and decide details of 
the application of that policy. 133 
The Hastings Trades Council wrote to the TUC declaring that 'an affiliated branch of 
the G&MWU has an I. L. P. or Communist element. ' The influence came under TUC 
scrutiny but because it was I. L. P. and not Communist it was not affected by the 'black 
circular. ' 134 Thus it was left to the right wing General and Municipal Workers' Union to 
take heavy handed action, closing the branch down in an unconstitutional fashion. 135 
The following June the branch was reopened but the closure had done little to dampen 
the enthusiasm of the 'left' within the organisation and the 'votes of the extreme 
elements' ensured that Jezzard, the former secretary of the Hastings Socialist League 
was appointed to the Trades Council. By October 1937 the I. L. P. had succeeded in 
getting the branch to adopt one of their members as delegate to the Trades Council and 
once the Trades Council had again checked with the TUC on the I. L. P. 's position with 
respect to the black circular the I. L. P. ers were allowed to maintain their position. 136 
The London division, especially in the period 1932-5, was heavily affected by factional 
disputes. Policy in these years was influenced, but never completely determined, by the 
R. P. C. and great stress was placed on the need for working with the Communist Party 
and organising workers' councils. This focus helped the I. L. P. little. Membership 
declined quickly. Many left frustrated with factional activity, still more left as first 
R. P. C. and then the Marxist Group joined their comrades outside the I. L. P. Despite the 
speedy decline in divisional membership the Division remained one of the largest 
within the party. Further, because of the strength of factional activity in the area 
members from London were amongst the main participants in the vigorous policy 
debates during the decade. However, the relative importance of London within the 
I. L. P. did not facilitate the effective contesting of local political spaces. The Party had a 
significant profile in some areas such as Welwyn Garden City. However, within the 
capital the I. L. P. struggle to establish roots within the working-class movement. 
3.7 Lancashire: Policy 
Immediately prior to disaffiliation, the Lancashire Division claimed a membership of 
5,266. However, the division was seriously affected by disaffiliation, it lost fourteen of 
its eighty-six branches including key branches such as Manchester Central. 137 Activity 
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was initially centred in Manchester and surrounding areas. However, the Division was 
plagued by factional activity and policy disputes. In 1934 when the majority of the 
leadership, and much of the membership including sixteen branches, left the I. L. P. 
either to return to the Labour Party or to the newly formed Independent Socialist Party 
the focus of the Lancashire I. L. P. moved towards Liverpool. 138 Shortly after the 
outbreak of the Second World War the Division had a paying membership of only 256. 
Much of the leadership of the Lancashire Division, including important figures such as 
Tom Abbott, who had joined the I. L. P. in 1894, had played an important part in the 
Lancashire Labour movement through its early years. Abbott and Lancashire I. L. P. 
leader Elijah Sandham, one of the rebel I. L. P. MPs who had come up against the PLP's 
standing orders, had enthusiastically embraced the disaffiliation decision as the 'end of 
careerism and foolish stunting' within the Party. 139 Under the leadership of Abbott and 
Sandharn in the period 1933-4 the divisional council allied itself to the anti-R. P. C. 
Unity Group, and strongly opposed the development of the 'new revolutionary policy. ' 
The Lancashire Council claimed to recognise the 'necessity of a revolutionary policy', 
however, Sandham argued that joint work with the C. P. did not constitute such a policy. 
For the him the 'new revolutionary policy', formulated more by the N. A. C. than by 
conference, was unconstitutional. Further, he argued that it was leading to the 
disappearance of a distinctive I. L. P. identity. His solution to the problem was to re- 
emphasise the'paramount importance of parliamentary democracy' and to end the united 
front with the C. P. '4° Thus, in July 1933 the Lancashire D. C. announced that, as a 
council, it was ceasing joint activity with the Communists. '4' By the Divisional 
Conference of 1934 there was open opposition to the 'new revolutionary policy' and the 
conference passed a motion declaring its ineffectiveness: 
The present official policy of the I. L. P. is not a revolutionary Socialist policy for this country, has 
not been deduced from the facts (historical, political and economic) of this country and has no 
relevance to the serious revolutionary business of achieving Socialism in Britain. 
Lancashire's alternative policy was firmly rooted in a constitutional understanding of 
revolutionary socialism: 
Socialism must be presented as a constitutional end to be sought by constitutional means and 
enforceable when the people will by the constitutional use of every force by a Socialist 
Government, against any anti-democratic and unconstitutional opposition by the King, the House 
of Lords, or by capitalistic or by financial revolutionaries. This conference believes that such an 
approach is acceptable to the majority of the British people and is therefore a real revolutionary 
policy. 142 
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The division, by a narrow vote also called for a return to the Second International, 
although maintaining that the I. L. P. should also continue its connections with the group 
of international "left" socialist parties. '43 
Added to these disputes over the new revolutionary policy were serious questions about 
the organisation of the Party. The Lancashire Divisional Council was strenuously 
opposed to the increasing tendencies within the Party towards democratic centralism. 
They fought against the establishment of an Executive Committee and Inner Executive. 
They also never fully co-operated with the central allocation of funds through the Power 
Fund, established in 1932.144 
However, during period 1932-4 the R. P. C. was beginning to gain some strength in 
Lancashire, especially within the Liverpool federation, which had been relatively 
unaffected by disaffiliation. '45 The Liverpool federation, arguing that the rest of the 
Division was stuck in 'pre-Bradford days', continued to engage in united front activity 
and stressed the successes for the I. L. P. in the meetings on the Anti-fascist day in April 
and on May Day 1933.146 The argument from Liverpool was that there was needless 
fear and suspicion from both sides in the united front, but that such feelings were 
unnecessary and that the I. L. P. could gain much from united front work without losing 
its distinctive identity. 147 However, the R. P. C. in Lancashire was not confined to 
Liverpool. For example the R. P. C. 's Lancashire Divisional chairman was a comrade 
Wolfenden, from the Moston Branch and the R. P. C. national conference in 1934 was 
held in Wigan. 148 
The increasing disruption caused by Lancashire's non-co-operation with the N. A. C., as 
in their failure to assist the 1934 Hunger March, led to calls for action against the 
Divisional Council from the R. P. C. in Lancashire and beyond. The non-co-operation of 
the Lancashire Division became a major issue for the N. A. C. Jack Gaster led the calls 
for strong action to be taken against the divisional leadership. 149 John Paton, one of the 
N. A. C. members most hostile to the R. P. C. was sent to Lancashire to sort things out, but 
the Divisional Council refused to co-operate even with his modest demands. ' 50 The 
N. A. C. was moved to condemn the activity of the Lancashire Division, but refused 
Gaster's demand to withhold its money. 151 
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By the I. L. P. 's 1934 Annual Conference in York there was a huge rift between the 
Lancashire Division and the National leadership of the Party. At the conference 
Sandharn stated that he would not leave the Party, but it was clear that others would. 
Immediately before the York Conference of 1934 the Lancashire Divisional newspaper, 
Labour's Northern Voice warned that if certain of the R. P. C's resolutions were passed 
then many within the Lancashire Division would find it difficult to maintain their 
membership of the Party. Although the York conference rejected the R. P. C. 's proposals 
it did accept the necessity of reorganising the Party, establishing an Inner Executive and 
Executive Committee. The Lancashire Division saw this as moving the Party towards 
democratic centralism and away from divisional autonomy. The conference had also 
been heavily critical of the Lancashire divisional attitude towards party discipline and 
rejected its calls for a restatement of the Party's commitment to a socialism which was 
not merely economic but also 'idealistic. "52 
These decisions convinced some of the leading members of the Lancashire Division that 
they could have no future within the ILP. Led by Tom Abbott, the resignations from the 
Party began. '53 The rebels left the I. L. P., but were still frustrated with the attitude of the 
Labour Party. In May 1934 they established a new party, the Independent Socialist 
Party. The impact on the Lancashire I. L. P. was enormous, sixteen branches and over 
half the paying membership, were lost. Added to this the entire divisional apparatus, 
including the divisional newspaper Labour's Northern Voice, was lost to the I. S. P. 
Those remaining loyal to the I. L. P. met for a Special Divisional Conference in 
Pendleton on May 26 1934, with 48 delegates representing 23 branches attending. The 
elections brought the R. P. C. to the fore in the Divisional Council. '54 The conference 
also elected R. P. C. member Bob Edwards, as the new N. A. C. representative by a 
divisional ballot. 155 The new Divisional Council immediately launched a membership 
campaign using special contributions from the N. A. C. to replace the sixteen branches 
that had lapsed. 156 Considerable resources from both divisional and national level were 
poured into the membership campaign meetings were addressed by leading I. L. P. ers. 
However, the Communist Party quickly targeted the Lancashire I. L. P. 's weakness and 
upped its efforts against the I. L. P. in the area and the campaign generated few results. 
The campaign resulted in the formation of only three new branches. '57 
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The effect of the departure of the Unity Group was to make Liverpool the strongest 
I. L. P. area in Lancashire, moving the centre of the Lancashire Party from the 
Manchester area, where the I. S. P. was strongest. 158 At the Divisional Conference at the 
end of the year the new Council revealed that they had reached agreement with the 
Communist Party for a united front covering activities surrounding opposition to 
Fascism and War, work in Trade Unions and the defence of the Soviet Union. 159 
However, illness and the poverty of new divisional officials led to quick changes in the 
Divisional Council. Florence Garner took over as divisional secretary and Tess Hilton 
took over as treasurer. As both Garner and Hilton were from the Old Trafford branch, 
the divisional headquarters were transferred from Liverpool to Manchester, a serious 
consequence because of the weakness of the I. L. P. in Manchester. 160 
The Divisional Conference the following year was dominated by discussion of a policy 
document prepared by the new Council. There were signs that the difficulties of the 
division were not over, with significant support on the question of international 
disaffiliation for both the R. P. C. and the Trotskyists. 161 Old factional fights were 
resolved only for new factional splits to begin appearing. However, it was the question 
of re-affiliation to the Labour Party which dominated divisional conferences after the 
R. P. C. members joined the Communist Party in November 1935. Reaffiliation was 
raised at the Divisional Conference in February 1936 but was decisively rejected. 
However, the issue would not disappear and in 1938 a two-thirds majority approved a 
resolution from Birkenhead, Todmorden and Gorton branches to make an immediate 
application to the Labour Party for conditional affiliation to that body leaving the I. L. P. 
the right to oppose 'rearmament and anti-working class measures. ' In 1939 this was 
taken further when the Division worked out the measures it would need to take on 
reaffiliation to ensure the I. L. P. 's spirit would be kept alive. ' The central proposal was to 
ensure that Parliamentary careerists should be kept out of the I. L. P. by requiring I. L. P. 
Members of Parliament to live at a working class standard and to hand the balance of 
their salaries into the party funds. 
In 1936 there was dissent over Industrial policy with a controversial attack on the recent 
miners' pay settlement, and calling for the socialisation of the cotton industry. In 1938, 
there was a dispute between those who thought I. L. P. ers should try to work inside the 
Army (to keep outside of gaol) and those who wanted open and clear opposition to war, 
with the latter position largely pushed by those who had been pacifists during the First 
88 
World War. In 1939 the Division expressed strong concerns over the parliamentary 
group's line on the Munich settlement, insisting that Socialists must not attempt to 
choose between a policy of Imperialist War and Churchill, and Imperialist Peace. 
Nevertheless the overall pattern in the second half of the decade was one of relative 
unanimity in accepting the party policy laid down by the N. A. C. 162 
3.8 Lancashire: Activity 
The activity of the Lancashire I. L. P. at the time of disaffiliation was largely determined 
by the Lancashire Cotton workers' strike. The Lancashire I. L. P. administered a strike 
fund nationally and locally establishing a committee which met daily and aimed at 
assisting the strikers in any way possible. There was particular prominence in areas such 
as Blackburn and Hyde where regular meetings were held and Nelson, Burnley, 
Warrington, Chorley and Great Harwood where the Party set up relief committees to 
distribute cash and food it was received. 163 The Lancashire I. L. P. supported 
nationalisation and was opposed to the Communist-backed 'Cotton Workers' Solidarity 
Movement'. The Solidarity movement's programme was based on a repudiation of the 
settlement and the dismissal of all officials that had voted for it. The I. L. P. claimed the 
Solidarity movement was'leading the workers up the garden', as without socialisation of 
the industry gains for the workers' would necessarily be extremely limited. 16 
In the first half of 1936 the Lancashire Division was again heavily involved in the 
campaigns within the cotton industry. Early in the year a joint committee was formed 
consisting of members from I. L. P., the Communist Party and the Independent Socialist 
Party1 65 However, the agreement quickly floundered with disputes between Lancashire 
I. L. P. and C. P. '66 The period was also marked by sporadic attempts at co-operation and 
union with the ex-I. L. P. ers in the I. S. P. The first such attempt came in May 1936 when, 
following the third I. S. P. annual convention, Sandharn and Abbott met with Maxton in 
order to arrange a united front with the I. L. P. particularly on the question of war. The 
following June, after the failure of the Unity campaign the I. S. P. made further, 
eventually aborted attempts to work with the I. L. P. 167 There matters lay until the I. S. P. 
reconsidered its position at the outbreak of war when they again considered closer co- 
operation with the I. L. P. and other socialist anti-war groups, and especially in Nelson, 
even considered rejoining the I. L. P. 168 
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Aside from these relatively high profile activities and away from the divisional centres 
of Manchester and Liverpool the I. L. P. was able to forge something of a role for itself in 
local politics. In some areas this was based largely in the electoral success of one high 
profile individual. An example was May Sandharn in Chorley. In 1929 she and three 
Labour Party candidates had been elected to the council. However, in 1932 following 
the I. L. P. split and candidacies from the Chorley Unemployed Workers Rights 
Committee, whilst Sandham retained her position on the council, all the Labour 
Candidates were defeated. She fought on the council on a range of issues such as free 
milk, the means test and use of recreational facilities for the unemployed. However, in a 
minority, initially of one and later with a small amount of Labour Party support, she was 
frequently reduced to disruptionist tactics, and thus she gained a certain notoriety in the 
town. In 1933 she married another leading I. L. P. er Bob Edwards, who, stood as I. L. P. 
candidate in the 1935 General Election. In 1934, after Elijah Sandham, May's father, 
joined the I. S. P., Bob became the Lancashire Divisional Representative on the 
N. A. C. 169 In 1936 May was re-elected and a lasting pact was agreed with the Labour 
Party to avoid conflicting candidatures. 170 
However, in Nelson, a traditional I. L. P. stronghold, the Party had a firmer basis in the 
union movement. At the time of disaffiliation the I. L. P., in terms of nominal 
membership was a dominant force within the Nelson Labour Party, which in turn held a 
majority on the council. Whilst the Nelson I. L. P. accepted the disaffiliation decision no 
councillors could be persuaded to follow this lead. This failure led the smaller party to 
decided that it would not contest municipal elections in the town. 171 The Party was also 
marginalised within the dominant Nelson Weavers' Association. I. L. P. ers were removed 
from all official positions within the Nelson Weavers following their refusal to work for 
the Labour Party in the 1932 municipal elections. 
These actions of the Labour Party and Weavers Association were considered by many 
to be extremely high handed and a Workers' Defence Group was established to assist 
the case of the dismissed I. L. P. weavers. Much of the support for the I. L. P. weavers 
came not from within Weavers Association but from the other workers in the town, 
primarily in the General and Municipal Workers' Union, who were disgruntled at the 
way in which the weavers dominated the Labour Party. Indeed only one of the Labour 
council members was not from the Weavers Association. He was Alderman Charles 
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Smithson, President of the General and Municipal Workers Union and a leading figure 
in the Workers' Defence Group. 172 
The dispute between the G&MWU, the second largest workers organisation in Nelson, 
and the Weavers centred on the distribution of municipal work by the council. This was 
allocated to unemployed weavers as a distress measure. The G&MWU were clearly 
upset by this treatment of their work, as the union put it: 'No other group of workers' 
would be expected to share their work as a kind of distress measure. ' 173 Carradice (the 
General Secretary of the G&MWU and Secretary of Nelson I. L. P) considered, but then 
decided against, stressing the opposition to the Weavers Association by running for the 
council. However, before the end of 1933 the relationship between the G&MWU and 
the Weavers further deteriorated after Smithson was passed over for the mayoralty. At a 
special meeting of the G&MWU the Weavers were accused of being 'A Hitler in 
Nelson' as the 'real test of a majority... is not how they deal with another big power but 
how they deal with minorities. ' Smithson decided to leave the Labour Party and join the 
I. L. P. as a protest at his treatment by the larger organisation, making both the leading 
figures in Nelson G&MWU members of the I. L. P. This I. L. P. involvement in the 
G&MWU was particularly notable given that nationally it was the most anti-left of 
unions which had, from 1926 taken a strong line against the Communist Party and had 
no significant left faction at national level. The Labour Party responded to Smithson's 
new involvement with the I. L. P. by removed him from his post as chairman of the 
Electricity Committee. 174 
Throughout the following year Smithson proposed a series of left wing measures calling 
for such things as restoration of unemployment cuts, reducing the hours of municipal 
workers without loss of pay and calling for the Government to raise the Old Age 
Pension. The Labour Party refused to support any of his proposals arguing that his sole 
purpose was to embarrass them. In March 1934 Smithson stood as an Independent 
Labour candidate in the County Council election with the support of the G&MWU 
without any approach to the Labour Party for endorsement or support. However, by 
towards the end of the year the situation began to move towards a resolution. 175 The 
Labour Party on the council began to take a less hostile approach to Smithson's motions 
and supported him for example in opposition to the Sedition Bill. However, the key to 
the resolution between the I. L. P. dominated leadership of the G&MWU and the Labour 
Party lay in the Nelson Anti-War movement. Both Smithson and Carradice were active 
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in the Nelson Anti-War movement which brought together the different sections of the 
Nelson Labour movement including the Labour Party, I. L. P. and Communist Party in 
opposition to the Government's rearmament plans. 176 
The development of this new found unity on the left in Nelson was combined with 
further council decisions of which the I. L. P. wholeheartedly approved, such as the 
decision to oppose Jubilee celebrations and attack on the new UAB in 1935. Carradice 
moving towards reconciliation, stated that 'Nelson Town Council has a record for 
looking after the children of Nelson that could not be beaten in any party of the country. ' 
Whilst tension persisted between the Nelson branch of the union and the local Labour 
Party, the wholesale opposition between the G&MWU and the Weavers was at an 
end. '77 
At the end of 1934 Smithson decided to give up his position as Secretary of the 
G&MWU for health reasons. He was replaced by Carradice who was elected by a 
majority of 223-101 over one of the newly elected Labour Councillors. Smithson, who 
decided to stay on as a councillor was finally given the position of mayor at the end of 
1935. Following his year as mayor Smithson decided not to stand for the council again 
and the I. L. P. 's connection with local electoral politics was ended. However, the party 
still remained active in the anti-war movement and within the unions and in 1939 the 
party was one of the moving forces in the creation of the local section of the No 
Conscription League. 178 
The Lancashire division was weakened by disaffiliation. Then, internally split, but most 
of all opposed to the Party's 'new revolutionary policy', the Divisional Council broke 
away from the I. L. P. and formed the I. S. P., removing over half the division's 
membership. Although the I. L. P. managed to maintain influence in some areas such as 
Nelson and Chorley, the formation of the I. S. P. removed over half the divisional 
membership and seriously reduced the Party's role within the Lancashire working-class 
movement. Increasingly marginalised, and within continuing residual dissatisfaction 
with the effectiveness of the I. L. P. 's new policy attention began to focus on alternative 
courses of action. Inevitably it was the idea of re-affiliation to the Labour Party which 
obtained most support and by the end of the decade divisional opinion was firmly in 
favour of re-affiliation. However, the division's significance both within the working- 
class movement and within the I. L. P. was much lower than in 1932. By this time the 
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division was reduced to a shadow of even the organisation that had disaffiliated from 
the Labour Party. 
3.9 East Anglia 
The East Anglian I. L. P. had been one of the first to support disaffiliation. However, 
their reasons for supporting disaffiliation, based largely on local political considerations 
and the influence of literary critic John Middleton Murry, had little in common with the 
R. P. C. Thus, the Division quickly became a focus for anti-R. P. C. activity. Middleton 
Murry, established connections with the Lancashire Unity Group writing regularly in 
Labour's Northern Voice and used the magazine Adelphi to gain support for attacks on 
the United Front and the R. P. C. 179 Immediately following the adoption of the new 
revolutionary policy the Norwich branch, under Middleton Murry's influence ceased co- 
operation with the Communist Party and began working on an alternative manifesto, 
which stressed the use of constitutional means. Middleton Murry was enthusiastically 
supported by the divisional chairman George Johnson, also from the Norwich branch, 
who vacated the chair specifically to oppose the new policy of the party and to support 
the manifesto. As he later wrote: 
We were sick of the wrangling with the C. I. and I am certain there is a real majority who are sick 
of our futile association with the C. P. and all that it entails. "' 
A special divisional conference was called which revealed serious differences within the 
East Anglian I. L. P. over the Party's new revolutionary policy. The Yarmouth I. L. P. 
strongly supported the I. L. P. 's new policy and attempted to discipline those who acted 
against it. Further, the division's N. A. C. representative, Dorothy Jewson, was especially 
hostile to the activity of the Unity group and the effect it was having on the East 
Anglian division. She suggested that some good work was resulting out of united front 
work on specific occasions and singled out the work of Yarmouth I. L. P. with the 
N. U. W. M. for particular praise and described the hostility to the united front as 'largely 
that of influential individuals, ' foremost amongst whom were Middleton Murry and 
George Johnson. 18' The conference thus rejected the manifesto, but it also rejected co- 
operation with the Communist Party by an overwhelming vote of twenty to three. The 
I. L. P. 's new revolutionary policy based on Workers' Councils was also rejected and the 
N. A. C. report on the place of parliament was thrown out by the slim margin of nine 
votes to eight. 192 
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After the departure of both R. P. C. and Unity Group from the Party during 1934-5 the 
position within Norwich settled down to increasing support for the national policy of the 
Party. At the 1936 Divisional Conference George Johnson the Divisional Chairman 
launched a strong defence of I. L. P. policy which was reiterated at the 1937 and 1938 
' Divisional Conferences. However, by 1939 conflict between Norwich and Great 
Yarmouth had broken out again. Johnson and the Norwich Branch had changed, and 
recognising the difficulties of the National Party, persuaded the conference to vote for 
re-affiliation to the Labour Party. This was opposed by the leading members of the 
Yarmouth I. L. P. including Burgess and Stone. However, whilst there were significant 
policy differences between Yarmouth and Norwich I. L. P. this did not prevent the 
branches from working together. Neither did the intenal disagreements within the 
division prevent the establishment of the I. L. P. as a significant force in municipal 
politics. Indeed, whilst the Party nationally was in decline the East Anglian Division 
managed to hold its position in terms of membership and raise its political profile in 
local politics. By the end of the Second World War the I. L. P. had five councillors in 
Great Yarmouth and a membership of over 900 in Norwich. Thus, over the decade the 
relative importance of the division for the I. L. P. nationally increased. 
The membership of the division was dominated by the Norwich Branch. Norwich I. L. P. 
claimed that disaffiliation had only cost the branch a 'few paper members' and, despite 
local opposition to the 'new revolutionary policy', grew from 450 in 1932 to 560 in 
1936. Indeed, following a membership drive and campaign at the end of 1934 
membership of every branch in the division, except Ipswich, was increasing. 183 The 
financial position of the Norwich branch was excellent. By the end of 1937 the I. L. P. 
had wiped out the debt on their premises, the hall held 500 and had a large number of 
committee rooms largely used by Trade Unions, a club lounge and a bookshop. 
Membership in Norwich fell off somewhat to 400 in the immediate period before the 
Second World War. However, the branch experienced an 'influx of membership' at the 
outbreak of War and maintained its influence in the early post-war period with a peak in 
membership of 930 in 1947. 
The Norwich I. L. P. was active across a range of different activities. In Municipal 
elections the I. L. P. secured a group of two in 1933 and had increased its representation 
to four by 1935, which was largely based in the Catton Ward where the Labour Party 
had no effective party machinery. The Party maintained two members on the Co-op 
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Board and four members on the Co-op education Committee. 184 The I. L. P. was also 
active in the local union movement. Although the Party came under attack within the 
G&MWU, with I. L. P. Councillor Alf Nicholls removed as one of the representatives of 
the Norwich Branch on the Trades Council in 1935 after instructions from the union's 
head office, it was able to raise its industrial profile by effectively supporting the local 
busmen. 
In January 1936, without the support of Norwich Trades Council, the busmen went on 
unofficial strike which the company, under the advice of trade union leaders attempted 
to break by bringing in strike-breakers from Northampton. 185 A concerted campaign 
was launched by the I. L. P. and the busmen, organised from the I. L. P. 's Keir Hardie 
Hall, where the situation was explained to the Northampton men who then refused to 
break the strike. However, following what was described as intimidation from officials 
of the Transport and General Worker's Union the men decided to call off the action. 186 
The activity of the Party in 1936 left the I. L. P. in an advantageous situation the 
following year during a second unofficial bus strike, which was again boycotted by the 
official elements of the Labour and Trades Union movement. The busmen again chose 
to use the I. L. P. 's headquarters as their central office and made extensive use of both 
local and national I. L. P. speakers in their cause with the culmination being a meeting at 
the end of April in the Market Place in Norwich where a crowd of 7,000 were addressed 
by Brockway, the I. L. P. Councillors and a number of the leaders of the strike. 187 During 
this period, these close connections between the I. L. P. and the busmen were an 
important part of George Johnson's arguments for the successes of I. L. P. policy. 
Nevertheless, for the Norwich I. L. P. the main questions, driven by municipal and 
parliamentary election activity, surrounded the relations with the Labour Party. The 
initial, extremely hostile relations between the two organisations were short-lived. After 
1933 the Labour Party was dependent on the I. L. P. for a majority on the Council and the 
I. L. P. group on the council attempted to develop a close working relationship with the 
elected representatives of the Labour Party. The local Labour Party was not opposed to 
such co-operation and moved a resolution to establish a permanent joint committee 
between the two groups on the council. However the idea was eventually crushed on the 
advice of the Labour Party's National Executive Committee. ' 88 Nevertheless, the two 
groups worked together closely and George Johnson spoke highly of the Norwich 
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Labour Party leadership. However, the small group was occasionally able to cause a stir 
as when in 1938 Johnson moved the suspension of standing orders to protest against a 
banquet given by the electricity committee. '89 
Following the failures of the Labour Party and I. L. P. in Norwich in the 1935 General 
Election the I. L. P. attempted to reopen negotiations with the Labour Party for electoral 
agreements, concentrating on the Parliamentary seat. There was widespread agreement 
with this view from within the local working class movement. However, despite 
repeated approaches from the Norwich Labour Party and Norwich Trades Council to the 
Labour Party the N. E. C. maintained a decision that both seats were to be fought by 
official Labour candidates, making clear that any agreement, explicit or tacit with the 
I. L. P. would mean that no candidate would be endorsed for the city. 190 The only 
concession was the selection of ex-I. L. P. General Secretary John Paton as one of the 
parliamentary candidates for the division. 
The East Anglian I. L. P. was not, however, confined to Norwich and the Party was able 
to build considerable strength and influence in Yarmouth during the second half of the 
1930s. Membership of the party in Yarmouth was never great. Immediately following 
disaffiliation membership stood at fifty and paradoxically as influence increased 
membership fell so by 1936 the total membership of Yarmouth I. L. P. was a mere 
twenty-three. Membership did pick up somewhat at the outbreak of war but by 1941 it 
had fallen back to seventeen, the level at which it remained to 1950. However, despite 
the falling membership, through the war and beyond the number of influential positions 
which I. L. P. ers found themselves in continued to increase so that by 1950 the Yarmouth 
Party had five members on the council and three on the executive of the Trades 
Council. 191 
Prior to 1935, the acrimonious divisions in the Yarmouth Labour Movement had 
prevented electoral progress. However, the leftward tilt of the local DLP together with a 
Liberal/Conservative municipal pact in 1935 moved the I. L. P. and Labour Parties 
towards an electoral agreement. 192 With this joint understanding in place, the I. L. P. was 
given a clear run by the Labour Party in two unsuccessful but promising fights in 
November 1936. By 1937 with the Unity Campaign in full swing there was close co- 
operation between the I. L. P. and the Labour Party. 193 
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In the 1937 municipal elections the I. L. P. made its first gain when L. F. Bunnewell 
gained a seat from the Conservatives, whilst the Labour Party gained its second council 
seat on the forty-eight strong council. Bunnewell received an enthusiastic reception at 
the I. L. P. club, he insisted that the result meant that the people of Yarmouth were 
condemning the old council and argued that Socialism would get rid of the 'old way of 
muddle'. The other I. L. P. candidate, Frank Stone, was defeated. He also had stressed the 
new unity between the two parties insisting that the increased vote for both Labour and 
the I. L. P. was an encouraging sign. 194 On Yarmouth Council, it was Bunnewell, as the 
most vocal of the three strong Labour-I. L. P. group who took the effective leadership of 
the organised opposition on the council. 195 The pact between I. L. P. and Labour 
continued through to the war enabling two further I. L. P. councillors to be elected, Frank 
Stone in South Ward and Mrs L. Gilham in St. Peters Wards. 196 
However, the primary strength of the Yarmouth I. L. P. was in the Union and Co- 
operative Movements. By 1937 I. L. P. er Frank Stone was established as chairman and 
Mrs Gilham as secretary of the Yarmouth Trades Council. Party members occupied a 
number of other influential positions within the Yarmouth trade union movement, 
including the chairman of the General and Municipal Workers' Union, the single largest 
trade union in the town as well as chairman of the Shipwrights and Shipconstructors 
Union, Chairman of Boilermakers Union, secretary of the Public Employees Union and 
secretary of Tailors and Garment Workers Union. The I. L. P. also had a number of 
members on the Trades Council and was influential within the Trades Union Club and 
Institute where the Chairman and Secretary were both I. L. P. ers. The Secretary of the 
Yarmouth NCLC was an I. L. P. er as was the Secretary of the Adult School and the I. L. P. 
also had a member on the Yarmouth Co-operative Education Committee. 197 
The East Anglian division, although internally divided, voted against the 'new 
revolutionary policy' in the immediate period after disaffiliation. However, the 
departure of rival R. P. C. and Unity Group factions combined with local growth and 
success to unify the division behind the N. A. C. It was only as national failings became 
increasingly apparent that the division moved to a position of support for re-affiliation. 
The East Anglian division was a relatively small division which became more 
significant within the party due to the declining fortunes of the I. L. P. elsewhere 
combined with success in developing a presence in particular localities. It is thus an 
interesting case of I. L. P. progress following disaffiliation. 
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3.10 Yorkshire 
Prior to disaffiliation the Yorkshire division was heavily influenced by its dominant 
Bradford federation. 198 However, Bradford was badly hit by disaffiliation, losing about 
half its membership, whilst other branches in the division were not as seriously 
affected. 199 The loss of many older members, such as John Fraser, the divisional 
organiser, disillusioned by the Party's United Front with the Communist Party was, 
largely offset by the recruitment of new members. 0° In particular the Sheffield branch, 
despite losing a large number of members immediately following disaffiliation, was 
quickly able to regain its previous size. 201 More significant was the fact that these new 
Sheffield members, led by R. P. C. member Stuart Friedenson, were young, active, and 
distinctly 'left'; the Sheffield Guild of Youth alone claimed 40 members in February 
1933.02 
In 1933 the Sheffield Branch managed to persuade the divisional conference to pass 
resolutions calling for the formation of militant workers groups in the wider Trade 
Union movement. 203 The following year there was a vigorous debate between Bradford 
and Sheffield members over the new party policy, where the Bradford members 
succeeded in passing a'pre-1932' policy document which did'not relegate Parliament to 
the backgroundi204 The conflict between older and younger members, between 
Bradford and Sheffield, continued through 1935. Sheffield objected to the 
overwhelming voting power of Bradford at divisional conferences, Bradford 
complained about R. P. C. and 'group activity' within the Party. However, during 1934-5 
the R. P. C. lost much influence in the Yorkshire division. In part this was because of the 
failures of the R. P. C. nationally. However, the failures of the R. P. C. within the 
Sheffield branch were a more important cause. The Sheffield branch leadership 
including Freidenson made a number of false accusations against one of its members, 
N. A. C. representative, Percy Williams. The resulting high profile dispute which took 
six months of 1934 to resolve, led to the accusations being withdrawn, the branch 
leadership resigning and the branch being split into four area groups. 205 The way was 
left open for the Bradford branches to commit the division to the cessation of group 
activities at the division's 1935 conference. 06 
Through the second half of the 1930s the Yorkshire Divisional Conference continued to 
be sharply divided. Having seen off the influence of the R. P. C. Bradford's dominance in 
divisional policy making, which stressed parliamentary and electoral socialism, came 
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under threat from a Trotskyist influence in areas such as Sheffield and Dewsbury. Thus, 
at the 1936 conference the influence of Trotskyists, most notably J. Goffe, within the 
Sheffield branch ensured that a number of motions were passed which were designed to 
protect the position of Trotskyists within party. Most notable was an amendment which 
declared that groups, in themselves, were not harmful. However, Sheffield also 
succeeded in passing its detailed plan of action and a criticism of the inner executives 
declaration on war. However, Bradford, along with other branches such as Hull which 
broadly supported the N. A. C. position, could still wield power within the division. 
Thus, Bradford blocked Sheffield's attempts to amend the immediate demands of the 
Party. Bradford was also able to ensure that motions more in line with its political 
priorities were passed, for example, with its plans to have the N. A. C. investigate the 
possibility of Regionalism in Local Government 207 
The I. L. P. 's main area of strength in Yorkshire, especially if measured in electoral terms 
remained in Bradford. The I. L. P. maintained an electoral presence in a number of wards 
in East Bradford, especially in the Tong and East Bowling wards. The Party's 
relationship with the Labour Party, largely dictated by electoral concerns and council 
business, at a low after disaffiliation, improved briefly before souring again with the 
opposition between the two parties in East Bradford during the 1935 General Election. 
In 1938 the Labour Party began opposing the I. L. P. in its East Bradford strongholds. 208 
The politics of the Bradford branches were heavily influenced by the character of Fred 
Jowett, the emphasis he placed on electoral politics and the continuing importance of 
Standing Orders in justifying continued severance from the Labour Party. However, 
despite the overwhelming sympathy which Jowett seemed to be able to generate within 
the Bradford I. L. P., there were nevertheless important dissenting voices from this 
policy. This was most significant within the Bradford Guild of Youth where the chair 
was held first by Horace Green, at the time sympathetic to the Communist Party, later 
C. P. North East Organiser, and then Evelyn Hurp, a Trotskyist and member of the 
Marxist Group. 
Elsewhere in the division the I. L. P. maintained an electoral presence, in Bentley, 
Darfield, Keighley and South Hemsworth. 209 However, despite the difficulties in the 
area it was in Sheffield that I. L. P. managed to maintain its highest profile outside 
Bradford. In particular it sustained a significant degree of activity, especially in 
agitation amongst the unemployed. In Sheffield, at the beginning of 1935, when the 
99 
Labour controlled council refused to meet a deputation from the unemployed there was 
a determined protest from the unemployed organised by the N. U. W. M., I. L. P. and C. P. 
with the leaders of the Yorkshire I. L. P. at the fore of the demonstration. Percy Williams 
led the demonstration at which twenty-three were arrested. Of those arrested all were 
released on bail apart from the I. L. P. 's Sheffield Organiser and R. P. C. member, Stuart 
Friedenson, who was singled out as a ring-leader. Following the demonstration the 
council agreed to restore the cuts, although they denied the decision had been influenced 
by the demonstration. 210 Nevertheless, the confidence of the demonstrators in Sheffield 
was increased, and the I. L. P. was involved in the organisation of further demonstrations 
in the city. 211 At the same time in Sheffield, the I. L. P. had some success recruiting for 
the trade unions and the General and Municipal Workers Union in particular. 212 
The Yorkshire division's membership was concentrated in Bradford. Yet, Bradford's 
strength was mainly based on its pre-disaffiliation position. In the period 1932-3 other 
areas, most notably Sheffield, were growing while Bradford was losing members. The 
differing perspectives of Bradford and Sheffield led to substantial conflicts throughout 
the early years after disaffiliation. However, the internal conflicts within the pro-RPC 
Sheffield branch followed by the R. P. C. 's decision to join the Communist Party, led to a 
shift in power back towards the Bradford federation. Although it faced challenges over 
the second half of the 1930s, Bradford succeeded in again incorporating its pro- 
parliamentary, anti-group perspective into the division's policy. 
3.11 Midlands 
In the immediate period after disaffiliation parts of the Midland I. L. P. were associated 
with the R. P. C. This came from two connected sources. First, the division was 
influenced by Eric Whalley, the Chairman of the Mansfield branch and leading member 
of the Comintern Affiliation Committee. Second, support for the R. P. C. came from the 
Midlands division Guild of Youth, which was both left-wing and highly active. 213 By 
1934, this section had gained significant influence on the Midlands Divisional Council. 
The result was that the Divisional Council came to an agreement with the district 
organisation of the Communist Party. The scope of the deal was much wider than 
required by the national I. L. P. line, including joint work within the trade unions and 
factories. 214 
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During the latter half of the 1930s, after Whalley and the R. P. C. had joined the 
Communist Party, the political orientation of the Midlands Division became based on 
loyalty to the N. A. C. position. At the 1936 Divisional conference the N. A. C. 's basic 
resolutions were all adopted, the only dissent coming over the question of sanctions 
against Italy, where the division supported Brockway's line. During the final two years 
of the decade this line of broad support for the party leadership was combined with an 
increasing level of pressure for reaffiliation to the Labour Party. In 1938 the Derby 
I. L. P., which had itself attempted locally to negotiate to rejoin the larger organisation, 
put a motion to the divisional conference. These initial moves towards rejoining Labour 
were strongly opposed from the rest of the division and the motion was heavily 
defeated. The following year amid strong opposition to the popular front being pressed 
by the Communist Party and opposed by the Labour Party, a Nottingham Branch 
resolution for conditional affiliation was carried. 215 
The main area of I. L. P. activity in the Midlands was Derby where the I. L. P. had initially 
been able to retain three Councillors. The I. L. P. group on the council attempted to 
improve the representation and hearing given to working class organisations, and the 
unemployed in particular, but the town council refused to listen to the small I. L. P. 
voice. 216 However, the real influence of the I. L. P. in Derby came through its work on 
the Trades Council. Five of the sixteen officials of that Council were definitely 
members of the I. L. P. and the numbers may have been higher. The vice-president of the 
Trades Council, Harry Cheshire, the district secretary of the Transport and General 
Workers Union, and the assistant secretary of the Council, J. F. Rushton of the National 
Union of Clerks and Administrative Workers Union were members of the I. L. P. Some 
Labour loyalists were extremely fearful that the Council had been captured by the I. L. P. 
Whilst such suggestions were exaggerated there was undoubtedly a strong left wing 
influence on the Trades Council which amongst other policies supported the Hunger 
Marches, vigorously opposed the means test and other government measures concerning 
unemployment and condemned collaboration with non-labour-movement personalities. 
It was the I. L. P., and not the Communist Party, which was the primary mover of such 
radicalism. 217 
Aside from the Trades Council the Party was particularly influential in the Derby Co- 
operative Society, the second largest in the East Midlands. I. L. P. influence in the Co- 
operative grew over the decade and reached its high point after May 1938. In May, as a 
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result of agitation by ex-I. L. P. councillor Goodwin England's NUDAW branch, the 
society began electing two employee-directors, and England was elected as one of the 
two. In addition, Alf Robinson, an I. L. P. member who had been on the board for some 
years was top of the poll in the ordinary directors election. The results meant that there 
were three I. L. P. members who were directors of Derby Co-operative Society. 218 
The Derby I. L. P. 's stress through the latter part of the decade was on rebuilding 
relations with the Labour Party. In 1936 the smaller Party 'refrain[ed] from putting up 
an I. L. P. candidate in order to secure a working class victory' when J. H. Thomas 
resigned the parliamentary seat 219 However, by the end of the decade the position of the 
I. L. P. within the Derby Labour Movement was on the wane. In part this was due to the 
loss of some of the organisation's most influential members, in particular Harry 
Cheshire, who died from pneumonia. 220 However, other much more systematic reasons 
played the most important part in the explanation of the decline of the I. L. P. in Derby. 
First of all whilst the I. L. P. was looking to move towards closer connections with the 
local Labour Party, the larger organisation was increasingly prepared to use its power 
against the I. L. P. to ease it away from influential positions. Thus in the lead up to the 
1938 municipal elections, the I. L. P. had nominated three candidates. However, as an 
unreciprocated gesture of unity the party withdrew two of them and tried to open 
negotiations with the Labour Party. The Labour Party, following N. E. C. advice refused 
to come to an agreement. The I. L. P. was thus left with its one candidate, John Gill, 
treasurer of Derby I. L. P., in the Normanton Ward where he had lived since 1916.221 
Nevertheless he was heavily defeated coming third and bottom of the poll well behind 
his victorious Labour opponent. The I. L. P. on the council was thus reduced in the 
second half of the decade to a single Councillor Tom Markland. As the Labour Party 
consolidated its majority on the Town Council less room was left for I. L. P. manoeuvre. 
At the same time the Communist Party began to establish itself more effectively in the 
town's major industries and the Communist Party influence in Derby rose to equal that 
of the I. L. P. by the outbreak of war. 222 
Elsewhere in the Midlands Division the I. L. P. could only muster limited influence, 
presumably based on local personalities. Its only other electoral successes were in 
Donisthorpe and Alfreton. In Donisthorpe the I. L. P. won a single seat in 1934. In 
Alfreton the I. L. P. was able to increase its representation from one to two in April 1938 
when Fred Lee was elected against Labour opposition. The I. L. P. 's retiring councillor, 
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was forced to defend his position as his campaign was hampered by an extended 
struggle with the religious organisations as he stood for Sunday facilities for recreation. 
Nevertheless, he won comfortably topping the poll with 1,079 votes. 223 The following 
year the electoral agreement between the I. L. P and the Labour Party was restored, and 
Joe Kitts, the I. L. P. candidate, topped the poll with 1009 votes. 24 In other traditional 
areas of strength in the Midlands the party was crippled by disaffiliation, as in Leicester 
where the decision removed 600 of the branch's 700 members. 225 
The Midland's Division was initially one of the most enthusiastic about the United Front 
with the Communist Party. Experience of the United Front in practice along with the 
adoption by the C. P. of Popular Front policies tempered the desire to work with the 
Communists. These difficulties were combined, especially in Derby with dwindling 
influence, as the I. L. P. was forced to combat the Labour Party. These factors combined 
together to swing Divisional opinion in favour of re-affiliation to the Labour Party. 
Nevertheless, largely though the position of a few influential individuals the I. L. P. was 
able to maintain a high profile in some parts of the Midlands during the 1930s. 
3.12 South Wales 
The policy of the Welsh Division evolved as a response to a series of crises and booms 
in activity and membership through the decade. The Division had been badly affected 
by disaffiliation. Before disaffiliation the main strength of the Welsh Division had come 
from Cardiff and Mid-Glamorgan 226 However, following the 1932 decision the 
situation in mid-Glamorgan was depressing for the I. L. P. 227 Whilst the main branches 
from the Cardiff area reported back to the I. L. P. enthusiastically about their support for 
the Bradford decision, they found it difficult to maintain their activities. 228 Almost the 
only bright spot for the Party was in Merthyr where the branch achieved a 'fifty percent 
increase in activity' in the immediate period after disaffiliation 229 
The division initially made a firm stand against the new revolutionary policy of the 
party and strongly backed the Socialism in Our Time Policy at its 1933 Derby 
conference. 23° When the 'revolutionary' policy was passed it was received badly in 
Wales, especially as it involved a commitment to work with the Communist Party. The 
Divisional Council drifted towards inactivity and by the annual conference the 
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following year had virtually ceased to operate. 231 Investigations by the N. A. C. led to the 
conclusion that it was necessary to reconstruct the divisional machinery completely. 232 
This reconstruction of the central Welsh machinery was complete by August 1934 and 
the N. A. C. reporters suggested a renewed enthusiasm and efficiency could be detected 
in the Division. 33 To consolidate, the Party conducted a ten day campaign across the 
division with meetings involving all the parties major speakers and meetings in every 
major city in industrial South Wales 234 They struggled with a few contacts to try and 
build up branches in Swansea, Taibach and Barry. In the Cardiff area there was a 
reliance on a small number of members almost all of whom were unemployed. In the 
Rhondda area the I. L. P. could only claim one branch, Treorchy, and even that was not 
functioning. Only in Merthyr could the I. L. P. claim real strength. 235 
However, from this weak base the membership drive did see something of a turn around 
in the fortunes in the Welsh Division. Membership, measured by affiliation fees had 
risen substantially by the 1935 conference. The debates at that conference reflected the 
new levels of enthusiasm. The Welsh I. L. P. struck out a position of fierce independence 
maintaining hostility to working with the Communist Party and equally to any pact with 
the Labour Party. 236 The stand of the division, especially against working with the 
Communist Party, was not in line with the new revolutionary policy of the party and at a 
subsequent divisional conference later in 1935 the R. P. C. leader, Jack Gaster, was sent 
to Wales as the N. A. C representative. Gaster used the opportunity of his visit to attack 
the Division for opposing both the national policy of the party and for refusing to work 
with the Communist Party. 237 
Gaster's attacks on the Welsh Division were not heeded. Their impact was no doubt 
weakened when he joined the Communist Party in November. The Division remained 
committed to working separately from the C. P., with a particular focus on establishing 
an industrial profile. Thus, in 1935 an industrial policy was formulated centred on a 
'rejection of class collaboration. '238 The debate at divisional conference the following 
year focussed on the stay in strikes in the mining industry and calls for the 
reorganisation of MFGB. This was supplemented with strong demands for control of the 
unions to be in the hands of the rank and file. 9 
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With the increase in Welsh radicalism through the second half of 1936 the party's partial 
recovery in Wales continued. For example, the twenty I. L. P. ers who participated in the 
1936 Welsh Hunger March were joined by many more party members along the route 
who assisted with the march. The I. L. P. was also involved with the action against 
Industrial Unionism in South Wales, in particular in the famous Nine-Mile Point stay 
down strike, where I. L. P. leader Jack Marsden, as chairman of the Nine-Mile point 
lodge was instrumental in both floating the idea of a stay-down strike to the SWMF and 
in organisation of the strike. 240 By the Welsh Division's January 1937 conference, 
affiliation fees were up a further twenty per cent, where the Welsh Party welcomed the 
unity proposal agreed to by the Socialist League, the Communist Party and the I. L. P. 
called for the setting up of a South Wales Unity Committee. 41 However, the boom in 
the Welsh I. L. P. 's fortunes was short-lived. 
The I. L. P. was marginalised from the growing 'unity' in Wales almost as soon as the 
increasing radicalism developed. The Unity Campaign was over almost before it started, 
Marsden's attempts to capitalise on his position in the stay down strikes failed and in the 
wake of the events in Barcelona in May 1937 relations between the C. P. and the I. L. P. 
hit new lows. The Party became engaged in long and acrimonious debate with the 
SWMF over the Bedwas agreement. The I. L. P. accused the SWMF, with the assistance 
of the Communist Party, of allowing the 'right' to gain the upper hand and accepting a 
no strike agreement. Will Paynter's reply on behalf of the SWMF Executive Committee, 
suggested that the I. L. P. position was 'nothing more than unwarranted slander'. 
However, criticism of Trade union bureaucracy moving 'towards collaboration with the 
employing class and repressing the fighting spirit of the rank and file' was not restricted 
to the miners, with the T&GWU also coming in for strong criticism. 242 The impact on 
I. L. P. membership was dramatic, affiliation fees fell by forty per cent in the first half of 
1937 and had been reduced from that level a further fifty per cent by mid-way through 
the following year. 243 
The rapid decline in divisional fortunes saw new moves to re-affiliate to the Labour 
Party. However, the division as a whole was of the view that 'I. L. P. provided the 
rallying ground for Socialists who were disillusioned with the policies of the Labour 
Party and the C. P. and would be the standby of the workers when the wider movement 
failed them. i244 The following year, as many of those who had advocated reaffiliation 
had rejoined the Labour Party as individuals, discussion again centred on the Labour 
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Party. However, the Division was now united on the issue. It adopted without 
opposition a resolution that although endorsing the principle of working class unity 
insisted that the I. L. P. 'must retain its identity and freedom of expression, that recruits 
must accept the policy of the Party and that strict discipline must be enjoined on all 
'2s5 members. 
Thus, the position of the I. L. P. across South Wales was, by the later years of the 1930s, 
significantly weakened. 246 However, there were areas where the I. L. P. could maintain 
sufficient strength not only to hold meetings and recruit but also to hold positions of 
influence and win electoral struggles. In some such areas, for example Newport, this 
appears to be largely due to the influence of a single individual. 247 Elsewhere, as in 
Machen, where by the end of the decade the I. L. P. 's two councillors held the balance of 
power on the UDC, the party's influence was somewhat more durable. 248 
However, the main area of strength for the Welsh I. L. P. throughout the 1930s was 
Merthyr. In the immediate period after disaffiliation the party had managed to secure a 
small group on the town council and they were normally supported by a further 
independent socialist councillor, Dai Protheroe, who had initially disaffiliated with the 
I. L. P. Undismayed by the relative failure of the 1934 by-election and buoyed by the 
reasonable result in the 1935 general election and their continuing success in the 
Plymouth Ward on the council, the Merthyr I. L. P. continued to fight with some 
effectiveness against the Labour Party especially in the Penydarren ward long after the 
I. L. P. in many other areas of Britain had adopted a policy of conciliation towards the 
larger organisation. 249 
Despite this failure to increase representation the I. L. P. did maintain its three 
councillors, Jim Davies, B. H. Davies and Claude Stanfield, who was also the I. L. P. 
Merthyr General Election candidate in 1935, throughout the period. Once established 
the group played an increasing role in Merthyr politics. By 1938 the I. L. P. group in the 
Town Council was able to take the lead in pressure to get increased unemployment 
allowances. They put forward a number of motions supported by Sam Jennings, a 
disillusioned senior Labour figure, and secured discussion on a motion examining 
proposed changes to deduction from the allowances. 250 By May 1938 Jim Davies had 
served on the council long enough to become mayor making him the first mayor in 
Britain to have been elected as a disaffiliated I. L. P. er. 
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Davies did not treat his position as mayor in an overly political manner but nevertheless 
took the initiative in calling a meeting to promote renewed action in Merthyr against the 
means test. The resulting meeting, later described in the New Leader as 'the largest and 
most militant held in Merthyr for years, ' had an all in platform with representatives from 
Miners' Federation, the Trades Council the I. L. P., the C. P., the Co-operative Society, 
the Free Church Council and even the Federated Chamber of Trades, in addition to the 
Mayor and the MP, S. O. Davies. However, at least according to the I. L. P. press, the 
greatest enthusiasm on the day was reserved for the most popular of the I. L. P. ers Claude 
Stanfield who as he rose to speak was initially unable to speak for several minutes due 
to the cheering. 25' 
However, the disagreements between the I. L. P. and the Communists which affected the 
rest of the country also had an impact in Merthyr, deadening attempts at united action 
and causing public controversy. Bad feeling developed during the opposition of 
Communist and I. L. P. candidates in the 1934 by-election and the attempts of the 
Communist Party to use the all-party N. U. W. M. in support of Hannington, which saw 
some of the younger I. L. P. members join the C. P. 252 Later, following the disputes over 
the Spanish Civil War, relations deteriorated further although the I. L. P. could still 
command considerable sympathy in Merthyr. For example in July 193 8a protest against 
the means test was organised by the Trades and Labour Council. One section was led by 
the most prominent I. L. P. ers, but Stanfield was only allowed to speak after protests 
from the crowd. The official Labour and Communist representatives both accused the 
I. L. P. of destroying the unity of the march and did so with considerable aggression in 
the case of the Daily Worker. Homer himself accused the crowd of terrorism and of 
being 'a sample of Trotskyism', however, from the I. L. P. perspective it was not they 
who had destroyed the unity of the march it was the organisers who sought to exclude 
the I. L. P: 253 
It was the cry of the people for workers' unity that led the crowd to demand that Stanfield the 
foremost fighter or the unemployed in Merthyr should not be excluded from the platform. 254 
Nevertheless, within Merthyr itself the I. L. P. appeared to maintain its level of influence 
and the three I. L. P. councillors remained in place until the war. 255 
The images of South Wales in the 1930s conventionally depict radicalism, with an 
emphasis on the hunger marches, stay down strikes, unemployed demonstrations and 
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miners acting against fascism. Those who created this history of the 1930s in Wales are 
. conventionally understood to have been in the Communist Party or on the left of the 
Labour Party. This is both because they organised the events and, as importantly, 
because it has been Communists and Communist sympathisers who have written most 
prolifically about such events. A study of the Welsh I. L. P. in the 1930s provides an 
interesting insight into the realities of left wing politics in South Wales in a period 
which is often characterised as one of unity. The I. L. P. maintained some areas of 
strength in the area through the period and saw itself clearly as part of the militant left, 
but deteriorating relations with the Communists and factional fighting set in almost as 
soon as any semblance of left unity could be established. Popular Front unity had clear 
limits, and by the second half of 1937, the I. L. P. to its cost stood without these 
boundaries. 
3.13 North East 
In the immediate period after disaffiliation the North East division, especially those 
branches on the East coast were deeply concerned about the Party's new revolutionary 
policy, the role of the R. P. C. and the relationship with the Communist Party. The 
executive of the Divisional Council, led by Mark Simpson256 voted decisively against 
the I. L. P. position with regard to the Communist Party and wrote to the N. A. C. 
requesting a discontinuance of all association with that Party. 257 However, the North 
East's Divisional Council disagreed with the actions of its Executive and in this they 
were backed by N. A. C. representative Tom Stephenson who frequently voted with the 
R. P. C. on the N. A. C. The issue was taken to a special divisional conference held at the 
end of October 1933. The meeting supported Stephenson and the Divisional Council in 
voting overwhelmingly for a continuation of the United Front, in favour of Workers' 
Councils and for the N. A. C. 's 'place of parliament' report. 258 However, the feelings 
against working with the Communist Party remained, especially amongst the east coast 
branches. At the Divisional Conference in early 1935 the Gateshead and Sunderland 
branches succeeded in passing a motion to discontinue joint activity with the C. P. 
despite opposition from the Cumberland area. 259 
The 1935 General Election changed the outlook of the division. Defeat in Whitehaven 
had the effect of convincing the Tom Stephenson, that there was little future in I. L. P. 
electoral contests and moving him towards supporting reaffiliation. 26° In 1936 
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Ashington successfully argued for moves to unify all competing organisations dealing 
with unemployment, sickness, accident and old age. In the subsequent years the division 
concentrated on issues such as 'the evils of overtime work' and 'the necessary first steps 
of social government'. The only hints of later events, when the Division came to be 
dominated by Trotskyists, came from the newly formed Durham Branch, which did try 
to push a Trotskyist position but were heavily defeated in 1936 in their attempts to 
retain organised groups within the party and to push the formation of the Fourth 
International . 
261 However, the relative divisional consensus of the mid-1930s began to 
show significant cracks in 1939 over the question of Munich which dominated the 
conference that year. Steve Wilson in his presidential address strongly supported 
Maxton's position, arguing, against the mood of many at the conference, that his speech 
was 'good Socialism. i262 
The North East division, which had been heavily dependent on Yorkshire divisional 
organisation prior to 1932, was relatively badly affected by disaffiliation, losing thirteen 
branches and failing to form any replacements. Membership was further cut with the 
loss of six more branches in the immediate period after disaffiliation during the period 
of co-operation with the Communist Party, those who opposed such activity claiming 
membership had been cut in half. However, there was also a considerable refocusing of 
the strength within the division, with Cumberland playing an increasingly active role. 
Partly as a result of this renewed activity in Cumberland the Party in the North East was 
able to grow in the period 1934-6. The growth was particularly rapid during 1934-5 
when the North East was the fastest growing area in the country with affiliation fees 
rising twenty five per cent over the year. 263 
The party kept a presence on the East Coast. Gateshead, under the leadership of Fred 
Tait, remained the strongest branch in the North East following disaffiliation, claiming 
about 100 members, despite an initial decision to maintain affiliation to the Labour 
Party. 264 The Gateshead branch was active not only in anti-fascist activity and working 
with the Socialist League, but also in developing its educational role, opening a branch 
library and in setting up the Gateshead Esperanto society. 265 The I. L. P. also maintained 
a reasonable branch in Ashington and also a branch of about 90 members, centred on a 
Socialist Cafe, in Newcastle East, where the disaffiliation decision had been relatively 
uncontroversial. 266 In South Bank on Teeside by 1937 the I. L. P. had five councillors on 
Eston UDC, two councillors on North Riding County Council, an AEU branch 
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secretary, and chairman of the PAC amongst their members. 267 In Jarrow, the I. L. P., 
although without any effective organisation in the early years after disaffiliation, had by 
1937 managed to secure the election of two councillors. 268 The I. L. P. also had some 
strength in Stockton, Sunderland where they were active in agitating for pensioners, and 
Rowlands Gill. 269 
However, following disaffiliation Cumberland, and the West Coast, came to play a 
much increased role in the North East division. I. L. P. ers achieved posts on the County 
Council, on Moresby RDC and on the Cleator Moor Co-op Committee of Management 
in October 1936270 However, as significant was the leadership role which Tom 
Stephenson, a prominent member of the Cumberland Miners' Association, and the I. L. P. 
was able to assume within the wider Labour movement. For example in November 
1936, on the first day of operation of the new UAB scales, the I. L. P. took a leading role 
in the demonstrations. The demonstrations were organised by the West Cumberland 
Workers Unity Committee. 71 The march involved approximately two thousand workers 
from Frizington, Cleator Moor, Cleator, Parton, Egremont and Kells who joined the 
workers of Whitehaven in protest. The demonstration culminated in a meeting which 
sent one member from each contingent went on a deputation to the UAB officer with 
Tom Stephenson as the acknowledged speaker for the entire deputation. 272 Following 
the demonstration the Cumberland PAC decided to pay the arrears of benefit owing to 
the unemployed. 273 Stephenson was also an integral part, with Comrades Cole and G. 
Garvil, the Cumberland I. L. P. federation secretary, of the I. L. P. dominated deputation to 
the council that succeeded in getting feeding for schoolchildren in Whitehaven. 274 
During the 1930s the I. L. P. maintained a significant presence in the North East despite 
being badly hit by disaffiliation on the East coast. Most of the I. L. P. 's strength built on 
the position established in Cumberland under the leadership of Tom Stephenson. 
Despite disagreements over the effectiveness of working with the Communist Party the 
North East Division was relatively unaffected by factional conflict during the 1930s. 
This allowed other areas of strength, such as South Bank, to be established. This proved 
possible even where, as in Jarrow, there was no post-disaffiliation organisation to build 
upon. However, disillusionment following the 1935 General Election led the division to 
increasingly serious consideration of re-affiliation. 
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3.14 South West 
The South West Division of the Party found itself in a difficult position following 
disaffiliation. The division had significant strength in only a few places, most 
importantly in Bristol, but the division covered a huge area. With only limited income it 
was virtually impossible for the Divisional organiser to keep in touch with branches. 
The problems were especially acute in Cornwall where poverty was widespread, and 
some branches were 200 miles away from the divisional centre in Bristol. 275 
In policy terms the dominant Bristol branch managed to pass a resolution opposing the 
emphasis on workers' councils in the new party policy in 1934. However, following 
disaffiliation the divisional secretary, Robert Rawlings of Taunton, was an active 
member of the R. P. C. and his influence went some way to explaining the prominence of 
support for the Communist Party within the division. 276 In early 1935, Bristol branch 
only narrowly managed to block a move from Clutton calling for a Unity Conference 
with the Communist Party. With this success for Bristol, and with the departure of the 
R. P. C. nationally later that year, the views of Bristol became increasingly ascendant 
within the division. 77 Later in the decade, the South West division was largely happy to 
reiterate the basic policy resolutions suggested by the N. A. C. 278 
In Bristol the I. L. P. was boosted initially by the defection of a significant number of 
Labour members to the I. L. P. following disaffiliation. 279 The Party maintained two seats 
on the council with Comrade Scull re-elected in 1935 and Fred Berriman the following 
year, in an election which saw an electoral agreement between Labour and the I. L. P. 
which lasted through the 1936 Municipal elections and allowed the I. L. P. to claim its 
part in the fifteen Bristol Labour gains that year. 280 Following the election the Labour 
Party had a majority on the City Council and it chose to further the extent of the co- 
operation between the two organisations by asking Berriman to co-operate in 
administration, without any restriction on his right to speak or vote. Thus he was 
appointed Chairman of the Small Holdings and Allotments Committee and Vice 
Chairman of the Mental Hospital and Printing Committees. 281 Some tensions remained 
within the Bristol Labour Movement, for example, in August 1937 the Bristol 
Amalgamated Union of Building Trade Workers refused to allow I. L. P. ers to take office 
in the branch. 282 Nevertheless, it was clear that the Bristol I. L. P. saw its future as 
working with the Labour Party. 
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Outside Bristol, the Party in the South West was relatively weak. There was some 
revival of interest in the I. L. P. in Cornwall where Fred Berriman and Wilfred Young 
organised a relatively successful campaign in 1934 involving amongst others John 
McGovern and Kate Spurell283 Meetings were held in Truro where the I. L. P. claimed 
that it was they who organised the unemployed, Delabole, Redruth, Camborne, 
Penance and Camelford. The I. L. P. managed to establish a new branch in Redruth and 
make some contacts in Camelford where the I. L. P. had never even held a meeting 
before. 284 Affiliation fees over the year to 1935 rose about nine per cent. 285 However the 
base of support for the party in the division remained very low, in Camborne, where 
hopes prior to 1935 had been hopeful of electoral prospects, the branch was reduced to 
twelve, mostly unemployed, members. 286 Nevertheless, the I. L. P. candidates Jack and 
Arthur Behenna gained two council seats in Truro in 1936-7 despite there being no prior 
tradition of I. L. P. electoral success. 287 
The I. L. P. in the South West faced an uphill struggle, a small membership spread over a 
huge area made organisation difficult, and the Division initially faced divisions along 
factional lines. Consolidation saw an increased role for the dominant Bristol branches 
and their policy of support for the N. A. C. accepted as divisional policy. Nevertheless, 
electoral victories elsewhere demonstrated that despite its weaknesses and isolation in 
the South West the I. L. P. could develop something of a local profile. 
3.15 Conclusion 
During the 1930s the I. L. P. was extremely active at local level. Members maintained a 
vibrant cultural life which, in areas such as rambling and cycling, saw the Party binding 
together the social with the political. This aspect of the I. L. P. 's activity was one reason 
why in some areas wo&, able to sustain high levels of membership and activity 
through the traumatic period of disaffiliation from the Labour Party. However, local 
electoral politics, another area of traditional I. L. P. influence, was particularly badly 
affected by disaffiliation. The overwhelming majority of the Party's elected 
representatives chose to remain with the Labour Party in 1932, even in areas where the 
rest of the I. L. P. was solidly behind disaffiliation. Thus, with the exception of Glasgow, 
if the I. L. P. was to succeed in local electoral politics during the 1930s it had to build up 
from scratch. In most places the demands of such a task were too great, but in a few 
places such as Barrhead, Bradford, South Bank, Norwich, Yarmouth, Welwyn Garden 
City and Merthyr the Party did secure a number of councillors. 
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As the policy of the party changed and became less focussed on electoral politics, the 
focus of local activity also shifted somewhat. Other arenas were found for I. L. P. 
activity; the N. U. W. M., or other unemployment associations, Hunger March 
committees, the Trade Unions, Trades Council and clubs, anti-fascist and anti-war 
organisations all had important I. L. P. influences in many places. The overall picture 
shows considerable diversity and local Party organisations showed considerable 
ingenuity in finding differing ways of expressing their political identity. Yet some 
general patterns can be detected. Where the I. L. P. flourished it was either because there 
was a significant remnant of organisational structure and membership from pre- 
disaffiliation days, or it was because there was a niche available for the party to exploit- 
electoral, conceptual or organisational. The Party's greatest successes came where these 
factors overlapped, as in Norwich, where there were remnants of a strong past, a long 
established I. L. P. club, rooms and electoral tradition. This was combined with 
organisational, conceptual and electoral niches- there was no Labour Party Catton Ward 
organisation, and the Labour Party refused to help with the frequent unofficial industrial 
disputes in the City. The Labour Party also made relatively few moves against the I. L. P. 
in Norwich, allowing the favourable situation to persist. Thus, remnants and niches gave 
an opportunity for the I. L. P. to develop a local political profile. They are central to an 
understanding of the successes of the I. L. P. during the 1930s. However, particularly as 
the emphasis moves to Parliamentary elections and national politics, these concepts also 
help explain the relative failures of the I. L. P. during the decade. 
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477 against the Ratepayers Association's 544 in a ward from which the Labour Party was prepared to 
withdraw in favour of the I. L. P. as it had previously fought it on four occasions with disappointing polls. 
Harrison was elected the following year. New Leader, April 16 1937 
127 For example when I. L. P. member Stan Parker led a deputation of the unemployed to the council Ruth 
Harrison was able to get a resolution unanimously passed that action should be taken by Bucks County 
Council. New Leader, August 20 1937 
128 The Daily Worker was quick to accuse the I. L. P. of splitting the vote but the I. L. P. claimed that as the 
Labour Party had refused to enter into negotiations and its victory at the previous election gave it the right 
to put forward a candidate. The result was a victory for the ratepayers over the split I. L. P. /Labour vote. 
New Leader, March 25 1938; New Leader, April 1 1938; New Leader, April 8 1938 
129 New Leader, March 11 1938 
130 London Organisers Report Oct 25- Nov 1 1936 
131 The Hastings unemployed group, quickly became defunct because, the party claimed, of the seasonal 
nature of unemployment. New Leader, March 13 1936; London Organisers Report Oct 25-Nov 1 1936 
132 In June 1936 they attempted to enter a straight fight with the ratepayers after the Labour Party had 
announced that they would not enter the contest. However, as soon as the I. L. P. announced its intentions 
the Labour Party also joined in. The I. L. P. came bottom of the three cornered contest with a fairly 
derisory 67 votes with the ratepayer winning comfortably. This one contest against the Labour Party was 
sufficient to convince the Hastings Party of their electoral weakness. New Leader, June 12 1936; New 
Leader, November 5 1937 
133 New Leader, May 18 1934 
134 A number of the I. L. P. ers responsible for the motion attempted to influence the consideration of the 
motion whilst attending the Trades Council meeting as non-delegates. However, as the TUC pointed out 
the I. L. P. was not a proscribed organisation thus the Trades Council itself chose not to take any action. 
TUC-Hastings Trades Council Correspondence 12 December 1935; 12 December 1935 (2); 14 December 
1935 MRC/MSS292/79H/20; Industrial Committee Minutes, May 26 1936; N. A. C. minutes February 15 
1936; New Leader, January 24 1936; TUC-Hastings Trades Council Correspondence June 26 1937 
MRC/MSS292/79H/20; TUC Correspondence I. L. P. File A. J. White to E. P. Harries October 4 1936 
MRC/MSS922/756.1/1 
135 The allegation against the branch was that it had appointed I. L. P. members to official positions, after 
three members of the I. L. P. were elected as a delegation to the Hastings Corporation Staff committee. The 
Union Head Office ruled that members of the I. L. P. were ineligible for any office in the Union. The 
branch ignored the ruling and sought a precise statement from an Head Office official. At the adjourned 
meeting the District Organiser, a paid official, took the chair, in direct contravention of the Union rules, 
which prohibited paid officials from presiding. The District organiser ruled that all nomination of 
I. L. P. ers should be barred and secured a majority of 25 to 20 for that decision. The I. L. P. ers then moved a 
successful resolution to be sent to the District Committee that the Black Circular should be discussed by 
that body. In response to this apparently constitutional proposal the Union District Committee sent Mr 
Whiting, the G&MWU official who had fought Bob Edwards in the 1935 General Election. He threatened 
the I. L. P. ers with expulsion and advised the District Committee to close down the branch indefinitely on 
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the grounds that 'the I. L. P. members were obstructionists and belonged to the Union only to propagate 
I. L. P. treachery and not to further Trade Union interests. ' The Union followed Whitting's advice and the 
branch was quickly closed down. 
136 12 December 1935 (2); 14 December 1935 (MRC/MSS292/79H/20); Industrial Committee Minutes, 
May 26 1936; N. A. C. minutes February 15 1936; New Leader, January 24 1936; TUC-Hastings Trades 
Council Correspondence June 26 1937 (MRC/MSS292/79H/20); TUC Correspondence I. L. P. File A. J. 
White to E. P. Harries October 4 1936 (MRC/MSS922/756.1/1) 
137 Notes on No. 9 NMLH/C. P. /IND/MISC/17/09; New Leader, 17 February 1933 
138 Over the year 1934-5 the Lancashire Division saw its affiliation fees drop by 58 per cent In the first 
three months of the 1935 financial year the Lancashire Division affiliation fees were £6 10s 4d, down 
from £15 16s 1 Id for the same period a year earlier. Executive Committee Report June 29-30 1935 
139 Labour's Northern Voice, May 1934 
140 Labour's Northern Voice, February 1933; September 1933 
141 Initially the council withdrew its support from such events, subsequently it requested all branches to 
cease united front activity. Labour's Northern Voice, July 1933 
142 Labour's Northern Voice, February 1934 
'43 Labour's Northern Voice, February 1934 
144 N. A. C. minutes June 24-25 1933 
145 The Liverpool federation had lost only one branch due to disaffiliation. 
146 Labour's Northern Voice, August 1933; December 1933 
147 Labour's Northern Voice, August 1933 
148 The Wigan R. P. C. was led by Robert Rawlinson and J. Home. Labour's Northern Voice, May 1934; 
New Leader, 4 May 1934 R. P. C. influence also extended elsewhere. In Chorley, R. P. C. member Bob 
Edwards held a position of such great significance within the Branch that they conceded that without 
Edwardssactivity it was virtually impossible . for the Branch to carry on in an effective matter. Executive 
Committee report for N. A. C. August 11-12 1934 Even in Sandham's Blackpool branch, there was a 
growing R. P. C. influence stemming from the activity of Comrade Sudlow, a young window cleaner. 
Letter from Francis Johnson to G. E. Humphries, BLPES/Francis Johnson Papers/1934 
'49 N. A. C. minutes August 5-7 1933 
150 The opposition to the united front from the Lancashire Divisional council only intensified with the 
letter to branches asking them to cease united front activities. The Council refused the N. A. C. 's demands 
to withdraw the circular by a vote of 10 to 5. Then the Divisional half-yearly conference on 19 August 
then ratified the Council decision, passing Sandham's resolution against the united front by a vote of 31 to 
26. N. A. C. minutes 23-24 September 1933; Labour's Northern Voice, September 1933 
151 N. A. C. minutes September 23-24 1933 
152 New Leader, 6 April 1934 cf. 1934 ILP annual Conference Report, Labour's Northern Voice, April 
1934 
153 Immediate resignations included other leading members of the Lancashire Division such as Samuel 
Higgenbotham, the editor of Labour's Northern Voice, Arthur Mostyn, an ex-councillor and the Labour's 
Northern Voice cartoonist from the Manchester Central Branch, and Stephen Shaw and Roger Shakelton 
of the Nelson Weavers. Sandham's personal position was initially unclear. He had committed himself to 
123 
the I. L. P. at York and deliberately refrained from attending the initial meetings of those who were leaving 
the Party and also attended meetings of those who were trying to reorganise the Lancashire I. L. P. 
However, his close connection to the Lancashire rebels meant that the pull of the I. S. P. was too much. 
Sandharn eventually made up his mind to resign from the I. L. P. in June over two months after Abbott's 
resignation. The delay in resignation was too much for the N. A. C., which refused to send out the letter it 
had written thanking Sandharn for his years of service in the I. L. P. New Leader, 4 May 1934; Labour's 
Northern Voice, June 1934; Minutes of Special Divisional Conference May 26 1934; Labour's Northern 
Voice, July 1934 
154 Six members of the R. P. C., Bob Edwards (Chorley), Comrade Wolfenden (Moston), the Lancashire 
Divisional Chair of the R. P. C, Gertie Slater (Moston), Rawlinson (Wigan), J. Home (Wigan) and Hughes 
(Liverpool), found themselves elected for the first time onto the Divisional Council. 
Minutes of Special Divisional Conference May 26 1934; Labour's Northern Voice, June 1934 
155 At the time Edwards was still officially suspended from the Party for his activities in the Comintern 
Affiliation Committee. Edwards was readmitted to the party at the first N. A. C. meeting he attended. I. L. P. 
Executive Committee Report November 16-17 1934. 
156 The sixteen branches were Ashton, Burnley, Blackpool, Denton, Irlam, Manchester City, Manchester 
East, Middleton, Moss Side, New Ferry, New Cross, Rusholme, Rossendale, Heywood, Prescot, and 
Tintwistle. (Executive Committee Report, August I 1-12 1934) 
157 New Leader, August 17 1934; I. L. P. Executive Committee Report November 16-17; 1934 I. L. P. Inner 
Executive 22 September 1934 
158 This was reflected in the choice of new leading officials in the Divisional Council, G. E. Humphreys 
was secretary and C. H. Cund was the treasurer, both were from the Kirkdale Branch in Liverpool. New 
Leader, September 28 1934 
159 New Leader, October 5 1934 
160 I. L. P. Executive Committee Report November 16-17 1934 
16' New Leader, February 15 1935 
162 New Leader, February 7; New Leader, January 29 1937; 1936 New Leader, February 18 1938; New 
Leader, February 10 1939 
163 New Leader, August 26 1932; Labour's Northern Voice Cotton Supplement, November 1932 
164 Labour's Northern Voice Cotton Supplement, November 1932 
165 Industrial Committee Minutes, July 16 1936 
166 The Lancashire District Committee of the Communist Party accused Lancashire I. L. P. of breaking the 
United Front, being isolated from the cotton workers struggle and anyway dead as a political force. The 
Lancashire I. L. P. replied that it was very much alive and that it was the C. P. who broke the United Front. 
It also claimed that it was I. L. P. members within the cotton unions, such as Tom Ralphs of Oldham I. L. P. 
and leader of the spinners union, who were quietly and without fuss fighting for a socialist policy whilst 
the Communist Party was continually seeking the limelight. Indeed the 1937 Lancashire Divisional 
Conference insisted that main work of Lancashire I. L. P. during the year had been connected with the 
cotton campaign while its pamphlet, The Great Cotton Swindle written by Bob Edwards, had sold well. 
New Leader, May 15 1936; New Leader, June 19 1936 
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167 Initially the I. S. P. proposed using the opportunity to engage in joint work with the I. L. P. and a letter 
was sent from I. S. P. asking for a meeting with I. L. P. representatives. However, whilst the I. L. P. was 
prepared to send its Chairman, Secretary and a Lancashire representative to a meeting with the I. S. P., the 
latter was having second thoughts and repeated delayed the meeting until the end of the year when an 
I. S. P. Special Conference finally decided August 1937 that it was 'not an opportune moment to open up 
another Unity Campaign. ' Executive Committee Report May 23 1936; N. A. C. minutes August 2 1937; 
N. A. C. minutes October 22 1937; N. A. C. minutes December 11 1937 
168 N. A. C. minutes December 1940; Labour's Northern Voice, May 1936; October 1936; January 1937; 
April 1937; August/September 1937; September 1939; October 1939 
169 Bob Edwards, later MP for Bilston, had been chairman of the I. L. P. Guild of Youth and a councillor in 
Liverpool at the age of 22.. Further details of Bob Edwards Life can be found in his unpublished, and 
uncompleted autobiography Revolutionary Adventures, parts of which are to be found in Box 4 of the Bob 
Edwards papers at the National Museum of Labour History. An examination of May Edwards' first spell 
on the council can be found in Pauline L. Budge's unpublished thesis, May Edwards: Councillor, a copy 
of which is deposited in the Bob Edwards Papers. 
170 In 1935 when May's council seat was up for re-election she failed to submit her nomination papers in 
time after misunderstanding a change in the regulations. Chorley Guardian, October 26 1935; Manchester 
Guardian, September 3 1938; New Leader, November 13 1936 New Leader, October 21 1938; New 
Leader, August 19 1938; New Leader, September 9 1938 
171 Nelson Leader, July 22 1932; August 12 1932; August 26 1932; September 23 1932; 30 September 
1932; November 4 1932 
' Nelson Leader, March 3 1933; March 10 1933; March 17 1933 
173 Smithson as chairman of the Electricity and Gas Committee was determined to give work to non- 
weavers. Thus, when a position appeared in the Gas department of the corporation Smithson saw to it that 
Dan Carradice was appointed. The appointment caused an immediate storm of opinion from both Labour 
supporters and opponents. The anti-socialists were most disturbed by the fact that the appointment was 
another example of 'political strings' being pulled by Labour men, whilst within the Labour Party the 
issue was the position of the Weavers Association. Nelson Leader, March 24 1933 
"` Nelson Leader, September 22 1933; October 13 1933; November 10 1933 
"s Nelson Leader, February 9 1934; February 23 1934; March 9 1934; April 13 1934; May 11 1934 
176 For a more detailed if somewhat tentative exploration of the Nelson anti-war movement see Evelyn 
O'Connor, 'Fighting for Peace, Waiting for War Left Wing Attitudes in Nelson to Europe and 
Rearmament 1935-39', North West Labour History, No. 22,1997/8, pp48-59 
'" There was still considerable pressure from the membership of the G&MWU to continue acting against 
the Weavers. Pressure centred on calling for non-weaver councillors. However, the G&MWU was an 
organisation politically affiliated to the Labour Party and thus would not nominate candidates against 
official Labour Party candidates. Indeed Carradice himself, despite his position within the I. L. P., was 
forced to censure a number of G&MWU members for actively opposing Labour Candidates in the run up 
to the 1935 municipal election. Nelson Leader, June 15 1934; August 24 1934; January 25 1935; May 10 
1935; June 28 1935; August 10 1935; October 11 1935; October 18 1935; October 25 1935; November 8 
1935 
125 
178 Smithson, aged 57 in 1934, was suffering from acute deafness, which was cited as his reason for 
giving up his union work. Despite his continued formal connection with the I. L. P. he worked throughout 
his period of office in close collaboration with the Labour majority. He did take the initiative in calling 
anti-war meetings such as the 1936 May Day Anti-War meeting, which was attended by 2000 and 
addressed by organisations from across the spectrum including Carradice of the I. L. P., Sidney Silverman 
the left-wing local MP, representatives of the local Anti-War movement and the ministers of both the 
Church of England and the Methodists. However, he also was prepared to act in ways contrary to the 
position of the I. L. P. as when he took the initiative in calling for a civic service to synchronise with the 
King's funeral. Indeed on the culmination of his service the anti-Socialist Nelson Leader felt it possible to 
commend him on his performance over the course of the year. Nelson Leader, November 16 1934; 
October 4 1935; January 31 1936; May 8 1936; July 24 1936; Executive Committee Report May 23 1936; 
New Leader, March 17 1939 
179 Middleton Murry had started the magazine the Adel f(i in June 1923. When he joined the I. L. P. in 
1931 the magazine, although no longer edited by him reflected this political slant. In October 1932 the 
Adelphi declared it was entering a new phase in its history. The price was reduced in order to attract a 
larger number of Socialist readers and it was declared that the magazine would carry at least one article 
each month on the subject of the Independent Labour Party. Most of these articles were written by 
Middleton Murry himself. 
"0 G. F. Johnson, Where Not to Lead, Controversy, July/August 1934 
18' Although Jewson did not fully agree with the new policy of the I. L. P. she was prepared to accept the 
basis of it in principle and she supported the new policy rather than the alternative put forward by John 
Paton. She was also a consistent advocate of the line that strong action must be taken against the 
Lancashire division and the Unity group. She not only voted for the majority position of censuring the 
divisional council but also for the much more confrontational minority position of withholding the 
Lancashire council's divisional grant. I. L. P. N. A. C. minutes June 24-25 1933; September 23-24 1933; 
January 6-7 1934 
182 The I. L. P. in Yarmouth and Ipswich attempted to work together with the Communist Party and 
N. U. W. M. For example the working class organisations in Yarmouth, with the exception of the Labour 
Party agreed to hold a joint meeting in protest against the Unemployment Bill on July 3 1934. The 
meeting gained widespread support including from many members of the Labour Party, John Lewis the 
prospective Labour Party candidate for Yarmouth spoke. George Johnson of Norwich spoke on behalf of 
the I. L. P. Division 5 Council Meeting minutes, June 1 1933; Division 5 Council Meeting minutes, 
February 3 1934; New Leader, May 5 1934; Executive Committee Report, August 11-12 1934 Division 5 
Council, 1 June 1933; Minutes of division 5 special conference 15 October 1933 I. L. P. Division 5 
Council Meeting minutes, June 1 1933; Division 5 Council Meeting minutes, February 3 1934; New 
Leader, May 5 1934; Executive Committee Report, August 11-12 1934 
183 Arthur Eaton was brought in to conduct the campaign. He visited Yarmouth, March, Lowestoft, 
Cambridge, Colchester, Ipswich, Wisbeach, Kings Lynn, East Dereham, Harwich and Norwich. Overall 
he reported that there was considerable disaffection within the Labour Party organisations in the area and 
suggested that the I. L. P. in the division could be considerably strengthened with more regular activity in 
the area. Executive Committee Report, November 16-17 1934; New Leader, September 29 1939 
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1S4 BLPES/ Coll Misc 497 (Division 5 minute book) February 2 1936; New Leader, January 10 1936; 
New Leader, October 15 1937; New Leader, February 2 1936 New Leader, March 20 1936; BLPES/Coil 
Misc 497 (Division 5 minute book) Feb 11 1939; BLPES/Coll Misc 497 (Division 5 minute book) June 
29 1941 
185 The Busmen's grievances had built up following the take over of the company by the Eastern Counties, 
which had led to wage reductions, spread-overs in duty, the Wilbrew ticket system with its stoppages 
from pay, the frequency of waybill booking and what were described as 'irritating regulations'. 
186 New Leader, January 1 1936 
187 Only days later as in so many other places there was a split in the May Day demonstrations between 
the Labour Party platform and the Unity Campaign platform. On Unity platform Councillor Alf Nicholls 
presided whilst there were speakers from the Socialist League with ex-I. L. P. activist Alex Rudling, and 
the Communist Party's Jock Watson along with two I. L. P. Councillors Dorothy Jewson and George 
Johnson and two busmen Asker and Cubitt. New Leader, April 30 1937; New Leader, May 7 1937; New 
Leader, May 21 1937 
188 NEC minutes, November 15 1933 
189 New Leader, September 24 1937; New Leader, November 4 1938; New Leader, March 17 1939; 
George Johnson (1872-1958) file, Dictionary of Labour Biography archives 
190 In 1937 when it was made clear that there would be no arrangement between the two parties the I. L. P. 
selected a second candidate to run alongside Brockway in the event of a General Election. New Leader, 
May 7 1937; Labour Party Organisation Sub-Committee minutes, December 22 1936; Labour Party 
N. E. C. minutes May 25 1937 
191 Division Five Minute Book (BLPES/Coll Misc 497) February 3 1934; June 20 1936; February 9 1941; 
February 1 1950 
192 In June 1936 Brockway debated Yarmouth Labour's prospective parliamentary candidate John Lewis, 
ex-ILPer and prominent Socialist Leaguer, on the question of whether Revolutionary Socialists could 
work through the Labour Party in Yarmouth. Lewis argued for the inclusion of both the I. L. P. and the 
C. P. into the Labour Party whilst Brockway made the point that the Labour Party constitution did not 
allow enough freedom to allow the I. L. P. to affiliate at present although this was a matter of revolutionary 
tactics. Brockway and Lewis took the opportunity of the debate to address large anti-war meeting under 
the joint auspices of the I. L. P. and the Labour Party in the evening. New Leader June 26 1936 
193 Yarmouth Mercury, November 9 1935; October 31 1936; November 7 1936 
194 Lewis was prominent in the calls for left unity and the Yarmouth Labour Party fully endorsed such 
calls. The May Day Rally, although poorly attended due in part to the cold weather was supported by both 
Labour and the I. L. P. Yarmouth Mercury, November 6 1937 
195 Bunnewell raised issues such as education, poor relief and the lack of democracy in the town. He 
introduced regular meetings to explain his activities as a councillor to the voters. When at the beginning 
of 1938 the group, and Bunnewell in particular, launched an attack on the new marina, the local press 
began to argue that he was overly argumentative and was making council meetings too protracted. Still he 
continued his argument for 'a more balanced industrial approach, not so geared towards tourism' and then 
for Socialism. Over the period the alliance between the Labour Party and the I. L. P. was strengthened, the 
I. L. P. annual dinner was attended by Labour Party and Trades Union officials in the face of a 
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reinforcement of the anti-socialist alliance. Yarmouth Mercury, November 13 1937, November 20 1937; 
December 8 1937; December 24 1937; January 15 1938; March 12 1938; April 9 1938; April 30 1938 
196 Yarmouth Mercury, November 13 1937, November 20 1937; December 8 1937; December 24 1937; 
January 15 1938; March 12 1938; April 9 1938; April 30 1938; June 4 1938; June 18 1938; September 10 
1938; November 5 1938; March 25 1939; April 1 1939; New Leader, November 5 1937; November 4 
1938; April 7 1939 
197 Gilham used her positions to challenge some of the sexist norms within the Yarmouth Unions as when 
she was the first female to be admitted to the Yarmouth G&MWU dinner at which both she and Stone 
spoke. From their position within the Trades Council the I. L. P. acted with the left wing to follow through 
campaigns which the Party could support. As well as adding Liberal and Conservative Parties to the list 
of proscribed organisations, Stone was active both in local issues where he joined his role as a Councillor 
with that on the Trades Council arguing for better treatment of workers in the Marina and also in longer 
term and more national issues for example attempting to create 'one great union for all workers. ' TUC- 
Yarmouth Correspondence (MRC/MSS292/79G/14); New Leader, July 3 1937; Yarmouth Mercury, June 
26 1937; April 8 1939; September 22 1939 
198 In 1931 Bradford had paid an affiliation fee of £46 13s 4d out of a total divisional affiliation of £191 
5s Od. the second largest branch in the division was Armley, with an affiliation payment of £ 19 Os 6d. List 
of Branches and Payments for Affiliation fees for the Financial Year ending 28th February 1931 
t" Laybourn, cited in Stevens, footnote 11 
200 Over the year 1934-5 the I. L. P. in Yorkshire was growing substantially, if affiliation fees are used as 
an indicator of membership the increase was about 18 per cent. Executive Committee Report June 29-30 
1935; Forward, November 11 1933; N. A. C. report to Conference 1934 
201 New Leader, 14 April 1933 
202 New Leader, 24 March 1933 cf. Report of Yorkshire Divisional Conference, New Leader, 10 February 
1933 
203 New Leader, February 10 1933 
204 New Leader, February 2 1934 
205 N. A. C. minutes February 10-11 1934; N. A. C. minutes March 30- April 1 1934; N. A. C. minutes; 
N. A. C. minutes August 11 1934; N. A. C. minutes April 3 1934; N. A. C. minutes November 16-17 1934 
206 New Leader, March 1 1935 
207 New Leader, February 7 1936; Trotskyist influence in the division did not end with the departure of 
the Marxist Group from the Party in December 1936. For example at the end of 1937 the divisional 
organiser reported the Trotskyist influence of P. J. Barclay in organising a series of meetings in Dewsbury 
Branch and his attempts at spreading this influence wider. (N. A. C. minutes 11 December 1937) 
208 For further details on the relationship between I. L. P. and Labour Parties in Bradford and the I. L. P. 's 
electoral successes and failures in the City see above pages 59-60 and 94-94. 
209 For a break down of I. L. P. local election victories see appendix 2. Cf. New Leader, April 23 1937; 
New Leader, September 23 1938 
210 New Leader, February 15 1935 
211 New Leader, January 25 1935 
212 New Leader, January 25 1935 
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213 The Guild of Youth within the Midlands division was relatively strong where the membership 
estimates, based on fees paid, showed the division as having the highest membership. Within the division 
the Guild showed strong left wing sympathies and a determination to retain its autonomy which was 
removed after the involvement of the youth organisation with the YCI. New Leader, March 22 1935 
214 N. A. C. minutes August 11-12 1934 
215 New Leader, February 7 1936; New Leader, February 18 1938; Stevens, 1997,117; New Leader, 
February 10 1939 
216 New Leader, July 20 1934 
217 Stevens, 1997,120-1 
218 England, who had been so influential in gaining the positions of employee-director was given a 
significant level of Trade Union support and was elected along with a 'right wing' candidate more than 
300 votes clear of opponents from higher managerial positions who had opposed the appointment of the 
new directors. Stevens, 1997,123-4; New Leader, May 20 1938 
219 The I. L. P. put all its resources into supporting the Labour candidate but reminded the Labour Party of 
its opposition to Thomas whilst 'the Derby Labour Party hero worshipped him. ' New Leader, June 19 
1936 
220 Cheshire had been a figure of some influence as Secretary of the Derbyshire federation of the I. L. P. 
and a member of the local executive of NUDAW, representing it on the Trades Council. In addition he 
had also been active in the Co-op. Secretary of Derbyshire I. L. P. federation and had been chairman of the 
Derby Guild of Youth. New Leader, February 12 1937 
'a' Gill, a prominent Trade Unionist and secretary of the CIS section of the NUDAW, had been defeated 
in 1935 when forced to defend his seat against Labour Party opposition. He stood on a platform which 
proposed Free hospital services, cheaper bus services and 'fair play for old-age pensioners' and opposed 
the means test the cost of ARP falling on the Rates and extending the school leaving age until grants are 
made. I. L. P. archive local material microfilm Item 7 (Burton on Trent); New Leader, October 21 1938; 
Stevens, 1997,117 
222 For a more detailed discussion of the influence and decline of the disaffiliated I. L. P. in Derby see 
Stevens, 1997 
223 The Labour Party, against the precedent of previous years, decided to field two candidates for the two 
seats. C. H. Bishop one of the Labour Candidates was also elected with 923 votes. New Leader, April 8 
1938 
224 The Labour candidate was also elected with 701 votes. New Leader, April 7 1939 
225 Minutes of the I. L. P. Women's Group National Advisory Committee 17 September 1932 
226 I. L. P. List of Branches and Payments for Affiliation Fees for the Financial Year ending 28 February 
1931 
227 The mid-Glamorgan federation had been largely dominated by the Briton Ferry branch, which was 
firmly opposed to disaffiliation and decided to maintain its links with the Labour Party, New Leader, 9 
September 1932 
228 Cardiff City expected to see no loss in membership at all as a result of the decision whilst Splott was 
able to immediately replace the two members of that branch who resigned. New Leader, 26 August 1932 
229 New Leader, 4 November 1932 
129 
230 New Leader, 10 February 1933 
231 Eventually members of the Merthyr federation felt forced to draw the attention of the N. A. C. to this 
inactivity. N. A. C. minutes March 30-April 1 1934 
232 N. A. C. minutes April 3 1934 
233 N. A. C. minutes August 11 1934 
234 Speakers included Maxton, McGovern, Jennie Lee, Fenner Brockway, Campbell Stephen, Alex 
Smillie, Tom Stephenson, George Johnson, Percy Williams, Sam Leckie, E. B. James, Jack Sproud, John 
Aplin, Jim Garton and Brinley Griffiths. New Leader, August 17 1934 
235 Executive Committee report November 16-17 1934 
236 Resolutions for pacts with the Labour Party were defeated by 21 votes to 4 and 22 votes to 2 
237 New Leader, July 12 1935 
238 The Welsh I. L. P. in 1935 was one of the few which had succeeded in compiling a relatively complete 
list of Trade Union, Co-operative Society and N. U. W. M. activity before the conference. However, 
disputes arose over whether the unemployed should be allowed to maintain membership of particular 
unions at a nominal fee or whether an all-inclusive unemployed section of the trade union movement 
should be formed. After contributions from those actively involved in the struggle including employed 
and unemployed miners, transport workers and railwaymen, the first of the proposals was adopted. New 
Leader, February 8 1935 
239 Calls were also made to reorganise 'the National Health Insurance on a non-contributory basis, benefits 
to be free, full medical, surgical and hospital treatment and convalescence, ' and for the provision of 
pensions on a non-contributory basis. New Leader, February 7 1936 
240 New Leader, April 3 1936; on the Nine-Mile point dispute see Francis and Smith 279-81 although no 
mention is made of Marsden's connection with the I. L. P.; For further discussion of the Hunger March see 
below.; New Leader, March 12 1937 
241 New Leader, January 29 1937 
242 New Leader, April 2 1937; New Leader, July 30 1937 
243 The only year after disaffiliation for which there are surviving Welsh Divisional membership figures 
calculated by the I. L. P. is 1947 when the membership was 37 (Thwaites, 1976,27) Thus, no exact figures 
for membership are available for the period 1932-9, but a relatively full set of figure for affiliation fees 
from the division, were sent from John McNair to Francis Johnson in 1940. In the second half of 1936 
with the growing demonstrations and the hunger march to London, affiliation fees paid to head office 
grew by nearly twenty per cent (£12 11s l Id). But then clear decline set in; the next six months saw 
affiliation fees fall by nearly forty per cent (£8 11s 2d) and the following year fees had declined even 
from this level by a further fifty per cent (£4 19s 10d). Finally by the outbreak of war membership in the 
division was at a further low, with fees falling by a further eighty per cent (£2 1s1I d). A conservative 
estimate Welsh membership of about 330 at the beginning of 1937 had fallen to somewhere under fifty by 
the outbreak of war. John McNair to Francis Johnson, July 1940, BLPES/Francis Johnson Papers/1940 
2" New Leader, February 11 1938 
243 New Leader, February 10 1939 
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246 Indeed in some areas of strength for the Labour Movement the I. L. P. was virtually non-existent. When 
C. L. R. James held an I. L. P. meeting in Trealaw in February 1936 the Party conceded that it was the first 
I. L. P. meeting in the area for years. New Leader, February 21 1936 
247 In Newport an I. L. P. er was senior president and then president of Newport Industrial Council. TUC 
Correspondence I. L. P. File January 29 1937 MRC/MSS922/756.1/1 
248 Two I. L. P. ers were re-elected to the Bedwas and Machen UDC in 1933. One of the two, F. H. Davies, 
a lay preacher at the local Methodist church who had been chairman of council from 1932-3, died in 
November 1935. Nevertheless, the I. L. P. maintained its representation in 1936 with the support of the 
Bedwas lodge of the SWMF, and would have increased its representation further in 1938 if it had not 
been for the intervention of the Labour Party, both of whose candidate polled under half the single 
I. L. P. ers total. Merthyr Express, November 23 1935; New Leader, January 24 1936; New Leader, March 
11 1938; New Leader, April 3 1936; April 10 1936; New Leader, March 12 1937; New Leader, April 15 
1938 
249 There were two fights in 1937 between the Merthyr I. L. P. and Labour Party, both of which saw the 
I. L. P. coming off second best by a considerable margin. However, in the Municipal elections of 1938 the 
I. L. P. again stood in the Penydarren ward and there was a considerable swing to the I. L. P. candidate with 
the Labour vote, for a man who had represented the ward for 30 years, being down 400 and the I. L. P. vote 
up 384. The left wing grouping on the council was weakened when Protheroe died in July 1937 and 
accordingly the New Leader carried a tribute to him. N. A. C. minutes 13 November 1937; New Leader, 
July 30 1937; New Leader, November 5 1937; New Leader, November 11 1938 
250 The committee eventually decided to refer the motion to a sub-committee. However, as Stanfield 
pointed out such a sub-committees was likely never to meet, as he reminded the Labour members that six 
months earlier he had moved that the SWMF demand for 12.5% increase in the scales should be accepted 
they had voted against it and referred it to a sub-committee but the sub-committee had never met. New 
Leader, February 18 1938 
251 New Leader, May 6 1938 
252 The arguments led leading Merthyr I. L. P. er Melville Rees to close down the Merthyr N. U. W. M. with 
resulting disputes and threats of legal action between Hannington and Rees. Executive Committee report 
November 16-17 1934 
253 The section of the march from the bottom end of town was lead by three prominent I. L. P. ers 
Councillors Stanfield, and B. M. Davies and W. Rowland of the Miners' Unemployed Lodge. The 
organisers of the march had organised speakers which deliberately excluded the I. L. P. but included 
Arthur Greenwood, William Mellor, Arthur Homer and MP S. O. Davies. When it was revealed that there 
would be no I. L. P. speaker the crowd began to demand that Stanfield be allowed on the platform. The 
demand was eventually acceded to, to the disgust of Greenwood and Davies who left the stand without 
speaking. 
254 New Leader, July 8 1938 
255 J. Davies joined the Labour Party at the outbreak of war. The other two I. L. P. councillors continued to 
be elected until 1950 when the 1. L. P branch closed down. For successive years before that Stanfield and 
then B. M. Davies served their time as mayor. Following the disappearance of the I. L. P. in Merthyr 
Stanfield in particular went on to play an active part in local politics as part of the Labour Party machine. 
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He remained on the borough council until 1974 and took over the chairmanship of the Mid Glamorgan 
County Council at the age of 71. He was also extremely active in his union, the National Amalgamated 
Union of Life Assurance Workers where he was on the national executive of the union for twenty-five 
years and national president for six years. Merthyr Express, April 1 1976; On the I. L. P. in Merthyr in the 
war and post-war period see Thwaites, 1976,226-30; On the history of the Plymouth Ward, where the 
I. L. P. councillors came from see Geraint James (ed. ), Plymouth Ward Scrapbook: The history of the 
villages of Troedyrhiw, Abercanaid and Pentrebach through the pages of the Merthyr Express 1935-85. 
256 Mark Simpson, an I. L. P member from the pre-first world war period, held the position of North East 
divisional secretary for sixteen years until his death in February 1941. Simpson was vocal on only very 
few issues, which made his opposition more telling. However, generally he preferred to let others take the 
centre stage whilst he worked behind the scenes. New Leader, February 22 1941 
257 Inner Executive Report, September 22 1934 
ug New Leader, 15 September 1933; New Leader, 6 October 1933; I. L. P. N. A. C. minutes June 24-25 
1933; New Leader, 3 November 1933 
259 New Leader, March 1 1935 
260 Padley to Littlejohns, November 7 1979 in Tom Stephenson file, Dictionary of Labour Biography 
archive 
261 New Leader, February 14 1936; New Leader, January 29 1937 
262 New Leader, February 24 1939 
263 Executive Committee Report, June 29-30 1935 
264 New Leader, 19 August 1932; New Leader, 30 September 1932; New Leader, 24 March 1933 cf. New 
Leader, 3 March 1933 
265 Todd, 1995 passim; New Leader, May 29 1936; New Leader, December 4 1936; New Leader, March 
19 1937 
266 New Leader, 2 September 1932; Todd, 12 
267 Scots New Leader, February 28 1936 Industrial Committee minutes, July 16 1936 
268 The Jarrow candidatures were not formally endorsed by the party as they had not fulfilled the 
constitutional requirement of being members of the Party for over one year. Immediately after the 
election the group of two were involved in a controversy on the council when it was reported in the 
December of that year that the two I. L. P. ers on the Jarrow Town Council had voted for the Tory nominee 
for the Mayoralty against the Labour Party nominee. However, the two were involved in more favourable 
publicity from the Labour Movement when the I. L. P. councillor Scullion proposed a motion for a march 
of the unemployed to the PAC and UAB at Newcastle. He was opposed by the Labour Members of the 
Town Council but the Jarrow Labour Party took the opposite view and supported the I. L. P. line in favour 
of the march; N. A. C. minutes 13 November 1937; N. A. C. minutes December 11 1937; New Leader, 
February 2 1938; New Leader, February 18 1938 
269 New Leader, March 1 1935 
270 New Leader, October 23 1936 
271 This represented the I. L. P., Workington Labour Parties, N. U. W. M., British Legion, Veterans' Club, 
Unemployed Clubs, but not the Whitehaven Labour Party, which refused to co-operate with organisations 
banned by the Labour Party. New Leader, November 27 1936 
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272 New Leader, November 27 1936 
273 New Leader, February 15 1935 
274 New Leader, August 2 1935 
275 The makeup of the Hayle branch in Cornwall was perhaps not atypical: the branch had nine members, 
only one of whom was in full employment, and that member had a sister and her boy dependent on his 
earnings. The rest of the branch was composed of. one member on a widow's pension, with an eighty- 
seven year old mother to support; three on the means test, with one having a daughter with three children 
and a son on occasional work; one member dependent upon the earnings of her blind husband; whilst the 
branch secretary was trying to eke out a living doing various bits of casual work despite being lame. The 
branch claimed exemption from the more standard of the I. L. P. 's claims to money through the branch 
quota scheme and power for socialism funds. Instead it had devised a number of plans to make money in 
other ways including making blackberry and elderberry wine (picking was free) and hatching a batch of 
'I. L. P. chickens', in both cases income over expenditure was to go to the party. New Leader, 14 July 1933; 
New Leader, 18 August 1933 
276 Rawlings Papers BLPES Coll. Misc. 496 file 1 
27 New Leader, January 25 1935 
278 New Leader, January 29 1937 
279 Twenty members of the St. Phillips Ward Labour Party left the larger party to join the I. L. P. 
280 Berriman's victory by 2163 votes to 1,673 was I. L. P. claimed 'remarkable', as three working class 
areas previously included in the ward had been separated into a ward of their own. New Leader, 
November 6 1936; New Leader, November 13 1936 
281 New Leader, December 12 1937 
282 G. L. Baston To Walter Citrine August 9 1937 (MRC/MSS922/756.1/1) 
283 Executive Committee Report, November 16-17 1934 
284 New Leader, August 17 1934 
285 Executive Committee Report, June 29-30 1935 
286 New Leader, May 29 1936' 
287 Arthur Behenna's victory in 1936 deposed the Mayor from top position on the poll. New Leader, 
November 13 1936; New Leader, November 5 1937 
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4. Parliamentary Elections and Political Space 
4.1 Introduction 
The task which the I. L. P. leadership set itself during the immediate period after 
disaffiliation was to clearly define the Party's new revolutionary policy. No aspect of 
this dispute was more controversial than the place of parliament and elections in the 
Party's strategy. Some within the Party, especially within the R. P. C. believed that 
elections, parliamentary or local, had no significant part to play in the strategy of a 
revolutionary party. Others, such as Brockway, saw the new revolutionary policy and its 
vigorous implementation as itself a means of achieving electoral success. At the same 
time most of those who remained unconvinced by the way in which party policy was 
developing, including the Lancashire based Unity Group, and others such as Jowett in 
Bradford, were convinced that the Party needed to refocus its activity and prioritise the 
electoral arena. 
These disputes over the correct attitude to take towards the electoral struggle did not, of 
course, remain entirely theoretical. During the 1930s the Party engaged in a series of 
electoral battles which altered the Party's understanding of its own position and the 
place of electoral struggle in the I. L. P. 's strategy. The most high profile of these 
electoral battles were the three by-elections and seventeen General Election Seats 
contested by the Party in the period 1933-5. The analysis presented here highlights 
some of the problems inherent in the I. L. P. 's attitudes towards parliamentary elections. 
First, it shows the effort and emphasis which many I. L. P. activists put into electoral 
activity. This makes it difficult to believe that the I. L. P. could easily have been 
transformed into the kind of revolutionary party which neglected elections completely, 
as desired by the Revolutionary Policy Committee. Second, the chapter argues that the 
detail of the Party's policy was not a major issue for the electorate. I. L. P. candidates 
were in many cases reluctant to follow the national Party line in their electoral contests, 
but it is difficult to accept, with Brockway, that had the Party line been correctly applied 
the result would have been substantially different. Finally, an examination of the 
limitations of the I. L. P. 's electoral successes suggests that the prospects for a party 
seeking to build a substantial electoral presence were limited in the context of the 1930s 
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given the resources available to the I. L. P. Thus, the possibilities of building the type of 
party envisioned by the Unity Group were extremely limited. 
4.2 Kilmarnock 
The first by-election that the I. L. P. stood for in the new parliament was in Kilmarnock, 
an area of considerable I. L. P. strength. The by-election, caused by the appointment of 
National Labour MP Cragie Aitcheson as a Judge of the Realm, gave an opportunity to 
consider the nature and extent of the breach between the two parties. In the 1931 
General Election only John Pollock of the I. L. P., unendorsed by the Labour Party, had 
opposed Aitcheson, who had won comfortably, polling 21,803 to Pollock's 14,767. In 
1933 both I. L. P. and Labour claimed the right to contest the seat each arguing the other 
was splitting the anti-Government vote. In justification of this position the I. L. P. 
pointed to Pollock's record as previous candidate in the constituency. ' However, in 1933 
the Labour candidate, Rev. James Barr, was a popular choice, he was a native of the 
district and had considerable personal support. 2 
All the parties campaigned actively and utilised their most attractive speakers for the 
campaign. For the I. L. P. this meant Maxton, McGovern and Buchanan were regular 
speakers with Jennie Lee, who attacked Barr as part of 'the Labour Party machine, ' 
joining them the night before the election. However, with a National Labour candidate, 
Lindsay, joining the fray three of the four candidates were claiming to be the authentic 
voice of labour, and both Barr and Pollock claimed to represent the real voice of the 
I. L. P. However, the I. L. P. campaign highlighted the tensions within the I. L. P. over the 
new revolutionary policy and the complex relationship between the I. L. P. and the 
Labour Party. Pollock had no desire to associate himself with the new revolutionary 
policy of the I. L. P. Indeed Pollock distanced himself much more from the Labour Party 
machine than from the larger organisations policies. Further it was the Labour Party, 
acutely aware of the tensions within the Kilmarnock I. L. P. over the United Front, which 
stressed the smaller organisation's new 'revolutionary policy' labelling Pollock the 
'I. L. P. -C. P. candidate. '4 The National Government campaign also placed great emphasis 
on the I. L. P. -Labour split. Lindsay on the eve of the poll, in an attempt to discredit the 
Labour Party challenge, made a point of claiming that the real fight in the constituency 
was between himself and Pollock. 5 Only Alexander MacEwen, the Scottish nationalist 
stood apart from what appeared to some to be a fraternal dispute. 6 
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The poll took place on the 2 November and Lindsay, the National Government 
candidate won the seat with 12,577 votes. However, the combined votes of the I. L. P. 
and the Labour Party would have been sufficient to overtake Lindsay with Barr polling 
9,924 votes and Pollock 7,575. This result caused considerable concern to both sides. 
The Labour Party NEC received a number of letters from divisional Labour Parties 
urging a settlement be found with the I. L. P. in the light of the Kilmarnock result.? At the 
same time Pollock's own branch of the I. L. P. approached the Labour Party, enquiring 
about re-affiliation, immediately after the contest. 8 The Labour Party's official report on 
the by-election put the blame for the defeat squarely on poor organisation which 
resulted from the split, which 'not only divided Labour People, but created divisions in 
many Labour families. '9 
From the I. L. P. point of view two things about the Scottish situation were made clear by 
the by-election result. First, that the dispute with the Labour Party was, in the short 
term, more likely to cause disruption of both parties' activity than to result in an increase 
in loyal support for either party. Second, it was evident that the high profile dispute 
raging between Lancashire and London over the new party policy was largely irrelevant 
to the bulk of I. L. P. ers in Scotland. 
4.3 Merthyr 
The I. L. P. had a considerable tradition of Parliamentary representation in Merthyr. It 
was the constituency where Hardie had first been elected and later Richard Wallhead 
had carried the I. L. P. banner as a rebel against the Labour leadership. Wallhead had left 
the Labour Party in 1932 with the I. L. P. but had rejoined the Labour Party as the 
smaller party developed its new revolutionary policy. After being reluctantly welcomed 
back into the P. L. P. he made a point of campaigning for the Labour Party against the 
I. L. P. in the local elections in Merthyr late in 1933.10 
This relationship with the past dominated the I. L. P. 's campaign in the Merthyr by- 
election caused by Wallhead's death. After Jennie Lee declined the nomination the 
I. L. P. selected the former MP for Glasgow Camlachie, Campbell Stephen, a known 
opponent of the new revolutionary policy, as their candidate. " His campaign was one 
based on attacking the Labour Party for its conduct over the Means Test and the 
Anomalies Act. 12 Although Stephen, buoyed by the Party's performance in the Merthyr 
municipal elections, pointed to the threat of fascism, and suggested the Labour Party 
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would prove no barrier to its progress, there was little mention of the I. L. P. 's changed 
policy after disaffiliation. 
The I. L. P. 's claim to the constituency's radical tradition was challenged by all three of 
the other candidates. The Liberal Candidate, Victor Evans, was a radical Liberal. The 
Communist Party, despite an earlier electoral agreement with the I. L. P. selected 
N. U. W. M. leader Wal Hannington to fight the seat. However, the biggest problem for 
Stephen lay in the choice of Labour candidate- S. O. Davies had been a long-serving 
member of the I. L. P. and a critic of the Labour establishment. In his role as vice- 
president of the South Wales Miners Federation he had been on the Advisory 
Committee of the Left Wing Movement in the late 1920s, he had also been a prominent 
member of the Miners Minority Movement. In the by-election his platform was that the 
I. L. P. had abandoned its historic task and all it was able to achieve in Merthyr was a 
splitting of the vote. 13 The Labour Party's strong candidate was backed by an effective 
campaign and support from all the major unions. '4 
I. L. P. hopes for Merthyr were clearly misplaced. The poll, which took place on June 5, 
placed Davies as the clear winner with 18,645 votes over the Liberal's 10,376. Stephen 
ended up a poor third for the I. L. P. with 3,508, less than 100 votes ahead of Hannington 
who polled 3,409. The Party made little attempt to hide its disappointment, its high 
expectations for Merthyr had been dashed. The I. L. P. tradition in the area had been 
insufficient to present a serious challenge to the Labour Party. 
4.4 Upton 
The Upton by-election took place just three weeks before the Merthyr poll, with I. L. P. 
General Secretary Fenner Brockway, the former MP for the neighbouring division of 
East Leyton, as the Party's candidate. In contrast to both Kilmarnock and Merthyr, 
Brockway was a keen advocate, and a principal author, of the I. L. P. 's new revolutionary 
policy. His campaign was thus based around this policy. His election address, which 
attacked the Labour Party as having 'feeble leadership' and 'flabby policies', began by 
stressing that he stood for a policy 'distinct from the policy of both the Conservative and 
Labour candidates. ' In line with the new revolutionary policy he spoke of the non- 
parliamentary'organisations for the coming struggle' that formed part of the I. L. P. 's new 
revolutionary policy. 15 The London Party also made considerable effort to get the 
support of the Communist Party and industrial organisations. With Brockway able to 
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agree with most aspects of C. P. policy apart from Soviet Foreign Policy, the 
Communists agreed to back him. 16 He also managed to get the support, by a unanimous 
vote of the West Ham branch of the Chemical Worker's Union and also from a number 
of railwaymen and transport workers. 17 
As in Merthyr and Kilmarnock, an opponent with I. L. P. credentials stood against the 
disaffiliated Party. Ben Gardner, the Labour Candidate who been elected for Upton in 
1923 and 1929, was a foundation member of the I. L. P. and had remained a member of 
that organisation for the thirty-nine years up to disaffiliation. Gardner was also able to 
use the difference within the I. L. P. to his advantage, using the Lancashire division's 
suggestions that Brockway was going to lose his deposit to claim that any vote for the 
I. L. P. would be a wasted vote. 18 Even taking this set back into account the result at 
Upton on 14 May was a disappointment. The Labour Candidate was a clear winner 
polling 11,998 with a majority of nearly 3,500 over the Conservative candidate who 
received 8,534 votes. Brockway trailed behind a poor third with 748 votes, a mere 3.5 
per cent of the poll. 
The 1935 General Election 
4.5 Candidates 
The I. L. P. initially indicated that it was going to fight fifty seats in the general election. 
However, in the event it only contested seventeen. Part of the reason for this reduction 
in numbers was financial, the burden of contesting such a large number of seats would 
have been far too much for such a small party with such meagre financial resources. 
However, there was much more to the decision to reduce the number of electoral 
fights. 19 The Party attempted to be much more selective about the seats it contested, 
deciding to fight only those seats in which it believed that it had a realistic chance of 
doing well. Further the I. L. P. attempted to choose candidates which it believed it could 
i20 'demonstrate genuinely had a claim to represent that division. 
For James Maxton in Bridgeton, George Buchanan in Gorbals and John McGovern in 
Shettleston, the three I. L. P. Glasgow MPs, the connections with their seats needed no 
further demonstration. Campbell Stephen in Camlachie, Fred Jowett in Bradford East 
and Jennie Lee in North Lanark had all previously sat as MPs for the seats they fought 
in 1935. Campbell Stephen, first a United Free Church Minister then a barrister, had 
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been one of the group of Glasgow MPs elected for the first time in 1922. He continued 
to represent Camlachie until his defeat in 1931 21 Fred Jowett had been elected to 
Parliament for the West Bradford constituency as Labour and I. L. P. candidate in 1906. 
Defeated in the victory election after the war he had been Chairman of the Labour Party 
in 1922 and that year was returned to Parliament for East Bradford. In 1924, despite his 
constant criticism of the Cabinet system of Government, he became a Cabinet Minister 
serving as First Commissioner of Works in the First Labour Government. After his 
election defeat in 1924 he was re-elected as East Bradford MP from 1929 to 1931 when 
he was defeated standing as an I. L. P. candidate unendorsed by the Labour Party. 22 
Jennie Lee had been elected for North Lanark in the famous 1929 by-election. She was 
defeated, polling just under 45 percent of the vote, in 1931 when she stood as an I. L. P. 
candidate unendorsed by the Labour Party. However, she had refused the opportunity to 
stand as I. L. P. candidate in other areas 23 
Elsewhere the candidates selected were all supposed to be significant figures who 
combined a connection to the seat with high profile personalities. Thus, in Norwich the 
I. L. P. nominated Fenner Brockway-aside from Maxton probably the I. L. P. 's leading 
personality- to try and capitalise on the I. L. P. tradition of putting forward electoral 
candidates in the dual member seat. In Kilmarnock the Party nominated John Pollock, 
chairman of the Scottish Area Council of NUDAW, who had stood for the constituency 
in both 1931 and in the 1933 by-election. In the areas surrounding Glagow, apart from 
the three MPs and Campbell Stephen the I. L. P. nominated three of its most active and 
well-known councillors. In Tradeston the leader of the I. L. P. 's council group, James 
Carmichael, stood. In Govan the I. L. P. candidate was councillor Tom Taylor, later Lord 
Taylor of Gryfe, and in Clackmannan and Eastern Stirlingshire it was Councillor David 
Gibson. 24 In Merthyr the I. L. P. Candidate was Claude Stanfield, local councillor from 
Troedyrhiw, who was well known in the area both for his work on the council, having 
recently defeated a Labour challenge in the municipal election, and with the N. U. W. M., 
having been one of the Merthyr leaders of the 1934 National Hunger March. 25 In 
Whitehaven the I. L. P. candidate, Tom Stephenson, was not only the leading member of 
the I. L. P. 's North East Division and of numerous radical and socialist organisations in 
the area, he was a County Councillor, and a prominent member of the Cumberland 
Miners' Association. 26 In Aberdeen their candidate was Fraser MacIntosh, local 
councillor and SCWS Northern Area chairman. 27 In Camborne the I. L. P. candidate was 
Kate Spurrell who had stood unendorsed but with the support of the local Labour Party 
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in 1931 as an I. L. P. candidate. 28 In Chorley Bob Edwards, one of the leaders of the 1934 
Hunger March and wife of May Edwards, prominent I. L. P. local councillor was the 
candidate. 9 Only in Lanark South did the I. L. P. candidate, William Carlin, who was 
chairman of the South Lanark Federation of the I. L. P. and had sat on the Scottish 
Divisional Council of the Party for four years and spent a year on its Executive 
Committee lack a significant local presence. Still the I. L. P. campaign there was closely 
connected with Jennie Lee's high profile campaign in the adjacent constituency. 30 
4.6 Campaign 
The Abyssinian crisis was a major part of the reason for the timing of the 1935 General 
Election. Yet, despite major divisions within each of the parties about the solution to the 
crisis it was not, overall, a major campaigning issue. The official position of the major 
parties, including the Communists, involved support for sanctions through the League 
of Nations. Given this widespread agreement over Abyssinia the election campaign was 
quickly drawn away from the international situation and towards consideration of other 
issues. The Labour Party largely succeeded in setting this alternative agenda 
concentrating on the issues of unemployment, the Means Test, housing and social 
services. 31 
The I. L. P. 's national campaign, began in July when Maxton wrote a series of articles for 
New Leader which emphasised the need for the I. L. P. Parliamentary Group to increase 
in size, suggesting that it might be possible to win as many as fifteen seats. 32 As the 
election drew nearer the national party campaign began in earnest. The I. L. P. case, 
publicised in the New Leader and in a series of leaflets produced for distribution during 
the election, focussed heavily on the Abyssinian crisis. I. L. P. candidates were described 
as 'Socialist and No More War Candidates' standing for 'no war, no rearmament, 
workers' rights and socialism. i33 Such International issues were placed to the forefront in 
the campaigns of several of the I. L. P. candidates, most notably by Fenner Brockway, 
the I. L. P. candidate in Norwich and a main author of the I. L. P. policy on Abyssinia. He 
spent much of his time arguing that war was a direct result of the operation of 
capitalism and the struggle between competing capitalist groups for markets and 
economic resources. 4 Claude Stanfield in Merthyr also made the I. L. P. 's statements on 
Abyssinia the main plank of most of his election addresses and choose to differentiate 
himself from his left-wing Labour opponent primarily on this issue. 35 Tom Taylor and 
James Carmichael in Glasgow both ran campaigns in a similar vein, with Taylor 
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declaring he was 'against all capitalist war' and Carmichael arguing the money spent on 
rearmament should be spent on pensions. 36 Similarly Tom Stephenson, the I. L. P. 's 
'Socialist and no more war candidate' in Whitehaven, whilst putting forward a similar 
programme of mines nationalisation to his Labour opponent, focussed his campaign on 
the Abyssinian crisis, stressing throughout that capitalism was the real cause of war. 37 
John Pollock in Kilmarnock, also emphasised the International situation holding a 
'Great Peace Meeting', with AEU district secretary William Cowan in the chair to get 
his campaign started, and arguing against rearmament and capitalist wars throughout. 38 
However, for most of the I. L. P. candidates the national line and focus of the Party was 
of secondary importance. The energy and enthusiasm for campaigns came from the 
local organisation. Jennie Lee's campaign for example, organised by the North Lanark 
I. L. P., was a frantic affair which involved arranging an average of six meetings every 
day and producing a daily 'Jennie Lee Newspaper' for the duration of the campaign. 39 
Further, most of the I. L. P. 's more senior figures chose to ignore the International focus 
of the election campaign suggested by Brockway and the New Leader. This was true of 
all the I. L. P. MPs in Glasgow, Campbell Stephen in Camlachie and Fred Jowett in 
Bradford who all emphasised domestic issues. Thus, Maxton, who was absent from 
Bridgeton for most of the campaign, stressed the need for higher pensions and argued 
for 'rebels in parliament, ' stating that 'there never was a Government that did not require 
to be kicked' and the 'I. L. P. intended to carry on that tradition. i40 Buchanan, scarcely 
mentioned the international situation, instead campaigning for plans to raise National 
Health Insurance benefits and widows pension and old age pensions, and the repeal of 
the Sedition Act. McGovern pointed to his own achievements with the Hunger 
Marchers and placed this alongside demands for increased unemployment benefit and 
pensions, reduced rents, higher school leaving age and maintenance grants. Campbell 
Stephen, untroubled by his failure to distinguish himself from his Labour opponent on 
the Abyssinian question, instead stressed his opposition to the means test and on 
demands that money be spent on children, pensions and the unemployed. Similarly in 
Bradford, Fred Jowett, or Percy Williams (who, because of illness, deputised for Jowett 
for most of the campaign) stressed that despite the party's peace position, home issues 
needed to take priority over Abyssinia. 4' 
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4.7 Labour and the I. L. P. 
The Scottish executive of the Labour Party was acutely aware that the I. L. P. posed a 
potential danger to the Labour Party in Scotland. The smaller party had stood ten 
unendorsed candidates in Scotland in the 1931 election of whom Maxton, McGovern 
and Buchanan had been elected. Of the ten who had stood in 1931, these three and 
Campbell Stephen, Jennie Lee and John Pollock were standing again for the I. L. P. 
However, Jean Mann and Jack Gibson, unendorsed I. L. P. ers in 1931, stood in 1935 for 
the Labour Party with Gibson facing I. L. P. opposition. In addition, Tom Irwin, who had 
fought the famous East Renfrew by-election for the I. L. P., also stood as the endorsed 
Labour Party candidate for Greenock in 1935. 
In March 1933, the executive of the Scottish Labour Party had discussed the 
'tremendous organisational difficulties' that they faced in Glasgow, the subsequent 
Kilmarnock result had stressed to them the importance of organising effectively against 
the I. L. P. The executive thus attempted to ensure that 'people of public standing' would 
oppose the most prominent I. L. P. candidates in Glasgow. They also tried to ensure that 
candidates in I. L. P. areas were put in place at an early date. Thus, the Glasgow BLP 
appointed a special committee for organisation and planning elections in I. L. P. 
strongholds and the Labour Party's Scottish Executive gave an additional grant to the 
Glasgow BLP to help it with a membership campaign to dent the I. L. P. These activities 
were strongly supported, morally and financially, by the Labour Party's N. E. C. and 
National Agent. 42 
The Labour Party machine also clamped down hard on any section which even 
considered giving support to the I. L. P. The considerations of the United Patternmakers 
Association over whether to give financial support to Buchanan, their President, 
resulted in defeat for the proposals, which although receiving a majority, did not obtain 
the required two-thirds margin. Nevertheless, the Gorbals DLP requested the N. E. C. 
declare the Patternmakers ballot 'an action inconsistent with the position of an affiliated 
organisation. ' Similarly, moves by the West of Scotland Shipbuilding and Engineering 
Unions to promote negotiations to avoid conflicting candidatures between Labour and 
the I. L. P., although unsuccessful, were condemned in the strongest terms by both the 
N. E. C. and the Scottish Executive. 43 The claim to 'the I. L. P. tradition' was to be an 
important part of the 1935 election campaign in Scotland and the Labour Party was not 
prepared to cede it to the smaller party without a fight. The I. L. P. decided to offer 
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support to Labour candidates if they broadly agreed with the I. L. P. position on peace, 
unemployment and the socialisation of industry. 44 The Labour Party machine, on the 
other hand was determined to destroy the I. L. P. challenge, whatever the cost. 
Despite the desire of the Labour Party's Executive and Scottish Executive to produce a 
strong fight against the I. L. P. in its heartland they had great difficulty in finding suitable 
candidates. In Gorbals the Labour Party candidate, Alexander Burnett, had no 
connection with the constituency. He entered the campaign late, and despite the extra 
funding from the Scottish Executive of the Labour Party and the N. E. C., the Labour 
Party's attempt to displace Buchanan was described by the Glasgow Herald as 
'extremely lack-lustre. i45 In Shettleston the Labour Party candidate, George Beggs, a 
Glaswegian native and NCLC lecturer, was faced with a Labour Party machine which 
had been effectively destroyed by a consistent I. L. P. campaign dating back to the 
Shettleston I. L. P. 's expulsion from Labour in 1931 46 In Bridgeton, Maxton's Labour 
opponent Samuel McLaren, chairman of Greenock Trades and Labour Council had 
great difficulty in generating any enthusiasm for his campaign. Only in Camlachie did 
the Labour Party find a popular candidate to fight a losing battle against the I. L. P. There 
the Labour Party, candidate, Ballie William Reid, a 'popular Sandyhills man who by 
1935 had represented Mile-end on the Council for many years', was much better known 
than those who fought the sitting I. L. P. MPs. 47 A key factor in the I. L. P. success against 
the Labour Party in these seats was the perception, which extended even to many 
Labour Party activists, that it was the I. L. P. which held the legitimate right to fight the 
seat on behalf of the working-class. 
Much of this I. L. P. legitimacy applied to the two other I. L. P. candidates who had been 
successfully elected in 1929, Jennie Lee and Fred Jowett. Jennie Lee later recalled that 
'all through the campaign came the cry, sometimes wistfully, sometimes angrily, from 
rank and file workers for working class unity. ' However, during the campaign both the 
I. L. P. and the Labour party spent much of their effort suggesting that the other side was 
facing a losing battle. Nevertheless, the Labour Party in North Lanark was clearly 
divided about running a candidate and placed considerable effort into attempting to 
persuade Lee to run as official Labour Candidate. 48 
Similarly, in Bradford there was considerable internal pressure from sections of the 
Bradford Labour Party membership not to oppose the popular figure of Jowett, and the 
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question had been left open until late in 1934. However, after further disputes between 
the two organisations which culminated in the Labour Party fielding an unsuccessful 
candidate for the I. L. P. traditional stronghold of East Bowling in the 1934 municipal 
election, it became clear that Jowett would face Labour opposition. 49 Thus, in 1935 
Jowett faced the opposition of the Labour Party and their candidate Wilf Heywood, a 
Trade Union organiser from the Textile Workers' Union. The question which dogged 
the Labour Party throughout its East Bradford campaign was why they were opposing 
Jowett. They attempted to deal with this issue in an article in the Bradford Pioneer 
entitled 'Why Labour fights East Bradford, ' which suggested that Jowett could never 
form part of a Labour team in the House of Commons and questioning Jowett's 
commitment to the I. L. P. given his well-known criticisms of the party's new 
revolutionary policy. In particular they pushed him on the question of whether there 
should be a united front with the Communist Party. 50 Jowett's reply to the Labour Party, 
which frustrated his opponents by side-stepping their main question, was published in 
the Bradford I. L. P. 's weekly Newsheet the I. L. P. News. Jowett was prepared to make 
some concessions to the new policy of the I. L. P., but the thrust of his reply was that he 
had always been a revolutionary socialist, and he remained committed to those ideals . 
51 
However, despite the attacks of the Bradford Labour Party machine many of the larger 
party's supporters, including three councillors and a number of trade unionists, declared 
their support for Jowett. 52 
In these six seats there was a clear perception that the I. L. P. fight was legitimated by the 
connections of the candidate and the I. L. P. to the seat. Elsewhere, despite the Party's 
best efforts to secure attractive candidates, the Labour Party was able to successfully 
argue that either that they were 'Labour' seats or that the Labour candidate was the true 
inheritor of the'I. L. P. tradition. ' 
This question as to who truly inherited the 'I. L. P. tradition' after 1932 was an important 
issue in a number of constituencies, especially in Scotland. These issues were most 
clearly raised in Lanark South. The I. L. P. was clearly strong in the area and from 1918- 
29 all nominees of the Labour Party had been I. L. P. sponsored. Then in 1931 the I. L. P. 
candidate had been unendorsed by the Labour Party because of his refusal to sign 
standing orders. Many, including the Glasgow Herald, looked at the situation and 
concluded that the 'major anti-Government forces will favour the I. L. P. i53 However, the 
I. L. P. faced a much harder task in claiming I. L. P. continuity and identity for the Lanark 
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constituency than for North Lanark. This was not just because of the high level of 
personal support for Jennie Lee but also because the Labour Party candidate, Jack 
Gibson, had fought the Lanark seat as an I. L. P. candidate unendorsed by the Labour 
Party in 1931. Gibson also made extensive use of the support he obtained from the 
Communist Party to stress his left-wing credentials. 54 The failure in Lanark South, 
especially when compared to Lanark North indicated just how fragile an apparent 
electoral tradition could be. 
A similar interpretation can be applied to Kilmarnock, where the I. L. P. tradition had 
been an issue in the 1933 by-election. The issue was raised again in 1935, with the 
I. L. P. buoyed by the relative obscurity of the Labour candidate James Crawford, 
compared with the Rev. James Barr, the candidate in the by-election. However, two 
factors combined to reduce the impact of the I. L. P. challenge. First the by-election 
result had seen Labour come narrowly ahead of the I. L. P., thus appearing in the eyes of 
many to legitimate their candidacy. Second, Crawford himself had considerable I. L. P. 
ss credentials and had been a member of the Party until 1932. 
Elsewhere the key issue between Labour and I. L. P. was not so much the I. L. P. tradition 
as the 'legitimacy' of the Labour Party candidate. Even in Glasgow, aside from the four 
seats which the I. L. P. won, the Labour Party was able to claim 'legitimacy'. Tom 
Taylor's opponent in Govan, Neil MacLean, was one of only two non-I. L. P. Labour 
candidates who had won Glasgow seats in the 1931 election. 56 James Carmichael's 
opponent in Tradeston, Tom Henderson, had held the seat prior to 1931. Thus, in Govan 
the most important aspect of the Labour campaign against the I. L. P. was the claim that 
this was a'Labour' seat. 
The I. L. P. had something of a tradition in nominating candidates in Norwich, with their 
candidate, Dorothy Jewson, taking one of the places in this two member seat in the 1923 
Election and standing in subsequent elections as an I. L. P. Candidate. 57 Following 
disaffiliation an initially strained relationship with the Labour Party had improved 
somewhat, especially on the council where Labour relied on the I. L. P. for its majority. 
In 1935 the I. L. P. tried strenuously to persuade the Labour Party to only put forward 
one candidate in the two member seat. 58 The Norwich Labour Party, under pressure 
from the N. E. C., had no intention of pulling one of its candidates out arguing that the 
national dimension was crucial in understanding why it was important to have an all- 
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Labour ticket. 59 The Labour campaign attempted to leave the I. L. P. unmentioned until 
the days immediately before polling when, probably as a response to the National 
Government Candidates' focus on the I. L. P. /Labour split, the Labour Party suddenly 
issued a leaflet with a scathing personal attack on Brockway. 60 
It was thus the question of the split vote which dominated I. L. P. 's fortunes in the 1935 
General Election almost everywhere. Only in Merthyr, where the I. L. P. alone stood 
against Labour, were the dynamics significantly different. The Labour Party and their 
candidate S. O. Davies dismissed the I. L. P. campaign as 'a childish attempt at disruption 
in the working class movement. ' Although the I. L. P. candidate had to cope with 
accusations that he was attracting the support of anti-socialists he was able to gain the 
support of some significant local Labour figures, most notably, Alderman Sam Jennings 
who had been passed over the previous year for the Labour nomination. 61 The I. L. P. 
was also able to obtain the support of the Communist Party in three boroughs despite 
the national line of the C. P. 62 
4.8 Religion 
Questions of religion were never a defining part of the I. L. P. 's politics in the 1930s. 
However, in the context of Glasgow, where an uneasy peace between rival religious 
factions was only beginning to be established, religious matters remained relevant to the 
Party's leading Glasgow figures. The I. L. P. still benefited from being part of the 
'Labour-Catholic alliance' after 1922 and even after 1932 Catholic elites had chosen, so 
far as possible, not to take sides in the dispute between the I. L. P. and the Labour 
Party63 In 1935 even McGovern, who was well known for his outspoken attacks on 
Church interference in politics, was not directly opposed by the Catholic Church. 
Despite continuing tensions with the Catholic elites, in 1935 the Catholic Union did not 
directly oppose him leaving it up to individual branches to decide their own policy. 64 
The significance of religion for the I. L. P. was enhanced by the fact that the chief 
opposition to each of the successful I. L. P. candidates came from the Unionist camp. 
This was particularly true for Maxton, as Bridgeton was probably the seat in Glasgow 
where Orange sympathies amongst the Protestant working class were strongest and his 
Unionist opponent, Lt. Col. McInnes Shaw, was a leading figure in Orange circles. The 
Unionists were initially hopeful that the divided Labour/I. L. P. vote would allow them to 
defeat Maxton. There were however, serious divisions within the Bridgeton Protestant 
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camp and McInnes Shaw had to dedicate much of his campaign to attacking Unionist 
complacency and arguing for a continuous effort to 'make sure that the bad housing 
conditions on which Socialism flourishes are removed. '65 Whilst the I. L. P. 's Glasgow 
candidates could not completely ignore the question of religion none made any effort to 
deal with such questions directly. 
4.9 Results 
The outcome of the 1935 General Election was another large victory by the National 
Government. The National Government returned 431 seats, Labour 154, the Liberals 19, 
the I. L. P. 4, the Irish Nationalists 2, the Communists 1 and other parties 5. This success 
has been described by some commentators as being as dramatic as the Liberal landslide 
of 1906 or the Labour victory of 1945.66 However, the Labour Party did make some 
progress in 1935. Overall they made net gain of 94 seats, with a swing to Labour of 
about 9.4%. Whilst the swing did not show the very marked regional variations of some 
elections it was above average in north-east Scotland, London, Lancashire, East 
Midlands, West Riding of Yorkshire, Durham, Northumberland and southern Scotland. 
The swing was lower than 9.4% in the West Midlands, south-west England, parts of the 
Clyde Valley, and some parts of north-east England. 67 
The I. L. P. saw four candidates elected. Its three sitting MPs were returned along with 
Campbell Stephen in Camlachie. In all four cases the Labour Party candidate lost his 
deposit. There was some surprise expressed in Glasgow at the size of the I. L. P. 
majorities and that even the relatively uncharismatic figure of Campbell Stephen had 
performed so well. 68 However, Stephen's performance showed up the significant 
weaknesses in their position as well. Stephen's victory was a statement of support for an 
I. L. P. candidate whose policy was not significantly different from his Labour 
opponents. The vote for Stephen showed a widespread acceptance that Camlachie was 
an'I. L. P. seat', it was a condition that could not be readily used elsewhere. 
Elsewhere, only in Bradford and North Lanark was there a widely accepted argument 
that the I. L. P. was the 'legitimate' working class party to contest the seat. In both cases 
the result saw the Labour party take enough votes from the second placed I. L. P. to 
prevent the smaller party from winning the seat, and to hand victory to the National 
Government. The I. L. P. had polled above the Labour Party, it was now necessary for 
the Party to ensure that this result translated into future legitimacy for the Party, to 
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ensure that workers who had voted loyally for the Labour Party would in future vote 
I. L. P. As the Bradford I. L. P. commented on the result 
The figures prove that our party had the confidence of more workers than any other working class 
party in the division. It is obvious that a large number of workers have put their trade union loyalty 
before their own political interests 69 
Everywhere else, with the exception of Merthyr, the I. L. P. had performed badly. Except 
in the two other Glasgow seats the Party had lost its deposit, and even in Tradeston and 
Govan it had come bottom of the poll. In Kilmarnock, where the Party had received a 
reasonable poll in 1933 the I. L. P. had been squeezed out, as Crawford, the Labour 
candidate, suggested the 1935 result, effectively buried the I. L. P. as an electoral force in 
Kilmarnock. 7° In Norwich where the I. L. P. was building up its electoral presence at 
local level and with Brockway as candidate the Party had performed badly. Yet in areas 
such as Norwich and Kilmarnock where the Labour Party was itself struggling to 
recover from 1931 the I. L. P. vote was still important. 7' The initial anger the Labour 
Party directed against the I. L. P. on occasion, as in Norwich, developed into a desire for 
a more positive alliance. 72 
In other places there was less consolation for the small defeated party. With convincing 
electoral defeats the only rewards were personal. In Whitehaven Tom Stephenson came 
out of events significantly better than the I. L. P. 
Actually the I. L. P. challenge proved a fiasco. Mr Stephenson won his spurs as a speaker who can 
grip and hold a crowd, but he had no organisation behind him, and the man in the street could not 
detect anything more attractive in the I. L. P. brand of socialism than that which he usually 
supported. 3 
Whilst in Camborne all Kate Spurrell was left with apart from hope for the future was a 
strong sense of personal pride: 
I am bottom of the poll. I have lost my deposit but I am a proud woman... I never tried to get your 
votes; I have fought a clean fight... I built a party machine at the last election which turned its 
guns upon me. I don't mind that. I am glad to be losing behind James Maxton rather than win as 
the official Labour candidate as I might have done... When the breakdown comes, and it will 
come, the workers will turn to leaders who have never betrayed them. 74 
The British electoral system leaves scant room for smaller parties, and the I. L. P., 
despite bucking this trend in Glasgow, and coming close in North Lanark and Bradford 
found its vote squeezed everywhere by accusations of 'splitting the vote. ' Only in 
Merthyr where this logic did not apply did the an I. L. P. candidate who had never 
represented the division perform surprisingly well. The crucial factor undoubtedly lay in 
148 
the fact that the logic which was so often used against the I. L. P. - that splitting the vote 
would let in a Tory- was irrelevant in the Merthyr campaign. 
4.10 Conclusion 
The performance of the I. L. P. in the three by-elections and the 1935 General Election 
contests suggests that the party's achievements were affected by a wide range of factors. 
These included the levels of campaigning, the candidates selected and the attitude of 
religious organisations and other political parties. However, the impact of most of these 
factors appears relatively small. In the 1935 General Election, for example, there is little 
evidence that the least well-known of the I. L. P. candidates performed significantly 
worse than the better respected when standing in similar seats. There is even less 
evidence that exact detail of the policy they were putting forward systematically 
affected the poll of I. L. P. candidates. Indeed, in so far as the Party was able to get the 
majority, and in some cases the overwhelming majority, of the Labour/I. L. P. combined 
vote one factor stands ahead of all others: the perception, or not, of a seat as an 'I. L. P. 
seat. ' The exact candidate, for example, was important largely in so far as they 
connected to a tradition of contesting a seat, as Campbell Stephen did in Camlachie, or 
Fred Jowett did in Bradford, rather than through charisma, activism or public speaking 
expertise. 
Following disaffiliation the role of contesting parliamentary elections in the Party's 
strategy had been seriously questioned. The N. A. C., with the R. P. C. campaigning for 
further reform, had reduced the emphasis given to electoral struggles. However, the 
I. L. P. through Maxton and the parliamentary group maintained a Parliamentary and 
electoral presence which gave the Party considerable prestige. The R. P. C. 's proposal for 
complete rejection of electoral activity would have been folly in a situation where 
electoral success was one of the Party's greatest strengths. However, by the end of 1935 
the two rival conceptions of the role of parliamentary activity in the Party's strategy 
seemed no more attractive. Brockway's idea that the I. L. P. 's 'new revolutionary policy' 
would prove a significant electoral asset appeared discredited by his own result in 
Upton, and this idea was rarely mentioned after 1934. Similarly the thought, expressed 
by Maxton in 1935, and the Unity Group before then, that the I. L. P. could build itself up 
into a significant national electoral force appeared discredited by the failure of the I. L. P. 
to make an impact outside its traditional areas of strength. 
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Thus, the Parliamentary arena posed the I. L. P. with great difficulties. The pre- 
disaffiliation strength of the Party meant that it was too strong to ignore the electoral 
and parliamentary activities. The pre-disaffiliation traditions and strategy of the Party, 
which saw Parliamentary legitimacy as one of the great strengths of the I. L. P., 
continued to inform the thinking of large sections of the organisation. Yet these aims, 
although not formally inconsistent with a revolutionary policy sat uneasily alongside the 
new outlook the I. L. P. was seeking to adopt. These strategic difficulties were made 
worse by the performance of the Party candidates in parliamentary elections. Whilst 
influence was maintained, there was no obvious strategy available to increase the 
I. L. P. 's parliamentary presence. In terms of Parliamentary elections the Party was only 
able to exploit existing areas of strength rather than develop new possibilities. The 
concerted efforts of the Labour Party to destroy the I. L. P. in electoral terms, combined 
with an electorate which did not make a significant distinction between I. L. P. and 
Labour programmes, removed any serious possibility of transforming local influence 
into a Parliamentary seat. In this situation there was no obviously effective strategy that 
the I. L. P. could have developed towards Parliament and elections. 
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5. Factions 
5.1 Introduction 
In the immediate period after disaffiliation most political debate within the I. L. P. was 
conducted against a backdrop of extreme factionalism, described by Fenner Brockway 
in 1977 as 'an appalling experience of sectarian controversy about revolutionary 
theory. " This chapter deals with the three major factional groups within the I. L. P.: the 
R. P. C., the Unity Group and the Trotskyists. Each of the factions had a different vision 
of the political possibilities for the disaffiliated I. L. P. The Revolutionary Policy 
Committee saw the party as a component of a dynamic United Revolutionary Party with 
the Communist Party, the Unity Group envisaged an independent ethical socialist party 
and the Trotskyists saw the possibilities of a more extensive British section of the 
Fourth International. Understanding the detail of these factional conflicts is central to 
understanding why the I. L. P. 's strategy developed as it did. However, the study of intra- 
party disputes also provides an explanation of why the Party's membership and fortunes 
declined so sharply. 
5.2 The Revolutionary Policy Committee 
The Revolutionary Policy Committee (R. P. C. ) was founded before disaffiliation by 
I. L. P. ers who were especially frustrated with the gradualist policies of the second 
Labour Government. In 1935 the R. P. C. decided to join the Communist Party en masse 
and this decision has generally conditioned subsequent commentators' assessment of the 
Committee. The general suggestion has been that the R. P. C. was a Communist entryist 
group 'faithful to every twist of C. P. policy. '2 In fact the R. P. C. was no simple 
Communist front; rather it displayed considerable independence of thought and 
organisation. The Committee was particularly influential in the immediate period after 
disaffiliation. However, its very independence of thought caused considerable problems 
and, divided amongst themselves, the Committee opted to join the Communist Party to 
the surprise of even the Communist Party's leadership. 
The R. P. C. was initially formed by Carl Cullen, a Party member who had come to 
Poplar in 1923 to take up work as a Health Inspector concentrating on tuberculosis. By 
the late 1920s he had become chairman of the Poplar I. L. P. and had been elected as an 
I. L. P. candidate onto London County Council. When a committee for disaffiliation from 
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the Labour Party was set up in 1930 Dr Cullen used it to circulate the wider I. L. P. with 
a call to form a Revolutionary Policy Committee based on Marxist ideas. A large 
number of London members were quickly attracted to the R. P. C. Some such as Dudley 
Edwards, the R. P. C. 's first secretary and Clive Branson, the editor of local I. L. P. paper 
Revolt, briefly joined before being drawn into the Communist Party. 3 However, the 
committee included many with an important attachment to the I. L. P. including Cullen 
and, following 1931, his close colleague Jack Gaster. 
Although not directly involved in the formation of the R. P. C., Gaster soon rose to 
become the R. P. C. 's leading spokesman. He was born in 1907, the son of Moses Gaster, 
the Haham (Chief Rabbi) of the Sephardi section of the English Jewish Community, and 
joined the I. L. P. in November 1926 as a result of the General Strike, under the influence 
of his friend Peter Mannheim, an antique dealer. 4 Gaster, who in January 1931 was a 
newly qualified lawyer setting out to establish his own practice in the City of London, 
was widely acknowledged as the R. P. C. 's most able speaker and as its leading theorist. 
Within the I. L. P., the R. P. C. was frequently referred to as 'the Gaster-Cullen group'. 
Together, he, Cullen and the rest of the Committee took their first task as persuading the 
party to disaffiliate from the Labour Party not on the 'superficial' ground of standing 
orders but on the 'fundamental' issue of 'revolutionary policy. ' Despite extensive 
canvassing, the Bradford Conference rejected the R. P. C. 's suggestion to define the break 
with Labour in 'revolutionary' terms. However, the conference enthusiastically accepted 
the R. P. C. 's proposal that the conditions of disaffiliation be made a compulsory 
condition of I. L. P. membership. 
The R. P. C. and associated members of the disaffiliation committee quickly came to play 
an important part in the machinery of the London Divisional Council of the I. L. P., 
where the Committee was increasingly well organised. It held regular meetings, 
especially before the I. L. P. 's national and divisional conferences to decide votes on 
resolutions, which even before disaffiliation were able to attract representation from half 
the branches in the London Division. 5 The Committee also began to appeal for funds to 
keep up its activity and it started publishing its own monthly journal: The London 
R. P. C. Bulletin. 6 In early 1932 Cullen launched a bid for the position of London 
representative on the ILP's National Administrative Committee. He was nearly 
successful, losing only narrowly to Guild Socialist and Post Office Workers' Union 
employee, J. Allen Skinner, with both leading candidates advocating disaffiliation from 
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the Labour Party. The nine members of the Divisional Executive included three R. P. C. 
members Cullen, C. Hanson and Bert Matlow, an R. P. C. member with Trotskyist 
sympathies. The wider Divisional Council included other R. P. C. ers such as Jack Huntz 
from the Party's youth section and Reg Bower the North London Federation Secretary. 
In September 1932, Gaster was elected onto both the London Divisional Council and its 
executive. Then at the Divisional Conference the following February, in a conference 
dominated by the R. P. C. and ex-members of the disaffiliation committee he was elected 
as the London Divisional Representative on the ILP's N. A. C. where he effectively acted 
as the R. P. C. 's spokesman until November 1935. 
The R. P. C. was also able to geographically expand its influence. By 1933 the 
Committee claimed to exert significant influence in the Midlands and North-East 
divisions! However, Lancashire was the R. P. C. 's main centre outside of London. There 
the R. P. C. had a large representation in the Liverpool area, but it also had made some 
inroads in other areas. 9 There was, for example, significant R. P. C. activity in Wigan, 
Chorley and Blackpool. '° 
From 1931 the R. P. C., as its name suggested, had been attempting to develop a 
revolutionary policy for the I. L. P. to follow. Some elements of this policy remained 
with the Committee from its formation to November 1935 when it joined the 
Communist Party. Most notably, the R. P. C. remained attached to the proposal that 
I. L. P. and Communist Party should be working together. The Committee also constantly 
suggested that the I. L. P. should be approaching the Comintern to enquire about the 
conditions for sympathetic affiliation. However, in other respects R. P. C. policy 
underwent considerable evolution in the period up to 1935. 
The R. P. C. released its first detailed policy statement before disaffiliation, in January 
1932. The statement was critical of the Communist Party for its sectarianism and of the 
I. L. P. for its reformist past. Nevertheless, the statement set out the long-term aim of 
uniting I. L. P. and Communist Parties into a single United Revolutionary Party. The 
memorandum presented the R. P. C. 's basic understanding of the economic and political 
situation from the starting point that Capitalism was about to collapse, a crash was 
expected within one or two years. Thus, the Committee argued, there was no time to 
win control of the Parliamentary machinery, which was anyway weighted in favour of 
the capitalists. Instead they suggested, peoples' minds would only be shaken from their 
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capitalist prejudices during a revolutionary crisis. The implication, according to the 
R. P. C., was that Parliament should cease to be the primary focus of the I. L. P. 1 1 The 
Committee proposed industrial activity as an alternative, arguing that the route to 
socialism was likely to be through a general strike. Given its analysis of the failure of 
leadership during the General Strike, a formative political experience for many of the 
younger members, the R. P. C. emphasised the need for a structure of Workers' Councils. 
In practical terms the R. P. C. suggested the need for a new revolutionary policy for the 
I. L. P. and a new constitution. This, they argued, should positively exclude 'gradualists' 
from the Party and recognise the necessity of a period of dictatorship of the Proletariat. 
Following disaffiliation, with the I. L. P. as a whole convinced of the need to develop a 
'new revolutionary policy', the Committee continued the development of its position. By 
1933 talk of economic crisis remained, but the idea of immanent economic collapse had 
receded. The Committee instead focused on attempting to change the constitution of the 
I. L. P., trying to get the Party to accept their suggestions for the objective, method and 
development of the party. The R. P. C. proposed an entirely new constitution at the 
London and Southern Counties divisional conference early in 1933, and after being 
accepted there it was submitted to the I. L. P. 's annual conference at Derby in 1933. The 
proposed party objective, as it was laid down by the R. P. C., corresponded, more or less, 
to a standard Marxist conception of Socialism: 
The Socialist Commonwealth is a classless society in which land and capital and all economic 
resources are communally owned and controlled; the power to live by rent, interest or profit is 
ended; all perform work of social value according to their ability and share in the common 
resources according to their need; and willingness to perform work of social value is the basis of 
citizenship. 12 
However, more controversial were the R. P. C. 's ideas on the methods of achieving 
socialism. Alongside continued proposals for regular work with the Communist Party, 
there was a commitment to a class-based struggle which carried with it the strong 
implication of the use of force. However, the most contested element of the programme 
was that the I. L. P. should abandon Parliamentary and electoral struggle and look to 
13 establish a'Worker's Dictatorship' through the development of Workers' Councils. 
The existing organs of national and local government being part of the machinery of Capitalism, 
such organs can not be employed as the main instrument for the capture of power by the working 
class, and the I. L. P. will work alternatively for the creation of direct Workers' Councils. 14 
The voting on the R. P. C. 's new constitutional proposals by the Derby conference was 
taken in parts. The definition of socialism proposed by the R. P. C. was just accepted by 
a vote of 80 to 87. However, the longest and most crucial section of the R. P. C. 's 
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proposal was defeated by a narrow margin, on a vote of 86 to 90.15 Rather than accept 
the R. P. C. constitution a slim majority of the I. L. P. chose to accept a policy which gave 
greater emphasis to the role of parliament and less to Workers' Councils which were 
used only as an example of possible forms of non-parliamentary activity rather than as 
the route to socialism. 16 However, the Derby conference did accept as Party policy the 
R. P. C. 's proposal, moved by William Warbey, later a Labour MP, to require the N. A. C. 
to investigate the possibility of affiliating to the Communist International. The result, 
despite the opposition of the N. A. C., was a victory for the R. P. C. with the conference 
narrowly passing the motion on a vote of 83-79.17 
In the period up to 1933 the Communist Party showed no support for the R. P. C. In 1931 
the C. P. was still firmly holding to its Class against Class line. Under this policy left- 
wing groups were seen as a block to the movement of the working-class into the 
Communist Party. 18 In some respects the R. P. C. could have been understood to have 
been an example of a group of leftward moving workers, blocked by the I. L. P. Instead 
of trying to attract the R. P. C. to the Communist Party, the C. P. instead attacked the 
Committee as itself a further block on the left-ward moving workers. Harry Pollitt, the 
Communist Party's General Secretary, rejected any thoughts of working with the R. P. C. 
naming its leadership amongst those with whom the C. P. was 'not interested in any false 
and unprincipled unity. i19 The leading members of the R. P. C. were lumped together 
with the mainstream leaders of the I. L. P. as the Communist Party claimed that the 
leftward moving 'rank-and-file of the I. L. P. must look past Maxton and Gaster if they 
wish to find the true path, the path indicated long since by Marx and Lenin... '20 The 
Daily Worker continually misreported R. P. C. support for the leadership of the I. L. P. and 
claimed the committee was failing to give leadership to the left within the Party. As 
Cullen commented 'I understand the tactics of the D[aily] W[orker] quite well, 
including their desire to smash our group in the hope of pulling people over to the 
C. P. i21 
During this 'Class-against-Class' period the R. P. C. also showed considerable hostility to 
the Communists. The R. P. C. 's 'Memorandum on the present political and economic 
situation and the I. L. P. ' released in January of 1932 was heavily critical of the tactics 
and unsound psychology of the Communist Party. Nevertheless, R. P. C. ers began 
attending Labour Monthly readers conferences during 1931 and the Committee was 
committed to the formation of a United Revolutionary Party. 22 
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Although Pollift was meeting with the leadership of the R. P. C. from the end of 1932, it 
was not until the Communist Party change in line on the desirability of a united front 
with the I. L. P. in March 1933 that cordial relations were really established. As soon as 
that decision was taken, Dutt, through the medium of Labour Monthly, increased the 
journal's coverage of the debates within the I. L. P. and announced a discussion 
conference on I. L. P. 'Revolutionary Policy'. Dutt was still careful to distinguish the 'left 
centrist line' of the R. P. C. from the revolutionary Marxist line. However, for the first 
time he began to speak of attaining agreement on 'the basic political platform' and to 
suggest that 'secondary differences should not be allowed to stand in the way of the 
great objective union of the revolutionary forces in Britain. i23 The resulting conference 
on 11 March, attended by around two hundred I. L. P. ers and C. P. members, represented 
the beginnings of serious attempts by the Communist Party to influence the R. P. C. 's 
strategy and policy. 24 
Despite this increasing connection between the R. P. C. and the Communist Party, there 
remained significant policy differences between the two organisations. In particular the 
R. P. C. placed a much greater emphasis on Workers' Councils than the C. P. would 
accept. The Communist Party claimed the R. P. C. was seeking to displace the central 
role of the Party in Leninist theory. Leading Communist figure, and founding editor of 
the Communist daily newspaper The Daily Worker, William Rust, summed up the 
Communist attitude to the R. P. C. 's'sheer drivel, ' when in the July 1933 issue of Labour 
Monthly he argued that R. P. C. propaganda 'distorts the meaning of Workers' Councils 
as forms of united front organisation and presents them as panaceas for all evils, as 
embracing bodies capable of doing all jobs from fighting wage cuts to running 
Parliamentary candidates and leading the revolution. 25 As Rust put it, 'in short, 
Workers' Councils have been put forward as a substitute for the revolutionary party of 
i26 the working class. 
However, in practice the Workers' Councils proved one important framework for 
increasing I. L. P. co-operation with the Communist Party, especially in the London area. 
When Workers' Councils were set up they were viewed as an important and natural 
extension of existing co-operation between the C. P. and the I. L. P. For example the first 
issue of the London and Southern Counties divisional paper, Revolt, reported that the 
first Workers' Council in South London, at Camberwell, at the end of January 1933 was 
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'built on the solid foundations of united activity. ' The report was keen to stress that 
organisational and party identities were not important in the selection of officers, and 
the executive were elected because they 'were the best men for the job. '27 In practical 
terms Workers' Councils formed a significant link between the R. P. C. and the C. P. 
From its formation in 1931 to 1933 the R. P. C. had made considerable progress. It had 
developed a policy framework based on Workers' Councils, a United Revolutionary 
Party and I. L. P. sympathetic affiliation to the Comintern. The Committee had obtained 
considerable influence within the London Division, and it largely controlled the 
machinery of the London Divisional Council. Within the National Party the R. P. C. had 
only a limited basis of organisation outside of London and the Committee was not able 
to push its policy through the national conference in the same way as it could through 
the London Divisional conferences. Nevertheless, the results of the 1933 Derby 
conference indicated that the R. P. C. could gain considerable support, even against the 
leadership of the Party. However, R. P. C. 's successes of 1933 represented the highpoint 
of both committee influence within the Party and R. P. C. independence of the 
Communist Party. 
5.3 The R. P. C. Divided: The Comintern Affiliation Committee 
The R. P. C. leadership under Cullen and Gaster wished to push their successes at the 
1933 Derby conference, especially with regard to sympathetic affiliation to the 
Comintern. In this respect their immediate aims were to publicise the Comintern's 
condition for I. L. P. sympathetic affiliation, and ensure that N. A. C. negotiators would 
include R. P. C. representatives. 8 However, for some within the R. P. C., including Bob 
Edwards of Chorley I. L. P., this approach was far too slow. They wanted a definite stand 
to be taken for the I. L. P. immediately joining the Third International, without further 
delays or conditions. Edwards, a leading member of the left wing within the Lancashire 
I. L. P., criticised the timidity of the R. P. C. leadership in an article in the August 1933 
issue of Labour Monthly. He argued that the Derby decisions implied the I. L. P. had 
already endorsed sympathetic affiliation to the Comintern. 29 Whilst the R. P. C. accepted 
this was what the Party should be doing they suggested that the Party still needed to be 
persuaded to take the decisions that Edwards believed had already been taken. For 
Edwards, under Gaster and Cullen's leadership, the R. P. C. was trying to push the I. L. P. 
to a position that they had already reached. Instead, he suggested they should have been 
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looking to move the Party to a new and higher level of co-operation with the 
Communists both nationally and internationally. 
At the same time the Communist Party leadership were looking to extend their influence 
within the R. P. C. Dutt in particular, had never been satisfied with the leadership of the 
R. P. C., characterising Gaster and Cullen in late 1933 as 'ambiguous evasive left types' 
who should be instructed to form'a committee for affiliation' to the Comintern. 30 Gaster 
and Cullen would not countenance such an undercover organisation. However, two 
members of the I. L. P., Hanson and Morgan, were persuaded to join the Communist 
Party and retain their I. L. P. cards. They immediately complied with Dutt's orders and 
building on the dissatisfaction which Edwards had expressed with the leadership of the 
I. L. P., the Comintern Affiliation Committee was born. 
The Affiliation Committee was significantly smaller than the R. P. C. but it was 
geographically more evenly distributed. At the 1934 York Conference whilst the R. P. C. 
motions were proposed almost without exception by London Branches, the Affiliation 
Committee resolutions originated from Dumfries, Nottingham and East Liverpool. 
Despite Hanson's role in the formation of the Committee and his role as first secretary, 
the highest profile members were the Chairman Eric Whalley, also the Chairman of the 
Mansfield I. L. P. and Bob Edwards, the leading opponent of the Unity Group in 
Lancashire 31 
The Affiliation Committee maintained its assault on the ineffectiveness of the R. P. C. 
leadership for being 'silent' and making 'no attempt to organise the revolutionaries 
against the reactionaries. "32 From the other side the R. P. C. was anxious to note the 
differences between itself and the Affiliation Committee. Not only did it point out that 
that Committee was much smaller than the R. P. C., but also that the R. P. C. did not stand 
for the policy of immediate unconditional sympathetic affiliation to the Communist 
International. The Affiliation Committee was not, they claimed, a faction of the R. P. C., 
but a separate group who had formed their own faction and then invited the R. P. C. to 
join. This offer the R. P. C. had quickly declined. 33 The Affiliation Committee thus stood 
outside the R. P. C. attempting to push it further in its attempts to promote co-operation 
with and affiliation to the National and International Communist movement. 
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The 1934 York Conference saw R. P. C. proposals for a more democratic centralist 
structure accepted by the N. A. C. and the rest of the Party, largely because of the party's 
financial situation. However, the Affiliation Committee line that the I. L. P. had already 
accepted the principle of sympathetic affiliation was made to look a little ridiculous 
when not only their amendment, but also the R. P. C. amendment on international 
affiliation was lost at the York conference. 34 After this defeat the Affiliation Committee 
experienced two separate conflicts with the wider Party, which led to its winding up. 
The first involved the two London members who had worked to establish the 
committee. The second set of problems centred on their two most prominent members 
of the Committee, Eric Whalley and Bob Edwards. 
J. Hanson, the secretary of the Affiliation Committee, was the London Division's 
propaganda secretary and Chairman of the Islington I. L. P. 35 As a prominent R. P. C. 
supporter in London he was disgusted by the behaviour of the Party's leadership over 
their attempts to contact the Comintern following the Derby decision, comparing their 
failure to the betrayal of 1931.36 When the fact that both he and fellow Affiliation 
Committee founder Morgan were actually members of the Communist Party became 
known early in 1934, it sent ripples through the Party and shockwaves through the 
Revolutionary Policy Committee. For many critics this situation was the logical result 
of the R. P. C. 's position, which they argued, justified taking strong action against that 
Committee. The R. P. C., in their dominant position on the London Divisional Council, 
was left with little choice but to come down strongly on the two individuals concerned. 
Hanson was immediately suspended from his position on the Divisional Council, and 
after an inquiry and consultation with the N. A. C. the two were expelled from the 
Party. 37 
Hanson was also involved the events that led to the suspension of Whalley and Edwards 
from the Party. The key aim of the Comintern Affiliation Committee's activity was to 
push for I. L. P. affiliation to the Third International. In order to facilitate this it decided 
to send Whalley and Edwards as a delegation to the Soviet Union to try and clarify the 
twenty-one conditions and alleviate the fears of some I. L. P. ers about what fulfilling 
those conditions would really mean. In order to facilitate this the Committee got Hanson 
to make an appeal for money to fund the delegation by sending a circular to I. L. P. 
branches. It was exactly this kind of money raising which the initial discussions 
between the N. A. C. and the R. P. C. had ruled out as a legitimate part of I. L. P. activity. 
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At least as serious was the worry that the funding for the trip may also have been 
coming from Communist sources. 8 
However, the main purpose of the visit was to clarify the basis for the I. L. P. to 
sympathetically affiliate to the Comintern. Edwards and Whalley published a pamphlet 
on their return, entitled Revolutionary Unity which gave the official C. I. answers to 
fifteen questions that Whalley and Edwards had asked. Perhaps the most significant 
question was the thirteenth, which asked 'what does affiliation of the I. L. P. to the 
Comintern, as a sympathising party, presuppose? ' The Comintern reply allowed the 
I. L. P. to retain its name, organisation and officials. However, one single stringent 
condition would be applied, that the policy of the party be in line with that of the 
Comintern: 
The only demand the Comintern will make of your Party and your policy is that your activity, and 
that of your officials, should be in line with the policy of the Comintern and that they should not 
be in opposition to its fundamental principles. 9 
The links of the Comintern Affiliation Committee with Morgan, Hanson and the 
Communist Party, were added to the doubts about fund-raising for the trip. The N. A. C. 
suspended Edwards and Whalley from the I. L. P. and sought assurances that their 
primary loyalty was not to the Communist Party. The impact of Edwards's suspension 
on the Chorley Party were particularly harsh in the wake of the resignation of the Unity 
Group in Lancashire, and the local federation wrote to the N. A. C. requesting them to 
deal with the matter quickly, especially in view of Edwards's claim that he had a 'record 
of Party loyalty comparable with that of any member of the Inner Executive. ' After 
considerable equivocation and dispute both men made statements which were 
considered satisfactory and their suspension was lifted. 40 
However, after the trouble caused by Hanson's and Morgan's association with the 
Communist Party and Whalley's and Edwards's trip to the Soviet Union it was clear that 
there was no future for the Affiliation Committee. With Hanson and Morgan outside the 
Party and the R. P. C. a decreasing influence Whalley moved back into the R. P. C. fold, 
working within it until the Committee departed the Party in November 1935. He then 
became an active member of the Communist Party and was appointed by that 
organisation as a political commissar in Spain during the Civil War only to be killed 
three days after his arrival. Hanson became an active member of the Communist Party 
and in September 1935 used his experiences within the Party to write an article heavily 
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criticising the International position of the I. L. P. and paving the way for the R. P. C. to 
join the Communist Party41 However, Edwards, appointed to the N. A. C. after the 
resignation of Sandharn in 1934, although initially sympathetic to the R. P. C. position 
moved quickly to the mainstream of the Party. He remained active within the Party until 
well after the Second World War, serving as Party Chairman after the War. 
5.4 Aplin, The R. P. C. and The Battle for Control in London 
The difficulties and divisions within the R. P. C. during 1934 had been partially solved 
after the Comintern Affiliation Committee had been dissolved. However, the R. P. C. 
remained in a difficult position and the 1935 Derby conference was a crucial 
opportunity for the Committee to reassert itself within the Party. Thus in the period 
before the conference the R. P. C. sought once again to step up its activity and profile 
within the Party. 
The R. P. C. began complaining formally about the attitude taken by the New Leader on 
the question of Soviet Foreign Policy. Tensions escalated in March 1935 when, in a 
move calculated to anger Brockway and bring to a head the question of the I. L. P. 
attitude towards the Soviet Union, Jack Gaster wrote an article putting the R. P. C. view 
on the subject. The I. L. P. 's London Divisional Chairman, A. H. Hawkins, previously the 
editor of the Communist journal Workers' Weekly, then submitted Gaster's article to 
New Leader requesting that it should be published. Brockway was forced to return the 
article and to remind Gaster and Hawkins that the principle had been accepted that 
inner-party controversy should be excluded from the columns of the Party's national 
journal42 Brockway's refusal to publish Gaster's article was endorsed by the Inner 
Executive but Gaster was determined to make an issue of the decision. At the next 
meeting of the full N. A. C. he moved that the Inner Executive Minutes be referenced 
back, claiming that his article was an elaboration of Party policy and was not 
controversial. He lost the motion, but only by a narrow 8-5 margin as Tom Stephenson, 
Sam Leckie, Bob Edwards and Lewis Povey supported him. 43 
Gaster also had serious disagreements with parts of the N. A. C. policy statement for the 
1935 Derby Conference. He refused to present the N. A. C. case on a number of issues 
and alerted the N. A. C. to the possibility of some N. A. C. members presenting a line that 
was not in step with the agreed position. These fears were fully justified by the conduct 
of John McGovern and Campbell Stephen in their attacks on the Comintern. 44 However, 
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the eventual conference decisions represented a series of blows to the R. P. C. Criticism 
of the Soviet Union's foreign policy, proposed by the N. A. C. and opposed by the 
R. P. C., was endorsed by the Party. The R. P. C. 's call for affiliation to the Comintern and 
definite rejection of a Fourth International were defeated and unofficial groups within 
the Party, focussing on the R. P. C., were declared 'bad in principle. i45 The 1935 
Conference had been seen by the R. P. C. as an opportunity to reassert its position and 
prominence within the Party. However, the conference had established the opposite, the 
R. P. C. was increasingly marginalised in I. L. P. decision making and there was an 
growing feeling that the Committee was simply damaging the Party's activity. 
The impact of the 1935 conference decisions was especially acute in the London 
Division where the committee had maintained a significant majority on the London 
Divisional Council from the period immediately following disaffiliation. Tensions had 
been rising between John Aplin, the London Divisional organiser, and the R. P. C. over a 
long period. Following the 1935 Derby conference the R. P. C. adopted a series of more 
confrontational stances which brought tensions to a head. These tactics included the use 
of Communist Party instructors and speakers and the refusal of the R. P. C. dominated 
London Divisional Council to appoint speakers on behalf of the I. L. P. or to co-operate 
in the production of party propaganda. 46 A speech given by Jack Gaster as the 
Divisional fraternal delegate to the C. P. 's London District Congress in June 1935, where 
he set out a non-party line on Soviet Foreign Policy, brought matters to a head. 47 Aplin 
had been a long term opponent of the R. P. C. and, in 1935, was in no mood to avert a 
confrontation. Vie believed that the time had come to make a definite stand against the 
R. P. C. He resigned his office as London Divisional Organiser in order to begin the task 
of organising divisional opinion against the Revolutionary Policy Committee and the 
group system. 
The London Divisional Council denied that they were being used for group purposes by 
the R. P. C. and claimed that Aplin's problems were not really with the group system but 
with his approach to Soviet Foreign Policy. The Divisional Council rejected by 10-6 a 
motion that Gaster's speech at the London Communist Party Conference had followed 
an 'anti-Party line. ' However, the I. L. P. 's Inner Executive ruled that the Divisional 
Council itself had failed to accept the Party policy on Soviet Foreign policy and decided 
that 'the influence of the London leadership [was] weakening faith in the Party and its 
policy in the Division. '48 This Inner Executive decision taken together with the 
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conference attitude towards group activities within the Party meant that the N. A. C. 
needed to act. However, whilst the conference had passed the condemnation of group 
activity it had rejected the disciplinary resolution which had been attached to it. The 
N. A. C. was only able to issue a statement calling on loyal members of the Party to cease 
participation in unofficial groups. 49 
w 
5.5 Goodbye to the R. P. C. 
Following the 1935 Derby Conference tensions between the I. L. P. and the R. P. C. grew, 
and by the end of the year the R. P. C. had joined the Communist Party en masse. 
However, the route of the R. P. C. to Communist Party membership, even during 1935 
was not straightforward. Tensions with the Communist Party remained. For example 
during the summer of 1935 the R. P. C. strongly backed the N. A. C. 's removal of 
autonomy from the Guild of Youth as it tried to affiliate to the Y. C. I., preferring to 
defend the principle of democratic centralism over the support of the Communist line. 50 
However, the situation was especially complicated during the Abyssinian crisis, as 
leading members of the Committee, including Gaster, appeared to be distanced from the 
Communist position and in agreement with Brockway. Indeed, it was internal division, 
split and failure as well as political conviction which pushed the R. P. C. into the 
Communist Party. 
The I. L. P. as a whole was split over the correct response to the Abyssinian crisis. 
Dispute centred on the question of whether the I. L. P. should seek to aid the Abyssinians 
against the Italians or should accept, as Maxton and the Inner Executive suggested, that 
there was nothing to choose between the two 'rival dictators'. Within those who wanted 
to follow the Communist line and support Abyssinia there were further splits over 
whether to support workers' sanction or to accept the sanctions of the League of 
Nations. The London Division Emergency Committee, whose composition transcended 
factional divisions, strongly supported workers' sanctions. Their position was put by 
R. P. C. leader, Jack Gaster in the Party's internal discussion bulletin Controversy. 
Gaster's position, for the primacy of class struggle, supported by Hilda Vernon another 
of the leaders of the R. P. C. was further outlined in the R. P. C. Bulletin. 
The problem then presents itself as a conflict between the classes - each attempting to utilise the 
interests of the other for its own aims.... Working class interests are served by the defeat of both 
imperialisms, and it has therefore to oppose and frustrate Mussolini's aggression and at the same 
time oppose the Government which represents the equally oppressive interests of British 
imperialism... It must also be obvious that effective direct working class action against Italy's war 
plans would entirely alter the relation of forces internationally. " 
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Thus a substantial element of the long term leadership of the R. P. C. was arguing for a 
policy that was more in line with Brockway's position than with that of the Communist 
Party. 
However, a note appended to Gaster's Controversy article stated that it had been 
unanimously approved at a meeting of the Emergency Committee at which all members 
'except Dr Cullen were present. ' Behind this seemingly innocuous statement lay a crisis 
in the Revolutionary Policy Committee. 52 Whilst Gaster supported the class-based line 
of Brockway and many Trotskyists for workers' sanctions, Cullen, with the backing of 
the majority of the R. P. C., supported the Communist Party's line of League of Nations 
sanctions. He argued that the Soviet Union had transformed the League of Nations 
when it joined in 1934. In this new situation the League was capable of 'postponing war 
while [the working class builds] up their own forces. ' 
In 1935 we have the existence of the League, set up by the capitalists as a Golden Calf for the 
workers to worship but capable of being used as a stalking horse by the workers in the fight for 
their own objectives; and in that League we have our own powerful representative leading and 
consolidating the opposition to the designs of the Imperialist Powers. 
Indeed Cullen went along with the logic of the Communist Party's Popular Front policy 
change presenting an argument which suggested the need for an anti-war anti-fascist 
alliance with as broad a base as possible, rejecting notions of purely working class 
action: 
Not only the workers desire peace. The petit bourgeoisie want peace. The smaller capitalists, 
insecure already, are made more insecure by war. The smaller countries want peace... Even the 
capitalist parties have to pose as the friends of peace or the guardians of security. We see therefore 
a real community of interests amongst the workers and a limited and temporary community of 
interests amongst the general mass of the population including the middle classes. 53 
The result, as the R. P. C. Bulletin conceded, was a crisis which went to the very heart of 
the Committee: 
Yes, there was a crisis in the R. P. C.... There was a sharp cleavage of opinion on the Abyssinian 
question and the line we should take on Sanctions and on our attitude to the broad peace 
movement. There were several conference of R. P. C. supporters, a few "personalities" exchanged 
together with some real straight from the shoulder hitting, a general election of the committee 
resulting in one or two changes in personnel, a great deal of heart burning and a devil of a lot of 
hard thinking, a determination to maintain revolutionary unity, - and the R. P. C. proceeds with its 
work. 54 
Within the wider I. L. P. it was considered acceptable to debate the question of whether 
assistance should be rendered to Abyssinia. But Cullen had gone beyond the bounds of 
this controversy. That he suggested that assistance could be given to Abyssinia through 
the League of Nations was bad enough, but he went further, arguing that if necessary 
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the issue could involve the use of military sanctions. All of this went beyond what the 
majority of the leaders of the I. L. P. considered acceptable. The Inner Executive, 
dominated by those who were most opposed to supporting Abyssinia, decided that 
Cullen, together with other leading R. P. C. ers who followed his line, should be deleted 
from the National Speakers list. 55 
These issues exploded at the Summer Divisional Conference of the London and 
Southern Counties I. L. P. The regular agenda was suspended for three weeks so the 
complete weekend could be devoted to the Abyssinian crisis. The scene was set for a 
showdown between the two factions within the R. P. C., in a situation complicated by the 
significant Trotskyist presence as well as those opposed to any form of factional 
organisation. Jack Gaster moved a motion stressing the necessity of working-class 
organisation against Italian Fascism and all imperialist oppression. He found his motion 
supported by the Trotskyists and John Aplin, whilst he met opposition from his 
colleagues in the R. P. C. who moved amendments suggesting the use of the League of 
Nations machinery. However, it quickly became clear that the combined forces of the 
dissidents within the R. P. C., the Trotskyists and those centred on Aplin who opposed 
group organisation held a large majority at the conference. No amendments were carried 
to a statement supporting workers' sanctions which was passed by a five to one 
majority. The days of automatic R. P. C. success at the London Divisional Conference 
were over. 56 
When the division met again to discuss the adjourned business, there were again sharp 
divisions over electoral policy and sanctions. However, by this time, at the end of 
October, it had become clear to the leadership of the R. P. C. that the Committee could 
not expect to have its policy accepted by the Division. This was partly because of the 
anti-group feeling at the conference; a resolution affirming the positive role of groups 
within the I. L. P. was only carried by the casting vote of the Chairman, R. P. C. member 
Bert Hawkins. The R. P. C. 's failure was also partly due to the opposition of the 
Trotskyists to their policy, and their support for Aplin against the R. P. C. However, 
perhaps the most significant reason the R. P. C. was defeated was because for the first 
time their leaders could not agree amongst themselves as to the correct policy to push. 57 
As a response the Committee staged a dramatic walkout from the conference over its 
failure to accept the R. P. C. line. This was despite the R. P. C. 's own failure to agree on 
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the correct line to adopt. The sensational exit from the conference on the 27 October 
then led to a special R. P. C. conference two days later. This conference decided with 
only six dissidents to dissolve the Committee. The final issue of The R. P. C. Bulletin 
available after the decision, called on 'all revolutionary socialists in the party to follow 
their example and make application to the Communist Party for membership. ' 58 
After leaving the I. L. P. the leading members of the R. P. C. sought to emphasise the 
effect which their departure had on the Party. Claims were made about the scale of the 
defections. Frequently it was suggested that hundreds of members had joined the R. P. C. 
moves towards the Communist Party, and in a recent interview Jack Gaster suggested 
that one third of the I. L. P. had left the Party as a consequence. 59 The I. L. P. on the other 
hand sought to suggest the impact was minimal. In public it stated '55 members have 
resigned altogether, of these, less than half were active members and only about half of 
them are joining the C. P. i6° In the private of the N. A. C., reports were only slightly more 
serious where it was conceded that sixty members in London and three outside London 
had left the Party. 61 
The departure of the R. P. C. marked a significant change in the politics of the I. L. P. A 
number of important members were lost to the Party; in particular Jack Gaster had 
played an important role on the N. A. C., as a speaker and also as one of the few left- 
wing lawyers of the period. In an example of the sectarianism of the Communist Party 
in this period, the C. P. passed up much of the publicity to be gained by the defection of 
a leading member of the I. L. P. when Dave Springhall refused him entry to the 
Communist Party because of his stance on Abyssinia. Eventually Gaster was allowed to 
join the Party after making a direct appeal to Pollitt. 62 He went on to play an important 
role in the Communist Party, which he remained a member of until the late 1980s. He 
was elected as a Communist Councillor for Mile End onto London County Council in 
March 1946 and served as chair of the National Jewish Committee shortly after the 
War. 63 Others were also to play a significant role in the Communist Party after leaving 
the I. L. P., such as Hilda Vernon who played an active part in the Communist Party 
women's movement. 64 However, it was the internal politics of the I. L. P. that were most 
affected by the departure of the Revolutionary Policy Committee. Despite their failure 
to be widely accepted, their language and ideas had come to represent a significant force 
within the Party. The style of internal politics of the I. L. P., described later by Brockway 
as 'an appalling experience of sectarian controversy about revolutionary theory', were 
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heavily dominated by the differing factional groupings, especially the R. P. C. 65 The 
departure of the R. P. C. did not represent the end of explicit factions within the I. L. P. 
The Marxist Group was still in existence and a minority within the R. P. C. had decided 
to carry on calling itself the 'Communist Unity Group. 66 Nevertheless, the departure of 
the R. P. C. meant a very significant change to both the style and the content of the 
politics of the I. L. P. In particular there was a definite movement away from factional 
politics; even those who were involved in the remaining factions had increasingly to 
stress their loyalty to the Party. 
5.6 From Unity Group to Independent Socialist Party 
As R. P. C. influence grew within the Party, a Unity Group faction, based in Lancashire, 
was established to combat it. In 1934 the Unity Group split from the I. L. P. and 
established the Independent Socialist Party, taking over half the membership of the 
division with it. Those opposed to the R. P. C. had two basic concerns, first the 
Committee's policy worried those who stressed the role of Parliament in their strategy 
for the Party. Secondly, there were concerns about the organisational form of the 
R. P. C.; about the ways in which the committee met, was funded and attempted to 
influence the wider party. Both sets of concerns were raised in the period before 
disaffiliation. For example, at a meeting between the N. A. C. and Divisional 
representatives in March 1932 the question of how to deal with such unofficial groups 
came up. The N. A. C. at this point had no representatives who were sympathetic to the 
R. P. C.; nevertheless, the decision was not to act. Even those who would later be 
amongst the most vocal opponents of the R. P. C. accepted, and even supported, this 
verdict, with John Paton arguing that attempts to quash such groups were likely to be 
counter-productive. 67 
In 1931 Allen Skinner was re-elected chairman of the London and South Division and 
that Division's N. A. C. representative. Skinner moved the successful motion for 
disaffiliation from the Labour Party at the Special Conference in Bradford. 68 However, 
following disaffiliation and the loss of a number of many 'traditional' members of the 
party Skinner felt under considerable threat. He began raising concerns about the 
working of the R. P. C. and spoke at the I. L. P. summer school about the dangers of 
organised groups within the party. On the NAC, he raised similar questions about the 
organisational form of the R. P. C. and its appeals for money. Brockway, typically, hoped 
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that the situation could be resolved in a friendly manner and reported that he had 
already had a number of informal meetings with leading members of the R. P. C. 69 
However, in Skinner's view the situation was getting worse not better. Probably aware 
that he would be defeated by the R. P. C., he stood down as both chairman and N. A. C. 
representative at the September 1932 London Divisional Conference. 70 
The 1933 Derby conference was a considerable success for the R. P. C. over its 
opponents. Dick Wallhead, one of the group of only four I. L. P. MPs, resigned 
immediately after Derby because the decisions relegated 'the use of parliament to a 
minor place and substituting for it a physical force revolutionary thought Workers' 
Councils. '71 Of even greater significance was the resignation of right winger John Paton 
as General Secretary of the Party. Paton maintained his membership of the Party and 
held back his resignation of the post until the end of the year to allow the Party to make 
adequate preparations. Skinner argued that if action was not taken then the R. P. C. 
would 'win by default', as its leading opponents were leaving the party. Thus, Skinner 
wrote an extended letter to the New Leader arguing that the R. P. C. represented a real 
danger to the 'traditional, democratic' structures of the I. L. P. Skinner ended his letter 
with a suggestion that the opposition to the R. P. C. needed to form itself into an equally 
organised faction. 
Discussion- so far as the accepted party machinery for discussion is concerned- is already 
deteriorating into a faction fight, and when those who are not associated with the R. P. C. decide to 
organise on similar lines it will do so completely. 72 
The Committee itself realised it was still far from dominant outside the London area. 73 
Skinner's opposition to the R. P. C. found little support within the London Division but 
frustrations were growing elsewhere. The Welsh Divisional Conference in September of 
1933 passed resolutions, which not only criticised tactics based on co-operation with the 
Communist Party but also called for the suppression of group organisation such as the 
R. P. C 74 In East Anglia the Norwich branch unsuccessfully moved an alternative policy 
statement to the new revolutionary policy. However, the strongest area of opposition to 
the R. P. C. was the Lancashire Division, which also coincided with the R. P. C. 's second 
largest area of influence within the I. L. P. 
In Lancashire it was widely argued that the problem of the R. P. C. was closely 
connected with the new policy of the I. L. P. as the main problems had emerged in the 
pursuance of joint activity with the Communist Party. The R. P. C. and others in 
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Liverpool were in favour of maintaining and increasing work with the Communist 
Party. Like John Paton, the Lancashire Divisional leadership, led by Elijah Sandham 
and Tom Abbott, the Divisional chairman and organiser respectively were initially 
prepared to accept a very loose united front with the Communists. However, when it 
became clear that there was little hope of pulling the Labour or Co-operative Parties into 
united front activity the Lancashire leadership moved to a policy of complete hostility to 
working with the C. P. 75 
Following the Derby conference and the unwillingness of Brockway and the N. A. C. to 
take action against the R. P. C. Skinner wrote to the Lancashire Division newspaper 
Labour's Northern Voice to begin the task of organising an anti-R. P. C. faction: 
I am writing to the No. 9 Division organ as representing the area from which the R. P. C. is likely to 
draw its main strength after London, and whose Divisional Council is probably next in order to be 
captured. I suggest that, regrettable as is the necessity, the members of the Party who have no 
intention of being associated with the R. P. C. should form their own protective caucus. 76 
Skinner suggested that the main activity of the faction should be focused on elections to 
official positions within the Party. On the one hand they would point out which 
candidates supported the R. P. C. and on the other they would create a list of candidates 
opposed to that Committee. There were some differences between Skinner's arguments, 
based on internal democracy, and those of the Lancashire Divisional leadership, based 
on policy disagreements with the R. P. C. Nevertheless, Skinner was able to obtain the 
backing of a large number of members within the Lancashire Division and on this basis 
the'Unity group', a new anti-R. P. C. faction, was created. 
The Unity group, despite its London origins, was overwhelmingly based in 
Lancashire. 77 The new group established its own bulletin but the focus for the Unity 
Group remained the Lancashire Division's official monthly newspaper Labour's 
Northern Voice. Immediately following the formation of the Unity Group, the 
Lancashire D. C. announced that, as a council it was ceasing joint activity with the 
Communists and declining to support United Front activities for branches. 78 The 
Liverpool federation, continued to engage in united front activity and argued that the 
I. L. P. could work with the Communist Party without losing its distinctive identity. 79 
However, the Unity Group assault on the united front increased and on the 20 June, the 
Divisional Council sent a letter to each branch suggesting that joint activities with the 
Communist Party should stop. 
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Added to this the Lancashire Divisional Council was deeply concerned about the moves 
made to introduce elements of democratic centralism to the party. Although Lancashire 
opposed all aspects of the R. P. C. 's democratic centralist proposals disputes centred on 
the question of funding. They argued that the required contributions from the divisions 
to the centre for the Power Fund, and for the New Leader, would be at the expense of 
local initiative. 80 The combination of the Lancashire Divisional Council's refusal to co- 
operate with the United Front and their boycott of the Power Fund gave the R. P. C. the 
opportunity to attack their opponents using I. L. P. apparatus. The matter was referred to 
the I. L. P. 's Organisation Committee and from there to the N. A. C. where Gaster, 
supported by C. A. Smith and Jim Garton, called for immediate action to be taken 
against the Lancashire Division. 81 The N. A. C. sent John Paton, who had considerable 
personal sympathy with the Lancashire position, to try to sort matters out. However, his 
trip to the Lancashire division was unsuccessful and the Divisional Council refused to 
withdraw its anti-United Front circular. 82 Further, the Divisional half-yearly conference 
on 19 August then ratified the Council decision, passing Sandham's resolution against 
the united front by a vote of 31 to 26.83 
These decisions of the Lancashire Divisional Council forced the N. A. C. to take action. 
Moves by Gaster first to expel the Divisional Council and then to withhold its grant 
were rejected; a further controversial proposal to censure the Council was passed, 
against the wishes of those who wished to test the party's opinion of the United Front by 
a plebiscite. 84 
The censure of the N. A. C. was rejected in Lancashire as the Unity group dismissed any 
suggestions of disloyalty to the party. First, they argued that they were not acting 
against the policy of the party, they claimed to act according to the constitution of the 
Party, which contained specific reference to the importance of parliamentary activity. 
They also claimed that only conference and not the N. A. C. had the power to override 
the constitution. Thus, they suggested that the interpretation of the Derby decisions by 
the N. A. C. was invalid because in effect, it was unconstitutional. Instead they believed 
85 it was the R. P. C. which was disloyal, as it was destroying the Party. 
The Liverpool federation reacted by seeking to further separate itself from the 
Divisional Council. It withdrew its endorsement of Sandham as the prospective I. L. P. 
candidate for the Liverpool constituency of Kirkdale, where Sandham had previously 
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been an MP and they accused the rest of the division of being stuck 'in the reformism of 
pre-Bradford days. ' Liverpool threatened the rest of the Division suggesting that whilst 
they would accept disagreement with the policy, they could not accept the flouting of 
the policy. 86 
Nevertheless, by the beginning of 1934, the Unity group's opposition to the R. P. C. in 
Lancashire had crystallised into complete and open opposition to the I. L. P. 's national 
policy. The report of Lancashire's January divisional conference in Labour's Northern 
Voice was entitled 'Lancashire Again says no', they saw themselves as rejecting the 
Communist inspired politics that had been adopted nationally and arguing for a return to 
the earlier constitutional policy of the I. L. P. 
"No" to the wrecking policy of the Communist Party 
"No" to the advocates of working-class insurrection and violence 
"No" to the abandonment of legality that is strength 
"Yes" to the policy of constitutional advance to working class power and the Social Revolution. 87 
The Lancashire conference passed a motion, by a vote of 29-16, calling to the party to 
revert immediately to the policy subscribed to before the 1933 Derby Conference. A 
further motion, passed by 29-14, criticised the new I. L. P. policy and called for a 
constitutional approach: 
The present official policy of the I. L. P. is not a revolutionary Socialist policy for this country, has 
not been deduced from the facts (historical, political and economic) of this country and has no 
relevance to the serious revolutionary business of achieving Socialism in Britain... 
Socialism must be presented as a constitutional end to be sought by constitutional means and 
enforceable by a majority when the people will by the constitutional use of every force by a 
Socialist Government, against any anti-democratic and unconstitutional opposition by the King, 
the House of Lords, or by capitalistic or by financial revolutionaries. This conference believes that 
such an approach is acceptable to the majority of the British people and is therefore real 
revolutionary policy. 88 
Finally by a vote of 21 to 16 the conference called for a return to the second 
international, on the basis that the I. L. P. should be aiming for an inclusive International 
and that the second international had the closest connections to the organised working 
class. The motion did however, maintain that the I. L. P. should continue its connections 
with the group of international "left" socialist parties. 89 
Even before the I. L. P. 's 1934 York Conference, within the Unity group there was a 
strong difference of opinion about whether to continue in the I. L. P. or not. Some, 
including Elijah Sandharn remained committed to a future inside the I. L. P. 90 Others 
argued that the Socialist League was doing good work within the Labour Party and the 
Unity group should be looking to support them. Considerable space in Labour's 
Northern Voice was dedicated to explaining and supporting the views of the Socialist 
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League chairman Stafford Cripps. 91 Prior to the conference, Labour's Northern Voice 
warned that if certain of the RPC resolutions were passed then many within the 
Lancashire Division would find it difficult to maintain their membership of the Party. 
By the end of the York conference it was clear that the R. P. C. was on the retreat within 
the I. L. P. The R. P. C. itself accepted that the `lead of the left-wing' had been 
`rejected'. 92 However, this defeat of the RPC was not sufficient for some members of 
the Unity group. Despite Tom Abbott's objections, the conference followed the NAC 
report in accepting criticism of the Lancashire divisional council's attitude to the united 
front, Labour's Northern Voice, the Power fund, the New Leader and the Hunger march, 
by a vote of 135-31. However, there were two more serious problems. First of all the 
Unity Group's ethical socialist policy was rejected by a vote of 101-61. This policy 
moved was on behalf of Manchester City branch by Norwich's John Middleton Murry 
the motion emphasised the ethical basis and parliamentary traditions of the Party: 
In a country where the industrial working-class is in a majority, a socialist regime can only be 
firmly based on the enlightened democratic assent of the majority of people. It is therefore an 
essential part of the work of a Socialist organisation to propagate not merely "Collectivist" as an 
economic necessity (for in this the "National Socialists" and Fascists will be equally successful), 
but Socialism as an ethically superior social system. Thus the ILP's propaganda must not be 
merely economic and addressed to the political intelligence of workers', but also idealistic and 
addressed to their humane intelligence, as was the practice of Keir Hardie and the pioneers of the 
ILP. 93 
Second a set of proposals to transform the organisation of the Party to a more 
democratic centralist organisation were passed with 'overwhelming support. 94 
These two decisions convinced some of the leading members of the Lancashire Division 
that they could have no future within the ILP. The Lancashire Divisional organiser, 
Tom Abbott, wrote a letter to his branch resigning his membership of the Party. Abbott 
had joined the ILP in 1894 at the age of 21. He had been a leading member of the ILP in 
Lancashire and the resignation of someone with his ILP tradition and seniority was seen 
by others within the division as definitely marking the `end of an epoch. ' Abbott's 
complaint was that the conference decisions removed `every bit of autonomous freedom 
which members and branches have enjoyed since the party came to life in 1893. ' He 
was equally critical of the policy of the party arguing that `Workers' Councils as 
outlined by the ILP, will, in effect, if operated sabotage the trade union and other 
working-class instruments of struggle with capitalism. ' Overall he blamed the R. P. C. 
for changing the I. L. P. into a 'fundamentally different' Party from even the one which 
had disaffiliated from the Labour Party less than two years earlier. 
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Abbott's resignation, and his ensuing decision to form a new Independent Socialist Party 
caused a wave of other resignations from the I. L. P. Other leading members of the 
Lancashire Division to quit included such as Samuel Higgenbotham, the editor of 
Labour's Northern Voice, Arthur Mostyn, an ex-councillor and the Labour's Northern 
Voice cartoonist from the Manchester Central Branch, and Stephen Shaw and Roger 
Shackleton of the Nelson Weavers. However some, including Sandham, equivocated. 
He did not attend the initial meetings of the Independent Socialist Party and turned up at 
the meetings of those 'Revolutionary I. L. P. ers' who were planning to reconstitute the 
Lancashire Division. 95 However, it eventually became clear to him that his position 
within the I. L. P. was hopeless and he joined with the I. S. P. two months after its 
foundation. 6 
Those who left the I. L. P. with Abbott were undecided about what their future held. 
There were two major opinions. One group, led by Abbott and Arthur Mostyn, favoured 
forming a new party. The others, led by Samuel Higgenbotham, the editor of Labour's 
Northern Voice, supported the idea of joining with the work of the Socialist League. 97 
At the conference, called by Abbott on May 13 1934, they chose to follow the first 
option, and to form themselves into the Independent Socialist Party. However, the I. S. P. 
was formed with the Socialist League firmly in mind. The view of the conference was 
that the Socialist League would be forced out of the anti-socialist Labour Party. In the 
view of the I. S. P., not being organised as a political party would badly affect the 
Socialist League once they left the Labour Party. The decision not to join with the 
Socialist League was so that, when the Labour Party forced the Socialist League out, 
there would be 'a live Independent Socialist Party to which they can turn. i98 
The conference accepted a commitment to an 'understanding that the change from 
Capitalism to Socialism involves a revolution' and affirmed that this transition 'can only 
be accomplished by the enlightened democratic assent of the majority of the people. ' 
The I. S. P. also maintained that Socialism should be presented not only as an economic 
necessity but also 'as an ethically superior social system. '99 Comrade Picken was 
appointed the provisional secretary of the new Party. Labour's Northern Voice insisted 
that its status, due to being owned by the Workers' Northern Publishing Society ltd., was 
independent of any political party. '°° However, in effect the newspaper along with its 
editor Samuel Higgenbotham came over to the I. S. P. 
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When Sandham resigned from the I. L. P. the month after the I. S. P. was formed he 
explained his reasons. Of course he complained about the 'irresponsible' elements in the 
Party, by which he meant the R. P. C., who had turned the I. L. P. into a 'pale shadow of 
the Communist Party. ' However, far more revealing was Sandham's disappointment 
with the leadership of the Party, especially Maxton, whom he argued had unexpectedly 
sided with the 'Communistically minded. ' Sandham also pointed to the new centralised 
organisation of the I. L. P., with an Executive Committee and an Inner Executive, which 
Sandham termed an 'inner dictatorship', as important reasons, necessitating the 
formation of the Independent Socialist Party. He suggested that as democracy had left 
the I. L. P. so it had 'become a sectarian backwater stuck in stultified truths of half a 
century before. ' On the other hand, he suggested that, the I. S. P. would 'appeal to man's 
reason. ' By utilising the higher level of education of British workers, it would recognise 
that revolutionary tactics appropriate to Britain would be very different from those in 
Russia, Germany or Austria. Overall, he argued that the job of the I. S. P. was to keep 
alive the spirit of the I. L. P.; despite his resignation from the party to join the I. S. P. he 
did not really feel he had deserted the I. L. P. 101 Sandham was appointed as the first 
official chairman of the I. S. P. at its first annual convention held in Manchester on 29-30 
September 1934, with Tom Abbott as the General Secretary. 102 The convention voted in 
favour of the socialisation of the cotton industry and to work closely with the Labour 
Party as well as adopting the I. L. P. 's 1922 constitution as its own. 
On the basis of these decisions many members of the I. S. P. attempted to rejoin the 
Labour Party. Initially some were successful. The Altrincham Branch even nominated 
an I. S. P. member, Arthur Mostyn, for its Parliamentary seat in the early months of 
1935. However, the National Labour Party decided that it would not allow I. S. P. 
members to be Labour Party Parliamentary candidates. Then, a few months later in 
October 1935 it declared on undisclosed grounds that membership of the I. S. P. itself 
was incompatible with membership of the Labour Party, a decision which also saw the 
I. L. P. added to the proscribed list. '03 
In 1936, the I. S. P. 's London Branch, based around the Adelphi magazine and John 
Middleton Murry, proposed seeking affiliation to the Labour Party but the rest of the 
Party, increasingly opposed to the London intellectuals, refused. Murry responded by 
resigning from the I. S. P. 's General Council. 104 In 1939, after Sandham had been too ill 
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to attend conference for two consecutive years he stood down as chairman. In March 
1939 the I. S. P. joined with the I. L. P., the Society of Friends and some members of the 
Labour Party in setting up the 'Manchester No Conscription Fellowship. "05 When war 
broke out the party came down firmly against the war. 106 They named themselves the 
I. L. P., the Socialist Party of Great Britain and the Socialist Labour Party as the only 
socialist parties opposed to war and called on all to join one of the parties. 107 
Only during the formation of the anti-war movement in Manchester did any of the other 
parties ever really acknowledge their existence and by 1941, the financial situation in 
the Party was so bad that they were reduced to selling off back copies of Labour's 
Northern Voice to chip shops in order to keep afloat. 108 On December 3 1950, after 
years of self-confessed 'technical existence' and the death of General Secretary Tom 
Abbot in September 1949, the I. S. P. was formally wound up. 109 
However, the formation of the I. S. P. had led to the decimation of one of the two largest 
and most influential English divisions of the I. L. P. Sixteen of the party's fifty-three 
Lancashire Branches were lost totally and the disruption in other areas was significant. 
There was also the old spectre of property disputes between the I. L. P. and those who 
had ceded. ' lo The effect of the formation of the I. S. P. on the I. L. P. in Lancashire cannot 
have been anything but disheartening to those who were trying to develop and maintain 
the prospects of the I. L. P. in the area. As Maxton had pointed out at the end of 1933, 
whilst trying to push his traditional position of wide tolerance in all matters, 'it was 
obvious folly to attempt to chop away a whole division and add to their present troubles 
the task of having to form a new one. "" l Events had proved him correct. 
5.7 Trotskyism and the Marxist Group 
In 1932 the newly disaffiliated I. L. P. seemed to some Trotskyists to potentially offer an 
attractive alternative focus for Trotskyist activity after expulsion from the Communist 
Party. The Balham Group had had contact with members of the I. L. P. in the South-West 
London Anti-War Committee and there were a number of I. L. P. ers in the London area 
who were sympathetic to Trotsky's ideas. Indeed, the early R. P. C., contained a number 
of Trotskyist sympathisers including Bert and May Matlow, Ernie Patterson and Sid 
Kemp. 112 The leaders of the Trotskyist Communist League thus looked to the I. L. P. to 
find a new focus for their political activity and Reg Groves devised a plan for the group 
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to form an organised faction within the I. L. P. 's R. P. C. 113 By July 1933 the group had 
established a committee to develop and co-ordinate its I. L. P. work. "4 
Trotsky devoted considerable time to considering and analysing the British political 
situation and held two separate meetings with leading members of the I. L. P., first with 
John Paton and then in August 1933 with C. A. Smith. 115 Trotsky, who had impressed 
Paton with his detailed knowledge 'of even the by-paths of the English political 
situation', was firmly of the opinion that the I. L. P. was an appropriate home for the 
British Trotskyists. 1 16 Of course he was aware of the distance between the political 
reality of the I. L. P. and his conception of a revolutionary party. 
A revolutionary proletarian party must be welded together by a clear understanding of its historic 
task ... 
[and] a revolutionary party must know how to establish correct relations with the working 
class... From the point of view of both these criteria innerly connected, the I. L. P. should review its 
relation to the Comintern as well as to all other organisations and tendencies within the working 
class. ' 17 
Nevertheless Trotsky believed that the I. L. P. could play an important part in 
revolutionary Socialist politics. In arguing for the importance of the I. L. P. in presenting 
a clear opposition to Stalinism in British politics he suggested that if the 'party should 
ingloriously disappear from the scene Socialism would suffer a new blow. ' Thus, 
Trotsky urged his followers to enter the I. L. P. wholeheartedly and not to join the Party 
to split it and win over some of its members. 118 
Despite Trotsky's opinion in favour of joining the I. L. P., the majority of the Communist 
League in Britain opposed entering the Party. 119 Whilst they accepted that the I. L. P. 
could become involved in the work of winning the working class to a correct 
revolutionary policy they claimed that the I. L. P. was a centrist organisation which made 
it 'politically shapeless and lacking any clear political position on the problems 
confronting the revolutionary movement. ' 120 
Within the I. L. P. there was also considerable opposition to the Trotskyists joining the 
Party. The R. P. C. was at its strongest, the 1933 Derby Conference had passed 
resolutions supporting much of the Committee's programme and seeking to further 
relations with the Comintern. There was thus a considerable movement against 
Trotskyism, and its emphasis on a new Fourth International. Indeed Trotsky's 
contribution to the I. L. P. 's internal discussion journal Controversy drew a strong rebuke 
from those who were opposed to the Fourth International. The burden of their response 
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in the following edition of the journal was to suggest that such proposals would cause 
the victory of the right wing both within the I. L. P. and elsewhere: 
The nature of the fourth international would defy rational definition. It is to be composed of all 
parties that for diverse reasons are tired of lax reformism and uneasy about disciplined 
revolutionism. It will say Socialism in one country is impossible but will hesitate to recommend 
that Russia go back to capitalism - it will have the same effect on the world population ranks as it 
is having on the I. L. P. today: chaos, futility and (quite regrettable and unintentional! ) a masking of 
the advance of the right wing. 121 
Following the fierce discussions and consultations with the International Communist 
League Trotsky's proposal for the group to join the I. L. P. was put to a vote at a meeting 
on December 17 1933. The majority of the group, led by Reg Groves, voted to maintain 
their organisation, separate political identity and paper. They argued that the best way to 
win over sympathetic I. L. P. ers was to debate with the I. L. P., where possible, speaking 
as an organisation to branches of the Party, but to work with it only on definite 
proposals. This they argued would also have the advantage of being an appealing 
strategy to militants who were not members of the I. L. P. 122 
The minority, including Denzil Harber, Stewart Kirby, Wally Graham, Dr. Worral, Max 
Nicholls and Margaret Johns, who favoured Trotsky's proposal, were dismayed at the 
decision of the group. They believed that an opportunity was being missed to create a 
significant Party that would support the Fourth International. However, their requests 
that the International Secretariat issue Groves's group with an ultimatum to join the 
I. L. P. had been turned down, despite the International Secretariat strongly disagreeing 
with the British majority opinion. 123 With the British Trotskyist movement unable to 
agree on its future and the International Secretariat unwilling to force a decision either 
way, the Communist League decided to split, with the minority group joining the I. L. P. 
The division of the small British Trotskyist movement into two sections was endorsed 
by the International Secretariat, which gave them equal status internationally, and the 
minority finally joined the I. L. P. in February 1934. On their entry they wrote to the 
I. L. P. 's N. A. C. declaring their 'sincere intention of participating in all possible Party 
activities. ' However, they sought to maintain the right to criticise the Party line: 
We wish to retain the right of comradely criticism and the right to fight and propagate (within the 
limits of the Party Constitution and discipline) our opinions, in particular the necessity for the 
I. L. P. helping to build the Fourth International. '24 
182 
The I. L. P. inevitably refused the group entry as 'an organised group... advocating a 
particular policy. ' However, the individual members of the minority within the old 
Communist League were permitted to join the party. 125 
There had been a small number of Trotskyists in the I. L. P. before February 1934. This 
group had been active within the R. P. C., attempting to alter its outlook rather than to 
directly change the policy of the wider Party. The entry of the minority from the 
Communist League into the I. L. P. changed this situation. Before the Trotskyists were 
able to efficiently oppose the R. P. C. they had to overcome the tensions which this 
situation created. Members entering from the Communist League, members already 
inside the I. L. P. and potentially new members needed to mould themselves into a united 
group. 
When the minority of the Communist League disbanded to join the I. L. P. they still 
understood themselves to be strict adherents of the Bolshevik-Leninist position. When 
they joined the I. L. P. they organised themselves into a secret fraction within the Party. 
The I. L. P. ers who had moved towards a Trotskyist position as Party members had 
arrived at similar conclusions by a quite different route, they were excluded from this 
covert organisational arrangement. The old Communist Leaguers clearly regarded their 
views as being somewhat in advance of the I. L. P. ers who maintained a Trotskyist 
position. In such a situation there were considerable tensions and the Trotskyists were 
not immediately able to operate successfully as a united faction. 126 
The I. L. P. 's 1934 York conference took place before many of the ex-Communist 
Leaguers had had a chance to join the Party and, more significantly, the wider I. L. P. 
was preoccupied with the dispute between the R. P. C. and the Unity Group. These 
factors meant that there was little opportunity for the Trotskyists to have an impact on 
the I. L. P. at the conference. However, in June 1934 the ex-Communist Leaguers, still 
acting somewhat separately from the other Trotskyists within the I. L. P., called for the 
formation of a Fourth International and for the I. L. P. to adopt a Democratic Centralist 
structure. 127 The call received little response and the need for the Trotskyists to unite 
was emphasised. Thus in the autumn of 1934 the small group of Bolshevik-Leninists 
from out of the Communist League joined together with those individual I. L. P. ers who 
had chosen to identify themselves as Trotskyist in a new organisation: the Marxist 
Group. 128 
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However, forging a united identity for the Trotskyists within the Party was a far from 
simple task; organisational unity was no guarantee of common purpose. Indeed it was 
after the ex-Communist Leaguers had joined together with the I. L. P. Trotskyists in the 
Marxist Group that frustrations grew to new levels. By early 1935 some of the 
Bolshevik-Leninists who had come out of the Communist League had grown so 
frustrated with the functioning of the Marxist Group that a number of them had left the 
I. L. P. 129 Some of the remaining old Communist Leaguers felt compelled to write to the 
International Secretariat to complain: 
With regard to the internal position of the group of Bolshevik-Leninists, the position is far worse 
today than it was a year ago. A dangerous spread of centrist tendencies is to be observed within the 
group itself. This is of course due to the centrist environment, and has been accentuated by the fact 
that many of the old I. L. P. comrades who have linked up with the Minority of the old Communist 
League since the latter entered the I. L. P. have never been more than left centrists, who set a 
sentimental loyalty to the I. L. P. 'their' party above the principles of B. L. ism. 
This danger of 'making a fetish of doing I. L. P. work and of "loyalty" to the I. L. P. 
leadership and constitution' was illustrated by the case of a comrade Johns who had 
placed loyalty to the I. L. P. above the principles of Bolshevik-Leninism: 
Recently two South African comrades said in private discussion with comrade Johns, a member of 
the committee of the Marxist Grp., that they thought that under certain circumstances the Labour 
League of Youth (Youth organisation of the Labour Party) might be found to be a better field for 
our work than the I. L. P. At the next meeting of the Holborn Branch of the I. L. P. (of which both 
comrade Johns and the S. African cdes. are members), cde Johns, in the absence of the S. African 
cdes. accused them of disloyalty to the I. L. P., in as much as they thought the Labour League of 
Youth a better organisation than the I. L. P., and on these grounds moved their expulsion from the 
branch and party. 30 
These problems were then exacerbated early in 1935 when a decision was made to try to 
operate an inner fraction within the Marxist Group. This inner group was set up with the 
intention of controlling policy and discussing the correspondence from the International 
Secretariat, but according to some ex-Communist League members 'there were invited a 
number of members of the Marxist Grp who were by no means yet fully won over to 
our principled position. ' The result was the initial meeting had to be aborted because a 
number of people walked out, some, 'the unreliable elements', because they were 
opposed in principle to relations with any body outside the I. L. P. A second meeting was 
called which did set up such an inner fraction. However, the inner fraction did not 
involve many of the prominent members of the ex-Communist League causing much 
resentment. 131 
The Marxist Group came to have some influence within debates at I. L. P. conferences. 
For example, at the 1935 Derby conference the Trotskyists played an important role in 
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determining the course of the debate. They presented amendments and resolutions to the 
entire policy of the N. A. C., and the description that the conference turned into a 'three- 
sided battle' between R. P. C., Trotskyists and the N. A. C. 132 is not entirely inappropriate. 
However, it is much more problematic to use the such public arenas as an indicator of a 
'new balance of forces' within the I. L. P. 133 The Marxist Group never managed to obtain 
a significant membership. When the Group had been formed it claimed a membership of 
sixty. One year later its membership in London was seventy, of whom between thirty 
and forty were active. Added to this were a small number of sympathisers outside 
London. Based on this membership, the Group managed to win control over six 
branches of the Party: Islington, Holborn and Finsbury, South Norwood, Finchley, 
Hendon and East Liverpool. Beyond this their influence was minimal in the period 
before the Abyssinian crisis. Their resolutions, especially where advancing a 
distinctively Trotskyist resolution such as a proposal for a Fourth International, received 
very small votes at most conferences whether Divisional or National. However, more 
worrying for the Trotskyists was their lack of success in winning recruits. In 1935 
members of the Group were forced to concede that 'since the entry of the Minority of 
the old Communist League into the I. L. P. not one old member of the party has been 
won over to our position in the London Division. ' Numbers were increasing only 
because of new members whom they 'had converted to Bolshevik-Leninism before they 
joined the I. L. P. '134 
Nevertheless, the Marxist Group did become influential within the I. L. P. in some 
localities. For example in Liverpool, Keighley and Sheffield I. L. P. all had more than 
one member of the Group on their respective executive committees. This was in 
addition to the Trotskyists greatest base, which was within the London I. L. P. Further the 
Group did a large amount of active propaganda work through the I. L. P., with most 
notable success when performed by C. L. R. James. For example the group undertook a 
propaganda tour of Wales in February 1936, which galvanised the I. L. P. in many areas 
where it had some strength as well as taking the organisation to areas which had long 
been weak. The tour, despite the vicious weather, took in Cardiff, Neath, Merthyr, 
Troedyrhiw, Treharris, Abadare, Seven Sisters, Blackwood, Tre-Alan, Newport and 
Machen often reaching audiences of over 100 frequently against the hostility of the 
highly organised Communist Party. It was notable that reports of the meetings 
suggested the meeting in the CP stronghold Tre-Alan in the Rhondda was reasonably 
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attended and that in Cardiff C. L. R. James was able to strike up something of a 
relationship with 'five coloured men who were members of the CP. i135 
Despite this activity the tensions between the Marxist Group and the I. L. P. were 
growing. The Marxist Group was at the forefront of those who supported the line of 
workers' sanctions in Abyssinia against the I. L. P. 's parliamentary group, with CLR 
James writing a number of influential articles in the New Leader. This was followed by 
a series of attacks by Trotsky on the parliamentary group's conduct on the Abyssinian 
question. 136 This feeling of antagonism from Marxist Group towards the ILP was 
matched in the other direction with an increasing frustration within the ILP towards the 
Marxist Group as the whole question of group organisation was raised. 137 
Whilst many within the Marxist Group were frustrated some continued to feel a deeper 
degree of loyalty to the I. L. P. than many of the London based organisers of the group. 
This loyalty became another of the stock defences of the Marxist Groupers who sought 
to differentiate themselves from the R. P. C. A resolution on Groups adopted by 
Liverpool Marxist Group argued the difference between the R. P. C. and the Marxist 
Group was that the former attempted to win a few over the C. P. and to smash the I. L. P. 
whilst the latter 'strives to win the ILP to a new ILP. i138 A letter from seven members of 
the Marxist Group to members of the ILP in March 1936 contained the claim that 'A 
Marxist Grouper is first and foremost a loyal and hardworking I. L. P. er' but nevertheless 
stressed that the I. L. P. 's problem was its lack of 'a clear revolutionary policy based on a 
Marxian analysis of the world situation. ' 139 
By the beginning of 1936 the Marxist Group's position within the I. L. P. was precarious. 
The tensions within the Group added to the anti-factional feeling within the wider party 
and the anger felt by the Marxist Group over the Parliamentary Group's conduct during 
the early months of the Abyssinian crisis. The 1936 Keighley conference was thus a 
crucial testing point for two reasons. First the conference provided the first opportunity 
for the party as a whole to discuss Abyssinia and the Parliamentary Group's conduct. 
Second, the N. A. C. proposals for the banning of internal factions were discussed. On 
the first issue there was considerable pressure from the Trotskyists and others for the 
party to take a definite line supporting workers' sanctions, and C. L. R. James proposed a 
motion which was initially accepted, dissociating the Party from the Inner Executive. 
However, the Parliamentary Group, which dominated the Inner Executive, and Maxton 
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in particular then pushed the conference to withdraw its decision by threatening to 
resign. Instead, they pressurised the conference into delaying their decision and holding 
a full plebiscite of party members on the issue. The conference also debated the 
question of Group activity and gave overwhelming support to the idea that groups 
within the party be banned despite the Marxist Group case being put by John Goffe and 
Bert Matlow. Trotsky then accused the Parliamentary Group of 'operating as a fraction, ' 
and he dismissed the importance of the I. L. P. '40 
The Marxist Group was seriously damaged by the Keighley decisions. In the six months 
following the conference the Group lost half its membership of just over fifty as it split 
into three factions. One group had found a political home within the I. L. P. and, aware of 
the allegations of disloyalty that would follow defection, argued for continuing 
membership of the party. A second grouping led by Bert Matlow argued for entry into 
the Labour Party as suggested by Trotsky, another was led by C. L. R. James who wanted 
to form an independent organisation. In the period up to October there was a gradual 
haemorrhaging of members. As the pressures on the Group increased so those who had 
been prepared to remain in the I. L. P. accepted that they would have to leave. On 
October 10 a meeting was held of the Marxist Group at which there was strong pressure 
from Liverpool, London and Glasgow to leave the I. L. P. The following day a 
conference was held of the three major Trotskyist organisations with thirty-nine 
delegates from the Marxist Group, twenty-six from the Trotskyists in the Labour Party 
and three Marxist League delegates. A number of members including Cooper, Pawsey, 
Ballard and Mazillier decided to stay on within the I. L. P. with the aim of 'splitting off 
the best elements from the I. L. P. leadership. ' However, the bulk of the Group and most 
importantly the London Marxist Group passed a resolution moved by C. L. R. James to 
leave the I. L. P. and establish an independent organisation as quickly as possible. The 
departure of the main group of Trotskyists from the I. L. P. was announced in the New 
Leader with the larger organisation estimating that about thirty members were involved. 
However, those Trotskyists who remained in the I. L. P. were to maintain a vocal 
importance throughout the remainder of the decade. 141 
In the immediate aftermath of the departure of the Marxist Group, the relationship 
between the I. L. P. and the Trotskyist movement was strained. Brockway, although 
maintaining some sympathies with their analysis was heavily critical of their conduct 
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within the working class movement. As he put it during the Unity Campaign 
negotiations: 
Take the Trotskyists. I believe they hold a truth... yet the Trotskyists are everywhere a source of 
mischief in the working-class movement. They remain conspiratorial cliques in what ever Party 
they attach themselves to, disintegrating it, making it less effective in the class struggle, 
antagonising other sections of the working class. 142 
This tension further developed when the I. L. P. refused to take a strong line against the 
Moscow trials. In February 1937 the N. A. C. adopted a resolution on the Trials 
instructing the party to 'make no declarations on the matter until a full investigation has 
been carried out. '143 This attitude angered Trotsky. He was further frustrated with the 
attempts, by the I. L. P. and the International Bureau for Revolutionary Socialist Unity, to 
form a committee of independent socialists to look into the Stalin's allegations against 
Trotsky, rather than accepting the findings of the Trotsky Defence Committee. Together 
with the I. L. P. 's moves against the Marxist Group and policy change on Abyssinia this 
led to a series of angry exchanges between Trotsky and Brockway in which Trotsky 
accused Brockway of being a'Pritt No. Two', and suggested that Brockway could not be 
considered in any way a neutral arbiter. Indeed Trotsky argued Brockway was 
proposing 'a partisan political trial against his ideological adversary. ' Brockway's 
responded that 'no "Committee for the Defence of Trotsky" could be regarded as 
fulfilling the necessary conditions of impartiality. ' 144 
Despite the increasing distance between the I. L. P. and Trotsky the I. L. P. did maintain 
something of a relationship with many of the remaining British Trotskyists and the 
Party's leadership was always reasonably receptive to Trotskyist arguments. However, 
the links which were maintained between Trotskyists and the I. L. P. were more 
significant at local level. '45 Thus, even after 1936 when the bulk of the Marxist Group 
left the I. L. P. important connections remained. Some Trotskyists, such as Ben Elsbury, 
joined the party in the period 1936-9 and the small number of Trotskyists within the 
party after 1936 played a highly vocal if not particularly effective role at conferences. 
Some worked their way through to positions of significance, within the party 
organisation, most notably Ernie Patterson's activities on the I. L. P. 's Industrial 
Committee of which he was a member by 1938. 
Nevertheless, even those Trotskyists who stayed in the I. L. P. after 1936 experienced a 
definite tension between their commitment to the I. L. P. and to Trotskyism, which 
frequently sometimes resulted in the Party taking disciplinary action. Thus, in 1939, 
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after Ernie Patterson found his attitude towards the I. L. P. changed by the pacifist 
response of the I. L. P. MPs to Chamberlain's Munich agreement, he began to work 
actively to split the party. 146 C. A. Smith, the new national chairman, was determined to 
assert his authority on the situation, which served to antagonise Patterson further. Smith 
announced his determination to stamp out the 'deplorable lack of discipline' which he 
pointed out had characterised the party since 1934 and thus moved against Patterson. 
Patterson then ignored two letters from the Executive Committee requesting an 
explanation of his conduct so the EC then suspended him from membership. However, 
the dispute threatened to erupt into a serious and widespread situation when seven 
members of the London Divisional Council broke the N. A. C. 's version of Party 
discipline by declining to operate the expulsion decision. The Executive Committee had 
little choice but to summon a Special Divisional Conference 'to thrash out the whole 
matter', with the inevitable consequence that an entirely new Divisional Council was 
elected. 147 Thus, it was clear that even when the number of Trotskyists in the 
organisation was small they could obtain positions of influence and, albeit largely in a 
disruptive way, have an important influence on the wider party. 
5.8 Conclusion 
Each of the factions examined had a significant impact on the membership and activity 
of the I. L. P. At national level controversies over international affiliation, working with 
the Communist Party, internal organisation and the Party's constitution were heavily 
influenced by factional activity. At divisional level, factional organisation particularly 
affected London and Lancashire. There is little doubt that the I. L. P. of this period was 
especially badly affected by factional disputes, yet it is far from clear why the party 
should have been so damaged. Whilst no conclusive points are evident, the analysis of 
such factional activity points does suggest a number of possibilities. 
Certainly the Party's leadership was extremely tolerant of dissent, and this contributed to 
the creation of an environment in which factionalism could rapidly expand. 
Additionally, decentralised organisation and the relatively autonomy of divisional 
machinery gave factions space to develop. Further, the widespread acceptance that there 
was a need for policy to be redefined in revolutionary terms added to the problem. As 
there was no consensus on the meaning of 'revolutionary policy' there was little way of 
providing 'ideological regulation' of the acceptable limits of debate. 148 Thus, the internal 
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culture, organisation and ideology of the party would seem to be partially responsible 
for the extent of factional activity. 
Further, the R. P. C. was based in London, and was able to have a significant policy 
impact at national level. Both the division, one of the I. L. P. 's largest, and the R. P. C. 
were perceived, even internally, as predominantly middle-class. The responding faction 
came from Lancashire, a division of roughly equivalent size but very different social 
composition. Some statements, in particular from the leading members of the 
Lancashire division, appear to combine class and geographical opposition. Thus, the 
geographical and social composition of the groups may also have been a factor in 
determining the extent of factional disputes. 
Whatever the reasons for the extent of factional activity in the I. L. P. during the 1930s. 
the existence and activity of the major groupings indicates much about the possibilities 
and prospects for the party. Factional activity caused much disillusionment within the 
party. Whilst most of the rest of the party was able to experience a brief period of 
growth in the period from 1933-4, London and Lancashire, the two divisions worst hit 
by factionalism, saw sharp declines. In addition, the departure of the factions from the 
party further reduced I. L. P. membership, in the case of the Unity Group, cutting the 
Lancashire division's membership in half. 
Factional policy also marks out some of the limits of the political space occupied by the 
I. L. P., from ethical socialism to Communist and Trotskyist sympathy, giving an, albeit 
unrepresentative, insight into I. L. P. political opinions at local and regional level. The 
confrontational and occasionally violent responses of the factions to each other's policy 
proposals indicates the ambiguities inherent in the commitment to a revolutionary 
policy. Whilst each of the factional groupings claimed to accept the need for a 
'revolutionary policy', there was little agreement about the meaning of such a policy. 
Such disputes clearly indicate the difficulties the I. L. P. faced in using its 'new 
revolutionary policy' to carve out distinctive political space which it could use to build a 
viable party. 
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6. Towards a Revolutionary Policy 
6.1 Introduction 
With I. L. P. policy described as 'revolutionary posturing' and 'quotation mongering' and 
the policy makers as 'cranks' and 'ideologues' there has been little serious analysis of the 
I. L. P. 's political development during the 1930s. 1 However, it is impossible to 
understand the activity and decline of the Party without an understanding of party policy 
and the dynamics of policy making within the organisation. This chapter explains the 
development of I. L. P. policy. It traces the pressures that led to the rejection of the 
'Socialism in Our Time' policy and the adoption of a 'new revolutionary policy' in 1933. 
The changes to that policy in the period up to 1935, as the party claimed to be in the 
process of 'clarifying' its 'new revolutionary policy' are examined. Finally despite the 
Party's claims to have established a consensus based on the 1935 policy declaration, the 
remaining ambiguities and policy problems that the Party faced during the latter half of 
the decade are examined. This understanding reveals not only the political and strategic 
development of the 1930s I. L. P. but also indicates some of the reasons for the Party's 
decline. 
6.2 The End of 'Socialism in Our Time' 
The 'Socialism in Our Time' policy, the self-described 'militant and constructive' moves 
to establish socialism'for this generation', was adopted by the Party at its 1926 Whitely 
Bay conference. 'Socialism In Our Time', developed on the insistence of then I. L. P. 
chairman Clifford Allen, had at its heart the doctrine of the 'Living Wage', which 
'represented the minimum standard of civilised existence which should be tolerated. ' 
This idea of a'Living Wage', developed with the assistance of the noted economist J. A. 
Hobson, was presented as an under-consumptionist solution to the pressing problem of 
unemployment. The suggestions, famously dismissed by MacDonald as 'flashy 
futilities', were forcefully debated at the 1927 Labour Party conference, but 
implementation was never likely and the proposals became lost in a joint Labour 
Party/TUC committee which focused rapidly on the divisive issue of Family 
Allowances. 
Despite its development under the Chairmanship of Allen, the I. L. P. soon found that 
'Socialism in Our Time' and its underlying 'Living Wage' doctrine were capable of more 
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than one interpretation. Maxton was elected Party chairman by an overwhelming 
majority at the 1926 conference. He had sat on the policy committee during 1925-6 and 
together with his close collaborator John Wheatley, interpreted 'Socialism in Our Time' 
as part of a 'third alternative' or 'middle way' between Communism and 
'MacDonaldism'. They stressed the national regulation of income and prices and a 
minimum income of about £40 per week as the first steps to socialism. Nationalisation 
would, they argued, be necessary to ensure the payment of this level of living wage. 3 
Such arguments from the Party chairman made the left-wing interpretation of 'Socialism 
in Our Time' into I. L. P. orthodoxy. 
However, by the time of disaffiliation political and economic crisis had convinced the 
party that it needed a new political outlook. In his speech at the Bradford Conference 
Brockway suggested that Socialism was at a crossroads. He reminded the conference 
that the I. L. P. had led the way in establishing the Labour Party at the beginning of the 
century, and then he called for a new effort to lead the way again, this time in creating a 
revolutionary working class movement. 
In Britain we can be proud that the I. L. P. was a pioneer in the creation of the modern working- 
class political movement. We have come to a new period, and it is our duty once more to be 
pioneers -pioneers in the creation of a new revolutionary spirit in the working class, so that it may 
be ready for the approaching situation. 4 
However, the exact content of such a revolutionary policy was to be one of the most 
hotly debated subjects within the Party in the post-disaffiliation period. For John Paton, 
the Party's General Secretary it implied 'the need for central control of the Party's 
parliamentary contests and for an immense intensification of activity by our members 
within the trades unions. '5 However, for others, including Brockway, the implications 
went much wider. According to this view an entirely new constitutional framework was 
needed. The disaffiliation decision at Bradford in July 1932 did not immediately declare 
on the detail of this new revolutionary policy, but it did go much further than Paton had 
hoped in breaking with the Labour Party. Indeed, the N. A. C. recommended to 
conference a seven point plan which included resigning individual membership of the 
Labour Party and ceasing to pay the political levy in Trade Unions: 
1) The I. L. P. should proceed to select, where desirable, I. L. P. candidates for suitable 
constituencies on a basis planned and definitely controlled by the N. A. C. and the Divisional 
Councils. 
2) Local branches of the I. L. P. should disaffiliate from Borough, Divisional and Local Labour 
Parties. 
3) Members of the I. L. P. should resign from membership of the Labour Party after stating to the 
Labour Party organisations of which they are members, their reasons for so doing. 
4) I. L. P. members on al governing bodies should resign from Labour groups and act as I. L. P. 
representatives. They should stand in future as I. L. P. candidates. 
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5) I. L. P. members should not continue to act as representatives of other working-class bodies on 
Borough, Divisional or Local Labour Parties. 
6) I. L. P. members should maintain their membership and activity within the Trades Unions. 
Trades Councils and Co-operative movements. 
7) I. L. P. members of Trades Unions should cease to contribute a political levy to the Labour Party 
and should seek to allocate it to the I. L. P. 6 
The Conference was not content with simply accepting the N. A. C. recommendation. 
Rather, on the initiation of the R. P. C. the delegates insisted that each 'should' in the 
resolution was to be changed to a 'must. '? The declaration became a clear statement of 
incompatibility with the Labour Party and its philosophy. The need to develop a new 
policy for the party had become accepted by almost all those who were in favour of 
disaffiliation. 
6.3 Workers' Councils and a'New Revolutionary Policy' 
The question of what was meant by a'new revolutionary policy' was the main subject of 
debate during 1933. By the end of the year the party had agreed upon an official 'new 
revolutionary policy' which was to remain the basis of the party's programme until the 
outbreak of war. This policy was made in two phases. First the decisions of the 1933 
annual conference in Derby outlined the foundations of the policy. Second the N. A. C. 
drew up the detail of the 'new revolutionary policy', basing its policy on its 
understanding of the Derby decisions. 
At the 1933 I. L. P. conference, conflicting opinions were evident. The N. A. C. was 
proposing a new policy framework. The Revolutionary Policy Committee, dominant in 
London, was proposing a new constitution as a complete alternative to the N. A. C. 
vision whilst the opponents of the R. P. C. in Lancashire and elsewhere were attempting 
to locate the party's new revolutionary policy within an ethical socialist tradition. Three 
questions were central to the debates: first the place of Parliamentary versus non- 
Parliamentary activity, second the question of joint work with the Communist Party and 
finally, the question of international affiliation. 
The N. A. C. report, moved by Maxton, the I. L. P. 's Parliamentary icon, gave Parliament 
and electoral struggle a much smaller emphasis than had been present in the 'Socialism 
in Our Time' programme. The thrust of the report was the need to consider the use of 
non-Parliamentary tactics in general and of Workers' Councils in particular. He argued 
that the Party needed 'to disabuse the minds of the workers that parliament alone could 
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bring about the establishment of a Socialist State. ' However, he did allow that the House 
of Commons was one instrument in a possible Socialist transformation and 'should not 
be thrown away. ' The N. A. C. position allowed for joint work with the Communist Party 
whilst suggesting that these policies were best pursued through contact with the 
international 'Left' socialist parties. Even the stated disagreements of the N. A. C. to 
working with the Comintern were in terms of tactics and organisation rather than 
fundamental policy. 
The R. P. C. although accepting much of the N. A. C. 's argument proposed a wholesale 
alternative. They proposed a Marxian socialist objective for the Party, opposition to 
Imperialism and to Imperialist war, support for the USSR, a united front with the 
Communist Party, reduced emphasis on parliament and use of Workers' Councils. All of 
this was broadly acceptable to the majority on the N. A. C. However, parts of the R. P. C. 
proposals were more controversial. First there was an obvious difference with the 
N. A. C. over International affiliation. The R. P. C. suggested moves to affiliate to the 
Comintern, rather than focus on the international 'Left' socialists. They proposed that the 
N. A. C. should 
Approach the Secretariat of the Comintern with a view to ascertaining in what way the I. L. P. may 
assist in the work of the International. 
Further the R. P. C. wanted a definite commitment to the Party working for the creation 
of a workers' dictatorship: 
The I. L. P. will thus endeavour to plan and to pave the way for the setting up of a Workers' 
Dictatorship upon the attainment of power for the carrying out of working class measures 
necessary in the transition period. 
These differences between the R. P. C. and the N. A. C. were clear from even a cursory 
glance at the agenda. However, there were more subtle differences evident between the 
two positions, especially on the place of parliament and Workers' Councils. The R. P. C. 
wanted a definite statement that parliament was inadequate and that Workers' Councils 
would be the focus of I. L. P. activity. 
The existing organs of national and local government being part of the machinery of Capitalism, 
such organs can not be employed as the main instrument for the capture of power by the working 
class, and the I. L. P. will work alternatively for the creation of direct Workers' Councils. 
The N. A. C. alternative, although less definitely worded than the R. P. C. 's statement, also 
conceded that Socialism would not come through voting alone. It further accepted that 
the main area of working-class struggle would be outside of parliament. However, 
whilst the R. P. C. named Workers' Councils as the alternative to Parliament, the N. A. C. 
simply named them as one possible alternative arena of struggle. 
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In the struggle for Socialism the working-class will find its main strength in its industrial and class 
organisations. Its power to defeat the capitalist class and overthrow Capitalism will depend finally 
on its capacity to develop effective industrial and class organisations for the successful conduct of 
the class-struggle outside Parliament (e. g. Workers' Councils) 
Further, the R. P. C. was proposing to make the rejection of Parliament, and the 
acceptance of Workers' Council, part of the Party's constitution. The N. A. C. was simply 
proposing a set of policy proposals which would not have constitutional status. 
These differences were to play an important role in working out exactly what the I. L. P. 's 
policy was to mean in the longer term. However, to many of the R. P. C. 's strongest 
opponents at the conference it was simply splitting hairs. They believed that the N. A. C. 
had conceded the whole of the R. P. C. case. Voices protesting against the N. A. C. and 
R. P. C. line on the rejection of parliamentary activity and work with the Communist 
Party, largely from Lancashire and East Anglia, were a major feature of the conference. 
Norwich's John Middleton Murry, the noted literary critic, argued that the report was 
'unbalanced, wrong in theory, and not Marxist. ' He also suggested that it ignored the 
psychology of the British working class. The overall feeling of this group was expressed 
by the recently deposed chair of the London Division, Allen Skinner, who claimed that 
the proposals were essentially just a set of Communist Party tactics. Similarly 
concerned was Fred Jowett, the veteran treasurer of the party, who argued against both 
N. A. C. and R. P. C. as a pacifist and a parliamentarian. 
However, the majority of conference votes were split between support for the N. A. C. 
and R. P. C. Parts of the R. P. C. constitution were accepted. 8 However, the crucial section 
of the R. P. C. 's proposed constitution, relating to parliament and workers' councils was 
rejected by a narrow margin, 86 votes to 90.9 Thus, in this respect, the constitution 
remained as at Bradford, with some emphasis given to the role of parliament. It made no 
specific mention of Workers' Councils, although it maintained the central importance of 
lines of struggle outside parliament: 
The Independent Labour Party believes that electoral activity for the capture of all the organs of 
Government, national and local, is essential, recognising that such control would be of the greatest 
importance in the change from Capitalism to Socialism. Nevertheless, it regards this as only one 
aspect of the general struggle. It realises that the interests behind Capitalism are likely to offer to 
resistance by any and every means, to any attempt to dispossess them of the economic and political 
power on which their privileges depend and, particularly in the circumstances of a complete 
economic breakdown, to resort to some form of dictatorship in opposition to economic and social 
changes. The minds of the workers must be prepared for such a situation and they must be made 
ready to meet it and overcome it by the use of their mass strength for the capture of power. 10 
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This was accepted along with the N. A. C. report on the place of parliament which, 
although less forceful than the R. P. C. position, did give a specific mention to workers' 
councils. 
The discussions at the Derby Conference gave the I. L. P. a slightly altered constitution, 
and they agreed on the place of parliament within Party activity. However, the 
conference, in rejecting the R. P. C. 's comprehensive proposals had not set out a new 
policy framework for the party to replace 'Socialism In Our Time. ' Some, especially 
within the Lancashire division were happy with this vacuum, fearful of the party 
moving too far from the 'left' interpretation of 'Socialism in Our Time' which they 
favoured. However, the N. A. C. decided that they would take on the job of formulating 
the detail of the party's 'new revolutionary policy' on the principles which had been laid 
down in Derby. 
Meeting in August, at one of the longest N. A. C. meetings in the Party's history the 
N. A. C. discussed a policy report from a specially appointed sub-committee. The new 
policy statement set out a comprehensive vision, which stretched from an analysis of the 
political and economic situation to a detailed prescription for the organisation of the 
I. L. P. The report was based on the economic decline of capitalism, and the expected 
fascist response to this decline from the capitalist class, with the likely result being the 
outbreak of imperialist or nationalist war. The report took an extremely positive view of 
the Soviet Union, and committed the Party to the defence of Russia. II The new policy of 
the I. L. P. made the claim that it would take account of these factors in outlining a plan 
for action. 
In line with the Derby decisions the new policy gave a limited role for Parliament and 
elections in I. L. P. activity. Whilst the Party remained committed to attempting to 
'occasionally wringing concessions from Parliamentary Capitalism' the main use of 
Parliament according to the new policy statement was to disseminate propaganda and 
gather information. It was acknowledged that 'If it were possible to secure a majority of 
revolutionary Socialists in Parliament this would be important in initiating a 
revolutionary change. ' However, the report stressed that this was extremely unlikely and 
in any case argued that a majority in Parliament would not be enough to generate 
revolutionary change, all that would happen is that this would 'create a crisis which 
would require action by the working-class. ' Given this it is clear that the role of 
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Parliament was to be substantially reduced in the activity of the I. L. P. Instead 'the most 
important task of the Socialist Movement' was to 'mobilise all the forces of the working- 
class for agitation and action. ' 
The policy statement also addressed the issue of co-operation with other working-class 
organisations. The goal was to encourage united action by 'all sections of the working 
class in the immediate struggle' However, the first step along these lines was to secure 
co-operation with other organisations who shared the I. L. P. 's 'revolutionary outlook; ' in 
other words, to reach agreement with the Communist Party. The aim of united action 
with these other organisations was to build local 'united effort organisations' such as 
Anti-War Councils or Tenants' Defence Committees. In the longer term the aim was 
then to build these local organisations into 'definite Workers' Councils, representing all 
sections of the working class and acting as the instrument of the immediate struggle and 
of revolutionary action. ' 
Despite the emphasis on Workers' Councils, they were seen within the new policy as a 
long-term rather than a short-term aim. It was recognised, for example, that there was 
little point in trying to build Workers' Councils except on the basis of some already 
existing local organisation engaged in agitation related to grievances that are felt in the 
area. In this way the policy saw three stages of united action starting with co-operation 
between the C. P. and the I. L. P. and then building up into some local organisation such 
as a Tenants' Defence Committee, culminating in a Workers' Council. 
Co-operation with all working-class organisations was seen as a route to building for 
Workers' Councils. However, joint action with the Communist Party was seen as of 
additional importance for the I. L. P. The key point was that the new policy recognised 
both the I. L. P. and the C. P. as revolutionary Socialist parties, the possibility was 
foreseen that the two parties might, at some point, merge: 
The co-operation of the I. L. P. and the C. P. is beginning to unify the revolutionary activity and may 
well facilitate the creation of a united revolutionary movement. 
It was not however possible to argue for increasing, or even continuing, co-operation 
with the Communist Party without addressing the very real problems that the I. L. P. had 
experienced in previous joint activity with the C. P. 
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Whilst the Communists had been operating its 'united front from below' policy the C. P. 
had used united front activity to disrupt the I. L. P. and to draw I. L. P. ers into the 
Communist Party. The new I. L. P. policy stressed the need to maintain a distinctive 
I. L. P. identity whilst working with the Communist Party and other organisations. It 
stated that 'our members must be conscious of belonging to "THE" Party which will be 
the spear-head of the united revolutionary movement in this country. ' The problem 
which this identified was real enough, the attempt to develop and maintain a separate 
identity for the I. L. P., a combination of policy and activity distinctive from the 
Communist Party on the one hand and the mainstream labour movement including the 
Labour Party on the other. The solution suggested by the new policy was that 'I. L. P. 
literature should always be kept to the front. Distinctive propaganda meetings must be 
maintained ... and 
branch personnel must be used so as to retain efficient officials for 
the branch itself. ' 12 
The N. A. C., like the wider party, was split in its attitude towards the new policy. Those 
who supported the policy saw it as a necessary step towards becoming a clearly defined, 
theoretically sophisticated revolutionary Socialist party. Those who opposed the policy 
were convinced that the policy was abandoning the practical basis upon which the 
party's existence was built. With the nine divisional members split the N. A. C. accepted 
the policy by a vote of nine to five on the votes of the national members and party 
officials. 13 
Reaction to the new policy focused on the stress given to workers' councils as an 
alternative to parliament. The R. P. C. and a number of others including the non-R. P. C. 
leadership of the London Division, John Aplin and C. A. Smith continued to argue for 
greater emphasis on workers' councils. As Smith argued that there was an urgent need to 
build Workers' Councils. More significantly he was also prepared to phrase his 
argument so that it would seem as though Workers' Councils were the way to Socialism. 
Just as the capitalists devised their own instrument for the conquest of power, so the workers must 
devise their alternative instrument now that the time has come for them to rise to the position of 
ruling class. That instrument is not new; but it must now take on a new and more permanent form. 
It is the instrument to which the workers have naturally turned on every occasion when they have 
been faced with a sudden intensification of capitalist attacks. It is the democratically elected 
Workers' Committee, the Council of Action, the Workers' Council. 14 
Sympathy for Workers' Councils however extended well beyond the R. P. C. and the 
associated 'left-wing' in London. Indeed, there was support in some form or another for 
the idea of Workers' Councils from most sections of the Party. Active encouragement 
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came from the Party's leading officials including James Maxton. He had frequently 
expressed his dissatisfaction with industry-based organisation of workers and had even 
suggested that there was no reason for the I. L. P. to have friendly contact with non- 
socialist organisations including trade unions. 15 Maxton's attitude to Workers' Councils 
was, partly, based on this attitude. He argued that it was not possible to use trade unions 
for revolutionary purposes because 'in their essence they were completely reactionary' 
so he preferred the idea of 'local geographical organisations' to 'narrowly industrial 
organisations. '16 However, at the base of his views lay his own recollections of radical 
movements in Britain, and especially his own experiences of the Clyde Workers' 
Committee: 
In the two circumstances in which there has been something akin to conditions of revolution in this 
country- during the war and at the general strike- I saw how the workers' Councils came into 
being. In the war on the Clyde, in the form of the Clyde Workers' Committee, in the general strike 
in the form of the Strike Committee. 17 
Maxton's expectation was that were a revolutionary situation to occur in Britain one 
manifestation would likely take the form of Workers' Councils. He did not wish to 
preclude other possibilities, including Parliament, but he thought it probable that 
Workers' Councils would be an important component of any potential revolutionary 
movement. 18 
In addition to Maxton, some of those who most vigorously opposed the new policy of 
the I. L. P., including one of the national members of the N. A. C., Campbell Stephen, 
were prepared to give limited support to the idea of Workers' Councils. Stephen's 
criticisms of the new policy statements were of the scope given to Workers' Councils, 
not of Workers' Councils themselves. He sought in his criticisms of the new policy to 
join together a Parliamentary strategy with the idea of Workers' Councils, arguing that 
by capturing Parliament, and changing its procedure, that institution itself could be 
transformed into a Workers' Council. 19 Indeed, well before Workers' Councils had 
become a major policy issue on the N. A. C., Stephen had stressed their importance 
within Socialist strategy. For example, whilst the I. L. P. was still affiliated to the Labour 
Party, Stephen had written an article for New Leader together with George Buchanan 
calling for increased emphasis on Workers' Councils in the working class movement: 
Is it too much to hope that in every district there can be created the local machinery for Workers' 
Councils, which will rule out no section of the working-class movement, in an endeavour to 
fashion an instrument to secure victory in the struggle for a new Social Order. 20 
Thus, it is clear that there was considerable support for the idea of Workers' Councils 
even from some of those who were strongly opposed to the emphasis of I. L. P. policy 
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being placed on them rather than Parliament. It is, thus, evident that there was some 
sympathy for the idea of Workers' Councils across the spectrum of views on the N. A. C., 
including some use of the idea from those who were most strongly opposed to the 
R. P. C. 
Thus, the widespread acceptance of the discourse of workers' council resonated with the 
lasting historical interest in syndicalist ideas within the Party. However, the prevalence 
of support for the idea also lay in a widespread dissatisfaction with the existing trade 
union structures and industrial organisation. The trade unions were, in the minds of 
many I. L. P. ers at root connected with the politics of gradualism, and the failures of 
1929-31. Indeed during that period and following disaffiliation Trade Union leaders 
made some of the most vicious attacks on the I. L. P. On the other side the I. L. P. had not 
spared the union leaders from their strong criticism. As Maxton had said, he did not see 
any reason for the I. L. P. to keep friendly connections with anti-socialist organisations 
such the trade unions. 21 Another of the national members on the N. A. C., Jennie Lee, 
argued that 'trade unions are becoming more and more obsolete. i22 In such a situation, 
the Party needed to find a replacement for the unions in order that the I. L. P. would not 
be solely concerned with political matters. For many, the suggestion of Workers' 
Councils was attractive because they avoided the alleged narrow focus of the unions on 
questions relating to particular sectional or industry problems. Further, they held out the 
promise of a more open and democratic instrument. 
Such ideas were quickly rejected by those with a keener sense of the importance of the 
Trade Unions in working class activity, most notably Fred Jowett and in particular, Tom 
Stephenson. Stephenson was an official with the Cumberland Miners' Association and 
he later became Cumberland's representative on the MFGB executive and subsequently 
the NUM executive. He criticised Workers' Councils as a scheme that would sound 
'quite unreal' to the working class. Instead, he argued that the I. L. P. should focus on the 
existing unions, and whilst pointing out the failings of the policies of the contemporary 
Trade Unions, they should work to increase their contact with the industrial worker. 23 
Similarly, Jowett argued that in a crisis advanced forms of 'Councils of Actions' would 
probably function, but they would be built on Trade Unions and would develop from an 
extension of normal Trade Union activity. 24 Thus, there was no need for the I. L. P. to 
work to build any new form of organisation, such as Workers' Councils, until such a 
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situation arose. Instead, I. L. P. work should be concentrated on working for an effective 
policy within and towards the Unions. 25 
By the end of 1933 the I. L. P. had defined for itself a 'new revolutionary policy', which 
was to form the basis for its activity until the war. The policy reduced the emphasis on 
electoral struggle and introduced a role for Workers' Councils. Whilst the Party had 
rejected the detail of the R. P. C. 's policy suggestions at its Derby conference it had 
accepted the broad outlines of the Committee's perspective. However, when the N. A. C. 
came to define the party's 'new revolutionary policy' it went beyond what the national 
conference had agreed. For example, there was a greater and more definite role for 
Workers' Councils in the 'new revolutionary policy' than had been implied in the brief 
mention accepted by the 1933 conference. However, the greatest shock to those who 
opposed the R. P. C. was the acceptance of a long-term aim of forming a United 
Revolutionary Party with the Communists. The decision at the annual conference had 
been problematic enough for opponents of the R. P. C., but the 'new revolutionary policy' 
appeared to give even further ground. 
6.4 'Refining' Policy 
Following the introduction of the Party's 'new revolutionary policy' those most opposed 
to the R. P. C. felt that 'undercover Communists' were taking over the Party. They began 
organising their own 'Unity Group' faction to oppose the R. P. C. and to present an 
organised alternative policy. The policy proposals of the 'Unity Group' came from the 
Lancashire division in association with others, most notably from Norwich. Indeed, at 
the end of 1933 the Norwich branch, led by John Middleton Murry and A. W. Votier, 
presented a special divisional conference with an entire manifesto attacking the 'new 
revolutionary policy' and stressing the importance of constitutional means. 26 
From the other side, the R. P. C. looked to build on its success at the I. L. P. 's 1933 
conference. The Committee stated its aims to further clarify the Party's revolutionary 
policy, specifically to introduce elements of democratic centralism to the I. L. P. 's 
organisation and to prepare for a period of illegality. 27 Thus, the Party's 'new 
revolutionary policy' came under careful scrutiny at the I. L. P. 's York conference in 
1934. 
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The 'Unity Group' proposals were moved for Manchester City branch by Norwich's 
Middleton Murry. They attempted to reassert the ethical socialist and constitutionalist 
traditions of the Party, but were rejected by a substantial majority. The conference also 
rejected the advances of the R. P. C. In particular the I. L. P. voted to move away from 
continuing communication with the Comintern over sympathetic affiliation. However, 
the suggestions, endorsed by the N. A. C., for a more centralised organisational structure 
and disciplinary system were accepted. If the 'Unity Group' were understood as 
representing the 'right wing' of the party and the R. P. C. the 'left wing', then the R. P. C. 's 
summary of the conference was apposite. 'The right wing has been soundly defeated but 
the lead of the left was also rejected. i28 
The decisions of the York conference led to the immediate departure of the 'Unity 
Group' from the Party and other problems of factional organisation began to mount. 
Increasingly sections of the Party were convinced of the need to act against the policy of 
the R. P. C. By the time of the I. L. P. 's 1935 conference, again held in Derby, the N. A. C. 
was able to use its new policy guiding powers to further remove the R. P. C. from 
influence over policy. The N. A. C. had worked out a policy statement, which it claimed 
was a slight clarification of the 1933 'new revolutionary policy. ' The basic commitments 
of the 1935 document appeared, to the uninformed outsider, essentially the same as the 
Party had made two years earlier. Workers' Councils maintained their central role and 
the close relationship with the Communist Party and the Third International remained 
an important theme. However, in reality these apparent continuities masked small but 
significant changes in the Party's political stance. 
In 1933, there had been a commitment to work for unity with the Communist Party, as 
the only named organisation of 'revolutionary socialists', and to look for sympathetic 
affiliation with the Comintern. In 1935, the stress had shifted to a search for unity with 
all revolutionary socialists including those who remained in reformist organisations 
such as the Labour Party and the Labour and Socialist International. This change in 
emphasis was clearly designed to move the Party away from the C. P. and R. P. C. 
proposals for unity with the Communists at an early date. Instead, it gave those opposed 
to such a course of action the conference backing that justified demanding significant 
changes in the Communist outlook before any unity proposals would be considered. 
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In 1933, the policy of Workers' Councils had been introduced by the R. P. C. with the 
intention of moving the Party away from its focus on Parliamentary activity. At that 
time the line agreed had remained ambiguous between the interpretation desired by the 
R. P. C. and one which was more sympathetic to electoral activity. The 1935 statement 
declared that existing governmental institutions would be used to their utmost together 
and announced that the I. L. P. planned extensive fights in the 1935 general election. 
Workers' Councils maintained their theoretical centrality, but the policy declared that 
their relevance would be primarily in 'actual revolutionary crisis. ' The commitment to 
'consistently prepare for theii' organisation' fell far short of the practical emphasis 
required to compete with a Parliamentary conception of the I. L. P. 's primary function. 
The R. P. C. 's interpretation of Workers' Councils as a replacement for Parliament, 
accepted in so much of the 1933 policy statement, was thus absent from the 1935 
declaration. 
Additionally many of the commitments made in the 1933 'new revolutionary policy' 
whilst still present in 1935 were made with qualifications that had not been present in 
the earlier statement. There were several of these small changes, such as the increasing 
emphasis on electoral work and the acceptance of a role for non-N. U. W. M. 
unemployment organisations. Each change moved the Party towards a slightly more 
flexible outlook, accepting the view that somewhat different practical considerations 
applied in different areas. The changes also tended to move the Party back towards a 
view of continuity with the I. L. P. 's past. They stressed the evolution of its 'revolutionary 
policy' since 1925, rather than the view that post-1932 policy was a radical break with 
the earlier period. 29 
All these changes pointed in the same direction. Whilst far from hegemonic, in 1933 the 
R. P. C. had been a significant force in generating the I. L. P. policy statement, with their 
influence extending to detailed wording as well as general principle. By 1935, this 
situation had changed; the R. P. C. was a far less important organisation within the Party. 
By removing certain ambiguities, and making slight changes in emphasis, those 
opposed to the R. P. C. position had used the 1935 conference, to close off some 
interpretations of I. L. P. policy favoured by the Revolutionary Policy Committee. 
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6.5 Consensus? 
The first three years of disaffiliation saw massive internal factional fighting and the 
partial disintegration of the Party. The hope which leading members of the Party 
expressed was that policy had been fully clarified at the 1935 conference; however the 
disappointing performance of the ILP outside of Glasgow in the 1935 General Election 
further changed the focus of the Party's activity. There was a new determination from 
the centre to reconsider the way in which the Party operated, to force unity on the 
membership to try to cut down on extended policy disagreements and rid the Party of 
damaging factional organisations. In part these moves towards centralisation and 
conformity were successful. At the 1936 Keighley Conference in the wake of the 
departure of the R. P. C. and continuing agitation by the Marxist Group, John Aplin, who 
had led. the struggle against the factions in the London Division, had little difficulty in 
persuading the conference to outlaw group organisation within the Party. Further from 
1935, the structure of the Party conferences had been changed, debate was tightly 
structured around a programme of high profile policy issues decided on by the NAC 
with the hope of preventing the kind of wide ranging disagreements that had plagued 
the Party in the years from disaffiliation to 1935. 
These attempts at control were partially successful, in 1936 Brockway argued from the 
proceedings of the conference that it was clear that 'the I. L. P. is developing a clear and 
consistent line of Revolutionary Socialist Policy and action. ' He felt able to make 
similar assessments of the conferences from 1937-9. Indeed his view of the 1938 
Manchester Conference was unequivocal: 
A feature of the conference was the unanimity of the delegates on basic principles. During the last 
four years the policy of the Party has been so clarified that the whole membership now starts all its 
thinking with a common attitude of mind. 30 
According to Brockway this common ground came from the shared understanding of all 
Party members as to the nature and consequences of the Capitalist system. This 
generated a set of 'basic principles' which he suggested could be put into a single 
sentence: 
War, Fascism, Imperialism and Poverty- all are the result of Capitalism; Capitalism can only be 
fought by the method of the class struggle; therefore the results of Capitalism can only be resisted 
by intensifying the class struggle. " 
Indeed the I. L. P. 's policy was showing considerable development. The initial 'new 
revolutionary policy' formulated in 1933 and modified in 1934-5, formed the basis of 
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the Party's official line until after the Second World War. However, events forced 
significant changes in the I. L. P. 's policy. These changes were, as in the 1935 case, 
largely cast as restatements or clarifications of the earlier policy. 
In these terms the Party's policy did see a degree of definite evolution in the period 
1935-9. Perhaps most significant was a reconsideration of the relationship between the 
I. L. P. and the Labour Party with re-affiliation emerging as a serious possibility. 
Connected with this was the development of the initial United Front with the 
Communist Party into the distinctive Workers' Front policy. The Workers' Front, as a 
development of the party's United Front attitude of the early 1930s, was first introduced 
to the Party's 1937 conference in Glasgow. The policy, developed in the wake of the 
Unity Campaign, sought to develop the ideas of working-class unity in concrete terms. 
In particular, the policy which was elaborated in Brockway's 1938 book Workers' Front, 
attempted to renegotiate the terms on which the I. L. P. could rejoin the Labour Party. As 
in its United Front policy, despite maintaining a stringent criticism of the Labour Party 
especially on foreign policy issues, the need for unity on class terms with working class 
organisations, was stressed. However, the Workers' Front, much more explicitly than 
the United Front, saw a federation of working class organisations coming together under 
the framework of a Labour Party with centralised discipline relaxed. 32 Further, the 
deterioration of the relationship between the I. L. P. and the Communists in both 
international and domestic politics led to changes in the I. L. P. position with regard to 
international affiliation and a major theoretical re-evaluation of the Soviet Union and its 
importance for the working class movement 33 
In part this process of policy development was the relatively non-contentious process 
that Brockway suggested. There was an appearance of unanimity and agreement 
particularly at the 1938 Manchester Conference and to a lesser extent at the 1937 
Glasgow Conference. However, this lack of conflict cannot be taken to demonstrate 
fundamental agreement across the Party. The structuring of the main debates around 
issues on which there were no major conflicts, such as the condemnation of 
Imperialism, expressions of support for the Spanish Republic and attacks on the Means 
Test, represented as much a conscious attempt to foster unity within the Party as an 
indication that there were no important issues on which the Party was fundamentally 
divided. Indeed as the conferences at Keighley in 1936 with divisions over Abyssinia 
and Scarborough in 1939 where the parliamentary group support for Chamberlain split 
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the party, demonstrated, such issues did exist. Indeed, the differing interpretations of the 
party's anti-war position were sufficient to cause some of the most acrimonious debates 
in the ILP's history. 
6.6 Conclusion 
By the second half of the decade, Brockway portrayed the I. L. P. policy consensus as its 
greatest strength. Other noted commentators have been equally convinced that the 
I. L. P. 's policy remained 'indefinite and hazy', vacillating between incompatible poles. 34 
The implication in either case is that policy is crucial to understanding the prospects and 
potential for the Party. The I. L. P. 's 1933 'new revolutionary policy' represented a 
significant break from its earlier 'Socialism in Our Time' stance. This policy represented 
a rupture with parts of the I. L. P. 's traditional position and was a significant victory for 
the Revolutionary Policy Committee. However, the policy also linked with the ongoing 
syndicalist sympathies of many other party members. This 'new revolutionary policy' 
remained central to I. L. P. 's political outlook until the outbreak of the Second World 
War. However, by redefining terms and removing ambiguities significant changes were 
made, which represented the changing balance of power within the Party. The detailed 
analysis of the changing policy of the I. L. P. indicates the part which the Party's political 
theory had in the struggle between competing factions. Such a study also shows the way 
in which, at times, such as during the Abyssinian crisis, the Party leadership could 
manipulate contested elements of policy to suit their own needs. Those who disagreed 
strongly with policy would leave the Party, in the case of the I. S. P. and the R. P. C., 
taking significant sections of the organisation with them. In these ways the detailed 
policy of the party was crucial to retaining members of the Party. A different policy for 
the I. L. P. could perhaps have helped the Party lose less of its members. However, there 
is little indication, particularly when policy is considered alongside electoral and local 
activity, that a changed political philosophy could have provided the I. L. P. with a 
significant tool for recruitment during the 1930s. A study of the Party's policy reveals 
much about the disputes within the I. L. P., but tells us little about how the Party could 
have recruited more effectively. 
1 Dowse, 1966,185-202 
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7. Communism and the N. U. W. M. 
7.1 Introduction 
The I. L. P. successfully found political spaces in some localities. However, in order to 
succeed and expand it needed to develop its national position. There were a number of 
possible routes to developing a national profile, the three most obvious of which were: 
first to become an independent political force, the second to work with the Communist 
Party and the third to work with the Labour Party. In the initial period after disaffiliation 
the Party chose, controversially, the second of the options. This chapter will attempt to 
explain the reasons why this decision was taken and to examine its consequences, 
suggesting that the I. L. P. 's failure to find political space through working with the 
Communist Party during the crucial period after disaffiliation played a significant role 
in the decline of the I. L. P. It drove large number of members out of the party without 
many of the hoped for compensating benefits, especially as relations with the 
Communist Party again turned bitter in the latter part of the decade. 
7.2 From 'Class-Against-Class' to 'United Front' 
At the time of disaffiliation relations between the I. L. P. and the Communist Party were 
at a low point. The Communist Party's 'Class-against-Class' policy, introduced during 
1928, attacked left-wing 'social democratic' organisations such as the I. L. P. for blocking 
the progress of an 'increasingly revolutionary' working class to the Communist Party. 
As time passed the Communist attacks on the Labour Party and the I. L. P. became more 
vicious and the accusations made against them became more outrageous. Thus, by 1932 
the Communist Party claimed the I. L. P. 's declarations of left-wing intent were the 
'greatest crime ever committed against the working class', ignoring examples such as the 
Great War and child labour. As Harry Pollitt, the C. P. General Secretary, suggested in a 
debate with the then I. L. P. chairman, Fenner Brockway, on 18 April 1932, there could 
be no unity between the I. L. P. and the Communist Party, only a war to the death. ' 
Comrades, [the I. L. P. 's] confusion is not accidental, not a result of stupidity, not a mistake. It is the 
deliberate policy of the I. L. P. It is consciously thought out, fostered and stimulated in order to 
confuse the struggle, to create doubt and hesitation in the minds of the workers, and it is the 
greatest crime ever committed against the working class movement that week by week this 
confusion can pour out its poison when one considers the situation with which the working class is 
faced today; wage cuts, the Means Test, tariffs , and now the entry of capitalism on its war period. Therefore, comrades, with such a party there can be no talk of unity, no talk of anything in 
common, and there can only be a war to the death. 2 
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The I. L. P. had been an important voice arguing for allowing Communist affiliation to 
the Labour Party through the 1920s. However, for some I. L. P. ers such as General 
Secretary John Paton, feelings against the Communist Party were nearly as extreme as 
the vitriolic rhetoric flowing the other way. Paton, viewed the Communist Party as 
practically useless as a force, with its only strength coming from its association with 
Soviet Russia: 
[I]t must be remembered that the history of the Communist Party up to this point had been one of 
consistent and gross failure. It had proved completely incompetent to turn to account in any 
effective way a situation of economic and political crisis which seemed made for it. Every single 
policy and tactic to which it had put its had had ended in futility and frustration. For all practical 
purposes it had ceased to count as a force and merely living on the reflected glory of the immense 
Socialist achievements in Soviet Russia. 3 
Nevertheless, from other quarters there was a growing feeling within the I. L. P. that it 
should look to work with the Communist Party and, as Pollitt viciously attacked the 
I. L. P., Brockway responded with a call for unity. Others within the I. L. P., mostly 
centred on the R. P. C., were even keener to advocate joint work with the C. P. 
At the end of the 1932 the Communist Party line began, slowly, to soften. In November, 
a Communist Party conference made a decision to abandon part of the basis of its class- 
verses-class line and to work with the I. L. P. The decision was taken to extend a 'united 
front from below' that is to work with the I. L. P. rank-and-file but not with the 
leadership. The C. P. argued that this would allow joint activity against fascism and war 
without the party becoming tainted by its connection to the social fascist I. L. P. 
leadership. This I. L. P. perception of Communist aims in this joint activity made it 
difficult for the I. L. P. to support fully the conduct of the united front at this time. 
Nevertheless it signalled a change in C. P. tactics from the times when Communists had 
been expelled as 'Trotskyists' for working with I. L. P. members. 
The tentative 'unity from below' policy was radically transformed into a real 'united 
front' policy following the rise of Hitler to power early in 1933. On 4 March the I. L. P. 's 
N. A. C. wrote to the other 'working class' organisations to suggest common action. 5 The 
following day the Communist Party issued a similar invitation. John Paton, I. L. P. 
General Secretary, stressed that the aim of the proposals for joint activity was to get 
action with all other working class groups, primarily the Labour Party and the T. U. C. 
Hitler's stride to power in Germany and the collapse before him, without even an attempt at 
effective resistance, of both Social Democrats and Communists alike, shook the workers' 
organisations of the world to their foundations.... It seemed here was an issue on which it should 
be possible to get common action by all workers' organisations in Britain, and on my suggestion, 
the I. L. P. National Council agreed to make an immediate approach to the other parties for the 
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purpose. There was no intention of course, of proposing any kind of alliance, but of getting the 
Labour Party in concert with the T. U. C., to take a lead in organising great united front 
demonstrations against Fascism in which every working-class organisation from the Co-operative 
party on the right to the Communist Party on the left, could, combine on the same platform. 6 
Paton's motivations and expectations for the I. L. P. proposals of common action were 
that some of the local links with the Labour Party could be maintained by the I. L. P., 
even after its 'clean break with the larger organisation. However, Paton's hopes were 
not delivered; the Labour Party executive, the T. U. C. General Council and the Co- 
operative Party all declined the invitations to meetings to discuss joint activity. 7 The 
result was a significant victory for the R. P. C. as only the Communist Party responded 
positively. 
The invitations of the I. L. P. and the C. P. to talks over joint activity led to a series of 
meetings between the two parties beginning on 17 March 1933. At the first meeting, the 
parties came to a broad agreement to pursue joint action, which should ideally include 
other working class organisations. Particular emphasis was placed on the need for the 
co-operation in local activity. As important however was the agreement reached 
suggesting an end to inter-party hostility: 
There must be a complete abandonment in any joint activities of the inter-party attacks and 
criticisms, and a sincere concentration on the common objectives. 8 
This led directly to joint organisation of a mass demonstration against Fascism on 2 
April and work towards building a demonstration on the International Labour Day, 1 
May. 9 
When the I. L. P. came to consider relations with the Communist Party at its 1933 
Conference in Derby, the R. P. C. was at the high point of its influence. There was 
widespread support for a policy of joint activity with the Communist Party. However, 
there was also considerable discontent at these proposals. Three influential Scottish 
members, the MP McGovern, and Councillors Carmichael and Lyall, led the arguments 
against continued co-operation on the basis that 'experience has shown that common 
action with the Communist Party is impossible. "° Thus, Maxton's argument, on behalf 
of the N. A. C. that the I. L. P. could engage with the C. P. without subordinating their 
identity, was crucial in securing continued support for the proposed joint activity. ' 1 The 
subsequent discussions within the N. A. C. which defined the party's 'new revolutionary 
policy' went even further. The proposal to form a united revolutionary party with the 
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C. P., which had originated from within the R. P. C., was accepted as party of the official 
policy of the I. L. P.: 
The ultimate formation of one revolutionary movement is desirable and, if practicable, one 
revolutionary party developing from the I. L. P., the revolutionary elements which are arising within 
the Trades Unions and the Labour Party and the C. P. 12 
However, this decision to increase co-operation with the C. P. caused considerable 
tension and loss of membership within the I. L. P., not only of leading members such as 
MP Richard Wallhead and General Secretary John Paton, but also of many local 
activists. A survey of branch opinion by the N. A. C. showed that a majority was against 
co-operation between the two parties in general activities. 13 Those such as McGovern 
who were keen to reduce connections with the C. P. argued 'that in all parts of the 
country members are "fed up" with the behaviour of the Communists. ' 14 The behaviour 
of the C. P. often reinforced these fears. For example, in what appeared to be a 
continuation of its 'united front from below' policy, the C. P. sent out invitations to 
individual branches and divisions of the I. L. P. to the aborted 1934 congress of the C. I. 
without inviting the I. L. P. nationally. 15 
In light of such problems the 1934 I. L. P. Conference, with the R. P. C. on the defensive, 
decided to limit co-operation to specific matters. However, this did not go far enough 
for many within the I. L. P. including the majority of the Lancashire division who 
resigned in protest. Further, future co-operative ventures between the two parties, such 
as at the Congress and Hunger March council meeting in May 1934 were marred by 
disagreements. Nevertheless, the leaderships of both parties stated a desire to continue 
working together and agreed to maintain the 'united struggle against Fascism, War and 
Unemployment'. 16 The Communist Party at its thirteenth congress in 1935 proposed an 
immediate meeting with the I. L. P. for the formation of a United Communist Party. 
When Harry Pollift brought the fraternal greetings to the I. L. P. conference later that year 
he stressed the hope for 'the complete unification of our two parties' within a short space 
of time. 17 However, the I. L. P., although until 1936, officially committed to the 
formation of a united revolutionary party was increasingly unprepared to take any 
practical steps towards achieving such a goal. 
7.3 Popular Front 
In 1935 the Communist Party changed its policy from United to Popular Front, and its 
attitude towards the I. L. P. changed. Its official position during the United Front period 
had been to work with the I. L. P. for the creation of a United Communist Party, during 
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the Popular Front period attention moved away from the I. L. P. towards Labour and 
eventually the other mainstream parties. At the same time the I. L. P. was becoming 
increasingly wary of the Communist Party, it was widely felt that co-operation was 
harming rather than helping the I. L. P. and the activities of the R. P. C., which culminated 
in its departure to join the C. P. led to an increase in tension. 
By the beginning of 1935, both parties were aware of the serious difficulties that existed 
on the ground in implementing a policy of co-operation, and initially determined to 
engage in a dialogue to sort out the differences. Pollitt attempted to blame the 
difficulties on the lack of lead given by the N. A. C. and the attacks on Soviet Foreign 
Policy in the New Leader along with a 'bias against those proposing united front 
activity. ' However, Brockway who saw things rather differently argued that the 
problems stemmed from the actual experience of I. L. P. branches in co-operation with 
the Communist Party. This he suggested largely emanated from three common factors: 
First, the sectarianism of the Communist Party, 'which saw a C. P. faction formed in 
every committee. ' Second, 'that appointments to positions on committees were generally 
on party lines rather than on the suitability of the person for the job. ' Finally he argued 
that the C. P. 'over summoned committees' leading to excessive amounts of work for 
very little return. In addition to this Brockway noted there were often specific local 
factors. 18 By the end of the exchange of letters it was clear that neither side possessed 
the will to sort the problems out. Indeed, much of Pollitt's final response to Brockway 
was dedicated to launching an attack on the 'Independent Revolutionary Parties' as a 
block to a United Communist party. 19 
By the middle of 1935 blunt criticism between the two organisations became 
increasingly frequent in their respective propaganda papers. Thus, for example, Harry 
Pollitt attacked the I. L. P. 's 1935 conference in the Daily Worker for its criticism of the 
Communist Party and the Communist International whilst stressing the importance of 
divisions in the I. L. P. He also accused the I. L. P. of trying to find 'the impossible ground 
between the Communist Party and the Labour. Party. ' The I. L. P. in return accused the 
Communist Party criticism of the I. L. P. of being 'repetitive propaganda speeches. 20 
Within the I. L. P., with the R. P. C. an active if decreasing force, there was much internal 
conflict over the line to take towards the Communist Party and the Soviet Union. In 
April 1935 the London Divisional Council, under the influence of the R. P. C., attempted 
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to prevent Brockway from attacking the diplomacy of the Soviet Union in the New 
Leader. 21 However, the leadership of the London Division was itself not united in 
support of the changing policies of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party. Thus, 
R. P. C. leader Jack Gaster caused something of a storm when he attended the London 
District Congress of the Communist Party as a fraternal delegate from the London I. L. P. 
He stressed the importance of creating 'one united revolutionary party' but he also 
launched an attack on the C. P. 's attitude towards the Soviet Union's foreign policy 
I ask you therefore if you wish to assist closer unity not to repeat just the phrase that Soviet Union 
foreign policy is a weapon in the hands of the workers for the preservation of peace for the time 
being. ... [It is] difficult for ordinary workers to understand when they have drummed into them from a hundred and one sources that this shows growing unity between the Soviet Union and 
Capitalist countries in contradistinction to the growing unity between the Soviet Union and 
working class forces. 22 
Relations between the two parties took a further downward turn when in November 
1935, despite his personal reservations about Soviet Foreign Policy, Gaster led the 
majority of the R. P. C. into the Communist Party. Thus, despite a number of R. P. C. ers 
choosing to remain in the I. L. P., most of the strongly pro-C. P. I. L. P. ers had left the 
Party. With this vocal and internally significant group removed from party discussions 
in a way which further tarnished the image of the C. P. within the I. L. P., it became 
increasingly clear that there was little prospect of the unification that remained the 
official policy of both organisations. Following the 1935 general election, when the 
Communist Party withdrew its support at the last minute from I. L. P. candidates, the 
frequent meetings between the leaderships of the two parties ceased. 23 
These tensions were exemplified in the House of Commons, where from the 1935 
election the Communist Party was represented by William Gallacher. The support given 
by Gallacher to the Labour Party, often felt by the I. L. P. MPs to be unquestioning, 
became another source of conflict between the two parties. Shortly after the election, in 
December 1935, John McGovern addressed these points and the Communist Party's 
policy change in an open letter to Harry Pollitt. 24 The Communist Party in response 
openly accepted that it had reversed its policy: 'so far from the Communist Party 
denying this, it is anxious to let every worker know about this change and why it was 
necessary. ' The I. L. P. again called for unity without surrendering a revolutionary 
position. 25 However, the issue was as much about the internal democracy of the C. P. as 
its policy: 
I would like to ask [Campbell] by whom this decision was reached. Was it decided by a 
conference of the C. P.? If so, when and where was the conference held? 26 
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The Communist Party response was to attack the I. L. P. 's record in the House, 
suggesting that disaffiliation had left the I. L. P. MPs with a closer relationship with the 
Tory Party than with working class MPs. 27 
At the I. L. P. 's 1936 conference in Keighley the N. A. C. indicated that, despite 
continuing activity at local level, co-operation with the Communist Party was 
declining. 28 The conference took the inevitable decision to reverse the 1933 policy 
statement and declare that the Party was no longer working to form a united 
organisation with the Communist Party. 29 This, combined with the I. L. P. 's firm 
opposition to the C. P. 's Popular Front policy, suggested little possibility of 
reconciliation and the frequency of denunciations of the two parties increased still 
further. The I. L. P. focussed its attack on the Popular Front policy of the C. P. calling for 
wider consideration and of exactly what alternatives were being defended. 
C. P. policy is to build up the widest possible front for the maintenance of the "status quo" both by 
independent working-class action and by support of any Capitalist government which will take a 
sufficiently resolute line of opposition to Fascist countries... Before we are taken in by talk of 
"collective security" let us ask ourselves "collective security of what? 00 
By the end of 1936 the C. P. was increasingly using its influence against the I. L. P. and 
the Party found itself frequently excluded from events and meetings at which they had 
previously been invited to speak . 
31 However, some joint activity remained, most notably 
the I. L. P. was heavily involved in the anti-fascist struggles even in the Communist 
strongholds in the East End of London. For example the party played an important role, 
along with the Communist Party and the Ex-Servicemen's association, in mobilising 
support against the Mosely marches through Jewish areas of the East End in 1936-7. 
The most notable of these occasion was the famous 'battle of Cable Street' in October 
1936 when it was the I. L. P. 's propaganda which was picked up by the national press and 
Brockway's call to the government which led to the Commissioner of Police refusing 
the fascists further permission to march. 32 Further, whilst the tensions in no way 
disappeared, the negotiations and the apparent potential of the Unity Campaign 
temporarily appeared to resurrect the prospects of useful co-operation between the I. L. P. 
and the Communist Party. 
7.4 The Unity Campaign 
The Socialist League was formed in 1932 by an amalgamation of ILP affiliationists and 
a small number of Labour Party intellectuals. Members of Socialist League, by refusing 
to split from the Labour Party were denying the validity of the disaffiliated I. L. P. 's 
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political project. Thus, it was inevitable that initial relations between the League and the 
I. L. P. would be antagonistic. 33 However, by the middle of the decade, with many of the 
immediate disputes that surrounded disaffiliation settled, contacts between the two 
organisations began to increase. Before the 1935 I. L. P. conference Brockway and 
Maxton engaged in talks with the Socialist League in order to try to achieve some basis 
for united action. 34 However, the central Labour Party quickly heard about the meeting 
and challenged the executive of the Socialist League on their relationship with the I. L. P. 
J. T. Murphy, the League's General Secretary, was quick to strip the meeting and 
agreement of any significance. 
The members of the Socialist League who were present... were there in their personal capacity and 
in no way representing the Socialist League. 05 
When the 1935 Socialist League annual conference turned down the suggestion for a 
united front with the I. L. P. and the Communist Party it seemed as though possibilities 
for joint action were limited. However, as the Communist Party began its Popular Front 
period, so reviled by many within the I. L. P., connections with the Socialist League 
began to take on an increased significance. 
In June 1936 Brockway suggested that there was a growing dialogue between the Party 
and those within the Labour Party who felt that the I. L. P. and not the Communist Party, 
following its Popular Front turn, represented the best hope for a real revolutionary 
socialist party. 36 Further, the I. L. P. 's attitude towards the 1936 Socialist League 
Conference was markedly different in tone from the I. L. P. 's earlier comments about the 
League. Nevertheless, despite some increasing optimism the I. L. P. maintained its 
scepticism about the League's position within the Labour Party, including predictions of 
exclusion from the Labour Party: 
There was ability and the revolutionary spirit among many of the delegates. There was less 
evidence of the 'careerist' elements. But one had the feeling of a small group of intellectual leaders 
without followers, and one saw, inevitably, exclusion from the Labour Party if the ideas of the 
resolutions and speeches are carried out. It all seemed depressingly futile. " 
Despite the improving relationship between the I. L. P. and the Socialist League and the 
deteriorating relationship with the Communist Party the I. L. P. focused on approaches to 
the C. P., Labour and Co-operative Parties rather than the Socialist League. 38 
The real initiative for the Unity Campaign thus came not from the I. L. P but from the 
Socialist League. Following the Labour Party's 1936 Conference H. N. Brailsford and a 
number of others led a call for a united campaign by the Socialist League, the I. L. P. and 
the Communist Party. Following this the Socialist League organised a series of 
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meetings between themselves, the I. L. P. and Communist Party. 39 These meetings led to 
the endorsement in principle of a joint campaign of the three organisations. The 
meetings also allowed Maxton, Brockway, Cripps, Mellor, Pollitt and Gallacher to 
agree to a number of joint demands such as those expressed in a joint letter to the 
National Council of Labour urging a Campaign to demand facilities for the provision of 
arms to the Spanish Government 40 
In the negotiations that surrounded the Unity Campaign both the C. P. and to a lesser 
extent the Socialist League looked to support a programme based on the Popular Front. 
However, the I. L. P. would not accept such proposals based on attempts to unite all 
'democratic' forces regardless of their class position: 
We must be quite clear, however, about the basis of unity. We do not want a unity so wide that it 
would involve giving up the fight against Capitalism. We do not want a unity which means the 
surrender of the class struggle. 
For this reason the I. L. P. rejects unity on the basis of the Popular Front. We are not prepared to 
become allies with the Liberal Party, Tory "democrats, " or other sections of the Capitalist class. 
The Party was also sceptical about the Unity Campaign proposal that all the three 
organisations should be seeking to work for immediate affiliation to the Labour Party. 
The I. L. P. declared that there would need to be significant changes to the structure of 
the Labour Party before reaffiliation was a serious consideration. In particular they 
focussed on the need for 'democratisation of its structure' and the adoption of 'an 
uncompromising Working-class and Socialist policy. i41 Thus, the I. L. P. negotiators, 
under instruction from the I. L. P. Executive Committee, agreed to sign up to the Unity 
Campaign, but only on the condition, opposed by the Communist Party, that they could 
express their reservations with the manifesto when it was published. 42 
The Unity Manifesto was launched at the beginning of January 1937 and the campaign 
began with a'vast and overflowing' meeting in Manchester's Free Trade Hall. The initial 
meetings of the Unity Campaign certainly seemed to many within all three 
organisations, and beyond, to be a huge success and apparently indicated the possibility 
of building a huge mass movement. That the three organisations which constituted the 
majority of the self-consciously socialist 'left' in Britain could come together so publicly 
seemed to give a signal of hope, and the follow up meetings around the country were 
enthusiastically attended, as one supporter later put it: 
The greatest meetings were addressed by Maxton, Cripps and Pollift. Each of the speakers had his 
own personal following and together they were irresistible. The first two or three months of the 
campaign proved beyond the shadow of a doubt that the mass of the British workers were ready 
for unity. They were prepared to forget bygone differences and misunderstandings and go forward 
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under the inspiration which the campaign gave. It is probable that we shall never see such great 
public meetings again in this country. 43 
However, from the beginning the Unity campaign was troubled. From the I. L. P. point of 
view unity was only worth achieving on a basis that did not require the sacrifice of 
principle. The primary principle at issue was the centrality of working class activity. As 
Maxton wrote in Controversy: 
Mere unity is barren and futile. Even unity of working class organisations is futile. The only unity 
that is fruitful is unity in working-class struggle. If the theoretical teachings of Marx had not in 
themselves been sufficiently convincing the actual experiences of the last twenty years would have 
proved that truth. 44 
That the Unity campaign really offered 'unity in working class struggle' was seriously 
questioned by many within the I. L. P. Indeed, the party had agreed to the Unity 
Manifesto only by distancing itself from the Popular Front basis and calls for immediate 
affiliation to the Labour Party. Nevertheless the Party was prepared to stand relatively 
united behind the decision of the leadership to endorse the Unity campaign and at the 
I. L. P. 's 1937 conference the campaign was adopted with only four (Trotskyist) 
dissidents 45 Tribune claimed that the vote 'scotched' the rumours of a split in the 
I. L. P. 46 However, the conference clearly underlined the overwhelming sentiment of the 
Party against the Popular Front 47 The I. L. P. 's position towards the Popular Front and 
the consequential criticism of the Comintern and the Soviet Union drew the inevitable 
criticism from the Communist Party. These Communist critics were joined by some 
from within the Socialist League who attacked the I. L. P. for its 'pure romanticism. i48 
Thus, even during the most enthusiastic points of the Unity campaign the I. L. P. saw a 
need to maintain a principled stand against the Popular Front, and the relationship 
which the Unity campaign suggested towards the Labour Party was far from being 
accepted by the party. This, combined with a reluctance from many Socialist Leaguers 
to enter into the Unity campaign at all, and existing tensions between the I. L. P. and the 
Communist Party in any event would have put a severe strain on the Unity Campaign. 
However, such dynamics had no time to work. The Labour Party N. E. C. intervened and 
as soon as the campaign began they decided that the Socialist League should be 
disaffiliated from the Labour Party. They followed this two months later with a further 
decision, operational from June 1, that membership of the Socialist League would be 
made incompatible with membership of the Labour Party. The Socialist League, 
influenced, many have suggested, by Pollitt, decided to dissolve itself before the June 
deadline as a'conscious political tactic. i49 The I. L. P. was sceptical about the decision to 
225 
disband the Socialist League. Whilst the Party recognised the pressures that had led to 
the decision and saw organisational advantages it stressed the 'two disadvantages in the 
decision of the Socialist League, ' one connected with the psychology of the Labour 
movement and the other with the organisation of the Left: 
The psychological effect of the dissolution of the League is undoubtedly to encourage the view 
that those within the Labour Party who support unity are on the retreat. It suggests to the average 
Labour member that the Socialist League did not dare to stand up to the Labour Party because it 
feared that the majority of the Labour Party would not come to its support when the Party 
Conference is held in the autumn. 
The organisational disadvantage of the Socialist League decision is that it will make any future 
affiliation of the I. L. P. or the Communist Party to the Labour Party more difficult. 5° 
Within the Socialist League there was also considerable disquiet at the decision to 
disband. Some suggested, perhaps with some foundation that the 'dissolution of the 
League was foisted on [them] by the Communist Party. ' In this situation a group led by 
D. Baker and M. McCarthy, argued the need for 'a new organisation of militant 
Socialists within the Labour Party. ' The policy of the new organisation with its anti- 
Popular Front, anti-League of Nations line, was similar to that of the I. L. P., especially 
as the latter had modified its attitude in relation to the Labour Party during preparations 
for the Unity Campaign. The policy of the proposed new group was set out in an eight 
point programme, mostly in line with I. L. P. policy. 51 
Nevertheless, at least in public the I. L. P. indicated that the Unity Campaign without the 
Socialist League could still expect to gain significant support, enough to influence the 
Labour Party conference: 
The movement is bigger than the official prestige of the Labour leaders or their ideas of policy. It 
is a force which will gather strength to sweep away Capitalism.... They are likely to be surprised 
by the result of their action. At the last Labour Party Conference nearly one-third of the vote was 
given for unity. It is well within the reach of possibility that, at this year's Conference, a majority 
vote will be secured. 52 
The Unity Campaign carried on with support of the National Labour Unity Committee. 
However, the N. E. C. quickly stamped down on this initiative. Members of the Labour 
Party were forbidden from appearing on platforms with members of the I. L. P. or 
Communist Party and the campaign had to be relaunched with separate meetings for 
Labour Party speakers and C. P. A. L. P. speakers. 53 From the Labour Party side the Unity 
campaign had first been organisationally destroyed and then outlawed. 
The I. L. P. decided to maintain its support of the emasculated Unity Campaign. 
Branches were circularised with a petition in favour of unity within the Labour Party 
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and Trade Unions by the Labour Unity Committee. However, with the campaign largely 
dependant on co-operation between the I. L. P. and the Communist Party it was 
effectively over. Indeed the I. L. P. went so far as to decide that its Branches should be 
instructed not to act on any Unity Committees with members of the Communist Party 
only. 54 The Labour Party supporters of Unity hoped to make a significant impact at the 
Labour Party conference to rejuvenate the campaign. Instead they were heavily defeated 
in an atmosphere where they made little impression. However, by this stage, as 
Brockway put it, 'the inner spirit of Unity was dead. '55 The situation in Spain had led to 
such a deterioration in relations between the C. P. and the I. L. P. that there could be no 
prolonged hope of united action between the two parties. 
7.5 Relations with the Communist Party 1937-9 
The opening of the Unity Campaign had led to a temporary thaw in relations between 
the I. L. P. and Communist Party, but the improvement was extremely short-lived. The 
breaking point came over the situation in Spain, and the May uprising in Barcelona in 
particular. Fears for the position of POUM members, and the I. L. P. ers associated with 
them in Spain had been rising following the sacking of POUM leader Andres Nin from 
the Catalan Government in December 1936. Early in 1937 the I. L. P. sent a circular 
letter to Communist Party branches raising concerns about the positions of Bob Smillie 
and John McNair along with Nin and Gorkin. The circular challenged C. P. ers to 
consider the role of the Communist Party in supporting the increasingly right-wing 
Government and called the C. P. to a debate. 56 
However, it was the events in Barcelona in May which were primarily responsible for 
the irreversible decline of the relationship between the two parties. The Communist 
Party denounced POUM for its supposed part in the Barcelona uprising which the C. P. 
declared to be a 'fascist plot. ' The presence of the I. L. P. battalion in Barcelona along 
with its connection with POUM meant that denunciations of the I. L. P. soon followed in 
the Communist Press. The I. L. P. responded by declaring the Communists to be involved 
in a'Counter-Revolution in Spain' in which 'the Communists were on the wrong side of 
the Barricades. ' John McNair, the I. L. P. representative in Spain challenged Palme Dutt 
in an open letter about his 'slanders' against the I. L. P. and POUM. 57 
It was quickly evident that there was little prospect of the spirit of the Unity Campaign 
being continued in an atmosphere where one of the three participating organisations had 
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been disbanded and the other two were viciously attacking each other. When Brockway 
visited Spain in July as part of the French Committee for the Defence of the Spanish 
Revolution he returned talking of strong reactions against Communism and of 
disillusionment in the International Brigade. 58 When Bob Smillie died of appendicitis in 
a Spanish Gaol, probably due to the neglect of his Republican captors, the I. L. P. 
emphatically did not attempt to turn the situation into a political issue. This refusal 
would seem to stem largely from concern about the impact on the Spanish situation, 
rather than a desire to prevent open warfare with the C. P. G. B., with whom there was 
already considerable conflict, as the Party put it in New Leader 
The Communist Party not only in Spain, but everywhere has ceased to be revolutionary. Its 
Socialism is as unreal as that of the Labour Party. The object, the concern, the anxiety of the 
Communist Party is not Socialism but capitalist democracy. 5 
The disputes over the Spanish Civil War continued to dominate the relationship 
between the I. L. P. and the Communist Party, especially after the suppression of POUM 
which followed the Barcelona uprising. The I. L. P. continued its support of its brother- 
party in Spain and its conduct in the Spanish Civil War. The Communists continued to 
attack the I. L. P. as Trotskyists and fascist agents. The Daily Worker refused to print 
adverts for the I. L. P. pamphlet The Truth About Barcelona in June and then refused to 
advertise any I. L. P. material at all. 60 As the year wore on relations became even worse. 
I. L. P. members began to talk of the 'murderous foulness of the Communist Party' and 
New Leader felt it was appropriate to carry a sarcastic article about Communist icon 
Harry Pollitt. 61 Debates between the two organisations were increasingly vitriolic, with 
the question of Spain at the centre of immediate disagreements. 62 Those most closely 
associated with the I. L. P. in Spain were given short shrift by the Communist Party. 
Stafford Cottman the one member of the I. L. P. unit in Spain who had left for Spain a 
member of the Y. C. L. was immediately expelled on his return to Bristol for 'taking part 
in a fascist uprising. '63 By the end of the Year, with the I. L. P. completely hostile to 
Popular Front concepts and the Communist Party convinced that the I. L. P. was aiding 
fascism, it was absolutely clear that no reconciliation could be expected. 
These developments in the relationship between the Communist Party and the I. L. P. 
were combined with a reanalysis of the nature of the Soviet Union from within the 
I. L. P. The Party had begun the decade with an official position which was strongly 
favourable to the Soviet Union. Significant portions of the New Leader were devoted to 
portraying an extremely favourable picture of life in the Soviet Union, and these views 
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persisted for some time. For example, in August 1934 Jim Garton, the former N. A. C. 
representative for the Midlands who had found employment in Moscow returned to give 
a talk at the I. L. P. Summer School devoted to praising the Soviet Union and expressing 
his confidence in 'the capacity of the Russian Communist Party to continue the rapid 
progress in the USSR. 'M However, the combined effect of the departure of the R. P. C. 
and the Soviet decision to join the League of Nations led the party towards a serious 
revaluation of its attitude towards Russia. 
This situation was given further impetus by the situation in Spain and then crucially by 
the 'Moscow trials. ' The I. L. P. first debated the trials at its the 1937 conference where 
there was some support for Moscow, led by Jack Huntz and Bill Jones (a Scottish 
Welshman from Glasgow). Leading the opposition to the trials were the Trotskyists. 
Patterson of Clapham and Cund of Liverpool argued the trials were 'frame-ups'. The 
N. A. C. position at the conference was rather equivocal. Carmichael, speaking for the 
N. A. C., declared that it was not prepared to declare either way, and that further 
evidence and an international inquiry by 'representative Socialists' was needed. 
However, by the Party's 1938 conference the position was more definite and the N. A. C. 
decided that the issue of the Soviet Union should form the central debate with the 
argument focussing of the trials and their implications. The N. A. C. position, made by 
Brockway, now sought to reconcile condemnation of the internal politics of the Soviet 
Union with a continued defence against aggression of what was still perceived to be the 
world's only Workers' State. 
The I. L. P. declares it to be the duty of the working class to defend against Imperialist aggression 
the USSR as a Workers' State in which the foundations of a Socialist Society have been laid. 
It deplores the continued political persecution in Soviet Russia which is undermining faith in the 
Socialist Regime among workers all over the world and which is being extended by the 
Communist International to other countries. 
It urges that there should be a return to proletarian democracy in Soviet Russia, so that the danger 
of bureaucratic oppression may be overcome. 65 
The N. A. C. defence of this position placed great stress on the 'conflict between the 
bureaucracy and the remnants of Socialist principles' whilst suggesting three areas 
where some vestiges of socialism remained: 
(1) Industries are still nationalised 
(2) New types of collectivised peasantry exist 
(3) No economic exploiting class remains in the Soviet Union. 
Thus, the N. A. C. contended, 'the basis of the Workers' State remains. ' However, on the 
other side the N. A. C. resolution listed a number of 'developments of a reactionary 
nature, ' which it summarised through four points: 
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(1) Soviet organs of the working class have been destroyed 
(2) The Trades Unions have lost their independence to fight for the working class 
(3) Inner democracy of the C. P. has been destroyed 
(4) State bureaucracy is now in control. 
The overall vote of the 1938 conference was overwhelmingly in favour of the N. A. C. 
line, condemning the internal developments in the Soviet Union, but maintaining 
support for it against 'capitalist aggression. 66 
As a result of these decisions the I. L. P. Parliamentary Group was instructed to write to 
Stalin protesting at the developments. Thus, in March 1938 I. L. P. MPs sent a well 
publicised letter to the Soviet Embassy to pass on to Stalin. The letter contained 'a clear 
message to Stalin' calling on him to end his 'savage terror and the 'regime of blood' 
associated with the show trials. Perhaps wisely the Soviet Ambassador returned the 
letter to the Parliamentary Group undelivered stating he 'did not feel inclined to pass it 
on to Stalin. '67 There was a considerable period of time in which the I. L. P. 's position on 
the internal politics of the Soviet Union had been rather unclear, but by the end of the 
1938 I. L. P. conference their condemnation of Stalin was unequivocal. 
This new line on the Soviet Union was, as would be expected, accompanied by a further 
deterioration in the already frosty relations between the I. L. P. and the Communist Party. 
Communist Party attacks on I. L. P. ers in positions within the Labour movement became 
more explicit 68 At the same time the I. L. P. attacks on the C. P. also became clearer. 
Prior to the 1938 National Conference, at the Scottish I. L. P. Conference, Maxton argued 
that the C. P. was not a revolutionary party 
It is difficult because of its traditions to convince the ordinary man that the Communist Party is not 
a revolutionary party. Yet such is the case. The policy of the Communist Party to-day is not the 
policy of a revolutionary working class party. 69 
Brockway and CA Smith echoed the same line of criticism in the run up to the I. L. P. 
conference when they had argued that 'the only party for revolutionary Socialists is the 
I. L. P. It alone rejects class-collaboration and raises the slogan of Independent Working 
Class Action. 70 The I. L. P. position prior to the 1938 conference was critical of the 
Communist Party for betraying its revolutionary ideals. Nevertheless, the tone of the 
criticism was rather moderate. The 1938 conference decisions saw a significant change 
in this tone and a move towards much more aggressive attacks on the Communist Party. 
Thus, in commenting on the C. P. 's 1938 conference the I. L. P. was prepared to strongly 
attack not only the policy of the Communists, but also to compare their action with that 
of the fascists: 
230 
The C. P. is evidently as much an automaton as any Nazi party. The delegates acted as one man 
sang the "Internationale, " clapped, shouted "Hurrah, " stood up in respectful show of admiration 
waiting for signals to cheer or sing, just as you would expect a trained corps of Nazis to do. There 
can be no hope that a Party of this kind can bring human liberty. 71 
Thus, by the beginning of 1938 relations between the parties had reached a new low. 
This mutual contempt between the two parties inevitably spilt over, preventing even the 
limited levels of joint activity which had previously been possible. At demonstrations 
and conferences I. L. P. and C. P. delegations found themselves attacking one another. 
For example, in July 1938 there was a significant dispute between I. L. P. and 
Communist delegations at the Conference on 'Peace and Empire' organised by the India 
League in conjunction with the London Federation of Peace Councils. The Communist 
Party line sought to fight against Imperialism to strengthen 'collective security. ' 
The major issue in the world today is the menace of the Fascist Powers to peace and liberty. How 
can the colonial people be assisted in their struggle against Imperialism so that they can be won to 
participate with the 'democratic' Governments of Europe in collective security? 
But the I. L. P. argued that Imperialism was as great a threat as fascism and thus saw the 
immediate struggle for Socialism as a crucial part of the struggle against Imperialism: 
Imperialism is as much a menace to peace and liberty as are the Fascist Powers. The Collective 
Security of the Imperialist Governments of Europe is an instrument to maintain Imperialism. How 
can European workers, whilst carrying on their struggle against Fascism assist the colonial 
workers to overthrow Imperialism, so that they may unite in establishing a world order of freedom 
and co-operation in which alone collective security can function for peace. 
The Daily Worker commenting on the conference referred to 'a tiny minority of 
disrupters', according to the I. L. P. its delegation consisted of 45 out of six hundred 
delegates. The I. L. P. delegation also obtained support from Jawaharlal Nehru in the 
opening speech and from 'most of the delegates from the colonial workers' 
organisations. Indeed, about one quarter of the delegates voted with the I. L. P., 
nevertheless it was increasingly clear that the Communist Party had little interest in the 
I. L. P. except in so far as it could belittle it in order to destroy it. 72 
There was little to change these hostile relations between the two parties as the tensions 
which led to the Second World War developed. In 1939 the Communist Party was still 
angering the I. L. P., suggesting that the I. L. P. ' was a Trotskyist organisation and that 
Franco was giving special favours to Trotskyist organisations. The Communist Party's 
pro-war line, which was not reversed until the end of September, led to considerable 
hostility between the two organisations as leading members of the C. P. launched attacks 
on organisations such as the No Conscription League in which the I. L. P. was playing a 
leading role. For example the opposition to the Glasgow Trades Council receiving a 
deputation from the No Conscription League was led by Communist Party 'democrats' 
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George Middleton and Peter Kerrigan. However, it was the contribution of one C. P. 
member which really angered the I. L. P., arguing that: 
'The No Conscription League is not a new organisation- it is an organisation formed during the last 
war by those people who were of military age but were too afraid to fight. ' 
The Communist dominated executive also ensured that Maxton was excluded from the 
speakers in all demonstrations despite, the I. L. P. claimed, the wishes of the wider 
Trades Council. 73 Despite the fraternal gestures of the period 1933-5, by the end of the 
1930's relations between the I. L. P. and Communist Party were even worse than during 
the hostility of the Class-against-Class period. 
7.6 N. U. W. M. and the Hunger Marches 
In 1932 the N. U. W. M. was aligned to the Communist Party in its class-against-class 
period. This meant that the organisation was prepared to accept some help and 
assistance from the I. L. P. and other parts of the Labour Movement, it was reluctant to 
give any credit to other organisations. Thus, it was virtually impossible for any 
members of the I. L. P. to participate in a way that would force them to be acknowledged 
as leaders of the organisation in any area. 74 With the exception of the Lancashire I. L. P. 
where anti-Communist Party feeling was especially strong and the Hunger March was 
not supported, the Party was willing to offer much often unrecognised assistance to the 
marchers. However, the conflict between John McGovern and the leaders of the 1932 
Hunger March, expressed the broader conflict between the I. L. P. and the N. U. W. M.. 
Shortly after the marchers arrived in London, McGovern met with their leaders, 
Hannington, Sid Elias and Harry McShane, to discuss the idea of him presenting their 
petition of over one million signatures to parliament. However, as a result of bad feeling 
between McGovern and the N. U. W. M. and because of the anti-I. L. P. line of the 
N. U. W. M. at that time the march leaders refused to allow McGovern to present the 
petition. McGovern was furious with the decision and returned to Parliament to give the 
infamous speech in which he denounced the leaders of the Hunger March for refusing to 
accept constitutional techniques claiming, they were going to rely on 'their massed 
strength to force Parliament to allow their deputation to appear. ' McGovern's speech 
was widely cited by the press as proof of the intentions of the marchers. The events only 
served to extend the bad feeling on both sides. 75 
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During 1933, as relations between the I. L. P. and the Communist Party relaxed, so the 
I. L. P took a more favourable view of the N. U. W. M. The Party's 1933 Derby Conference 
made the important decision to support a motion from the London Division declaring 
the N. U. W. M. as the only genuine movement of the Unemployed. 76 Thus, by the time 
of the 1934 Hunger March, the situation had radically changed. The I. L. P. was able to 
take a leading role in organisation of the Hunger Marches in 1934 at both central and 
regional levels. 
The I. L. P. was instrumental in calling the meeting that led to the 1934 Hunger March.. 77 
The Party was also active in the organisation that allowed the March to run smoothly. 
John Aplin, the I. L. P. London Divisional Organiser took on the role as joint secretary of 
the March and Alex Gossip sat on the Council as well. Of the nineteen signatures to the 
manifesto presented to the meeting at the end of the march, five were from I. L. P. ers. 78 
The I. L. P. was also influential in a number of local areas. 
The I. L. P. presence was most keenly felt in Scotland where I. L. P. ers John McGovern 
and John Heenan were amongst the leaders of the Scottish contingent along with Harry 
McShane, Peter Kerrigan and George Middleton of the Communist Party. However, 
there was still considerable bad feeling particularly between McGovern and the leaders 
of the Communist Party. In his recollections of the Hunger March written in 1978 Harry 
McShane made a point of playing down the influence of McGovern and the I. L. P. in 
organising the unemployed. 79 However, it is clear that even if McGovern was not 
deeply involved in the organisation of the 1934 Hunger Marches other members of the 
I. L. P. were. In particular three of the I. L. P. 's Glasgow Councillors put a considerable 
amount of effort into the organisation of the march. John Heenan, Joseph Taylor and 
David Gibson all used their positions as councillors to work for the march. Gibson was 
particularly active and also took on the role of joint treasurer of the Campaign 
Committee. Despite disagreements over the role of the I. L. P. in the 1934 Hunger 
March, both I. L. P. and C. P. accounts suggest that the co-operation between the I. L. P. 
and the Communist Party made the conduct of the march much easier than in the 
80 sectarian conditions of 1932. 
Outside Scotland I. L. P. ers also played a role in the Lancashire, South Wales and East 
Anglian contingents of the 1934 Hunger March. In Lancashire this was largely through 
the influence of Bob Edwards. Although Edwards did not begin the march as the official 
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leader of the contingent by the end of the march Edwards felt himself to be the 'real 
leader' of the Lancashire contingent. By this stage he was doing most of the actual 
planning and was elected the chairman of the Lancashire contingent's Marchers Control 
Council. 81 In the South Wales contingent the I. L. P. had some influence through Claude 
Stanfield one of the Party's Merthyr councillors and W. E. Rowlands, the chair of the 
Merthyr Unemployed Miners' lodge who was active in organising the Merthyr section 
of the march Stanfield was eventually elected one of the leaders of the contingent. 82 In 
Norwich, where the N. U. W. M. was very weak, and the Communist Party had little 
influence the I. L. P. played a crucial role in the organisation of the 1934 Norwich 
contingent. 83 
The 1934 Hunger March thus represented the highpoint of I. L. P. involvement in 
organisation of the unemployed and Hunger Marchers during the 1930s. However, even 
at this time the relationship between the I. L. P. and the N. U. W. M. remained rather 
strained. The 1933 decision to recognise the N. U. W. M. as the only legitimate 
organisation of the unemployed had brought dissent which was centred on a number of 
important I. L. P. centres, including Glasgow, Norwich, Bristol and of course much of 
the Lancashire division. These opponents were looking to support 'all organisations that 
fight the cause of the unemployed. '84 Many of these organisations had been set up by the 
TUC to oppose the Communist dominated N. U. W. M. and in some places, such as 
Norwich, were supported by the I. L. P. 85 However, across the country there were also a 
series of unemployed organisations set up and run by the I. L. P. These included the 
Chorley Unemployed Workers' Rights Committee set up by the I. L. P. in June 1932,86 
and the Ferryden Workers' Rights Committee, the only two for which any extensive 
records appear to remain. 87 As Scottish Hunger March leader and Communist Harry 
McShane noted the I. L. P. attitude towards the N. U. W. M. was far from consistent: 
The I. L. P. seemed to do strange things at times. Sometimes they would support us. Then they tried 
to form separate Unemployed Committees, separate entirely from us. They and the British T. U. C. 
were doing the same thing, forming rival bodies. 88 
Thus, whilst the I. L. P. at national level gave its unconditional support to the N. U. W. M. 
the extent to which this support was realised on the ground is debatable. 
In 1936 following the adoption of the Popular Front line the I. L. P. 's importance for the 
Communist Party had diminished enormously. The latter's focus was then on the Labour 
Party and the non-working class parties beyond. Yet I. L. P. ers across the country 
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attempted to give all the assistance they could to the 1936 march. In London John Aplin 
was picked out by the Police Special Branch as one of the main activists on the London 
Reception Committee. 89 In Wales thirty of the marchers were members of the I. L. P. 
Assistance to the marchers was frequently provided with the I. L. P. 's assistance. For 
example in Bristol, I. L. P. councillor Fred Berriman was joint secretary of local Hunger 
March reception committee for the Welsh marchers, with E. H. Parker, the Trades 
Council Secretary. 9° Similarly the I. L. P. also assisted with the Scottish and Northern 
Contingent, for example Tom Stephenson organised accommodation and a meeting for 
the marchers at Carlisle and the Edinburgh section of the march were housed by Armley 
I. L. P. on their way south. 91 There was an overall feeling within the ILP that the march 
had been a success; as the London Divisional Council put it, it had 
Struck a resounding blow against the means test and marchers played a 'decisive role' in breaking 
the reaction decision of the TUC and the Labour Party against the United Front. 92 
However, the C. P. 's decreasing interest in the Party led to an increasing marginalisation 
of the I. L. P. This was reflected in the makeup of the organisation committee. There 
were no I. L. P. ers on the Marchers Council in 1936 whilst the thirty members of the 
London Reception Committee included only three I. L. P. members, John Aplin, Jennie 
Lee and Alex Gossip whose relationship with the party was increasingly strained. This 
was in sharp contrast to the situation in 1934 when there had been eight I. L. P. members 
on the Committee 93 
This marginalisation was also reflected in the official organisation of the speakers for 
the marchers. Since the I. L. P. had no representation on the Marchers Council who 
organised the speakers in London, consequently no ILP members were asked to 
officially speak to greet the marchers. When this news was conveyed to the I. L. P. 'ers in 
the contingents this caused considerable bad feeling which was exacerbated by the fact 
that all of the speakers were from the official leadership of the labour movement, rather 
than rank-and-file militants. 4 This frustration with the 'petty sectarian attitude of the 
Labour and Communist elements of the Reception Committee' was communicated to 
the I. L. P. leadership who then organised its own reception addressed by Maxton, 
Campbell Stephen and Frank Gant 95 Further this exclusion of the I. L. P. was not 
confined to London, with I. L. P. public speakers being ignored even in the Party's 
Glasgow stronghold. 96 The increasingly troubled relationship between the I. L. P. and the 
Communist Party that lay behind the exclusion of the I. L. P. from much of the 
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organisational and speaking work was clearest where the I. L. P. presence in the marches 
was most obvious, in the South Wales contingent. 
The Welsh contingent contained over thirty I. L. P. members, including Trevor Williams 
and W. J. Powell of the I. L. P. 's Welsh Divisional Committee P. Gunter, Secretary of 
Neath I. L. P. and Tom Nicholls another member of Neath I. L. P. and an unemployed 
miner. The famous image of one of the marchers carrying a red flag past Windsor Castle 
was an image of a Merthyr I. L. P. er. Further, Doris Young, wife of the I. L. P. 's South 
West Organiser Wilfred Young, kept with the march from Bristol becoming known as 
the'General Secretary to the march', producing the Welsh marchers' Bulletin from I. L. P. 
head-office and typing 'innumerable' letters every day. 97 
The ILPers in the Welsh contingent were frustrated when the news came through of the 
ways in which their party had been excluded from the official side of the hunger march 
reception. They were even more frustrated when they heard that they would be expected 
to pay tribute to the Cenotaph war memorial. They approached the ILP leadership to 
consult on what they should do to register their protest at the decision, they were 
advised to maintain solidarity but to sign a letter of protest 98 However, the marchers led 
by the I. L. P. ers, but supported by other marchers including five Communists, refused to 
participate in the ceremony. 
However, the I. L. P. -led protest within the Welsh contingent was seized upon by the 
official sections of the march, especially the Communist elements, to attack the Party. It 
was suggested that the I. L. P. leadership had organised the protest in order to disrupt the 
arrival in London. 99 The Welsh marchers objected: 
It cannot be too plainly stated that the protest was purely spontaneous from rank-and-file and did 
not come as a suggestion from any 'I. L. P. leader. ' Only after we had reported our opposition did 
the I. L. P. leaders intervene. Then the national Council of the party whilst endorsing our protest 
instructed us to take part in the ceremony. 100 
Contrary to the suggestions of leading Communists the ILP had no representation on the 
Marchers Council, which had decided to march past the cenotaph, and there had been no 
ILP presence in the majority of the official organisation and speaking arrangements. In 
contrast to 1934, despite the attempts of party members to take an active role in the 
organisation and conduct of the march, the I. L. P. was more than ever marginalised from 
major parts of the militant working class movement. 
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7.7 The Guild of Youth and the Y. C. L. 
The I. L. P. 's youth organisation, the Guild of Youth, established in 1924, had always 
been relatively weak. This weakness was further exacerbated by disaffiliation, although 
the youth organisation was less affected than its adult party. 1°' This weakness made the 
Guild of Youth an important target for the Communist Party which in turn led to a 
further deterioration in the Guild's standing and relationship to its adult party. By 
October 1933 the Guild barely existed across many parts of the country. Only in 
Scotland, London and the Midlands was there a real network of Guilds although there 
were active but isolated Guilds in Wales and Yorkshire. The work of the Guild 
nationally was hampered not only by lack of numbers but also by its weak financial 
position. This was not helped by the failure of some divisions, most notably London, to 
return affiliation fees. 102 The I. L. P. allowed its youth organisation to decide its own 
policy supposedly free from any interference. Before disaffiliation the policy of the 
Guild had been to the 'left' of its adult party. The Guild had withdrawn from the Second 
International before the I. L. P. and its acceptance of a revolutionary policy had been 
much more enthusiastic. Soon after disaffiliation it established a close relationship with 
the Young Communist International (Y. C. I. ). By the end of 1933 the N. E. C. of the 
Guild found it could agree with the majority of the statements of the Y. C. I. The only 
substantial disagreement came over the Y. C. I. 's Social Fascist discourse. 103 These 
sympathies for the Y. C. I. were especially strong in the Scottish Division, where the 
Guild had grown from 3 to 20 Branches following disaffiliation. In February 1934 the 
Scottish Divisional Guild of Youth Conference decided, after a heated debate, to accept 
Bridgeton's argument for conditional affiliation to the Y. C. I. 104 By March 1934 the 
Guild had decided to approach the Y. C. I. to consider affiliation. 
The increasing likelihood of a close relationship between the Guild of Youth and the 
Y. C. I. whilst the I. L. P. was moving away from the Comintern, was a matter of major 
concern at the I. L. P. 's annual conference at York in 1934. The N. A. C. report to the 
conference noted not only that there had been a slight decrease in numbers in the Guild 
but also that there had been an increasingly close working relationship developing 
between the I. L. P. 's youth organisation and the Y. C. L., the possibility of conditional 
affiliation to the Y. C. I. was also raised. '°5 The conference debate over the Guild of 
Youth indicated discontent with the Guild's position. The Guild acknowledged that to 
completely ignore the I. L. P. 's wishes would be 'a fatal thing to do' whilst stressing that 
'the Guild is autonomous and not bound by the decisions of this conference. ' Brockway 
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and Maxton aimed to calm the situation confirming that the Guild was within its rights 
and that it had 'expressed its desire to keep in line with the adult party. "06 An initial 
motion criticising the Guild was thus defeated.. 107 
In May 1934 three representatives of the I. L. P. Guild of Youth, Lewis Povey the 
National Secretary of the Guild, Jack Huntz of London and Comrade McFarlane of 
Bridgeton attended a meeting with the Y. C. I. representatives in Paris. The Guild group 
were accompanied and overseen by John McGovern who had been appointed by the 
N. A. C. 108 The aim of the meeting was to obtain information to enable the national 
conference of the Guild to better decide on whether to affiliate to the Y. C. I. The three 
came to no immediate conclusions but declared instead that they would report in detail 
to the Guild's annual conference adding that they hoped 'that, as a result, revolutionary 
proletarian unity will be furthered and a real advance made against Capitalism, Fascism 
and War, and for the defence of the Soviet Socialist Republic. "09 In fact the report, 
which recommended the Guild sympathetically affiliate to the Y. C. I. was not prepared 
in time to be properly considered by the annual conference, which was held only three 
weeks later. "° 
Thus, the crucial 1934 Guild of Youth annual conference in Norwich was held without 
prior consideration of the delegation's report. The conference, held 20-21 May, was 
attended by only 28 Guilds, with 30 votes between them. Debate centred on the 
question of whether to affiliate to the Y. C. I. to the exclusion of almost everything else. 
The delegation members who had visited the Y. C. I. recommended affiliation, a 
suggestion that was opposed by the Guild's National Committee but inevitably 
supported by Alex Massie, a representative from the Y. C. I., present to answer questions 
from Guild members. The most significant opposition to the Guild's decision came from 
Brockway who was present to make a statement on behalf of the N. A. C. He pointed to 
the differences between the way in which the Y. C. I. had treated the Guild and the way 
in which the Comintern had treated the I. L. P. The favourable conditions that the Guild 
had managed to obtain, he suggested could only be explained because the Communists 
wanted to use the Guild of Youth 'to strike a blow' against its adult party. He also told 
the Guild that if it made decisions which were incompatible with the policy of the I. L. P. 
their whole relationship would have to be reconsidered. Thus, his speech contained the 
thinly veiled threat of removing the Guild's autonomy or even cutting the Guild off from 
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the adult party. Nevertheless, the vote finally saw the Guild decide to affiliate to the 
Y. C. I. by 18-12.111 
As Brockway's warning failed to deter the Norwich Guild Conference from its 
affiliation plans so the N. A. C. was forced to act. Lewis Povey, the Guild's 
representative on the N. A. C. was initially refused entry to its meeting. Even his later 
presence could not prevent the N. A. C. declaring that it considered the sympathetic 
affiliation to the Y. C. I. to be incompatible with the Guild remaining the youth section of 
the Party. 112 The Guild's National Committee was reluctant to accept the N. A. C. 's 
decision, despite a majority opposed to Y. C. I. affiliation. 113 They pointed to the fact that 
they had no powers to overturn the conference decision and asked for time to show that 
the decision would not be disruptive to I. L. P. activity. However, the N. A. C. was in no 
mood for compromise and the General Secretary sent a letter to the National Guilds 
Council that was also distributed to each branch of the Guild of Youth stating that the 
Guild had to choose between the I. L. P. and the Young Communist International: 
As an autonomous organisation the Guild must choose between its connection with the I. L. P. and 
the Y. C. I. If it decides in favour of the Y. C. I., the I. L. P., as an equally autonomous organisation , 
will then be at liberty to reconstruct its Youth section. ' 14 
This made clear the crisis in the youth organisation and after meeting with the N. A. C. 
the Guild National Committee narrowly accepted, by a vote of 3-2, the need to call a 
special conference, recommending the termination of sympathetic affiliation. 115 
However, concern at the decision was not restricted to the adult party and a number of 
Guilds began to organise to reverse the decision. Indeed, despite the support for 
affiliation from the Derby Branch at Norwich the majority of the Midlands Division 
Guild of Youth were strongly opposed to the Norwich Conference decision. 116 The 
threat to the relationship with the I. L. P. led to a Special Conference of the I. L. P. 's youth 
organisation, which was called in Derby on Sunday November 18. 
When the Guild met for its special conference in Derby there was little doubt about the 
seriousness of the situation. There was no possibility of the Guild maintaining its 
affiliation to the Y. C. I. and keeping its position as the Youth section of the I. L. P. The 
Guild N. E. C. proposed a motion stating a desire to `act in harmony with the I. L. P. in 
national and international policy. ' However, the conference, frustrated by their 
treatment by the adult party rejected this compromise. Instead the conference opted for 
resolutions that, whilst maintaining the connection to the adult party, expressed 
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discontent with the situation. The resolution, passed by 22 votes to 11, suspended the 
sympathetic affiliation to the Y. C. I. but maintained the principle of sympathetic 
affiliation and condemned the attitude of the N. A. C. It also made explicit that it agreed 
to the suspension of affiliation `only to prevent the N. A. C. splitting the I. L. P. and the 
Guild. ' The conference had preserved the connection between the I. L. P. and Guild, but 
it opened up another set of issues. 
Prior to the Guild's Derby Conference the I. L. P. 's N. A. C. had made explicit its intention 
`to review the powers of autonomy of the Guild so as to restrict that autonomy to 
organisational matters only, and subject to the policy, constitution and rules of the 
I. L. P. ' The Guild encouraged by the Communist Party, was clearly unhappy with these 
proposals passing a resolution pledging resistance to any encroachment on the `full 
organisational and political autonomy of the Guild. '117 Nevertheless, the N. A. C. 
persuaded the 1935 I. L. P. national conference to remove the Guild's political 
autonomy. 118 
The National Executive of the Guild, reconstructed to give a majority of those loyal to 
the adult party, made a statement welcoming the decision. 119 The N. A. C. appointed 
Jennie Lee as its representative on the National Committee of the Guild of Youth, 
giving a new focus to her activity within the Party, and called a special Guild 
conference in Leeds at the beginning of June. 120 However, this reconstruction did not 
ensure the end of the conflict. The pro-Communist minority on the Guild's Committee, 
which included the Guild's N. A. C. representative Lewis Povey, was vocal, well 
organised and resourced by the Communist Party. On finding that the majority planned 
to support the N. A. C. the minority planned to launch what Jennie Lee described as a 
'vicious attack on the I. L. P. '121 Thus, the N. A. C. decided that it would allow only those 
Guild members who supported the reconstruction of the I. L. P. 's youth organisation to 
the Leeds conference. 122 
Thus, the Guild of Youth held its Special Conference in Armley without those who had 
long supported Y. C. I. affiliation in June 1935. The main thrust of the conference was to 
reassert links with the I. L. P., and to set out an agenda of work consistent with the wider 
Party Programme. First, the principle of closer connection with the I. L. P. was endorsed. 
Second, the international question was resolved with the Guild accepting a policy of 
aiming for a united International drawing together the revolutionary elements of the 
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Young Socialist International, the Y. C. I. and the independent Revolutionary Socialist 
Youth. A resolution of protest against the decision to call the special meeting of the 
Guild was defeated by a two to one majority. The Guild of Youth had been dragged 
back into line by the I. L. P. 123 
The leadership of the Guild was largely reconstructed with Bob Smillie, son of the 
Scottish I. L. P. Chairman, as Chairman and the Guild started a new loyal journal Rebel 
Youth which was edited by General Secretary Fenner Brockway's daughter, Audrey 
Brockway. At the same time it was able to report a little success with the formation of a 
few new branches of the Guild including those in Stockton, Middlesbrough, Welwyn, 
Parkhead and Cardiff. However, the support of the Guild at the Leeds conference was 
bought at a significant price. The decision to exclude those who supported the Y. C. I. 
meant shedding a large number of members in some of the Guild's most significant 
areas including Bridgeton, Derby and Govan. Despite the decision to exclude them, 
eight disgruntled members had nevertheless attempted to attend the conference as a 
`militant' delegation. When they were refused admission they attempted to force their 
way in and had to be physically excluded. During the scuffles, windows were broken 
and the doorman called the police. 124 The excluded Guilds had then held their own 
meeting, giving another significant opportunity for Communist propaganda at the 
expense of the I. L. P. 
Following the reorganisation of the Guild at the Leeds conference a number of branches 
were lost to the Communist Party. There were majorities against the decision in 
Aberdeen, Bridgeton, Rutherglen, Derby, Leicester and Portsmouth and overall 25 per 
cent of the Guild membership refused to accept the new basis of the youth 
organisation. 125 In the major centres of dissent such as Bridgeton and Derby, the Guilds 
managed to carry on despite the loss of membership. 126 With the Guild weakened by 
these disputes over the relationship with the Y. C. L. and the Y. C. I. it was susceptible to 
further difficulties. The Guild as a whole expressed discontent with the N. A. C. reversal 
of line on the workers' boycott of war materials to Italy. 127 Thus, the 1936 Guild sent a 
letter to the adult party which expressed a 'unanimous decision that no policy other than 
that of independent working class action in relation to the Italo-Abyssinian war should 
be advocated publicly by any member of the guild or by any party speaker from a Guild 
platform. ' The Committee aggravated matters further by protest against the manner in 
which the Annual Conference decision on policy had been subsequently dealt with at 
241 
the Leeds conference. 128 These continuing divisions with the adult party led to a 
deteriorating internal situation in the Guild. By the end of 1936 there was a permanent 
division into groups on the National Guild Committee, over these question of loyalty to 
the adult party. The N. A. C. was once again compelled to intervene in the activity of the 
Guild, planning further controls on its activity and increasing levels of supervision. 129 
These further restrictions placed the appointment of the Guild's officials in the hands of 
an I. L. P committee and they predictably decided to appoint known supporters of the 
Party line to these positions. Most notably Bob Smillie, who was at that time already in 
the Spanish Prison he was to die in, was re-appointed chairman with Kathleen Ellis of 
Leeds as treasurer. The new mandate for the Guild stressed a breadth of non-political 
activities in addition to 'putting the socialist case, ' including encouraging the 
organisation of sport, the development of craftsmanship and the stimulation of speaking 
choirs and Socialist drama. Despite these overarching changes, which in effect meant 
the closing down of the Guild of Youth as it had previously existed, it was decided to 
maintain the name 'I. L. P. Guild of Youth'. However, other activities which the Guild 
wished to continue such as the production of Rebel Youth, the London Guild of Youth 
newspaper which had been causing so much of the trouble, were discontinued by the 
N. A. C. to lessen any further disruptive powers operating through the Guild. 130 
Following the reconstruction of the Guild a major effort was made to build up the youth 
section. A speaking tour had been planned for Bob Smillie on his return from Spain. Of 
course when he died in infamous circumstances in Spain the campaign had to be 
rearranged and was eventually conducted by Dan McArthur, the National Guilds 
Organiser. 13 1 Nevertheless, the results appeared impressive enough. The Guild reported 
rapid growth. 132 By the I. L. P. 's Manchester Conference in 1938 the N. A. C. described 
the Guild's membership as being 'of the reliable type, ' a significant contrast to the 
situation in any other period following disaffiliation. 133 However, during the 1930s the 
I. L. P. 's youth section found its activities dominated by the relationship between it and 
the Y. C. L. /Y. C. I. As a result the Guild's membership and influence declined even faster 
than the adult party. 
7.8 Conclusion 
The events of the 1930s saw a huge change in the relationship between the Communist 
Party and the I. L. P. The beginning of the decade had seen the I. L. P. inside the Labour 
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Party, critical of the Communist Party, but moving towards a more revolutionary 
position. Prior to 1933 the Class-Against-Class line of the Communist Party saw them 
arguing for a'war to the death' with the I. L. P. The change to a United Front line in 1933 
had led to much closer relations and the development of an official policy on both side 
for an eventual unification of the organisations. During 1933-4 in many parts of the 
country the two parties had made serious attempts to work together. However, 
operational difficulties, the departure of the R. P. C. and most importantly the adoption of 
the Popular Front line by the Communist Party in 1935 signalled the end of realistic 
possibilities of working together in the longer term. Despite the apparent promise of the 
Unity Campaign, the period from 1935-9 was characterised by increasing hostility 
between the two organisations. By the outbreak of war, following the arguments over 
Spain and the Moscow show trials relations reached a new low. In 1932 the I. L. P. had 
been accused by the Communist Party of 'social fascism. ' By 1937 the Party was 
accused of straightforward 'fascism. ' Whatever political overlap might occur during the 
war, there was no real possibility of the parties working together. 
Thus, relations with the Communist Party played an important part in the struggle of the 
I. L. P. to find political space during the 1930s. Initially it faced the question of whether 
to engage in joint activity with the C. P. The heavily contested decision to engage in 
such activity was entered into as much by those who saw the I. L. P. 's closest ally as the 
Labour Party as by those who wanted to join with the Communist Party. However, the 
impact was to drive out of the Party a large section of the membership who defined 
themselves as Socialists who were against the Communist Party. The possibility of 
forming a United Revolutionary Party with a high level of I. L. P. input would have been 
significant compensation to the I. L. P. for such a loss. However, despite the acceptance 
of this as an official position by both Parties it was never a likely outcome. Instead, 
Communist policy changes increasingly marginalised the I. L. P. from arenas in which 
the Communists were strongest. The party failed in the early 1930s to find a significant 
niche with the Communist Party and in the latter part of the decade instead looked 
towards the larger working-class bodies, the Labour Party and the Trade Unions. 
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8. Labour and the Unions 
8.1 Introduction 
In July 1932 the I. L. P. had declared its politics incompatible with membership of the 
Labour Party. However, the relationship between the I. L. P. and the main institutions of 
the British Labour movement, the Labour Party and the Trade Unions, remained a 
subject of intense dispute throughout the 1930s. As all other independent left initiatives 
had and would find, these institutions simply could not be ignored. This chapter 
examines the I. L. P. 's changing relationship with the Labour Party, moving from initial 
extreme hostility, through campaigns for joint activity to attempts to re-affiliate. It also 
looks at the I. L. P. 's relationship with the Co-operative Movement before looking at the 
Party's activity and strategy towards the Trade Union Movement. The analysis finds 
considerable development of I. L. P. policy towards Labour Party, Co-operative 
Movement and Unions. It also suggests that I. L. P. activity in all these areas was of 
much greater significance than that indicated in most literature on the Party during the 
1930s. 
8.2 The Labour Party 
In the immediate period after disaffiliation the I. L. P. adopted an extremely hostile 
position towards the Labour Party, arguing that it could aim to replace Labour as the 
Party of the working class. They refused to accept the easy answers proposed by most 
Labour Party members that the problems of the Labour Party had been caused by the 
personal defects of MacDonald. Instead, they argued it was the absence of a 
revolutionary policy which condemned the Labour Party to pursuing futile activity. 
With the I. L. P. claiming that the block vote and attitude of the leadership gave no 
opportunity for real democracy the party argued that there was no alternative but a 
'clean break. " However, with Hitler's rise to power in Germany the I. L. P. changed line 
and began approaching the Labour Party, and other working-class organisations, to get 
them to engage in joint activities. The N. E. C. rejected these approaches, and 'try-on by 
the I. L. P. flea. i2 Only Stafford Cripps was in any way supportive of the idea of working 
with the I. L. P. However, within the leadership the attitude towards the I. L. P. was 
significantly different from that taken towards the Communist Party. Thus at the Labour 
Party's 1935 conference after the vote which proscribed the I. L. P., the National Agent, 
George Shepard, speaking for the N. E. C., stressed that they would be prepared to accept 
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the I. L. P. back into the Labour Party. 3 The response from local and constituency 
organisations could be significantly more positive and a number sought to persuade the 
N. E. C. to further soften its line. 
However, the I. L. P. maintained its position of determined independence through to the 
failure of the Unity Campaign. The 1936 Keighley conference decisions, for example, 
although indicating a 'need for both unity and revolutionary policy' stressed that the 
party 'cannot consider reaffiliation to the Labour Party whilst restrictions remain forcing 
I. L. P. members of parliament to advocate a reactionary policy. 's However, during 1936 
the Party's justifications of its position outside the Labour Party became increasingly 
focussed on practical objections concerning the structure of the Labour Party rather than 
objections to reformism. The claim was that the I. L. P. was outside the Labour Party 
... not so much 
because of its reformist policy as because its bureaucratic machine does not give a 
reasonable hope of changing that policy and because it places unacceptable restrictions on 
revolutionary advocacy and action... We can only enter the Labour Party by surrendering our 
revolutionary attitude, by standing at elections on a reformist programme and by promising 
obedience to the Labour Party Whip in the House of Commons. For a revolutionary Socialist that 
means surrender. 6 
The I. L. P. thus maintained the need for its independence and called on Socialists who 
remained within the Labour Party for 'tactical' reasons to join the I. L. P. and help with its 
work. Nevertheless, with an emphasis placed on these organisational questions the 
possibilities of a return were greatly increased. 
Within the Labour Party the moderate wing continued its successful containment of the 
left and at the 1936 Edinburgh Labour Party conference the left suffered significant 
defeats over the United Front and on the Labour Party's non-intervention policy for 
Spain. Following the disillusionment of the conference, proposals began to be floated 
from within the Labour Party that Constituency Labour Parties, the Socialist League, 
S. S. P. and I. L. P. should unite. 7 During this period the I. L. P. leadership stressed their 
perception of the policy inadequacies and lack of 'fighting spirit' within the Labour 
Party. 8 
However, a significant change in the I. L. P. 's attitude towards the Labour Party was 
beginning to develop. In part this stemmed from the Workers' Front policy. 9 The issues 
of the appropriate relationship to the Labour Party came to the fore during the debates 
which surrounded the Unity Campaign in 1936, where the I. L. P. had to seriously 
consider reaffiliation for the first time since 1932. The question was opened by 
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Brockway who, in reflecting on the question 'How can we get unity? ' in the I. L. P. 
discussion journal Controversy, took as his starting point the proposition that' We want 
it at all costs, except sacrifice of Principle. ' He suggested, contrary to the party's 
position in 1932, that the I. L. P. would not be able to replace the Labour Party as the 
mass party of the working class and thus accepted that it was likely that at some point in 
the future the I. L. P. would have to consider reaffiliation. However, the condition he 
suggested for reaffiliation was that the Labour Party be ripe for conversion to 
revolutionary socialism. This condition in his view had not been fulfilled: 
The moment for the I. L. P. to consider the question of affiliation to the Labour Party is not when 
the Labour Party has been made the finished instrument for Revolutionary Socialism, but when it 
becomes evident that the Labour Party can be made such. I do not think that moment has come and 
it is still uncertain whether it will ever come. '° 
In significant ways, this represented a shift towards those, most notably Fred Jowett, 
who had advocated disaffiliation for precisely these organisational reasons, and away 
from those who thought that independence was required on the grounds of policy 
disagreements. This change in attitude manifested itself in many different ways. Within 
the Scottish I. L. P. there was a widespread negative reaction to the Divisional Council's 
decision not to give support to the Labour Party in the 1937 Springburn by-election. l 1 
Jennie Lee, who changed her assessment from the year before, gave a notably upbeat 
assessment of the 1937 Labour Conference, with its moves towards rejection of non- 
intervention in Spain, arguing that it was: 
vastly different from the unrelieved gloom at the Edinburgh Conference a year ago. Rank-and-file 
delegates feel that in the opening debates they have made notable successes. '2 
However, the most important development in this direction came at the end of 1937 
when Brockway conducted a detailed review of the Party's position and concluded in 
terms favourable to reaffiliation. He mentioned the disadvantages of reaffiliation, that 
the I. L. P. would become identified with the reactionary views of the Labour Party. 
However, his focus was on the advantages. Thus, Brockway's conclusion was clear; 
reaffiliation was 'now a tactic. ' What was most important was to consider how to rejoin 
the Labour Party. He realised that in order for any of the I. L. P. 's aims to be achieved 
once back within the Labour Party it would need to be united. Thus, he stressed the 
main aim of any moves towards reaffiliation must be to ensure that there was no split 
within the Party. At the same time in order for the Party to influence the Labour 
leadership there was a need to persuade the Labour Party to accept the I. L. P. back by 
making the I. L. P. strong. In addition, he argued the need for the conditions of affiliation 
to be correct, including the right for the I. L. P. to voice its own view and publish its own 
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material including a voice in Parliament. However, crucially he accepted that this would 
not necessarily give the I. L. P. the right to vote against PLP decisions. 
As far as Brockway was concerned there were a number of possible routes for building 
up a relationship that could lead towards reaffiliation. In terms of the National Labour 
Party the I. L. P. was keen to develop its electoral prospects suggesting the Party could 
seek to add to its existing seats with an agreement with the Labour Party, particularly 
looking at East Bradford, North Lanark and, if only one Labour candidate was standing, 
the 
Norwich. However, the main line of approach to4Labour Party was to proceed by 
building up contacts of 'lefts' within the Labour Party sympathetic to the I. L. P. position 
through networks in Unions, Co-operatives, the NCLC, Trades Councils, together with 
gatherings like the I. L. P. summer school, and Controversy and social events. Within 
both these networks and any discussions with the National Labour Party over any 
possible future for affiliation Brockway argued the need to stress the concept of a 
federal basis for I. L. P. affiliation to the Labour Party. 13 The fact that such a document 
was produced and became the basis of discussion about the future of the Party was an 
indication of how far the mood within the party had changed since 1932. 
At least in public Maxton appeared to maintain his hostility to the Labour Party. In his 
speech to 1938 Scottish I. L. P. conference he declared: 
The Labour Party is indistinguishable from the National Government in outlook and political 
action on the major issues of the time. Yet because of its name and structure it is able to maintain 
itself in the minds of the workers as being the working class party. 14 
However, behind the scenes his view was changing substantially and at the 1937 
conference he made an important concession accepting that the Labour Party was 
moving towards a more acceptable politics. 
The I. L. P. alone has consistently opposed the means test, but the Labour Party has now taken up 
complete opposition to it. " 
Whilst he was far from convinced of the complete wisdom of a return to the Labour 
Party he was, in 1938, more receptive to the suggestion than at any time previously. 16 
The I. L. P. 's 1938 Manchester Conference, with two local DLP's sending fraternal 
greetings, was held in the wake of such policy developments and changing opinion. The 
N. A. C. submitted a resolution to the conference calling for working-class unity and the 
need for a 'permanent structure for common action on a federal basis. ' A composite 
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amendment was considered, instructing the N. A. C. to 'approach the Labour Party for the 
purpose of securing the maximum common action against the National Government, 
united action on class issues and an electoral understanding. ' Crucially, any proposals 
involving change in the organisational relationship of the Party were to be submitted to 
a special conference. 
The conference was split between those who supported continued complete 
independence for the party and those who sought a federal arrangement, with the 
N. A. C. backing the latter. Carmichael moved the N. A. C. position of a federal 
arrangement condemning both 'those who would rush back into the Labour Party' and 
the'splendid isolationists. ' Others, such as Glasgow Councillor Tom Taylor argued for a 
return to the Labour Party because it 'would give added strength to the I. L. P. to press its 
policy. ' However, there was still much opposition to any idea of reaffiliation. Some such 
as the future Party Chairman C. A. Smith opposed reaffiliation largely because of the 
question of 'international relations. ' He also feared that if reaffiliation were rejected by 
the Labour Party it would discredit the I. L. P. Others were even stronger in their 
condemnation of reaffiliation, most notably the Trotskyist Ernie Patterson who heaped 
scorn and 'deplored' any talk at all of reaffiliation. The conference was keenly divided 
and the voting was close but eventually the amended motion, which effectively gave the 
N. A. C. the right to discuss reaffiliation with the Labour Party but which required a 
special conference decision before any agreement was reached, was carried by 55 votes 
to 49. 
As a result of the 1938 decisions the I. L. P. announced that it had 'decided to approach 
the Labour Party Executive for common action on class issues against the National 
Government and the Capitalist Parties. ' It proposed an electoral agreement to avoid 
conflicting candidatures and a discussion of the general relationship between the two 
parties. '7 When the Communist Party approached the N. E. C. for such talks it was not 
dignified with a response and even the I. S. P. had been summarily dismissed without its 
request being passed to the N. E. C. Thus, the N. E. C. 13 to 4 decision to meet with the 
I. L. P. was not without significance. '8 
The content of the talks made clear that there was ground on which an agreement could 
be reached between the two parties. Essentially the I. L. P. was prepared to concede 
every point that the Labour Party demanded. Maxton pressed his and the parliamentary 
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group's views, which made clear his hope for reaffiliation, arguing that the 'isolation of 
the I. L. P. is no longer defensible' and that 'some members of the Labour Party were at 
greater variance with its principle and policy than were the I. L. P. ' Maxton also outlined 
one major concession to appease the larger organisation, suggesting that the smaller 
party was 'principally concerned with spreading Socialist propaganda. ' The N. E. C. 
pushed the question of whether the I. L. P. would accept PLP standing orders. McGovern 
showed some reticence pointing to the 'anti-working class' uses to which they had been 
put. However, Maxton effectively cleared the obstacle which had seemed insuperable 
seven years earlier stating clearly: 
The signing of the Standing Orders of the Parliamentary Party were not such an important matter 
now for the I. L. P. as in 1931. It was in fact of quite small importance to-day. 
Other possible sticking points were also quickly cleared. Brockway noted that it was 
unlikely that I. L. P. work with the Communist Party would lead to any problems as the 
relations with the C. P. were now 'extremely bitter. ' Further whilst the I. L. P. contingent 
did suggest that they would desire electoral adjustments to be made in North Lanark, 
East Bradford and Norwich, Maxton said that he did not think that the 'inability to 
secure such adjustments would prevent agreement. ' 19 
One does not have to read far between the lines to see the basis of an affiliation 
agreement being forged, indeed it seemed that only two obstacles stood in the way of 
affiliation. First, the Labour Party N. E. C. expressed some concerns as to the possible 
damage 'to the Party machine due to the establishment of ad hoc committees for 
propaganda which ought to be done by the Labour Party itself. ' Second the I. L. P. had no 
formal conference decisions to allow them to pursue such a course of action. 
The N. A. C. and the Labour Party continued a dialogue but little further progress was 
made beyond the discussions at the initial meeting. The Labour Party was prepared to 
co-operate with the I. L. P. by allowing reaffiliation on conditions identical to those in 
existence before disaffiliation, but in no other way. 
... after consideration 
it takes the view that the affiliation of the I. L. P. to the Labour Party would be 
the satisfactory way of bringing about co-operation between the two parties. 
The I. L. P. negotiators had no mandate to re-affiliate on these or any other terms. 20 To 
try and clarify the course of action that the Party should take the N. A. C. thus established 
a sub-committee to consider the alternatives, composed of Percy Williams, John Aplin, 
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Emrys Thomas and Bob Edwards with John McNair as secretary and James 
Carmichael? ' 
Whilst the committee was considering matters the party was actively debating the re- 
affiliation question. However, the conduct of the debate was very different to the 
disaffiliation debates in 1932. In part, this was because the party was much smaller and 
of course there were significant differences in what was at stake in 1938/9.22 In addition 
the party leadership consciously decided to try to calm discussion. After a strongly 
worded letter against reaffiliation in New Leader from the Birmingham Quaker Joseph 
Southall, one of the leading advocates of disaffiliation in 1932, it was decided not to 
print any correspondence about the issue in the Party's weekly journal. Instead debate 
was restricted to the lower circulation and less frequently published discussion 
magazine Controversy. Extended debates with long and heated exchanges across the 
country were not possible in such a format, making the tone of the printed debate 
considerably less sharp than had been the case six years earlier. 23 
There were certain common premises, which were held across the re-affiliation debate 
divide. Most importantly there was widespread agreement about the need for 'class' 
based, 'revolutionary' politics. However, as Brockway had pointed out in 1938, as in the 
1932 debates, the mere adoption of a 'revolutionary line' did not immediately decide the 
correct attitude to take towards the Labour Party. The case for re-affiliation, in its most 
elemental form, was that with the rise of fascism a united working class movement was 
essential: 
In the existing world situation- with the dangers we all know- can we afford the I. L. P. - except as 
independent fighting socialists in the Labour Party- now? 24 
In other words in the late 1930s there was little choice but to affiliate to the Labour 
Party to help promote a Workers' Front from within the larger party: 
A few thousand disciplined clear Socialists can exert a world of influence, can popularise the 
Workers' Front against the Eden Front. That is the job of a revolutionary party inside the Labour 
Party ... The essential conclusion remains 
inescapable: the I. L. P. must re-affiliate to the Labour 
Pes, is 
However, as both sides of the dispute were committed to the Workers' Front the real 
crux of the re-affiliation case was that the I. L. P. was isolated outside the Labour Party: 26 
After the 1931 catastrophe we made the mistake of leaving the Labour Party voluntarily. So 
naturally the workers concluded we were people who liked to be isolated. We should have stayed 
inside until we were chucked out- then it would have been clear where the responsibility lay.... 
The result of our isolation will be- a Popular Front. 27 
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Those opposed to re-affiliation suggested it was futile to look only at the current 
situation to guide their attitude towards the Labour Party. Instead they suggested that, as 
a revolutionary party, it was necessary to consider the future: 
A revolutionary party can never hope to obtain a party of a broad, popular mass character in a pre- 
revolutionary period... we should be equally isolated inside the Labour Party as we are outside 
it28 
In addition they argued, from the experience of the Socialist League, that they would 
not be able to operate effectively inside the Labour Party. Further, it was suggested, 
recalling the struggles of the early Labour movement, that the experience of isolation 
was far from unique to the I. L. P.: 
Keir Hardie spent his entire political life "splitting the workers' vote, " trying to wean the workers 
from faith in "the mass workers' party" He did not always secure one-eighth of the total poll when 
he contested elections. Staunch Radical-Socialists hated him bitterly. And he died with the workers 
still strongly loyal to the massive Liberal Party.... Patience is the first virtue of a revolutionary. 
We are rather impatient if we are disappointed to find "the masses" have not yet decided to follow 
US. 29 
Further, not all members had the same assessment of the party's 'isolation' from the 
Labour movement. Indeed, James Carmichael, chairman of the Scottish Division, 
argued that the experience of disaffiliation had allowed the I. L. P. to develop its political 
position to such an extent that in terms of its policy and potential position within the 
Labour Movement, it was in a much stronger position in 1937 than it had been in at the 
point of disaffiliation: 
Before the I. L. P. disaffiliated in 1932 it was being slowly but surely crushed within an 
organisation that was limited politically to a very indifferent and indecisive struggle for 
Parliamentarism... The I. L. P. today occupies a stronger position than when it left the Labour 
Party. In 1932 it was wedged between the reformism of the Labour Party and the ultra- 
revolutionary policy of the Communist Party. It survived largely on tradition.. . To-day 
it stands out 
as the only truly revolutionary party. 30 
Concerns over standing orders and the dictatorial machinery of the Labour Party were 
also prevalent in the debate. Fred Jowett, who had stressed the importance of standing 
orders both in 1932 and in the intervening period, was the most vocal of those who 
placed stress on the structure of the Labour Party in arguing for continued 
independence. However, Jowett was not alone and talk of the Labour Party dictatorship 
was a frequent refrain during the disaffiliation debates. 31 That such a position was held 
consistently by a significant number of I. L. P. activists through the period from 1932 is 
testimony to the importance of the disciplinary structure of the Labour Party as a factor 
in the separation of the two bodies. However, there was a suspicion from those who did 
not follow this logic that the standing orders argument was held to by those who were 
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not afraid of a 'pure but impotent' stance. Such fears were heightened by the 
contributions of some leading advocates of independence, whose evangelical zeal for 
purity outside the Labour Party outweighed any practical argument: 
No, the true object of disaffiliation was to preserve the life of the one Socialist party which 
although small in numbers, should be strong in thought and steadfast in principle. Our aim now 
must be to keep out of the strangling tentacles of the Labour-Imperialist octopus, and to maintain 
the democratic influence of the branches over our Annual Conference. Our strength is not in 
numbers, but in mind and heart. 32 
Thus, there was a divide between those who saw a future for the I. L. P. as a coherent left 
wing force within the Labour Party and those who argued that the party would be most 
effective, perhaps in the longer term, by continuing outside the larger organisation. In 
the aftermath of the 1938 conference and the ensuing negotiations, although the 
standing orders question was frequently raised, none of the four I. L. P. MPs whom it 
would directly affect took up the cause and without their backing the anti-reaffiliation 
argument appeared rather marginal. The central issue was the question of the best tactic 
for a party which, in contrast to the earlier years of the decade, believed itself to be an 
organised, disciplined, revolutionary organisation. 
After looking at the various possibilities the N. A. C. -appointed committee on 
reaffiliation reported their conclusions to conference. They suggested that the I. L. P. as 
an organisation should continue its independent existence, but that individual members 
should be encouraged to join the Labour Party. Bob Edwards presented this idea to the 
I. L. P. 's 1939 conference, suggesting that it was the only real possibility. The committee, 
he pointed out, had representatives of both those who suggested continued 
independence and those who wanted reaffiliation. Yet they had, he claimed, reached 
unanimity 'because they were practical men who faced the issues squarely. ' 
The main issue for the workers of this country was to get rid of the National Government and 
substitute for it a Labour Government. How could the ILP assist in that process The unanimous 
opinion of the committee was that the best assistance would be through work within the Labour 
Party. It was time the membership was sent into the Labour Party to fulfil its revolutionary destiny. 
Brockway wound up the debate with a considered, but far from stirring defence of the 
Committee report, arguing that its suggestion would allow I. L. P. ers to work within the 
'mass movement' if affiliation were not possible. However, despite Edwards's 
confidence, support from the majority of the N. A. C. and Maxton's assertion that the 
Party was equally divided on the report, few were prepared to speak in favour of its 
conclusions. 
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Indeed, even John Aplin, a member of the committee chaired by Edwards, by the time 
of the conference had changed his mind to oppose the committee report. He had been 
prepared to sign the report, believing that the I. L. P. could act 'effectively as a united 
revolutionary force within the Labour Party. ' However, the Parliamentary Group's 
actions over Munich, which Aplin had been extremely forthright in criticising, had 
'disillusioned him as to the ILP's ability to act as a revolutionary party united on 
principle. ' Further, the committee made no attempt to deal with the fact that their 
suggestion of dual membership had been ruled out by the Labour Party when they had 
decided in 1935 to proscribe the I. L. P. 
These arguments for continued independence received a large measure of support, in 
particular from Scotland, the largest division. For example Lachlan McQuarrie of the 
Scottish Divisional Council vehemently urged independence whilst David Gibson, the 
newly elected N. A. C. representative for Scotland, speaking for the Alexandria Branch 
called for the termination of negotiations with the Labour Party. Gibson ridiculed the 
idea that going back into the Labour Party would bring an influx of new members into 
the I. L. P., maintaining that the failures of the party were due to the lack of activity by 
the party during the seven years since disaffiliation. Those who desired reaffiliation, he 
suggested 'were prepared to let the I. L. P. fail the working class by lining them up 
behind National Unity' with the Labour Party 'more bureaucratic and reactionary than 
ever. ' 
In this attack on the Labour Party he was joined by Jennie Lee, who argued that the 
Labour Party was on the point of disintegration, 'lining the workers up behind the 
Government for War. ' Thus, she suggested it was exactly the wrong moment to 
'consider going inside. ' Further she pointed out that 'once inside the bloc vote will 
ensure defeat for whatever we say. ' She concluded with a strident defence of continued 
independence for the Party: 
We don't accept their policy, we don't respect their leadership and if we can hold out a little longer 
we shall find our allies coming to us from many quarters. 
However, Brockway later suggested that it was the veteran Fred Jowett, 'old and frail 
after years of struggle in the working-class movement', who made the most influential 
argument for continued independence. Building on the general warmth with which he 
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was greeted he maintained that the I. L. P. needed the freedom to pursue its own policy, 
especially during War: 
Then the I. L. P. was able to propagate and stand by its point of view. That is all changed and every 
candidate for Parliament is require to promise on the dotted line that he will never vote against the 
Labour Party. The ILP would be hampering itself at the outset of a world crisis if it allows itself to 
be associated with the reactionary policies of Transport House. 
Despite this considerable support for maintaining the independence of the I. L. P. the 
majority of contributions came from those who were advocating a return to the Labour 
Party. The driving force of the affiliationist case was the isolation of the Party; outside 
the Labour Party, they suggested, the I. L. P. had limited influence, inside, the Party 
would have a chance to give a definite lead to the working class. As Tom Taylor, the 
former Glasgow Councillor and Co-operative activist put it: 
the justification of the existence of the ILP was its ability to retard the steady progress towards war 
in the country. In his opinion it had no influence in that direction. While he agreed that the Labour 
Party was more reactionary than ever there was no guarantee that the workers would swing 
towards the ILP in any crisis. The fate of the workers was bound up with the fate of the Labour 
Party and the tendency if the ILP remained outside was for it to become a second SPGB. 
The attack on the isolation of the I. L. P. was continued by another of the Glasgow 
Councillors, James Carmichael, who had changed his position from the previous year, 
two leading members of the Norwich Branch, Reg Spraggins and Arthur South, and 
Maurice Lechstein of the Welsh Divisional Council. In addition a number of other 
arguments were advanced for re-affiliation. Members from Wales and Derby, both areas 
where the Party had suffered considerable setbacks, argued that their local experience 
was sufficient to suggest reaffiliation, although this was countered by Frank Stone, 
chairman of Yarmouth Trades Council, where the Party was making progress at 
municipal level, who suggested that his local experience pointed to continued 
independence. Further, the Trotskyist E. Patterson gave a spirited pro-affiliationist 
speech, directly contrary to his equally fervent position the year before. He attributed 
his change in line to the Parliamentary Group's actions over Munich, sharing Aplin's 
view that it demonstrated that the I. L. P. did not have the potential to develop into a 
revolutionary party, but drew the opposite, affiliationist, conclusion. 
The voting was close, reflecting the deep divisions within the party over its relationship 
with the Labour Party. The possibility of attempting affiliation without any conditions 
was considered first, but was defeated by a vote of 63 to 45. Then the committee report 
was considered and rejected by 68 to 42. This left a simple decision between seeking 
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affiliation to the Labour Party if suitable conditions could be agreed upon as against 
retaining the party as a completely independent body. In moves reminiscent of the 
decision at the Blackpool conference seven years earlier the vote, by 69-40ý went in 
favour of conditional affiliation 33 
Superficially the I. L. P. 's position with respect to the Labour Party in April 1939 was 
identical to the position seven years earlier. The challenge for those I. L. P. ers who 
sought to be affiliated to the Labour Party was to find 'conditions' which both 
organisations would find acceptable. However, the attitude of the leadership of the party 
had changed significantly between 1932 and 1939. The Parliamentary Group was in 
favour of re-affiliation; Campbell Stephen and John McGovern had been outspoken in 
their support of re-affiliation whilst George Buchanan decided unilaterally to rejoin the 
Labour Party following the Scarborough Conference's equivocation on re-affiliation. 34 
Even Maxton, who often appeared the most strident of isolationists, supported moves 
towards re-affiliation 35 
On the N. A. C. opposition to re-affiliation was led by Fred Jowett and C. A. Smith, who 
became party chairman in 1939. Initially Bob Edwards supported Jowett and Smith. 
However, following Edwards's involvement in the committee reporting to the 
Scarborough Conference he became increasingly a supporter of re-affiliation. Against 
this, in 1939 the strongly anti-affiliationist David Gibson replaced the pro-affiliationist 
John McGovern as the Scottish representative on the N. A. C. to bring the number of 
those arguing for continued independence back up to three. Nevertheless, the N. A. C. 
did move towards a position of support for re-affiliation as Brockway led those who had 
been ambivalent about the proposition towards more explicit support for rejoining the 
Labour Party. It was this increasing support for re-affiliation from the N. A. C. that meant 
the prospects for finding a settlement in 1939 were much greater than in 1932. 
Following the 1939 conference the N. A. C. attempted to gain further clarification from 
the Labour Party N. E. C. on the questions of organisational independence, Standing 
Orders and International Affiliation. The I. L. P. was seeking some reassurance from the 
Labour Party that it would be able to retain its own propaganda and organisational 
machine that its MPs would have the right to abstain in Parliament if they opposed the 
official Labour Party line and that they would be able to maintain their affiliation to the 
International Bureau. 36 This was clearly a much less demanding set of conditions than 
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the I. L. P. had insisted upon in 1932, in particular the MPs were asking for the right to 
abstain in votes, which was in any case allowed by the standing orders of the PLP. On 
the organisational issues the I. L. P. requirements were no more liberal than they had 
always been allowed. The question of international affiliation held the most potential for 
disruption of the re-affiliation process. However, the Labour Party had stated during the 
1938 negotiations that it would allow re-affiliation on the same terms which the I. L. P. 
had previously been affiliated and the Party's connection with the International Bureau 
predated disaffiliation. The Labour Party had no interest in further negotiations. It felt 
that its conditions had been laid out clearly the year before. The I. L. P. would have to 
accept the conditions obtaining prior to its disaffiliation if it wanted to return to the 
Labour Party. The only further comment was on the thorny question of international 
affiliation where the larger organisation expressed its scepticism over the I. L. P. 's desire 
to maintain affiliation to the International Bureau, although it stressed that 'there is no 
intention or disposition to create or encourage difficulties in this direction X37 The 
N. A. C. faced a stark choice: there was no possibility of moving the Labour Party 
towards a more sympathetic position. The choice was between accepting a set of 
conditions which the N. E. C. had placed on the table in 1938 and rejecting re-affiliation. 
The Party was relatively evenly split over the question of re-affiliation; although 
Scotland and London both supported continued independence, there was strong support 
for re-affiliation from Lancashire, South Wales, the Midlands, and the increasingly 
important East Anglian division. The N. A. C. met on 5 August and decided to give a 
lead to the Party recommending re-affiliation and calling a special conference for 17 
September. With the party so divided an N. A. C. lead would likely have been decisive in 
convincing the vast majority of those who had supported conditional affiliation at 
Scarborough to vote for re-affiliation. The decision seemed to make re-affiliation 
inevitable. It was not. War was declared on 3 September and the N. A. C. suspended the 
conference, taking the view that 'under present War circumstances it is not desirable that 
the Party should apply for re-affiliation to the Labour Party. 38 
8.3 Relations with the Co-operative Movement 
The I. L. P. had a long history of relations with the co-operative movement. 39 However, 
the disaffiliation decision required party members to refrain from activity within the co- 
operative movement where this involved any level of support for the Co-operative 
Party. This caused problems, especially in London and Scotland, the two areas of 
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greatest I. L. P. strength within the co-operative movement. These could only be resolved 
by an I. L. P. retreat. 
As a result of the hostility between the Co-operative movement and the I. L. P. in the 
wake of the disaffiliation decision, in December 1934 the Scottish Co-operative 
Wholesale Society (SCWS) changed its rules to restrict time off with pay to those on 
public duties who accepted the policy of the Co-operative Political Party. The move was 
explicitly to prevent pay being given to I. L. P. er Tom Taylor, later President of the 
SCWS, who in November had been elected as councillor in the Glasgow City Council 
seat of Dalmarnock. 40 The I. L. P. complained that this action of the Co-operative Society 
was more punitive than even that of the capitalists, pointing to the example of A. E. 
Nicholls in Norwich. When he had been elected as the third I. L. P. member of the 
Norwich Council his employers, Colman's, the mustard manufacturer, had decided to 
maintain their practice of paying full wages to employees elected to a public body. 4' 
This strengthened the Party's resolve to sort matters out with a decision in their favour. 
Thus, in June 1935 an I. L. P. delegation consisting of Maxton, Buchanan, Heenan and 
Carmichael met with Neil Beaton, Davidson and Cameron of the SCWS to discuss the 
situation. The I. L. P. felt the results of the meeting were promising as they understood 
the motivation behind the SCWS policy to be that candidates who would damage the 
Society should not be paid to act in this way. In order to remove any such doubts about 
himself, Taylor sent a letter to the board of the SCWS. The intention was to make clear 
that as long as he was serving on the Glasgow Corporation he would uphold the 
principles of the Co-operative Movement. However, the directors rejected his letter and 
made it clear that they would not consider anything other than a signed acceptance of 
the policy and programme of the Co-operative Party. This was a blow to the I. L. P., but 
it was even more annoying given the fact that such a document was virtually worthless. 
One of the directors, who was a Liberal, had signed the document and therefore was 
allowed to remain a member of his local authority whilst being paid for his time off. 42 
After considerations, which revolved around Taylor's case, the Party decided to make 
further concessions to the demands of the Co-operative movement and permit the 
signing of a declaration of loyalty to the Co-operative Party and an acceptance of its 
constitution. 43 
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A similar dynamic was visible in London where after disaffiliation the Co-operative 
Society decided that all the Co-operative Political councils would expel all members 
who opposed the Labour Party. 44 This decision had an impact on a number of I. L. P. ers 
including Jack Alderson, who lost his place on the London Co-operative Society 
Political Committee in 1933 45 However, after the situation in Scotland had been 
resolved and after C. A. Smith had raised the issue in 1935, Jack Hammond, the London 
ILP industrial organiser, was elected on to the London Co-operative Political 
Committee after accepting the Co-operative Party's conditions. 46 
Outside of London and Scotland there was a weaker, but often less troubled connection 
between the I. L. P. and the Co-operative movement. For example Marjorie Plumb of 
Eastbourne was also involved at national level with the women's co-operative 
movement 47 In Cleator Moor J. R. Pritt, the secretary of Arlecdon I. L. P., was elected to 
the management committee of Cleator Moor Co-operative Society ahead of three failed 
Labour Party nominees. 48 Similarly in Nottingham and Derby the I. L. P. had an 
important presence within the Co-operative Movement. In Southampton Gilbert White 
had obtained a very high profile in the Co-operative movement. 49 The July 1938 
meeting on the Peace Alliance in Scarborough was attended by six members of the 
I. L. P. who were organised prior to the conference through the Industrial committee and, 
it was claimed, worked as an effective team as a result. 5° 
Thus, the ILP had an ongoing if troubled relationship with the Co-operative movement. 
The conflicts of the early years after disaffiliation in the centres of London and Glasgow 
were ironed out largely by the Party's retreat from its earlier more confrontational 
position. However, the problematic relationship in these areas was not repeated 
everywhere and the Party could frequently obtain considerable influence within 
individual co-operative societies. However, the message from the troubles was clear, 
conflict between the co-operative movement and the ILP would only be resolved by the 
Party changing to a more compliant strategy. 
8.4 The I. L. P. and the Trade Unions 
The relationship between the I. L. P. and the Trade Unions during the 1920s and even 
more during the 1930s remains little studied. In part this stems from the troubled nature 
of the relationship, yet a systematic examination of the role of the Party in the Trade 
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Union movement reveals much about both the I. L. P. and the Industrial wing of the 
Labour movement. 
In the years before disaffiliation the I. L. P. had relatively limited influence within the 
Unions. Disaffiliation had worsened the situation in three main ways. First, as with local 
councillors and those in other positions of authority, trade union officials were far more 
likely to remain with the Labour Party than the rank-and-file membership. Second, the 
massive disruption of losing so many influential members left I. L. P. leaders with 
relatively little co-ordination of its industrial activity. Finally, the Party had very little in 
the way of a considered policy towards trade unionism. On top of these, perhaps 
inevitable, problems of disaffiliation the Party chose to add another. The Bradford 
Conference voted that I. L. P. members within Trade Unions 'must cease to contribute a 
political levy to the Labour Party and should seek to allocate it to the I. L. P. '5' To 
extricate itself from this difficult position the party needed to develop its industrial 
policy, increase its co-ordination of industrial activity and to make sure that party 
members were much more involved in industrial activity. Developments over the period 
to 1939 showed progress in each of these areas and by the end of the decade the Party 
had a considerable industrial profile including members on the executives of twelve 
unions, a more considered industrial policy and a developing industrial strategy and 
organisation. 
8.5 Industrial Policy 
At the time of disaffiliation the I. L. P. had little in the way of a considered industrial 
policy. Indeed, some leading members including Maxton were completely disillusioned 
with the whole operation of the Trade Union movement. The 'new revolutionary policy' 
of 1933, with its stress on Workers' Councils, did little to clarify the Party's position in 
the industrial sphere. Some interpreted Workers' Councils as a completely alternative 
focus for industrial activity, whilst others simply saw Workers' Councils as a minor 
adjunct to the Unions. There was little within the detail of the new revolutionary policy 
statement that would allow a decision between interpretations. 52 Indeed what little 
emphasis there was on industrial policy in the immediate period after disaffiliation came 
in the consideration of the practical problems of the Trade Union movement, most 
notably on the question of dual unionism in the Lanarkshire coalfield53 
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However, as the gaps in the Party's industrial policy became increasingly evident the 
I. L. P. made a conscious effort to clarify its thinking. The leading figure in these 
considerations was Tom Stephenson, whose prominence in the Cumberland Miners' 
Association meant he was the only N. A. C. member with significant union connections. 
In an effort to redirect the party's thinking on Trade Union questions away from a focus 
on Workers' Councils he presented his detailed thoughts on industrial policy at the 
I. L. P. summer school in August 1934. He drew a contrast between his view of the 
reality of the working class movement, which was strongest in the industrial sphere, and 
the concentration of the I. L. P. on electoral work. He argued that the I. L. P. 's role was to 
transform the Unions from mere bargaining organisations into democratic revolutionary 
organisations. This, he suggested, would require Party members to attempt to destroy 
the Union's sectional basis, making them into class organisations. The short term 
priority would thus be to amalgamate unions within industries and to provide better 
union based support for the unemployed. In the longer term the aim should be to 
establish factory organisations on the lines of building up Workers' Committees in each 
factory in preparation for a general strike. 54 
A number of similar points were made by young Perth I. L. P. er, William Ballantine, 
who was elected onto the NUR executive in 1937. His analysis of the situation accepted 
much of the I. L. P. criticism of Trade Unions. He was happy with the idea that 'Trade 
Union theory needs to be worked out anew following 1926 and 1929-31' and argued 
that the 'Trade Union movement is still marching under the banner of planned 
capitalism, ' which 'despite Socialist phrases is more likely to lead to the Corporate State 
than Socialism. ' He also re-enforced the Party's opposition to unofficial and minority 
movements as 'the average Trade Unionist has this sense of loyalty strongly developed 
and resents group organisation. ' Thus, he argued that 'unofficial movements cannot 
retain the necessary atmosphere of loyalty to the organisation. ' However, his main point 
was to stress the need for the left to make progress at local level not so much by 
criticism of leadership but by demonstration 'of Trade Union enthusiasm by slogging 
work. ' He also pointed to the need for militants to 'select "men of character" as a rank- 
and-file member elected to the executive begins to move in different circles and often 
succumbs to temptation. ' Thus, the method of progress for 'the left', which Ballantine 
attempted to institute in his own activity in the NUR in the 1930s was to 'work through 
the Constitution of the Union and demand democracy within it. '55 
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At National level the Party was highly critical of the Union movement. The 1937 I. L. P. 
conference strongly attacked the 'class collaboration' of the TUC's 'Peace in Industry' 
policy, arguing that: 
In the present critical situation only uncompromising working-class solidarity against the ruling 
and employing class can be effective in carrying forward the demands and policy of the working 
class. 56 
Indeed, in January 1938 John Aplin, the I. L. P. 's National Industrial Officer felt the 
conduct of Union leaders compelled him to address the question 'Should Workers Join a 
Trade Union? '57 Despite answering in the affirmative it was clear that there was 
considerable tension between the Party and the Union movement. This was further 
exemplified by the Industrial Policy agreed at the 1938 I. L. P. annual conference. The 
policy stressed the importance of the 1937 bus strikes, engineering struggles and 
railway crisis and developed an overall theme of 'class struggle, ' emphasising 'the 
inescapable fact that militant working-class organisation is the only reply that the 
workers possess to ruling-class exploitation. ' Thus, the Party called for Trade Unions to 
'terminate all undertakings and agreements with the employers which prevent effective 
and speedy action by the workers. '58 The conference also saw the Party reaffirm its 
support for industrial against craft unions, which was supplemented by an amendment 
arguing for the necessity of shop stewards and Workers' Councils as a first step from 
craft Unions to Industrial Unions. Thus, the stress throughout the I. L. P. 's Trade Union 
policy was on the failings and limitations of the trade union structures and leadership. 
The I. L. P. 's industrial policy which had been virtually non-existent in 1932 saw 
significant developments over the period to 1939. The 'new revolutionary policy' of 
1933 had potentially posed a considerable threat to an emphasis on Trade Union work. 
The criticisms of the Trade Union leadership implicit in this interpretation of the new 
policy were widely accepted. However, those most committed to Trade Union activism 
were able to present influential arguments in favour of developing the party's union 
profile. By 1937-9 trade union activities were again a regular feature of the I. L. P. 's 
political agenda, with discussion largely driven by influential union activists such as 
Tom Stephenson and William Ballantine. However, the I. L. P. 's problems could not be 
solved by policy changes alone. 
8.6 Industrial Co-ordination 
The initial industrial problems of the disaffiliated I. L. P. were exacerbated by the fact 
that the I. L. P. 's national leadership had virtually no detailed information about I. L. P. 
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activity in the Trade Unions. It thus became a priority for the Party to obtain such 
information. Towards the end of 1934 the N. A. C. began attempts to obtain information 
regarding the Trade Union and Co-operative membership of Party members. Events 
surrounding the 'Black Circular' brought a wave of increased uncertainty concerning 
Union activity which the N. A. C. conceded that the Party machinery was inadequate to 
deal with. One aim of the I. L. P. 's 1935 conference was to rectify this situation. 59 The 
Party appointed a National Co-ordinator of Industrial Activity, Trevor Davies of the 
Welsh I. L. P., and attempted to establish an Industrial Committee and an Industrial 
Officer in every division. 60 
By August 1935 the process of organising Industrial Committees was underway in most 
divisions. London, which had been arranged prior to the 1935 conference, was the most 
orderly having a full Industrial Organiser and Secretary in place and a provisional 
register of union membership. In the North-East, Yorkshire and the South-West 
structures were being put in place whilst in Trevor Davies' own Welsh Division a 
register of Union members had been obtained prior to the 1935 Conference. Elsewhere 
progress was slow, particularly in the I. L. P. 's largest area Scotland where the Party 
lagged behind every other division and had not even begun the process of determining 
its Union and Co-operative membership. 61 
By the 1936 Annual Conference, despite the fact that only about 10 per cent of branches 
had sent in any information on trade union membership, some progress had been made. 
For example, there had been a definite increase in the industrial coverage within New 
Leader. 62 The register of Trade Union membership, although limited in coverage, was 
well advanced in some divisions and the I. L. P. had been actively seeking to work with 
other 'left' delegates at Trade Union Congress and the National Conference of Trades 
Councils. In particular they claimed to have worked together with the Communist Party 
against the 'Black Circular'. 63 However, I. L. P. influence within the Union movement 
remained limited. The Party received only one positive response to a request for 
information about I. L. P. delegates to the 1935 TUC. 64 
These points were reaffirmed at the Keighley conference where further decisions were 
taken to assist with systematising the Party's industrial activity. 65 As a result of the 1936 
decisions the Party's National Industrial Committee was established on May 2 1936 
initially comprising Tom Stephenson, Jim Davies, Wilfred Young, John Aplin, Trevor 
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Davies (New Leader's Industrial Editor), and Jack Hammond. 66 By November of that 
year the committee claimed to have stimulated co-ordinated industrial activity, and with 
the assistance of Ernie Patterson, had initiated a regular industrial feature in the New 
Leader. 67 By July 1938 industrial organisation committees had been set in Glasgow and 
Manchester and Divisional industrial officers had been nominated in Yorkshire, South 
Wales and London. 68 Also the Party succeeded in giving some degree of organisation to 
its members in a range of unions. The Industrial Committee was especially optimistic 
about the Party position in the Transport and Engineering industries but Party groups 
were established in a number of unions that went beyond these sectors. 69 Although the 
situation was still far from perfect at the end of the 1930s there had been a definite 
increase in co-ordination and organisation of I. L. P. industrial activity by the outbreak of 
the Second World War. 70 Yet the most important question remained the level of actual 
I. L. P. influence within the Trade Unions. 
8.7 Industrial Activity 
At national level the I. L. P. 's industrial influence remained limited throughout the 1930s. 
In 1935 the party was aware of only one delegate to the TUC and the following year this 
had only increased to two, although one of the I. L. P. ers came from the Litho Workers' 
Union where the left wing faction was largely under I. L. P. control. In 1936 the I. L. P. ers 
were, according to Party sources, 'lost in a sea of reaction'. 71 In 1938 the situation was 
only slightly improved, according to Bob Edwards's report of the 1938 TUC 'The 
decisions of this Congress were tragically reactionary and completely bankrupt of 
leadership on all the major issues affecting the working class movement. ' With the 
Communist Party supporting a Popular Front, pro-League of Nations line the I. L. P., led 
by the 22 year old NUDAW delegate Walter Padley, was isolated in its opposition to 
the 1935 policy of collective security and military action against aggression. The 
complaint of the I. L. P. was the lack of real democracy at the TUC. As Edwards put it 
'the voice of the rank and file, in the workshop and in the branches, is buried under the 
i72 weight of a steam roller that grinds out mechanical decisions. 
At the Scottish TUC, where there were a few more I. L. P. delegates, the party had 
greater input. I. L. P. activity at the STUC was led by Tom Taylor, the young Glasgow 
councillor and representative of the National Union of Clerks. At the 1935 Scottish 
TUC, Taylor moved a resolution on war based on I. L. P. policy. The motion was 
defeated by 103 votes to 22, but it was significant that the I. L. P., under the leadership of 
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Tom Taylor, were advancing their own policy and not simply backing the Communist 
line. This point was not lost on Arthur Woodburn, who in his fraternal greetings to the 
congress on behalf of the Scottish Labour Party, strongly attacked the I. L. P. 73 The 
I. L. P. 's prominence within the left wing of the Scottish T. U. C. was re-enforced at the 
1936 St. Andrews Scottish T. U. C. The left wing was led by the I. L. P. in the debate on 
the Abyssinian War, in opposition to the TUC's support for rearmament, and calling for 
an end to class collaboration. 74 The I. L. P. found itself in a similar minority with its anti- 
class collaboration line at other Scottish TUC conferences. For example in 1938 at the 
STUC, where there were seven I. L. P. ers acting as delegates, after the T&GWU 
withdrew their resolution in favour of Independent Working Class action against war it 
was left to the I. L. P., again led by Tom Taylor, to present such a case whilst the STUC 
establishment, supported by Communist representatives argued for the League of 
Nations line. 75 Despite vocal opposition the I. L. P. was able to have little influence 
within either the TUC or the STUC. 
Despite this isolation at national level in both England and Wales and Scotland, the 
Party continued its work within individual unions and at local level, and over the 1930s 
managed to obtain some influence. The Party made advances within three of the largest 
unions, the MFGB, the NUR and NUDAW, and also managed to advance its position 
within a number of medium sized and smaller unions such as the National Union of 
Clerks and the Chemical Workers Union. However, the Party had to contend with 
waning influence within both the Patternmakers and NAFTA and with sustained 
hostility from some unions, most notably the General and Municipal Workers Union. 76 
N. U. D. A. W. was the largest union with branches directly representated at its annual 
delegate meeting. Perhaps as a result it had a reputation for a wide diversity of views 
being expressed at conferences. One important component of the opinions which made 
an impact at the Union was the I. L. P. 77 From the 1933 N. U. D. A. W. conference 
Fernyhough, then secretary of the Audley (North Stafford) I. L. P. and later full time 
N. U. D. A. W. official in Norwich and subsequently a Labour MP, had put the I. L. P. case. 
In 1933 he had succeeded in ensuring the passing of a resolution against the injustices 
of the Anomalies Act, which had come to symbolise the I. L. P. -Labour split pre-1931.78 
In 1935, as secretary of the Butt Lane (Stoke-on-Trent) N. U. D. A. W. he had again 
represented the changing policy of the I. L. P., this time working in tandem with 
Communists and other left wingers. 79 The union leadership was clearly worried about 
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this I. L. P. influence; the N. U. D. A. W. executive used part of its annual report to launch 
an attack on the Party. 80 
After 1937, Walter Padley, later general secretary of USDAW, was sent as one of the 
Union's delegates to the TUC. However, the influence of the Party went deeper in the 
union and a number of other NUDAW members were able to obtain influential 
positions. Others also increased their influence such as Gilbert Hunter of Dartford 
I. L. P., who became an increasingly important speaker at NUDAW conferences, perhaps 
most importantly at the 1938 conference where he led the significant anti-Peace 
Alliance minority. 81 However, there was still considerable hostility towards the I. L. P. 
within the Union leadership. Allegations about the financial irregularities between the 
I. L. P. and the Labour Party in the final years of affiliation continued to be made by 
leading members of the union in order to weaken the position of the I. L. P. in 
NUDAW. 82 At the same time in some localities the union was attempting to crack down 
on the influence of the I. L. P., for example preventing those who refused to accept the 
Labour Party Constitution from taking on official posts in Aberdeen. 83 
The National Union of Railwaymen, despite a significant militant section within its 
membership, had a right-wing leadership complemented by some tradition of C. P. 
initiatives. 84 The I. L. P. established an industrial group with David Gibson, the Glasgow 
Councillor acting as group secretary. However, despite efforts in January 1937 the 
group was forced to concede that it was disappointed with the response received from 
members within the NUR and admitted that only a small number had signed up. 
85 
Nevertheless, the group continued to operate and in September 1937, supported by the 
N. A. C., it held a fairly well attended meeting at which members were circulated with 
programme adopted by the NUR group. The programme analysed the negotiations 
between the different unions and railway companies and called for 'One Programme for 
All Railway Workers'. The outcome of the group's discussion was endorsed by the 
N. A. C. and released as a leaflet by the Industrial Committee. 86 This leaflet was then 
followed up by further activity by the group which resulted in the release of a pamphlet 
Railwaymen Unite! which, by the I. L. P. conference of the following year, had sold over 
4000 copies. 87 
The activity on the ground was accompanied by the election of I. L. P. er William 
Ballantine to the executive of the NUR. Ballantine, originally of Perth No. 2 
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NUR, worked his way up within his locality and in October 1936 was elected to the 
Executive Committee of NUR representing the Loco. Group, Area No. 1.88 Within the 
Union he represented an important section of the left which was militant but clearly not 
under the direct influence of the Communist Party. On the executive he formed an 
important part of a strong left wing, and was influential on a number of issues as when 
he moved a resolution against the handling of Japanese Goods in February 1938, which 
resulted in an equally split vote. 89 Ballantine remained committed to the I. L. P. and a 
militant left-wing agenda including promoting strikes over issues such as minimum 
wages and holiday deals. 90 
Whilst Ballantine was the most influential I. L. P. er within the NUR during his time on 
the executive, his influence did not end when he retired after his three years of service 
in 1940. He remained an active member of the union; in the short term he was elected as 
one of the NUR delegation to the Scottish TUC in 1941, whilst in the longer term he 
rose to become Assistant General Secretary of the Union in October 1958. Further, 
other I. L. P. ers were capable of being elected to official positions even if they were not 
on the executive committee. For example James Barrie of Govanhill I. L. P. was elected 
to the executive of the approved section of the NUR just as Ballantine was stepping 
down. 91 
The Miners' Federation of Great Britain had a militant reputation especially in some 
coalfields. Although severely weakened in the aftermath of the General Strike, the 
second half of the 1930s saw a significant rise in militant activity with the stay-down 
strikes and the struggle against company unionism. The federal structure of the union 
further gave the space in which diverse and frequently militant political agendas could 
develop. 92 Within the MFGB I. L. P. influence was more limited than in either the NUR 
or NUDAW. In South Wales there were pockets where I. L. P. ers had managed to obtain 
significant influence. In Merthyr there was a significant I. L. P. input, especially in the 
unemployed miners lodge where I. L. P. er W. E. Rowlands was chairman and was able to 
obtain the support of the executive of the SWMF after being excluded from the Merthyr 
Trades and Labour Council in the wake of the 'Black Circular. 93 The I. L. P. was also 
influential within the Nine Mile Point lodge, where Jack Marsden, with support from a 
number of other I. L. P. ers had become chairman. However, I. L. P. influence within the 
wider SWMF was severely limited. Marsden was easily defeated when he stood as 
Vice-President of the SWMF and when relations between the I. L. P. and the Communist 
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Party deteriorated during the Spanish Civil War and the I. L. P. criticised the Federation 
for its Popular Front line the I. L. P. found itself further marginalised from the 
mainstream of the Federation. 94 
Only in Cumberland, under the leadership of Tom Stephenson, did the I. L. P. achieve a 
really high profile within the MFGB. There the I. L. P. had built up a significant base 
initially within the Walkmill Colliery at Morseby, where I. L. P. er John Carvill was 
secretary of the miners' lodge and Stephenson was checkweighman and union delegate. 
In March 1934 Stephenson and fellow I. L. P. er and Walkmill MFGB activist J. Bell 
were elected to two seats on the RDC against Labour opposition. 95 During the mid- 
1930s Stephenson had been heavily involved in organising the unemployed in action 
against the Government. Although performing poorly as I. L. P. candidate in the 1935 
General Election his personal credibility appears not to have been damaged and in May 
1937 he was elected as Financial Secretary of the Cumberland Miners' Association. 96 
Subsequently he was active along with other I. L. P. ers in connection with a strike 
affecting over 800 miners at the Walkmill Colliery. 97 He also organised the major 
victory of the CMA during the 1930s when they obtained holidays with pay in 1938.98 
Within other large unions I. L. P. ers attempted to put across the Party's position at both 
national and local level. For example the I. L. P. was active in calling factional meetings 
at AEU conferences and moving resolutions against both the leadership and the 
Communist Party. However, despite the work of members such as J. C. Clockey of 
Glasgow, A. Messnan of Kirkdale and W. Wilkinson of Derby at the AEU national 
committee, their attempts to be elected to national positions or have their resolutions 
accepted by the committee were always thwarted. 99 Outside of NUDAW, NUR and the 
MFGB the I. L. P. had relatively little direct impact on national policy of the large 
unions. 
I. L. P. ers were more frequently able to obtain positions of influence within medium and 
smaller unions, such as the NUC, the Post Office Workers, N. A. F. T. A. and the 
Patternmakers. For example, within Glasgow and the wider Scottish N. U. C. there was 
significant support for the I. L. P. Thus the Glasgow food branch of the N. U. C., the 
largest branch in Scotland, had passed a resolution urging the support of all Trade 
Unionists for the I. L. P. candidate at the 1934 Pollockshaws by-election in Glasgow. 
That decision aroused considerable opposition from the Glasgow BLP, who referred it 
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to the Scottish N. U. C. General Council. The latter body, despite the appeal of Scottish 
TUC General Secretary, refused to disassociate itself from the actions of the branch. '°° 
This I. L. P. influence within the Scottish N. U. C. was an important element within the 
left wing of the National Union of Clerks, which was increasingly evident at its 1934 
conference. That event held in Buxton saw an unsuccessful but significant left wing, 
which represented roughly one third of the conference votes, for such measures as 
affiliation to the British Anti-War movement and opposition to the Sedition Bill. 101 The 
following year the militant section of the union made further significant strides forward. 
The conference voted to condemn the black circular and elected a member of its left 
wing, as a delegate to the TUC along with the General Secretary. Hardcastle of Bristol 
I. L. P. stood against Elger of the Scottish TUC for the post of General Secretary and was 
defeated by a margin of 4,202 to 3,321.102 By 1937 two I. L. P. ers were able to obtain 
positions on the executive of the National Union of Clerks, Harry Nutt and Comrade 
Hardcastle, a position which reflected considerable strength within the Union. In 
particular there was considerable support for the I. L. P. from within the NUC based on 
sections of the co-operative society in Scotland. 103 
I. L. P. ers were also gaining some prominence within other unions, for example within 
the Post Office Workers' Union I. L. P. ers remained active through the decade and were 
influential in presenting Guild Socialist and workers' control ideas in the union context. 
J. Allen Skinner, the I. L. P. 's London N. A. C. representative and chairman of the London 
Divisional Council had been a leading figure in the union. He was full-time assistant to 
the mainstream Labour MP George Middleton, a deeply religious man, during the 
latter's editorship of the union's journal, the Post. Then in 1931 when Middleton 
resigned there was considerable support from Union branches for Skinner to take over, 
but it was decided that as an employee of the Union he could not stand. Instead the job 
was given to Francis Andrew, a Birmingham telegraphist and poet, who also remained 
with the I. L. P. through disaffiliation and who used the Post, which he edited for fifteen 
years, as a vehicle for Guild Socialist writing and thought. 104 Then in 1935 Majorie 
Peake of Preston I. L. P. was elected to the executive committee of the Post Office 
Workers' Union. 105 During the 1930s the Union had been antagonised by the Clause 5 of 
the Trades Disputes Act which forbade them from affiliating with other Trade Unions or 
with any political party and which made it a technical offence for individual post office 
workers to take a prominent part in any political organisation. The leadership invited Sir 
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Walter Citrine to give fraternal greeting to the May 1936 Brighton conference shortly 
after he had been knighted by a Government led by Baldwin who had earlier passed the 
Trades Disputes Act. Sections of the conference, led by some rank-and-file I. L. P. ers, 
were extremely angry. Moves to disallow the fraternal speech were only defeated on a 
card vote of 1,081 to 910. However, a significant number of the delegates were not 
prepared to accept the decision and Jenny Duncan of Lochgelly I. L. P. and secretary of 
the I. L. P. group in the union led a walkout of more than 200 delegates during his 
speech. 106 Duncan, who was also influential in pushing for an increasing recognition of 
female rights within the profession, was subsequently elected onto the Executive along 
with Peake, who by 1944 although dying of cancer had become assistant secretary of 
the union. '°7 
Within the small craft union, the United Patternmakers' Association, where George 
Buchanan was President, there had been serious tensions with the Labour Party at the 
time of I. L. P. disaffiliation. 108 One branch of the Glasgow Patternmakers withdrew its 
affiliation from the BLP and subsequently branches of the Patternmakers had been at 
the forefront of calls for anti-fascist action and for extensive support for the Hunger 
Marchers. Then in January 1934 the Clyde District Committee of the Patternmakers 
found itself in further conflict with Glasgow Trades Council. The Trades Council 
considered that the Patternmakers, in calling political meetings, addressed by Buchanan, 
to which non-U. P. A. members were being invited, were usurping the functions of the 
Trades Council. As selections approached for the 1935 election the union's executive 
was aware that they could not maintain both their affiliation to the Labour Party and 
their financial support of Buchanan. Thus, they decided to only go ahead with the 
nomination of Ellis Smith, the left wing candidate for Stoke. 109 As Smith showed there 
was a left wing within the Union which was attracted to the Labour Party. However, 
Buchanan was popular within the Union, in 1934 he had polled 200 votes more than the 
combined total of his two opponents for the position of President of the U. P. A. In this 
situation it was a difficult decision for the union executive to remove U. P. A. support 
completely! 10 The union decided to hold a ballot of its membership on the possibility of 
raising a voluntary fund for Buchanan's election. Gorbals DLP were dismayed at this 
U. P. A. proposal, as their own plans to place an official Labour candidate against 
Buchanan were well advanced and supported by the national Labour Party. The Labour 
Party's N. E. C. thus decided that the U. P. A. proposal to even consider the question of 
raising a voluntary fund for Buchanan was inconsistent with the position of an affiliated 
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organisation. 1 11 However, the union ignored these threats and informed the N. E. C. of its 
intention to go ahead with the ballot. 112 The General Secretary of the union appealed to 
the membership to vote against giving assistance for Buchanan's electoral expenses. 
Whilst a majority of 180 voted against the wishes of the executive and in support of 
Buchanan, he did not achieve the necessary two-thirds verdict that would have seen the 
decision enacted. Buchanan was thus deprived of the financial support of the union, 
instead he had to fall back on the financial support of the I. L. P. 1 13 However, by 1939 he 
was no longer so sure of his electoral future unendorsed by the union. His decision to 
rejoin the Labour Party was symptomatic of the declining relevance of the I. L. P. in the 
Union. However, many other I. L. P. ers within the Patternmakers' had over the period 
made the same political journey as Buchanan. Further, and especially in Scotland where 
the I. L. P. 's presence had been greatest, influential I. L. P. ers of an older generation either 
retired or died. ' 14 
Within another small union, N. A. F. T. A. the General Secretary, Alex Gossip, was a 
member of the I. L. P. 115 After the disaffiliation decision Alex Gossip found his position 
increasingly difficult. The I. L. P. 's N. A. C. agreed that whilst he should fulfil the 
conditions agreed at the Bradford Conference, including contracting out, he should take 
steps in doing so to safeguard his official position. 116 Gossip's affiliation to the I. L. P. 
thus played a minor role in his union activity. However, he maintained a close interest 
in the political activity of the Party. Gossip's politics were heavily influenced by support 
for the Soviet Union and a belief in united action by the I. L. P. and the Communist 
Party. This, combined with his membership of the Fulham I. L. P. brought him into close 
contact with the R. P. C. He chaired the Labour Monthly Revolutionary Policy 
Conference, in March 1933 and argued that it was likely that 'circumstances would 
force the advanced parties in this country together whether they liked it or not. '117 His 
work to promote unity also saw him involved in the organisation of the 1934 Hunger 
March sitting as a representative of N. A. F. T. A. and the I. L. P. on the March and 
Congress Council in 1934.118 Through these roles and writing in the columns of New 
Leader Gossip gave his unequivocal support to United Front work outside the Labour 
Party. He stressed the need to keep up opposition to the Labour Party and the TUC, 
which he argued could not be trusted. 119 The I. L. P. played a prominent party in 
organising an all-in meeting to celebrate Alex Gossip's 75" Birthday. 120 However, 
Gossip's attitude towards the Soviet Union did not change in the same way as the I. L. P. s 
and by the outbreak of war serious differences had arisen between the Party and Gossip. 
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He began calling for an immediate alliance with Russia against Germany. 121 Although 
Maxton volunteered to see Gossip as 'an old personal friend' it was clear that, despite 
Gossip's continuing membership of the I. L. P., there was considerable political 
difference between himself and the party. 122 
In both the Patternmakers and N. A. F. T. A. I. L. P. influence diminished as leading 
members chose to increasingly distance themselves from the Party. I. L. P. influence was 
threatened in other areas by more direct and explicit assaults from Trade Union 
establishments. The Party was affected by the TUC's so-called 'Black Circular' in 1934, 
which sought to exclude 'members of disruptive organisations' from holding positions 
within Trade Unions. The 'Black Circular' did not affect the I. L. P. directly, because the 
circular was directed against the Communist Party as a 'disruptive organisation', and the 
I. L. P. was not considered by the TUC to be a disruptive organisation. However, I. L. P. 
members had, since disaffiliation, not been eligible to sit on joint Trades and Labour 
Councils and the circular brought the situation of some I. L. P. ers who were 
'illegitimately' sitting on such joint councils to light. 123 In other places, despite the 
separation of Industrial and Political sections the Trades Council used the circular to 
exclude I. L. P. ers. 124 This was most significant in Yarmouth where tensions between the 
Labour Party and the I. L. P. were running high in 1935, and the I. L. P. had come to 
dominate the Trade Union club. Despite the decision to exclude the Party from the 
Trades Council in 1935, within two years, with improved relations with the Yarmouth 
Labour Party, the Trades Council had a Chair and Secretary from the I. L. P. 
However, the problems for the I. L. P. were greatest with respect to the G&MWU. They 
had an active, if unthinking, anti-left wing policy and during the 1920s had led the 
attacks on Communism in the Trade Union movement. The Union decided to extend the 
general TUC ban on 'disruptive organisations' to exclude I. L. P. ers from holding official 
positions within the union. 125 The widespread repercussions led to the closure of one of 
the Unions branches in Hastings126 and the exclusion of Councillor A. E. Nicholls from 
being nominated as representative of the G&M. W. U. on the local Trades Council in 
Norwich. 127 However, I. L. P. influence within the G&MWU was not completely wiped 
out. The Party, led by Albert Richards, the I. L. P. 's Welsh Industrial Secretary, was able 
to organise a fractional meeting at the union's Bi-ennval conference in Swansea in June 
1936. In Nelson and Merthyr I. L. P. ers were sufficiently secure in their posts to be 
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unaffected by the Union's decision and even attended the Union's national conference to 
put the I. L. P. case on League of Nations sanctions against Italy. 128 
Over the course of the 1930s the I. L. P. had many problems in its relationship with the 
trade unions. Its weaknesses were obvious to all the party members who seriously 
analysed the position of the party, and it was through such considerations that the Party 
came to reform its industrial policy and structures. However, later commentators have 
overplayed these weaknesses; contrary to the position suggested by R. E. Dowse the 
Party did have 'contacts worth maintaining in the trade unions. ' 129 Indeed, through the 
changes which came about in the later part of the decade the Party was able to achieve a 
number of things. First, it was able to come to a more carefully considered policy with 
respect to the trade unions, stressing the need to build loyalty and trust through hard 
work combined with a critical position towards 'class collaboration. ' Second, and 
perhaps more importantly, it was able to increase the number of members in influential 
positions within the union movement. Thus, by the 1939 Conference, Party members 
held executive positions in twelve unions. Far more held positions on District 
Committees (or their equivalent) whilst fifty-two Trades Councils had two or more 
sitting I. L. P. ers. Indeed the description given by the N. A. C. to the I. L. P. 's 1939 
conference is apposite: 
The general position of the I. L. P. industrial activity may be described as patchy, both in activity 
and organisation but with distinct signs of rapid improvement so far as activities are concerned. '30 
8.8 Conclusion 
Disaffiliation injected considerable hostility into the relations between the I. L. P. and the 
rest of the Labour Movement. However, as the I. L. P. 's close co-operation with the 
Communist Party broke down, and the rise of fascism convinced the I. L. P. of the need 
to work with other working-class organisations, so the Party's attention turned back 
towards the 'official' organisations of the Labour Movement. The initial hostility 
towards the Labour Party, Co-operative Movement and Trade Unions from many 
I. L. P. ers was tempered in 1933 and eased even further during the rest of the decade. The 
Party remained convinced that it had a 'revolutionary' policy distinct from the Labour 
Party. Many believed that this distinctive policy justified organisational independence. 
However, an increasingly significant section of the Party argued that the I. L. P. 's 
socialist goals would be better pursued within the larger organisation, and that 
disaffiliation had been required only as a temporary measure to allow policy 
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clarification. By 1939 those advocating re-affiliation probably formed a majority of the 
Party. Within the Unions the I. L. P. met with a little more success and from 1935-9 the 
I. L. P. 's industrial activity increased substantially. Its policy was increasingly directed by 
industrial activists and much more effectively centrally co-ordinated and it was 
accompanied by a larger number of Party members achieving positions of prominence 
within the Unions. Nevertheless, the success of those advocating re-affiliation has 
implications for the definition of the I. L. P. 's 'political space'. In particular it seems that 
despite the political space available at local level, within the unions, and the 
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development of the I. L. P. without such a national role were limited. 
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9. Pacifism, Wars and the Internationals 
9.1 Introduction 
The image of the I. L. P. as a pacifist party is common. ' Indeed some commentators have 
argued that the development of I. L. P. policy during the 1930s was marked by the 
victory of pacifism over revolutionary politics. 2 In fact, although the I. L. P. opposed the 
Second World War, it did not have a pacifist policy, rather it endorsed the possibility of 
using violence in a Socialist revolution. This chapter traces the development of the 
I. L. P. 's new revolutionary attitude in the international arena. It begins with the question 
of international affiliation and associations and moves through the crises of the second 
half of the 1930s which so shaped I. L. P. policy. It is argued that the Party rejected 
pacifism because of its international associations and the Abyssinian Crisis and the 
Spanish Civil War. This rejection of pacifism did not come easily to the Party with its 
considerable tradition of opposition to militarism in all forms, and with a large pacifist 
section of its membership. There was throughout the decade considerable resistance to 
the rejection of pacifism. The result was that the I. L. P. 's response to the outbreak of the 
Second World War, although apparently founded on the party's revolutionary attitude, 
was in fact based on an uneasy compromise with the pacifist sections of the party 
membership. 
9.2 A Question of Internationals 
Through the 1920s the I. L. P. found itself consistently located somewhere between 
Labour and Communist Internationals. This was the case, most famously, with the 
I. L. P. involvement with the Vienna Union, derisively known as the Two-and-a-Half 
International, formed in 1921 with the express purpose of bringing the 2nd and 3rd 
Internationals together and wound up two years later. By the end of the 1920s I. L. P. was 
an increasingly unhappy member of the Labour and Socialist International. The Party 
was dependent upon the Labour Party for its representation. The I. L. P. 's leftward move 
meant that its delegates to L. S. I. Congresses were increasingly unhappy with what they 
saw as 'the practice of using revolutionary rhetoric to cover up motions with no content 
relating to positive Socialist action. '3 By 1931 the I. L. P. adopted a similar role within 
the L. S. I. to the one it had chosen within the Labour Party, as self-appointed conscience 
of the organisation. 4 
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The I. L. P. leadership almost welcomed this alienation from the mainstream of the L. S. I. 
for two reasons. First of all it felt that it was at odds with the basic policy of the parties 
that made up the L. S. I.; the rise of fascism and the desperate world-wide economic 
situation called for urgent Socialist action. Second, it had become involved in the 
International Bureau for Revolutionary Socialist Unity (IBRSU), at that time known as 
the Left International Committee. 
During the disaffiliation debates the R. P. C. had increasingly connected the demand for 
disaffiliation with calls to approach the Communist International to enquire about 
affiliation. During 1932, with the disaffiliation issue to the fore the question of 
internationals had not been raised. However, the following year the R. P. C. case, argued 
by William Warbey, was for disaffiliation from the second international and for 
approaching the Communist International. There was scarcely any disagreement with 
the first of these suggestions. The L. S. I. had strongly attacked the I. L. P. when it left the 
Labour Party, and the N. A. C. had already agreed to withdraw the Party from the LSI. 
The alternative supported by the N. A. C. was that the I. L. P. should maintain its position 
with the international "left" parties. However, given the failure of the Vienna 
International, and that the Bureau was new and its status as an international was unclear, 
it is perhaps not surprising that the R. P. C. case for approaching the Comintern was able 
to gain significant support. The 1933 Derby Conference, against the wishes of the 
N. A. C. voted with the R. P. C. to approach the Third International to investigate the 
possibility of affiliation. 5 
Following the Derby conference, there were important differences in interpretation of 
the decision to approach the Third International. The R. P. C. saw the vote for 
sympathetic affiliation to the Comintern, as more important than the I. L. P. connections 
to the group of 'left' socialists. 6 However, whilst Brockway and other members of the 
Party leadership made enquiries of the Comintern, their primary commitment was to the 
International 'Left' Bureau. Indeed they argued the I. L. P. could not determine its attitude 
to the C. I. independently from the other parties of the International Bureau. 7 After 
extended but fruitless correspondence with the Communist International the N. A. C. 
took the view that, although opposed to the formation of a new international, it would 
work with the Independent Revolutionary Parties towards the formation of an inclusive 
revolutionary international. 8 It was this line that was submitted to the 1934 annual 
conference in York. 9 
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At York, the R. P. C. proposed further enquires to the third international to clear up the 
difficulties in moving the I. L. P. towards sympathetic affiliation. However, the mood of 
the party had moved against the R. P. C. and the motion was lost 98-51. Instead, the 
N. A. C. line of working with both internationals in united action against fascism and 
war, with the aim of creating a unification of `all genuinely revolutionary sections of the 
working class' was passed by a vote of 102-64.10 The following year the I. L. P. 's 
relationship with the renamed International Bureau for Revolutionary Socialist Unity 
(IBRSU) was firmly cemented. The N. A. C. statement accepted by the conference, 
argued that the IBRSU should be striving to bring the Internationals closer together. The 
statement also called for sympathetic affiliation to the Communist International and 
opposed the formation of a new International. " This opposition to a Fourth 
International brought inevitable resistance from the Trotskyists within the Party, who 
objected to the idea of attempting to bring together 'two bankrupt internationals. ' The 
R. P. C. was represented by Jack Gaster, who on this occasion had proposed an 
amendment that the N. A. C. line would lead to Fourth International, bankrupt of any 
principles. The already heated debate was wound up by Campbell Stephen, who joined 
John McGovern in attacking 'Moscow Gold', a move that caused howls of protest from 
the floor. Maxton in the chair was forced to state that whilst Stephen was speaking at 
the request of the N. A. C. it could not take responsibility for the speech. In the event all 
the amendments were defeated, and a resolution to continue co-operation with the C. I. 
but not to affiliate was carried along with the N. A. C. statement. 12 
In 1936 the issue of Internationals was again raised by the conference, but with the 
R. P. C. out of the I. L. P. the issue was raised by Trotskyists aiming to push for a Fourth 
International. Their motion was overwhelmingly defeated and the conference also 
passed an amendment stating resolute opposition to the formation of such an 
International. 13 The Trotskyist demands, despite the departure of the majority of the 
Marxist Group in 1936, were again raised in 1938 and again overwhelmingly defeated. 
The battles of the first half of the 1930s, when it was unclear which International 
Affiliation I. L. P. conferences would vote for, were over. The I. L. P., by 1935 was firmly 
connected to the International Bureau for Revolutionary Socialist Unity. 
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9.3 The International Bureau 
The Left International Committee, nevef intended as an alternative International, was 
made up of a number of Socialist groups who found themselves uncomfortable with 
both the L. S. I. and the Comintern. The Committee, formed in 1931, initially had seven 
affiliated parties. Apart from the I. L. P. only two of these seven had, in 1931, an 
affiliation to the L. S. I., the Polish I. L. P. and the Polish Bund. The two Polish parties 
worked in difficult conditions, which meant that it was impossible for the Bund, a 
Jewish Socialist organisation, to get a representative to the 1932 foundation conference, 
and it was represented by the representative from the Polish I. L. P., which had a 
membership of approximately 3,000.14 Of the four other parties the Norwegian Labour 
Party was by far the largest, with a membership of 80,000 as well as considerable 
influence within the Norwegian Trade Union movement. 15 The Norwegian Party was 
unique at the conference in being the largest party representing labour interests in its 
own country. However, by 1935 the Norwegian Labour Party had dropped out of the 
Bureau to support League of Nations sanctions against Abyssinia. They then 
concentrated their international efforts on moves to establish a United Scandinavian 
Front with the Social Democratic Parties of Sweden and Denmark. 16 
Of the remaining three parties the Bulgarian left was the smallest, and whilst it 
remained within the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party publishing a paper with a 
circulation of about two and half thousand, it felt restricted by the larger organisation. '? 
In Holland the 'Left' of the Socialist Party, led by P. J. Schmidt, found itself in 
increasing conflict with the wider party over the unemployment question. After the 
'left's' paper was suppressed by the party it decided to found a new Independent 
Socialist Party. In the month that the party had been in existence before the 1932 
conference it had established 78 branches and claimed over 6,000 members. In addition 
the circulation of the weekly paper, De Fakkel, had risen from 5,000 to 15,000.18 The 
Dutch Trotskyist organisation, the R. S. P., was also briefly a member of the bureau. 
However, by 1935 the R. S. P. and I. S. P. had amalgamated to form the Dutch 
Revolutionary Socialist Workers Party, which left the Bureau in order to support 
Trotsky's moves to create a Fourth International. 19 In Germany the S. A. P. had been 
formed out of the SPD for similar reasons. The strength of fascism and the German 
Communist Party's vicious attacks on the S. A. P. led to a temporary return to the 
S. P. D 2° The S. A. P. remained in the International Bureau until 1938 when it left in 
support of the Popular Front line. 
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By 1935 the Bureau had settled on the name 'the International Bureau for Revolutionary 
Socialist Unity. ' They declared that it was an association of 'Revolutionary Socialist 
Parties' unaffiliated to either the Second or Third International who had joined together 
with the purpose of 'developing common international action between its own sections 
and with other revolutionary sections of the Working-class movement; with the object 
of preparing the formation of a reconstituted International on a Revolutionary Socialist 
basis. ' This they suggested was in opposition to 'the reformist and compromising 
policies of the Second and Third Internationals. ' The Bureau stood on a Class based 
programme which opposed 'collaboration with the Capitalist Class, Capitalist 
Governments, or Capitalist Parties in time of either war or peace. ' This they took to 
include revolutionary resistance to any war conducted by a Capitalist Government 
whether through the League of Nations or not. Their position against the Third 
International and against the League of Nations and an insistence on the need to 
maintain freedom of criticism of Soviet Russia placed them firmly in opposition to the 
Soviet Union despite their recognition of it as the first Workers' State. 21 
The development of the Bureau was speeded up in 1935 when, with many of the IBRSU 
operating in illegal conditions, the I. L. P. took responsibility for the Secretariat of the 
Bureau. Its headquarters were moved to London where they remained until January 
1939 when the headquarters were transferred to Paris. 22 A new stress was placed on the 
development of contacts with 'lefts' in the Second International and on collaboration 
with socialist organisations in colonial countries, especially in India, Egypt and 
Palestine, whilst it was claimed that constant contact was maintained with 'lefts' in the 
Dominions and South America. The formal organisation of the Bureau was tightened 
and from November 1935 it published a bi-monthly Revolutionary Socialist Bulletin. 23 
The Bulletin drew together reports of independent left wing activity from about 
eighteen countries including Spain, Italy, Austria, Belgium, Sweden, Norway, 
Denmark, Holland, Poland, Romania, USA, Ceylon, India and Egypt. 24 
In October 1936 the Bureau arranged an International Revolutionary Socialist Congress. 
The congress was the first large scale delegate congress which the Bureau had 
organised, and inevitably the issue of Spain dominated the agenda. 25 The congress 
agreed that the issue was not 'Capitalist democracy versus Fascism, but of Workers' 
Power versus Fascism. ' Thus, they argued 'it is the duty of the whole working-class 
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movement and each working-class Government to go to the active aid of the Spanish 
workers and their Government by the provision of arms. ' Julian Gorkin obtained the 
support of the Congress for POUM's actions in joining the Government by stressing the 
anti-Popular Front line, that it had only 'agreed to go into the Government because it 
had accepted the socialisation of land and of industry as its immediate programme. i26 A 
further large conference was scheduled for Barcelona the following January. 
The situation in Barcelona, and the increasing pressure on POUM led to delays in the 
scheduling of the conference but it was eventually and unfortunately agreed that the 
conference should be scheduled in that city in the early weeks of May. Despite the 
presence of the Bureau Office in Barcelona, given the events of that time in Barcelona 
the Congress was postponed and took place in Paris the following February. 27 Although 
the I. L. P. delegation was broadly satisfied with the conference there were two important 
exceptions. First, the conference was influenced by the International Communist 
Opposition, suggesting that revolutionary socialist parties should under no 
circumstances take part in a Popular Front. Second, the conference rejected the I. L. P. 
suggestion of a universal condemnation of alliances between Workers' States and 
Capitalist States. 28 
Nevertheless there appeared to be an increasing level of co-operation with elements of 
the working-class movement as the conference was attended by members of the 
International Communist Opposition and some workers' organisations in colonial 
countries. George Padmore, representing the African Negro Workers' Movement 
declared that 'it has been a splendid conference. ' The Bureau also welcomed new 
affiliation from the Palestine Workers Party, the Archo-Marxist [sic] Party of Greece, 
and the "Alarm" Group of Czechoslovakia whilst the Dutch Revolutionary Socialist 
League renewed its affiliation to the Bureau. At the same time it was able to agree a 
broad set of seven principles to which all affiliated organisations were expected to 
subscribe in a disciplined fashion. Nevertheless problems of co-operation and unity 
remained, with the Bureau rejecting the Trotskyist pressure for a fourth International. 29 
Further within the Bureau itself there was a developing tension between the SAP and 
the other parties over the opposition to Popular Front politics. This disagreement was 
contained at the 1938 conference with a compromise statement which accepted the 
correctness of the Workers' Front line but allowed for temporary agreements with petty 
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bourgeois organisations providing the scope for independent revolutionary class action 
was not limited. However, within the year the SAP had left the Bureau over the 
issue. Mover the following year the departure of the SAP was offset for the Bureau when 
the International Communist Opposition applied for affiliation. Further a number of 
other organisations signed up to the principles of the bureau but were unprepared to 
apply the IBRSU's discipline to themselves. 31 
During the final period of 1938 the operations of the Bureau were further consolidated. 
During the September crisis an International Workers' Front against war was established 
on the initiative of the Bureau, the French PSOP, the Dutch RSAP and the ICO, an 
appeal to 'Workers of the world' was released and a detailed statement on war was 
adopted. This was followed at the beginning of 1939, by a proposal from the American 
Independent Labour League (until shortly before the American section of the ICO) for 
the establishment of an International Revolutionary Centre. The same discussions also 
saw the I. L. P. relinquish the Secretariat which it had held since 1935, with the position 
initially transferred to Paris. 32 However, with the outbreak of war in May 1939 the 
International Bureau's name changed to International Revolutionary Marxist Centre and 
its headquarters moved first to New York and then following the dissolution of 
Independent Labour League, was moved again to Mexico, with Julian Gorkin of POUM 
as Secretary. 33 
The I. L. P. 's relationship with the International Bureau was increasingly close. The 
Party's policy of maintaining association with the International Bureau was increasingly 
firm. These close ties with the Parties of the International Bureau provide an important 
context for understanding the I. L. P. 's response to the international events of the 1930s; 
in particular the crises in Abyssinia and Spain. 
9.4 Abyssinia 
At the end of 1934 fighting had broken out on the ill-defined border between Abyssinia 
and Italian Somaliland and Italian troops began mobilisation. The League of Nations led 
by Britain, attempted to place pressure on the Italians not to open hostilities in Ethiopia, 
but despite this the Italians invaded Abyssinia in October 1935. Within each of the 
major parties in Britain there was support for League of Nations sanctions against Italy. 
However, there were also divisions within each of the major parties, which in Labour's 
case led to the resignation of Lansbury as leader. 34 The Communist Party, with the 
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Soviet Union having joined the League of Nations in 1934, argued in support of League 
of Nations sanctions against Italy. 35 
The I. L. P., in the New Leader, quickly identified the cause of the dispute as the rival 
Imperialist interests of the different countries, with the focus firmly on their economic 
interests. 36 As the crisis accelerated the I. L. P. began mobilisation against what it had 
declared to be another 'Capitalist and Imperialist war' which it stood uncompromisingly 
against'whether sanctioned by the League of Nations or not. ' The Inner Executive of the 
Party, controlled by the Parliamentary Group, immediately issued an anti-war 
declaration signed by Maxton, McGovern and Stephen: 
The Independent Labour Party views with abhorrence the threat to world peace by the clash of 
capitalist interests in Abyssinia, but urges the people of Britain to show the National Government 
that they are determined that no British lives shall be placed at the disposal of either side.... In our 
estimation the difference between the two rival dictators and the interests behind them are not 
worth the loss of a single British life. Peace can only be guaranteed by the workers in each country 
refusing to fight for these powerful interests and struggling for workers' control in each nation. The 
Independent Labour Party calls upon its members and the working class of Britain to offer the 
maximum opposition by holding mass demonstrations in their area, by refusing to bear arms, and 
in very other way possible to show the Government their determination that they are not going into 
another blood bath under the false cry of a small defenceless nation. 37 
The N. A. C. released a further manifesto, which stressed that the real issue was 'not 
between Italy and Abyssinia but between Italian and British Imperialism. ' Unlike the 
Communist Party line, there was no support for League Sanctions, whether economic or 
military. Instead, the N. A. C. made a call for working class action against the National 
Government: 
Refuse to support the National Government in imposing sanctions or waging War for British 
Capitalism and Imperialism! 
Carry on the struggle against the National Government, Capitalism, Imperialism and War! 
Carry on the struggle for Workers' Power and Socialism! 38 
Across the country the I. L. P. launched itself enthusiastically into a 'Resist the War' 
campaign and thousands of working class organisations were circularised with an anti- 
war letter signed by Maxton and Brockway. 39 The London I. L. P. organised a committee 
which appeared to unite the different branches of the membership with participation 
from Jack Gaster, Hilda Vernon40 and Carl Cullen of the R. P. C., Bert Matlow of the 
Marxist Group and John Aplin who had campaigned so stridently against the factional 
organisation of the party. 41 The committee declared for a policy of Workers' sanctions 
without supporting the League of Nations: 
War cannot be stopped by pious resolutions. Of what use is it presenting a petition to a prowling 
tiger? Words are only of consequence if followed by deeds. The forces of the workers must at once 
be asserted. Without waiting for the League of Nations or the national Government we must 
follow the magnificent example of the Trade Unions in South Africa who by refusing to handle 
goods, already have stopped supplies destined for Italy. 42 
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In Scotland the I. L. P. was also active in promoting its own line against the League of 
Nations sanctions, the TUC and Communist Party line, holding mass demonstrations in 
the centre of Glasgow addressed by the Party's MPs. 3 Similar meetings although on a 
smaller scale were organised in every division. 44 
New Leader carried articles written by cricketer, Finchley I. L. P. chairman and Marxist 
Group leader C. L. R. James on the crisis. James stressed the continuities between the 
Imperialism of Mussolini and the League of Nations plan for Abyssinia, concluding in 
favour of working class action against both Italy and other forms of Imperialism: 
Workers of Britain, peasants and workers of Africa, get closer together for this and for other fights. 
But keep far from the Imperialists and their Leagues and covenants and sanctions. Do not play the 
fly to their spider. 
Now as always, let us stand for independent organisation and independent action. We have to 
break our own chains. Who is the fool that expects our gaolers to break them? 45 
The I. L. P. 's initial response to the Abyssinian crisis thus appeared to be principled and 
united. A workers' sanctions line also appeared to set the party apart from all the major 
parties including the Communist Party. Even in London, the division where factional 
fighting was at its strongest, the different groups had united with those in support of the 
majority on the N. A. C. in order to present a single policy. This had then allowed the 
I. L. P. to begin mobilisation of support through mass meetings and demonstrations at 
which the I. L. P. point of view appeared distinctive. For a time, it appeared as though the 
issue could be used to gain support for the Party as individuals attracted to the line with 
even some prominent Labour Party members drawn into support. For example, Thomas 
Johnson used the front page of Forward to announce his support for 'Brockway's line of 
Workers' sanctions. i46 However, behind this success the reality of the Party's position 
was very different. The issue, which had seemed to some as though it could unite the 
divided party, instead led to open conflict. 
The Workers' sanctions line of Gaster of the R. P. C., James of the Marxist Group and 
Brockway from the I. L. P. leadership, which had been implicit in the original New 
Leader article presupposed a level of support for the Abyssinians. The Inner Executive 
line, expressed in their manifesto and supported by the N. A. C. manifesto, assumed 
neither side should be supported. Further, a majority of members of the R. P. C., 
including leader Dr Cullen, argued, in line with the Communist Party for support for the 
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League of Nations. The result of these different positions within the Party was open 
conflict and frustration. 
In the October 1935 issue of Controversy the London Divisional Council Emergency 
Committee which had united the warring factions in that area wrote with disgust at the 
policy adopted by first the Inner Executive and subsequently by the N. A. C. They 
complained at the flaws in the N. A. C. 's analysis which classified Italy and Abyssinia 
together. The N. A. C. position suggested an opposition to War and the National 
Government. The London Committee wanted to actively oppose not only British but 
also Italian Imperialism: 
Abyssinia and Italy cannot be classed together. The N. A. C. analysis is wrong. ... The 
defence of 
Abyssinia at this particular time is our responsibility. The defeat of British Imperialism is also our 
responsibility. We cannot divorce these two tasks, and act as though our responsibilities began and 
ended in this country though our actions must necessarily begin at home. 
For the London Committee it was thus crucial to find a way of opposing Italian 
aggression without falling into the 'wrong' line of the Communist Party and supporting 
the League of Nations and British Imperialism. The solution was to be found in the 
active policy of pure Workers' Sanctions, advocated unhesitatingly by so many within 
the Party. 
[The N. A. C. line] confuses the Imperialist line of the TUC with the wrong but completely different 
line of the C. P. It sees nothing but the necessity to resist our Home Government, with no concrete 
proposals for the period before the outbreak of war, and only the pure pacifist line if war should 
come. We must not think, as the N. A. C. is doing, in terms of rallying those only who are with us 
now- they are too few. We must think and plan in terms of winning over those who are not yet 
with us... We must raise the call for workers' action under workers' control. 47 
This frustration with the N. A. C. line was not restricted to the London Division. The 
N. A. C. received a number of complaints about its lack of support for Workers' 
Sanctions including those from the Party's Divisional Councils in Scotland, Lancashire 
and Yorkshire. Further the N. A. C. could do little to resolve the conflict as it found itself 
increasingly split. Indeed, when they met to discuss the issue in October a stalemate had 
48 been reached. 
In this initial period of the Abyssinian crisis, divisions had emerged within the I. L. P. 
based on three opposing viewpoints. However, virtually all those who supported the 
imposing sanctions on Italy through the League of Nations had left the party with the 
R. P. C. Following this, the Party was able to agree on the negative aspects of a policy 
on the conflict; opposition to the League of Nations and its sanctions, and opposition to 
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War. 49 However, there remained two strongly opposed viewpoints on Abyssinia. One, 
the position championed by the Parliamentary Group, was that the working-class should 
refuse to take sides in the conflict. The second, advanced by the International Bureau, 
Brockway and the Marxist Group, proposed a policy of Workers' Sanctions against 
Italian Imperialist designs on Abyssinia. Whilst the N. A. C. stressed the consensual line 
of opposition to War, many of the most active groups within the party continued to 
press for Workers' Sanctions, angry at the way in which the Parliamentary Group, 
through control of the Inner Executive, appeared to be able to steamroller the rest of the 
Partyy. 5° These frustrations were intensified by the conduct of a particular section of the 
Party during the 1936 Keighley Conference. 
The debate on the Abyssinian question at Keighley centred on the change in the initial 
line of the New Leader, which had supported the Abyssinians and its reversal by the 
Inner Executive which had later been endorsed by the N. A. C. The opposition to these 
changes was led by C. L. R. James who started by trying to refer back the N. A. C. report, 
arguing for the centrality of struggle against Imperialism and the need to assist colonial 
peoples. The argument received support from around the country, and from all sections 
of the Party. Brockway was the leading member of the N. A. C. to lend his weight to the 
position, making use of the similar line taken by Fred Jowett in the Bradford I. L. P. 
News. The reference back was also supported by a number of divisional councils, most 
notably London with C. A. Smith, and Lancashire, whose representative accused the 
Inner Executive of basing their line on political expediency in the light of the election. 
The Parliamentary Group received support from some in Scotland, including James 
Carmichael, the Scottish organiser, who argued that Workers' Sanctions against Italy 
had no chance of success. But in the main the members of the Parliamentary Group 
were left to speak for themselves with Buchanan strongly refusing to accept 'the verdict 
of the League of Nations that Italy was the aggressor nation. ' He also ridiculed the idea 
that propaganda for working-class action could be got over to the masses organised in 
the trade union movement arguing that 'the reformist leaders were the obstacle to such a 
method. ' However, the most consistent line of defence, which was used by all members 
of the Parliamentary Group was to argue that 'the only way to fight Imperialism was to 
smash Imperialist Britain. ' 
299 
When it came to voting, James' reference back of the N. A. C. report was joined by a 
resolution from Lancashire Division Council backing the early New Leader line and 
stating that the action of the National Council was 'in direct conflict with declared Party 
policy and a contradiction of Party discipline. ' The Lancashire resolution was carried 
by a substantial majority on a vote of 70 to 57. The reference back was carried but by a 
margin of only one vote. It appeared that a considerable victory had been won against 
the Parliamentary Group. 
However, this appearance was quickly reversed. Following the day's proceedings the 
Parliamentary Group met and decided to continue its opposition to the Workers' 
Sanction line despite the conference decision. The following day (Monday), Maxton 
presented the conference with a set of options which many considered unpalatable. 
Either the conference reverse its earlier decision, putting the policy to a plebiscite, or 
face an open revolt from the Parliamentary Group: 
This conference is absolutely united in its opposition to capitalism and imperialist war in its view 
that the Abyssinian war is a struggle between British and Italian imperialism, both of which would 
sacrifice Abyssinia, and in its opposition to Government or League action against Italy, including 
the use of military or economic sanctions. 
There is a difference in the party on the issue of working-class action against Italy. The Chairman 
of the Party, the three members of the Inner Executive, the Parliamentary Group, and other 
members of the National Council are unable conscientiously to operate the decision reached 
yesterday. 
The National Council therefore asks, having regard to the narrowness of the majority, that the 
matter at issue be referred back to the Party for decision in three months time by a ballot vote of 
the membership and that in the mean time the conference should express its confidence in the 
National Council and allow liberty for the expression of differing views within the Party. 
Inevitably the position of the Parliamentary Group caused fierce anger from some of 
those, most notably the Marxist Group, who felt that they had won a legitimate victory 
the previous day. However, many of those who had supported the sanctions line the 
previous day, led by Brockway, were not prepared to lose the Parliamentary Group. 
Brockway stated that though he supported the decision of the conference he felt it 
would be 'a bad blow for the Party' if the decision taken the day before involved the loss 
particularly of the chairman. He urged the delegates to accept the proposal for a 
plebiscite of the membership for 'the sake of the maintenance of the I. L. P. and its work 
and after a heated debate the proposal was carried by 93 votes to 39. 
Following the conference, and after extended discussions the N. A. C. decided the 
plebiscite should be split into two questions. The first asked whether the I. L. P. should 
have 'declared against Italy and in favour of Abyssinia by the refusal of war materials to 
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Italy. ' The second reversed the question and asked whether the party should 'have 
refused to back either Italy or Abyssinia and opposed the sending of war materials to 
either side. ' 
The issues were debated in a special issue of Controversy devoted to the question of 
whether workers should take sides in the struggle between Italy and Abyssinia. Two 
members of the Parliamentary Group, Maxton and McGovern argued the case against 
along with the Birmingham Quaker Joseph Southall. The contrary position was put by 
Brockway, Bob Edwards the Lancashire N. A. C. member and West Indian Marxist 
Grouper CLR James. 
Those who opposed taking sides in the dispute stressed two points. First they 
emphasised the need to postpone war for as long as possible which appealed to the 
strongly anti-war and pacifist tradition within the Party. As Maxton argued this would 
assist the Soviet Union to get'her social and economic machinery in full working order' 
thus 'demonstrating its superiority over capitalism in a manner so clear as to be beyond 
argument and denial' and at the same time the delay would allow 'the working-class 
movements in capitalist countries should have time to rally themselves, reorganise 
themselves, and get united on a real policy of struggle. ' Second, they gave central place 
to the need to oppose British Imperialism suggesting that supporting Abyssinia was to 
aid British Imperialism: 
If I believed in Machiavellian tactics I could easily argue that to those who wish British 
Imperialism weakened a pro-Italian policy was the correct line. To take a pro-Abyssinian line was 
to aid British Imperialism. That was the popular line in this country. 
On the other hand, those who supported workers' sanctions, apart from pointing the 
recruitment possibilities of such a line, stressed the need to move beyond the Party's 
traditional views adopted during the Great War. C. L. R. James angrily argued that Italian 
aggression was the issue: 
Is there any child of five who does not know that first and foremost in this question is the fact that 
the Italian army are using every means at their disposal to destroy the Abyssinian army in order to 
make Abyssinia a colony ... No interest of British Imperialism in Abyssinia can obscure this plain 
and simple fact. It is waste of ink and paper to have to write it. 
Brockway in a similar vein suggested that the I. L. P. could only succeed by challenging 
all forms of Imperialism, whether British or not. 
We must find a policy that strikes at both Italian and British Imperialism. This means supporting 
Workers sanctions and not Imperialist sanctions. The strongest case for independent working-class 
action is that it challenges Imperialism abroad and Capitalism at home at one and the same time. 
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Despite these arguments two factors combined in favour of the Parliamentary Group 
position. First, by the time of the plebiscite, the immediacy of the crisis had passed. The 
policy of workers' sanctions had seemed most plausible at the outbreak of the crisis 
almost a year before the plebiscite. By the Keighley conference, in March, much of its 
relevance was diminished although anger against the Parliamentary Group was still 
clearly widespread. However, by the time of the actual plebiscite in May Haile Salassie, 
the Emperor of Abyssinia, had been forced to leave Abyssinia and Mussolini had 
proclaimed the foundation of a new Roman Empire. It was no longer so clear what 
positive impact an I. L. P. declaration for workers' sanctions could have had. Second, a 
declaration for workers' sanctions would split the Parliamentary Group from the Party, a 
consequence which many of those who might otherwise have supported workers' 
sanctions found unpalatable. In such circumstances it was not surprising that the results 
of the Ballot supported the Parliamentary Group's position by the considerable majority 
5 of 809 to 554.1 
The plebiscite was a defeat for those who sought a more interventionist opposition to 
Imperialism across the world, and it appeared to represent a victory for the more pacifist 
line of the Parliamentary Group. It also, in terms reminiscent of the debates over fusion 
with the SDF in 1898, indicated much about the real distribution of power within the 
I. L. P. However, in reality the compromise that the plebiscite represented gave only very 
tenuous support to the Parliamentary Group position. 
The N. A. C. immediately stressed that the result of the plebiscite did not lay 'down a 
policy to be applied under all circumstances. ' The Executive Committee was thus given 
the task of examining the question of how the I. L. P. should react in situations where the 
British Government was not involved. 52 The policy which the N. A. C. produced and was 
passed at the 1937 Glasgow conference was a defeat for the policy of the Parliamentary 
Group. The decisions supported the initial decisions of the 1936 conference and 
opposed the result of the plebiscite in backing workers' sanctions. 
In the event of an attack by an Imperialist Government on a subject people, it will be the duty of 
the British working class to take all possible action in support of the subject people, including 
organised action to refuse war materials to the Imperialist Government. 53 
There were a number of conditions which made the resulting policy slightly more 
palatable to those who had been victorious in the plebiscite. The N. A. C. was given 
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discretion to allow for alteration to this policy if British (or other) Imperialism would be 
assisted by this action or if the leadership of the subject people were not of a 'character 
which will eventually make for the emancipation of the working and peasant 
populations: Nevertheless, the temperament of the decision was clearly in line with 
those who had supported a policy of workers' sanctions. The plebiscite was a short-term 
measure to keep the Parliamentary Group within the Party. The tensions were evident, 
but by the time they were exposed the situation had changed substantially; not only 
because of the rapidly changing situation in Abyssinia, but more importantly, because 
of the civil war in Spain. 
9.5 Spain 
The I. L. P. has taken an important place in commentary on Britain and the Spanish Civil 
War. George Orwell's Homage to Catalonia, one of the most widely read interpretations 
on the war, is based on his time with the I. L. P. unit. This impression was further 
strengthened by Ken Loach's recent film Land and Freedom, inspired at least in part by 
the recollections and instructions of Stafford Cottmann, another of the members of the 
I. L. P. unit. Thus, images of the I. L. P. contingent have formed an important part of the 
story of the British contribution to the Spanish Civil War. Still, such images represent a 
counterpoint to the dominant narrative which continues to be underwritten by major 
historians, especially those with former C. P. links, one consequence of which has been 
the tendency to simplify the I. L. P. line as the alternative to Stalinism 54 
These images, Orwell's more than Loach's, tell an important part of the truth of the 
impact of the Spanish Civil War on the I. L. P. The suppression of POUM and the event 
in Barcelona in May 1937 transformed the war for the I. L. P. An enthusiastic response 
and initial period of activity was frustrated by the impact of these events. However, the 
reality of the I. L. P. 's position was more ambiguous. Even in the initial phase of the war 
there were serious concerns from many leading I. L. P. members. Either because of 
concern about the Catholic reaction to this position or because of pacifist feelings they 
felt unable to fully support the Party's position on the war. 
I. L. P. support in Glasgow was closely related to the Catholic community and the leaders 
of the Glasgow I. L. P. had an acute awareness of the risk of alienating that support. 
Support for the Nationalists in the Civil War dominated the leadership of the Catholic 
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community throughout Britain, and even most of those who opposed this view argued 
for neutrality. These views were largely shared by much of the Catholic working class, 
as one recent commentator has argued 'hostility to the Republic was, therefore, 
widespread amongst working class Catholics. 55 This dilemma was particularly acute for 
the I. L. P., all of whose representatives in Glasgow considered themselves dependent on 
Catholic support. This problem was emphasised by the defeat of Catholic Glasgow 
I. L. P. leader John Heenan in the 1936 local elections. Members of the Catholic 
community saw Heenan's defeat as an expression of the power of the Catholic vote to 
dislodge those who were not sufficiently sympathetic to their case. The other I. L. P. 
leaders were threatened by hecklers with a similar fate. 56 
The response of the I. L. P. leadership in Glasgow varied. Buchanan, for example, 
remained silent on the issues surrounding the conflict and it was later suggested that he 
refused to accept the party line of support for the Republican Government. 57 In contrast 
McGovern was one of the labour movement's most combative speakers on behalf of the 
Republican cause. In November 1936, McGovern accompanied John McNair, the 
I. L. P. 's international representative, to Barcelona with the purpose of investigating the 
Catholic position in Spain. 58 On his return he published his views in the pamphlet Why 
Bishops Back Franco which obtained a circulation of 28,000. In the pamphlet, based on 
'interviews and observation', he argued that Franco was using Churches as fortresses 
whilst claiming that Catholics were not being treated harshly. He also argued that the 
Spanish Church had 'become a thoroughly Capitalist Institution. i59 
McGovern also embroiled himself in a number of large set piece debates in Glasgow 
against prominent Catholics such as his June 1937 debates with Glasgow Catholic 
journalist Douglas Jerrold at St. Andrew's Hall which attracted three pages of coverage 
in Forward. Whilst Jerrold based his defence in religious terms, McGovern countered 
with a class-based argument. 60 Some members of the I. L. P. in Glasgow such as 
Buchanan and Heenan, who rejoined the Labour Party after complaining that the I. L. P. 
did not recognise the importance of attending Mass for Catholics fighting Franco, were 
reluctant to oppose the leadership of the Catholic community. However, these concerns 
within the Party over the treatment of Catholics by the Republicans appear only to have 
been expressed by the relatively small number of individuals concerned about the 
electoral position in strongly Catholic areas. 
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The argument for participation was further reinforced because the revolt against the 
Spanish Government, on July 18 1936, came immediately after the internal party 
disputes over the correct policy to take during the Abyssinian crisis. As part of the 
compromise that had seen that dispute resolved it had been agreed to give support in the 
case of 'a civil war against the Capitalist class in another country. ' With this agreement 
so recently reached along with the Party's increasing widely accepted commitment to a 
'Revolutionary Socialist' policy the pacifist elements within the party were unable to 
mount any serious opposition to support for the Spanish Civil War. 
Thus, a number of leading members of the party including Brockway and Mixton came 
to support the struggle. Their support was, however, conditional on the fact that the 
'struggle was a working class struggle against the capitalist class. ' Thus, the Workers' 
Front line, which suggested that united working class action independent of other 
classes, was the only policy which could defeat fascism in Spain, was undoubtedly 
believed by the leading members of the I. L. P. However, it was also the basis of an 
uneasy compromise which allowed those with pacifist leanings to support the Spanish 
Civil War whilst not feeling as though they were compromising their general anti- 
militarism. 
Thus, the most important constant in the official analysis of the Spanish situation by the 
I. L. P. was the stressing of working class activity and the Workers' Front policy. Thus, 
the Party stressed the role of the working class in the short term process of preventing 
the immediate victory of the fascist revolt. As John McNair wrote in the I. L. P. 's 1936 
pamphlet In Spain Now!: 
It must never be forgotten that Spain was not saved by the Government in Madrid, by loyal 
elements in the Army or even by the loyalty of the larger part of the fleet. Spain was saved by the 
spontaneous and united efforts of the workers and in the beginning they were not even armed. 
This analysis allowed McNair to unite anti-fascist and revolutionary socialist sentiment 
to declare complete and unflinching support from the I. L. P. for the Republican side. 
We say to our Spanish comrades quite simply: "We are with you in every fibre of our bodies and 
minds right up to the end. Your sufferings are our sufferings because your fight is ours, and when 
victory finally comes to you it will be to us a source of happiness to realise that we at least have 
not hindered, but, to all the extent of our powers have tried to help you towards that triumph. i61 
The 1937 I. L. P. annual conference stood entirely behind McNair's sentiments. It 
declared the party in 
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complete solidarity with the Spanish workers in their war against Fascism and in their use of 
Workers' Power for the Social Revolution in Catalonia and other territories of Spain freed from 
Fascism. 
In these initial stages of the conflict the Party's support for the Republican side was 
demonstrated in a number of practical ways. 
In the first place the I. L. P. arranged for an envoy, John McNair, to be sent to Barcelona. 
McNair, up to that point had been acting as assistant secretary of the International 
Bureau for Revolutionary Socialist Unity. He arrived in Barcelona in August 1936 
taking with him the first £100 that the party had raised to assist the Republicans. 62 
McNair then worked to establish an international committee of the Bureau in Barcelona 
with him acting as chairman, and Bob Smillie as International representative. 63 
The I. L. P. also set out plans for an exhibition on the subject of the Spanish Civil War. 
Initially it planned to try to co-ordinate the exhibition with the Spanish Medical Aid 
Committee, the London Trades Council, the London Labour Party and the Communist 
Party. For the I. L. P. Edward Fletcher of Birmingham, later Labour MP for Darlington, 
went out to Barcelona with Bob Smillie. He was joined by Roland Penrose to collect 
material for the exhibition. The other organisations declined to participate and the 
Spanish Exhibition, which opened 20 February 1937 at 36 Ludgate Hill, London, 
consisted entirely of I. L. P. material. The exhibition was arranged by Penrose and 
Thomas Grey as Fletcher stayed in Barcelona to help McNair and the international 
committee. 64 
The initial wave of I. L. P. activity also saw a large amount of fund raising. For example 
the Party bought and equipped an Ambulance, which they named after Joaquin Maurin, 
the POUM leader who was widely believed to be dead. The ambulance was driven to 
Spain by W. B. Martin, described as an 'artillery expert', who then volunteered on the 
Huesca Front. 65 The I. L. P. also aimed to raise clothing and food through a series of 
appeals in the initial phase of the conflict. Brockway outlined the chief aims of the 
I. L. P. 's fundraising strategy in the New Leader stressing in addition to obtaining medical 
supplies and medical units the necessity of raising money for weapons, getting relief to 
the victims of the war and of stopping transports getting through to the Nationalists. 66 
The Party was able to act effectively on only some of these points but it intervened in a 
variety of ways. These methods ranged from political lobbying to personal appeals. On 
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the political side the I. L. P. was active in the successful efforts to persuade the Co- 
operative movement to revise its attitude and send food and medical supplies to Spain, 
canvassing support at both national and local levels. 67 On the personal side the Party 
held a Socialist self-denial week which raised £144 for Spain and directed an appeal 
specifically to its women readers to knit clothing to help the Spanish workers: 68 
To Women Readers- Are you knitting those sweaters and socks for the Spanish Workers? They are 
needing them very badly - both for adults and children. 69 
In addition to these attempts to aid the Republican side from a distance the Party also 
attempted to help in more direct ways. Most importantly, it decided to send a group of 
fighters out to Spain to demonstrate in the most practical way possible their support for 
the cause. 
The police, aware of the Party's attempts to recruit fighters had been keeping a close eye 
on the Party. Special Branch's botched attempts to keep a surreptitious watch on the 
Party's headquarters, which resulted in them being forced to decline the offer of a cup of 
tea from staff inside, made the national news, whilst Brockway later claimed that three 
members of the police also failed in their attempts to be recruited to the I. L. P. 
contingent. Nevertheless, with this and other police attention and the awareness of 
impending Government legislation to prevent further military aid to Spain, the 
contingent had every reason to be careful. Thus, the march to the train at Victoria 
Station on 1 January 1937 of the group of about twenty-five soldiers-to-be, singing the 
International, under the charge of Bob Edwards, was seen by only a few trusted 
members of the Party who were informed of the departure details. The press were 
informed only later along with a claim that the Party intended to send a further one 
hundred or so men out to Spain. 70 
The war, for the contingent, famously described by George Orwell in his Homage to 
Catalonia, was after this evasion of police attention in Britain, a relatively quite affair. 
The initial group of twenty-five was joined in Spain by a number of others, including 
Eric Blair, then not using his pen name George Orwell. Along with Blair, came Bob 
Williams, a Welshman married to a Spanish girl who joined up with his brother-in-law, 
Ramon. 71 The contingent was also joined at this stage by Bob Smillie, the grandson of 
the famous Scottish miners leader Bob Smillie. Smillie had been working with John 
McNair as the representative Youth section of the International Bureau for 
Revolutionary Socialist Unity. However, he quickly became convinced that he would be 
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of most service at the front and persuaded McNair to agree to him signing up when the 
I. L. P. contingent came over. With these, and other, additions the I. L. P. contingent 
numbered somewhere between thirty and thirty-five. 72 
Eric Blair's childhood experiences in India, at prep school and at Eton are well known. 
The backgrounds of the other members of the contingent were diverse. Members were 
recorded as coming from Belfast, Chorley, Larkhall, Glasgow, Anglesey, Manchester, 
Bristol, Dartford, Bingley, Twickenham and Golders Green. Three had fought in the 
First World War: Charles Doran of Glasgow, Harry Thomas of London and Arthur 
Chambers, who died in 1938 after transferring to a CNT unit. Few others, apart from 
Harry Webb the stretcher-bearer and Paddy O'Hara, from Belfast, who had some 
training in first aid, had either military or medical experience. 
The journey to Spain was relatively uneventful, with the group claiming widespread 
support from those they met: 
From Perpignan right to the Spanish frontier the clenched fist was our welcome, and garage- 
workers, mechanics, small shopkeepers, agricultural workers in the fields, the women-folk and all 
the kiddies, there is not the slightest doubt are solid for the workers' cause. 
On arrival on 10 January at the Lenin Barracks in Barcelona, where they were initially 
stationed, a discussion circle was formed. Whilst the discussion group centred on 
political issues the group was not solely concerned with such topics. A social secretary 
was also appointed to 'arrange concerts and entertainments' and a sports secretary was 
elected with a hasty football match organised between the I. L. P. ers and a team of 
Spanish militia-men. Orwell later described the barracks in bleak manner. 
The whole barracks was in a state of filth and chaos... We ate at long trestle-tables out of 
permanently greasy tin pannikins, and drank out of a dreadful thing called a porrön. 
The contemporary descriptions of meal times which appeared in the New Leader was 
altogether more favourable: 
The food is good but it will take the lads a week to get used to the drinking of wine at practically 
every meal. A packet of cigarettes is supplied to each man per day, and the pay is 10 pesetas. " 
The training received at the Barracks was notoriously short and at the end of January the 
I. L. P. contingent, as the British section of the POUM militia, began their journey, 
stopping off at Lerida, where they were visited by John McNair before leaving for the 
area surrounding Huesca on the Aragon Front on 2 February. 74 At the front the 
contingent took over three advanced posts, about 100 yards distant from the others, 
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joined by communication trenches. The outposts, on the slope of the hills looking west, 
were about two hundred yards from the nearest Fascist lines on the opposite slopes 
looking east. 75 
Bob Edwards, the brigade commander, reporting in the New Leader, was keen to stress 
the most exciting aspects of the unit's work. He wrote about scouting within hearing 
distance along the fascist lines with Blair, of holding their position and dealing with the 
desertion of fascists. The reality of the conttgent's activity was much more mundane. It 
largely consisted of building roads from their dug-out to the nearest Spanish position 
and creating a dug-out for community purposes where they could meet to talk and 
receive instructions. 76 In terms of fighting the fascists the contingent saw relatively little 
action. As Orwell later put it: 
Meanwhile nothing happened, nothing ever happened. The English had got into the habit of saying 
that this wasn't a war it was a bloody pantomime. 
Indeed, the main descriptions of fighting against the fascists which appears both in 
Homage to Catalonia and in the New Leader, concerned a night attack in which some of 
the contingent took part. The plan initiated by the position captain, Benjamin, a French 
speaking Polish Jew, involved fifteen English volunteers in a plan to storm a fascist 
parapet and seize the machine gun which dominated the POUM line. The attack, with 
Paddy Donovan second in command to Benjamin, initially went according to plan. The 
men crawled across the mud of no man's land and captured the parapet. However, the 
machine gun had been removed and the co-ordinated manoeuvres to capture other 
necessary strategic positions failed. The group soon found themselves under attack from 
all sides and retreated with only a small quantity of fascist bombs and injuries to, 
amongst others, Reg Hiddlestone, Paddy Thomas and Douglas Thompson, to show for 
their efforts. 77 
The contrast between this brief moment of close combat and the everyday experience of 
the trenches was summarised, in Orwell's recollection, by someone shouting 'This is 
war! Isn't it bloody? ' Nevertheless injuries to the contingent were not restricted to that 
'dirty' April night. Arthur 'Lanky' Clinton, from Lancashire and the humorist of the 
contingent, was injured in the shoulder during shelling at the end of March. Philip 
Hunter, of Dartford I. L. P., and Buck Parker both sustained leg injuries shortly before 
the night attack. Bob Williams broke his ankle during shelling in February 1937 and 
Eric Blair was shot through the throat by a sniper. Alongside these injuries Stafford 
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Cottmann, the youngest member of the contingent at only eighteen years old, was 
hospitalised with suspected TB. 78 Thus, despite the limited military role of the 
contingent, a number of its members were injured during the Spanish Civil war. This 
effort signified for many the attitude of complete and unqualified commitment of the 
I. L. P. towards the War during its early phase. However, whilst the I. L. P. contingent 
may not have played a major part in the military side of the Spanish Civil War it was 
nevertheless involved in the events in May in Barcelona that were to transform the 
I. L. P. attitude to the Spanish Civil War. 
In these events, influentially described in Orwell's Homage To Catalonia, the I. L. P. 
contingent, on leave in Barcelona from the end of April, became involved in the 
fighting between the rival anti-fascist groups. During the initial fighting the I. L. P. 
contingent was split into four separate groups, with eight members in Hotel Falcon, the 
main residence for POUM militia men in Barcelona, six across the road in the Comite 
Local of POUM at the Plaza del Terato, four in the barracks and one or two with John 
McNair at the Executive Committee's head-quarters at 10 Ramblas de los Estudios. The 
members of the I. L. P. contingent between them had very little idea of exactly what was 
happening. Nevertheless, most of the contingent managed to congregate at the Hotel 
Falcon and Comite Local and kept up their spirits in the following days by singing 
reading and talking whilst those who had been on night duty slept. None of the I. L. P. 
contingent were drawn into the fighting in any extended way. 79 
However, the significance of the Barcelona for the I. L. P. lay not so much in the events 
themselves as in the reaction to the situation. Immediately after the events the 
Communist press began to attack POUM, claiming they were solely responsible for the 
fighting and were in league with the fascists in doing so. These accusations were 
quickly published in the Daily Worker, appearing in the 11 May issue. However, there 
was no immediate attack on the I. L. P. itself and the New Leader of the 14 May was 
surprisingly quiet on the issue. However, the New Leader of 21 May carried extensive 
comment on the 'Counter-Revolution in Spain'. Brockway argued that the Communists 
were on the wrong side of the barricades and were now 'committed to the defence of 
property', suggesting that the Communist Parties not only in Spain, but everywhere, had 
ceased to be revolutionary parties. 
Sincere revolutionary Socialists will increasingly turn to the Parties in each country which carry on 
the revolutionary tradition. In Spain that party is the POUM. In this country that Party is the I. L. P. 
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The articles also gave the first account of the I. L. P. contingent's presence and activities 
during the events. The response from the Communist cress was immediate. J. R. 
Campbell wrote an article asking 'Is the I. L. P. for winning the war or aiding Franco? ' for 
the following day's Daily Worker. In the same issue Palme Dutt accused the I. L. P. of 
having involved itself in 'the criminal armed attempt against the Spanish Peoples Front. ' 
Following this, the accusations from the Communist Party against the I. L. P. flowed 
thick and fast, with considerable attention being given to the subject at the 14th National 
Communist Congress later that month. Gallacher and Campbell in particular were 
vitriolic in their attacks whilst Pollitt's speech signalled the effective end of the Unity 
Campaign. Stafford Cottmann found himself expelled from Bristol YCL for'taking part 
in the fascist rising in Barcelona. '80 
These problems were exacerbated later in the year by the reporting of statements alleged 
to have been made by Frank Frankford, an I. L. P. contingent member. Frankford was 
arrested by the police and held for some time whilst the police investigated the theft of 
some paintings about which it was suggested that he had evidence. He was eventually 
released, he believed because of the influence of Sam Lesser, a member of the 
International Brigade and then a Daily Worker journalist. Frankford gave an interview 
to Lesser which was transformed into a statement which appeared in the Daily Worker 
on 14 September. The statement accused the POUM contingent of working for the 
fascists and contained specific allegations that there had been collaboration between the 
fascists and the POUM. The allegations were attacked in the New Leader first by John 
McNair and then in detail by Orwell who answered the allegations individually. 
Orwell's article was signed by the fourteen members of the contingent who could be 
contacted at short notice. 81 Brockway later wrote that Frankford came to the I. L. P. and 
withdrew the allegations: 
A few days later the boy arrived in London and came at once to McNair at the I. L. P. Head Office. 
He broke down crying and begged forgiveness. He had been imprisoned in Barcelona and had 
been presented with the document to sign as a condition of freedom. 92 
The Daily Worker undoubtedly distorted the facts of Frankford's interview with Lesser, 
it was forced to correct certain points of the interview two days after it was published. 
The allegations themselves were clearly without substance. However, it appears that 
Frankford himself was not necessarily opposed to the gist, that there was a certain 
fascist outlook amongst the POUM. In an interview with Bernard Crick on 22 
December 1979 Frankford maintained that 'there are things still to be explained' and 
stated that the Daily Worker article, which he agreed he had never signed, was 'quite 
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legitimate in politics' as he was 'a realist'. Indeed, during the interview he went on to 
state that he felt that Orwell was basically a fascist: 
Basically his attitude was Fascist, he didn't like the workers... I don't care what he says and what 
he's written, when you spoke to him he didn't like them, he despised them. That was why I could 
never understand what he was doing there. In fact we said to him that he was a man of the right 
and not of the left and that he had never thrown off his Burma police attitude. I'm sure he despised 
us all, which was why we disliked him. 83 
The relationship between the I. L. P. and the Communist Party continued to deteriorate 
from this point on, and was never to recover from this blow. By the end of the year all 
cordial relations between the Parties had broken down with the Communists, with 
attitudes reminiscent of the class-against-class phase, treating the I. L. P. as in some ways 
more dangerous than the fascists themselves. 84 Thus, the response of the Communist 
International to the events in Barcelona in May 1937 had a profound impact on the 
relationship between the I. L. P. and the Communist Party, removing permanently the 
idea of united left wing action between the two parties. However, the impact of the 
events on the I. L. P. went far beyond the relationship with the Communist Party. 
Not all of the I. L. P. contingent returned home immediately, Arthur Chambers, Bob 
Williams and Reg Hiddlestone all stayed on to fight in Spain. Williams returned home 
in December 1938 after being injured three times, Hiddleston was the final member of 
the contingent left in Spain, returning home in February 1939, leaving Barcelona only 
hours before the fascists entered. However, Chambers was not so lucky, being the only 
member of the I. L. P. contingent to be killed in combat in Spain when he was shot by a 
fascist sniper in August 1938 after transferring to a CNT unit. 85 
Nevertheless, the situation for the members of the I. L. P. contingent in Spain was made 
extremely uncomfortable by the attacks on POUM and it became more so as moves 
were made to ban the I. L. P. 's Spanish 'brother party '. The Party made considerable 
efforts to get its members home safely and several of the I. L. P. contingent made furtive 
returns home escaping police arrest. 86 For example Cottmann, McNair, Blair and his 
wife Eileen O'Shaughnessy made an escape across the border by train after posing as 
wealthy English businessmen. 
87 Other were not so lucky, many members of POUM 
were arrested and some assassinated. Of those closely associated with the I. L. P. brigade 
the arrest of George Kopp, the unit commander, and Harry Milton, one of the American 
members of the contingent, were of particular concern. However, both were eventually 
released. Milton did not spend long in gaol, as McNair ensured his release. Kopp on the 
312 
other hand, despite attempted intervention on his behalf by the I. L. P., remained in 
prison for a further eighteen months. However, most attention both at the time and 
since, has focused on the case of Bob Smillie who died in gaol in Valencia. 
The disputes and difficulties within the I. L. P. Guild of Youth had been extensively dealt 
with by the Party's 1937 Easter Conference. There it had been decided that Smillie, as 
both a hero of the Spanish Civil War and supporter of the party leadership, should lead a 
campaign to reinvigorate the I. L. P. 's youth section. He set out to return home on 10 May 
and was arrested the following day. Initially Spanish Government authorities told the 
I. L. P. 's representatives that the arrest was 'merely a technical matter. ' Nevertheless, as 
he continued to be held both Brockway and Maxton wrote to the Spanish Ambassador. 
Maxton was further assured by the Ambassador that the matter would be investigated. 88 
However, at the beginning of June, Smillie's case was transferred to the Secret Police as 
investigations started into his role in 'rebellion against the authorities' in the events in 
Barcelona. As these investigations began, the authorities reported that Smillie had been 
taken ill and on Friday 11 June shortly after he had been transferred to Provincial 
hospital they claimed he had died of peritonitis. 
Smillie's death has been surrounded in mystery, and has been the subject of much 
speculation. The official I. L. P. report into the investigation, conducted by David Murray 
of Motherwell I. L. P., found that the authorities were guilty of carelessness rather than 
violence or direct malice: 89 
We consider that Bob Smillie's death was due to great carelessness on the part of the responsible 
authorities, which amounted to criminal negligence. 
Against this position it has frequently been asserted that Smillie was 'done to death' by 
the Communist authorities. Recent analysis by Tom Buchanan, of the evidence 
surrounding Smillie's death, focusing on that collected by David Murray, suggests that 
the full facts will probably never be known. However, he makes clear that there are 
good reasons to believe that Smillie did indeed die of appendicitis. In fact one focus of 
Buchanan's argument is to stress the restraint of the I. L. P. leadership and the lack of 
political use made of Smillie's death. He concludes that 
[T]he events surrounding his death suggest a degree of neglect for which the official I. L. P. formula 
of'criminal negligence' barely appears adequate. 90 
However, John Newsinger has presented a letter from Georges Kopp to the I. L. P., 
which seems to indicate that the appendicitis was imaginary and that Smillie was in fact 
kicked to death by his Communist interrogators. The letter is based upon Kopp's 
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claimed recollections of a dossier which he claimed to have had in his possession which 
he had stolen from the Secret Police headquarters whilst imprisoned. In an unpublished 
response, Buchanan convincingly questions many of the facts which Kopp claims to 
have established from his reading of the dossier. Most importantly it is clear from a 
range of sources that Smillie had been unwell for a long period of time with symptoms 
consistent with appendicitis. Given this it is unlikely that the appendicitis was 
'imaginary', simply a 'cover story' invented by the authorities. Buchanan also questions 
Kopp's integrity as an historical witness, although relying on the viewpoint of Orwell's 
biographers to establish these points. 91 This negative view of Kopp's reliability was 
shared by many of those who fought alongside, and even considered themselves friends 
of Kopp. For example Bob Edwards knew and admired Georges Kopp, but nevertheless 
considered him an unreliable witness, and one who was prone to extreme exaggeration: 
I suppose I knew Georges Kopp better than any other person. We lived and worked together 
during the Spanish Civil War on the Aragon Front for three months.... Georges Kopp was one of 
many courageous men who came to Spain to fight because fighting was a kind of career for 
them .... He was 
inclined to exaggerate. For example, he told me he was a friend of Henry Spaark, Cc, 
the Socialist Foreign Minister of Belgium. I met Spaark [sic] and discussed the plight of Georges 
Kopp with him aneifindeed it was Spaark's [sic] intervention that had Georges Kopp released from 
prison. But Spaark de`iiied any knowledge of Georges Kopp, and as far as I am aware, he had no 
background of activity in the Labour Movement of Belgium. 92 
Given these considerations it seems reasonable to, adopt an attitude of some scepticism 
to Kopp's letter and to suppose that the findings of the initial I. L. P. report were largely 
accurate if somewhat underplayed. Smillie died of appendicitis, but he would never 
have done so if he had not been a political prisoner and suffered from 'criminal neglect'. 
The Party's reaction to Smillie's death was an illuminating indication of their political 
position. Inevitably tributes to Smillie flowed in. Stress was placed on his personal 
qualities: his enthusiasm, friendliness, and repeatedly on his love of singing. Emphasis 
was also placed on his political heritage, as Maxton wrote in tribute: 
We knew the stock from which he came. We saw his father and mother living a strenuous 
existence on their little farm in Lanarkshire, toiling early and late on the soil, but still with surplus 
energy to devote to the Socialist Movement, to the unemployed, to the improvement of the 
conditions of the miners living around them. 
We knew his grandfather- that strong leader of the miners, who pioneered their organisation first 
in Lanarkshire, then in Scotland and Great Britain, finally to become a great International 
working-class figure. We knew his grandmother, a great woman who to this day at advanced years 
maintains a spirit of sturdy independence, and staunch adherence to the workers' cause. 93 
His own political activity and role in the working class movement also played a major 
part in the tributes to Smillie: his participation in the Lanarkshire section of the 1935 
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Scottish Hunger March, his role within the Guild of Youth and the International Youth 
Bureau, and of course, his activity with the I. L. P. contingent in the Spanish Civil War. 94 
Despite all of this, and the growing antagonism with the Communist movement, there 
was no attempt to make Smillie into a heroic victim of Stalinist oppression in Spain. 
Indeed mention of the way in which he died was almost absent from the Party literature 
dealing with the incident. For example, the official tribute to him We Carry On 
carefully avoided mentioning the issues which surrounded his illness and death. It 
simply recorded that Smillie had 'died in a hospital in Valencia. ' There was not hint of 
any controversy about the way in which he was treated. His arrest received only a quick 
mention: 'It was while he was on his way home to undertake a national campaign for the 
Guild of Youth and the Spanish workers that he was detained by the authorities. ' There 
was a stark contrast between this, and the way the Communist Party used the reporting 
of deaths for political purposes. 
The events in Barcelona and the resulting suppression of POUM changed the I. L. P. 's 
outlook and activity with respect to Spain. The I. L. P. had, of course, always supported 
POUM. The ejection of Andres Nin from the Catalan Government in December 1936 
for example had brought a series of letters of 'wholehearted support' from the I. L. P. 
expressing support for the POUM line, and calls from the Party for an international 
investigation into the charges against the Spanish Party. 95 
However, support for POUM against the Communists and Socialists in Spain, once seen 
as a relatively small part of the Party's Spanish concerns after the suppression of POUM 
soon became the major focus of their activity. By July the Party had decided to express 
a policy pointing to the overriding importance of tolerance, to secure unity for the defeat 
of the Fascists. 96 The I. L. P. leadership became increasingly involved in attempts to 
secure this tolerance on the ground in Spain. Brockway, for example, visited Spain in 
July as part of the French Committee for the Defence of the Spanish Revolution. Then 
two months later, following the assassination of Nin, Maxton went to Spain as part of a 
deputation from the International Bureau for Revolutionary Socialist Unity. Both 
Brockway and Maxton returned further disillusioned about the role which the 
Communists were playing in the Civil War. 
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Maxton, for example, met both the five leading POUM figures who were being held and 
with a number of leading figures in the Republican Government including the Prime 
Minister, the minister of justice, the minister of the interior and the attorney-general. He 
reported back an overall feeling that the Government 'intends to see that they have a fair 
trial' and that 'no one takes seriously the charge of espionage and that there is no desire 
to pass vindictive sentence for the May events in Barcelona. ' However, he noted that 
this did not match the attitude of the Communist Party: 
Against this I have to say, and I say it with regret, that the Communist Party in Spain carry on a 
day-to-day campaign in their Press, calling for the most drastic action.... If it is strong enough to 
secure the death penalty on our POUM comrades, against the better judgement and understanding 
of the members of the Government cause in Spain, it will be a very bad day's work for the 
Government's cause in Spain. t97 
The Party press increasingly focused on attacking the Communist Party in Spain, with 
articles on these matters by ex-members of its Spanish contingent, on supporting POUM 
and carrying articles written by the Spanish Party's leadership. 98 Behind the scenes the 
Party was working, trying to raise money to support POUM and establishing contacts 
with the Spanish Republican Government to secure the release of the POUM prisoners, 
and attempting to win support for POUM within the British working class movement. 99 
The only relief activity which the Party was directly involved after May 1937 came 
through their assistance in arranging a Basque Children's home in Somerset. The forty- 
one children the I. L. P. made itself responsible for arrived at the Grange in Street, 
Somerset on 7 June 1937. The Grange, an old country house with large gardens which 
had previously been used as a home for mentally deficient children, was offered to the 
Party for use in housing the Basque children by Mr and Mrs Clark, of the shoe family, 
in Street. '°° The home stayed open for exactly two years, until June 7 1939, at which 
time twenty six of the children returned to their families. The fifteen remaining children 
were found temporary or permanent adoption places in Britain by the combined efforts 
of the Street Committee and the I. L. P. During its time of operation the home was 
mainly administered by the residents of Street. The Party's input was however 
significant with large sums of money being raised, with John MacCallum Scott chiefly 
responsible for organising the Party's work in Street, assisted by Brockway and 
McNair. 10' 
In 1936 the I. L. P. had understood the Spanish Civil War as a revolutionary struggle 
against fascism and capitalism. By the middle of the following year the Party accepted 
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that serious revolutionary hopes had disappeared. The changing situation lead to 
changing attitudes. The I. L. P. maintained its overall support for the war, whilst 
increasingly attacking the role of Communists in Spain. After the May 1937 it would no 
longer be possible to argue, as Jennie Lee did at the 1937 Easter Conference that 
'differences with the Communist Party should not blind us to the great work that the 
Communists are doing in Spain. ' Neither was it possible for Spain to be the great 
rallying cry within the I. L. P. that it was in both within much of the left in Britain and 
within the Party in the early period of the War. Indeed by the end of the war the focus of 
the I. L. P. 's activity was on trying to secure safety for its Spanish comrades from both 
Republican and Nationalist gaols. 102 
9.6 Munich 
Perhaps the most public controversy within the I. L. P. during the 1930s came over the 
Munich Crisis. In September 1938, the N. A. C. issued a manifesto in which the Party 
declared 'unconditional opposition to any form of support to the Government for war, ' 
and drew explicit comparison with its position on the 1914-18 War. 103 The Manifesto 
was referred to in a BBC News Bulletin and in the press and a further pamphlet was 
published dealing with the political issues involved in the crisis. The N. A. C. Report of 
the following year declared that these declarations had brought much good publicity for 
the Party. However, the same could not be said for the controversial statements of 
Maxton and McGovern in the House of Commons, and the response that these brought 
from both Party and Press. 
Concerns within the I. L. P. were raised when Maxton in the House of Commons wished 
Chamberlain well before he departed for Munich. Things got worse following Maxton's 
speech during the Commons debate on the Munich agreement. Speaking to a crowded 
House on 4 October Maxton announced his opposition to War as 'the one great over- 
riding evil of humanity' claiming 'nothing could justify it. ' He was sceptical of the 
Munich agreement. 104 However, he suggested that the agreement represented 'breathing 
space' and, whilst distancing himself from Chamberlain's social and political 
philosophy, he went so far as to 'congratulate the Prime Minister on his work'. 
105 
Maxton's comments were sufficient to attract the attention of the press gallery and a 
number of London members of the Party appealed to the Parliamentary Group to 
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explicitly distance themselves from Chamberlain. However, John McGovern, who 
never let slip an opportunity to amplify his colleague's most controversial statements, 
made a speech which added to the problems. Although he reiterated much of what 
Maxton had said, much of the nuanced wording of Maxton's declaration was missing. 
Indeed McGovern's speech contained almost none of the condemnation of British 
Imperialism that was central to both I. L. P. policy and Maxton's speech. The only part of 
the statement which related to Imperialism sounded almost apologetic: 
I recognise that the country does not want war. Britain has a great colonial empire, and wants to 
pursue a policy which would ensure its continuation in an orderly way. But Germany and Italy are 
bound to challenge the supremacy of the older empire. 
However, the most challenging aspect of his speech for other members of the I. L. P. 
was his almost unequivocal support of Chamberlain: 
If he averted war and gave a breathing space to the world for reason to operate- they were entitled 
to say to him generously "Well done, thou good and faithful servant. " 106 
The BBC and National Newspapers picked up on the statements of first Maxton and 
then McGovern, predictably highlighting the support that the two I. L. P. ers appeared to 
have given to the Prime Minister. 
Groups within the I. L. P. were furious at the action which they perceived Maxton to 
have taken, and at the association of the I. L. P. with support for the Munich agreement. 
A number of I. L. P. branches and federations immediately issued statements distancing 
themselves from the Commons speeches of the MPs. 107 However, the greatest 
controversy came over the reaction of the N. A. C. Two members of the N. A. C., Fenner 
Brockway and John Aplin, the N. A. C. member for London, were particularly frustrated. 
Brockway later stated that he felt the 'speech was regrettable from a revolutionary 
socialist point of view. ' He gave two reasons: 
First for the praise of Chamberlain and, second, for its omission of any denunciation of the terms 
of the Munich pact. 108 
Brockway requested an emergency meeting of the Inner Executive at which he and 
Aplin raised their objections to the impression that had been given of the Party's policy 
by the Parliamentary speeches. Feelings were running high, but it appeared something 
of a stand-off had been reached when the Executive agreed to 'put no obstacle in the 
way' of Brockway and Aplin if they distanced themselves from Maxton and McGovern. 
Maxton also asked that Brockway delay twenty-four hours to think over his position 
before issuing any statement. However, Brockway, to his later regret, was not prepared 
to wait the twenty-four hours and released a statement the following morning publicly 
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dissenting from what he described as 'the unreserved praise given to Mr Chamberlain's 
actions' by members of the Parliamentary Group. 109 
The Party press attempted to play down the divisions over the Munich Crisis. The New 
Leader editorial on the 14 October briefly acknowledged the disagreements over 'the 
Prime Minister's role in the recent war crisis. ' It stressed that there was no disagreement 
about the Party's attitude towards war nor to the policy to now be pursued: 
We are unanimous in our view that the present Imperialist Peace will lead to war unless the 
workers are mobilised, first in resistance to the War Danger and then in the supreme task of 
overthrowing Capitalist imperialism. 
Behind these claims to unity there was deep division which fundamentally altered the 
way in which a number of I. L. P. ers saw the future. There is little doubt that Maxton 
himself was deeply affected by the way in which he felt treated by Brockway and Aplin, 
especially the fact that Brockway had not waited the twenty-four hours he had 
requested. ' 10 The feelings of the other members of the Parliamentary Group, largely out 
of sympathy for Maxton, were almost as strong. John McGovern in his autobiography 
suggested that the events persuaded him that there was no future for the I. L. P. outside 
the Labour Party. Other leading figures within the Party felt strongly that Maxton's 
speech was not only correct in line and temper but was a fine piece of propaganda 
stating the Party case. John McNair, who witnessed it, later described Maxton's speech 
as 'probably his greatest speech during this period' and at the time he was no less 
convinced, as he wrote in that weekend's issue of the New Leader: 
When James Maxton sat down the vast majority of the House realised that "common folk" had 
been heard, and in no uncertain manner. A journalist sitting near to me said: "At last the people 
have spoken. " As a member of the I. L. P., I felt immeasurably strengthened and inspired by a clear, 
courageous and unequivocal exposition of the Socialist message across the bleak wastes of 
Capitalist rivalries. 111 
However, feelings on the other side were equally as strong. At the 1939 I. L. P. annual 
conference the Parliamentary Group faced motions for its expulsion from Croydon and 
Southend branches and motions that it should be brought under strict party discipline 
from Greenwich, Clapham, and Birmingham City branches. The Munich speeches also 
marked a distinct turning point for a number of individuals in their relationship with the 
Party, not only for John Aplin, but other such as Ernie Patterson, who following the 
Munich Crisis declared that the Parliamentary Group were not 'revolutionary Socialists 
but social reformers, ' who had become socialised into Commons culture: 
Gone were the days of Keir Hardie when he shocked the House of Commons by his burning 
hatred. Now the struggle in the House was conducted on the hail-fellow-well-met principle. 
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Patterson declared the events had changed his mind about the possibility of 
transforming the I. L. P. into an effective revolutionary organisation. 112 
With the threat of expulsion at the 1939 conference the debate over the Parliamentary 
Group's position intensified through the early months of 1939. A significant amount of 
space in the Party's discussion journal Left was given over to the matter. A defence of 
Maxton was published in the April 1939 issue, immediately prior to the conference, 
which asked 'what then has Maxton done wrong?.. What more and what better could 
any Socialist have done? " 13 The same issue featured a strongly worded attack on 
Maxton which argued that the impact of the speech had been extremely damaging, 'the 
less intelligent workers misled, the more intelligent at first incredulous then angry or 
scornful, and the I. L. P. ers resentful and dismayed. ' The anonymous author went on to 
argue that Maxton had accepted a false capitalist dilemma, rather than sticking to 
Socialist analysis: 
Maxton accepted the dilemma alleged to be facing Chamberlain. At a particular moment he had to 
decide for war or peace- there was no third way. But why should Socialists accept the dilemma 
created by the capitalists? ' 14 
The dispute came to a climax with the debate that surrounded the action of the 
Parliamentary Group at the I. L. P. 's 1939 annual conference in Scarborough. The 
Parliamentary Group were accused by a range of influential members from C. A. Smith, 
the new I. L. P. Chairman, to Joseph Southall of not understanding the Party's analysis of 
Capitalism. Maxton responded by expressing his hurt at the actions of Brockway and 
Aplin, but finished by tactfully distancing himself from much of the controversy 
insisting that 'if he had thought that five words of his speech would have caused so 
much controversy then he would not have used them. ' McGovern, on the other hand, 
responded in typically angry fashion, first asking 'if the Party didn't want a Capitalist 
war or a Capitalist Peace what the hell did it want. ' The question did little to meet the 
main point of the objectors who had suggested that Revolutionary Socialism provided 
the alternative. He then went on to restate the point which Maxton carefully avoided 
emphasising when he reiterated the statement that he 'genuinely believe Neville 
Chamberlain had secured peace. ' Having aggressively argued his point he then moved 
on to attacking Aplin and Brockway at a personal level, suggesting that they had acted 
in a 'scurrilous manner' and accusing Brockway of being a 'double crosser' before 
writing off the London Division as 'fireside theoreticians and middle class dilettantes 
with no contact with the working class. ' 
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With the tone of debate angrily raised by McGovern, Brockway was forced to respond 
in part with a detailed personal defence. However, he attempted to focus on the political 
argument suggesting that there were three alternative policies: firstly, appeasement, 
secondly, lining up behind the democratic powers and finally the option he supported, 
opposition to both a bad war and a bad peace. However, questions to be voted 
surrounded the conduct of the Parliamentary Group and not the correct policy of the 
Party with respect to the Munich settlement. All the critical resolutions were defeated, 
the move to expel the Group was defeated by a large majority and the repudiation of the 
MPs was also defeated. However, the referencing back of the Parliamentary Group 
report was only narrowly defeated 65 to 43 and the Bradford amendment which would 
have congratulated the MPs was defeated. The conference was prepared to back its 
MPs, but it was a very uneasy vote of confidence. 
9.7 Pacifism? 
Throughout the 1930s the Party stressed its historical, and ongoing opposition to war. 
As the 1936 conference declared: 
The I. L. P. has in the past a sound record in its opposition to war and we need have no doubts that 
confronted with any war the I. L. P. will again play an honourable and courageous part. It is 
distressing to find at this stage that we are almost as solitary as we were at the time of the Boer 
War in 1900 and the World War in 1914.1 15 
There was significant pacifist sentiment within the I. L. P. which argued it was the 
closest of the then existing left-wing parties in Britain to the pacifist position. 116 The 
Party opposed the Second World War from its outbreak and was involved in organising 
resistance to war preparations. The Party was, for example, at the forefront of the 
formation of the No Conscription Fellowship in January 1939. There were two I. L. P. 
members on the provisional committee of the Fellowship, with William Ballantine 
acting as chairman of the committee. 17 The New Leader gave prominence to the Party's 
strongly worded statement against conscription in May 1939.118 Then at the National 
Convention of the No Conscription Fellowship, presumably under the influence of 
Alfred Salter, held in Bermondsey Town Hall in June 1939, with Ballantine in the 
Chair, the I. L. P. had a strong presence, with 91 I. L. P. organisations represented. 119 
Importantly there was also a significant I. L. P. dimension to many of the trade union 
delegations to the convention including those from the NUR, Building Trades, 
NUDAW, Life Assurance Agents, Chemical Workers and the Litho Workers. 120 In this 
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situation the I. L. P. was able to significantly influence the course of debate and one of 
the two I. L. P. amendments, which called for the conference to support those who 
became conscripted unwillingly or without realising its implications, was passed after 
being moved by the I. L. P. team of Jack Hammond and Walter Padley. 
Nevertheless, the I. L. P. was not a pacifist party. This much was apparent even at that 
National Convention of the No Conscription Fellowship. A second I. L. P. motion, which 
was defeated 198-178, suggested that whilst it would not be acceptable to fight for 
capitalism it might be necessary to fight for socialism. 121 Thus, according to the official 
party position pacifism had to be rejected and replaced by a revolutionary socialist 
outlook. As Brockway wrote on leading pacifist Dick Sheppard's death: 
The Pacifist Movement of which he was the leader has both its advantages and disadvantages. It is 
dangerous when it encourages non-resistance to War, Fascism and Capitalism; but the thinking 
Pacifist rarely remains in that position- he is driven on to opposition to Capitalism to a recognition 
of the reality of the class struggle, and finally to the revolutionary Socialist view. NZZ 
In 1939, the Party argued that in practical terms there was every reason, from a 
revolutionary socialist point of view, to oppose the war. By the outbreak of war there 
was an uneasy compromise within the Party, and indeed within many individuals' own 
thoughts, between revolutionary socialism and opposition to all wars. 
The Party's official argument was that Capitalism was the cause of both war and 
fascism. War, the Party argued, was 'due to the fight between the Capitalist classes of 
the Imperialist Powers for raw materials and markets. ' 123 Whilst Fascism, they argued, 
was also an 'inevitable development of Capitalism in crisis. ' 
124 In this situation, the 
Party suggested that the Capitalist Class in Britain would never be able to defeat 
Nazism as they 'have more sympathy with Nazism than with real democracy. ' Thus, 
they suggested only the working class and the establishment of socialism could really 
defeat Nazism. According to the I. L. P. this could best be achieved by the British 
workers seeking to oppose British Capitalism, both in terms of wealth distribution 
within Britain and crucially in opposing British Imperialism. 
Thus, I. L. P. Policy at the outbreak of war proposed an anti-imperialist and revolutionary 
socialist alternative to war and there was nowhere within such a position for support for 
an anti-fascist war conducted by Britain and her allies. In other words, there was an 
agreement between many pacifists and the I. L. P. about what should be done. 
Nevertheless, the I. L. P. 's position on war fell apart dramatically during 1940 as its 
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chairman CA Smith began attacking the Party line, and eventually resigned from the 
Party. These disputes which disrupted the Party during the war graphically 
demonstrated that disputes between 'pacifist' and 'revolutionary socialist' sentiment had 
only partially been resolved. 
9.8 Conclusion 
In 1936 Brockway claimed that the I. L. P. had developed a unity of purpose and 
understanding based on its new revolutionary policy. His assessment could not be 
applied to international affairs. Having apparently sorted out its International affiliations 
in the fierce internal battles during the immediate period after disaffiliation, from 1935 
to the outbreak of war the party stumbled from one argument to the next on questions 
relating to war. The difficulties faced by the I. L. P. stemmed from pacifist sentiment 
within the party, and an apparently growing incompatibility of this position with a 
developing revolutionary socialist policy. These conflicts were dramatically played out 
when the Parliamentary Group refused to support the workers' sanctions line during the 
Abyssinia crisis, largely because of the implication that it may lead to the support of 
war. The short-term solution was a compromise; to accept the need for revolutionary 
violence under certain conditions, but to deny those conditions obtained. However, the 
resolution of that dispute, although giving way to a near pacifist attitude on the 
immediate issue saw the acceptance of the principle that the Party should take sides in 
certain types of dispute. With the Spanish Civil War following so closely on the back of 
these decisions the pacifists had little choice but to accept the results of their recent 
'victory'. However, the I. L. P. 's first foray into supporting war was scarcely a 
conspicuous success. The Spanish Civil War saw the party increasingly ostracised 
within the British 'Left' and unable to effectively pursue its aims of supporting 
revolutionary elements within the Republican forces. 
At the outbreak of the Second World War support from Capitalist Governments in the 
struggle against fascism prevent the I. L. P. from applying the logic that had led to their 
support for the Spanish Civil War. It was difficult to conceive of such a war as an 
immediately revolutionary struggle. As the war continued tensions between the pacifists 
and others within the I. L. P. grew and there were a number of very public disagreements 
between leading figures, centred on the position of the then Party chairman C. A. Smith. 
Such continuing difficulties indicate the strains and unresolved tensions inherent in the 
I. L. P. 's new revolutionary policy. They also show the enduring importance of support 
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for the Soviet Union, internationalism and pacifism to the I. L. P. in the 1930s. Thus, 
international events, more than domestic politics, show up the continuing political 
tensions and difficulties for the I. L. P. during the 1930s. 
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10. Conclusion: Explanations and Alternatives 
The Second World War fundamentally changed the environment in which the I. L. P. 
operated. The Party's size and tradition allowed it to play a major part in the anti-war 
movement in Britain. The Party saw some growth in membership and an increase in 
middle-class financial support. ' During the War, especially after 1941, the Party 
performed well in a series of by-elections. 2 However, the legacy of the 1930s remained. 
The ambiguities of Party policy on war, evident in the Abyssinian and Munich crises, 
were still unresolved at the outbreak of war. These tensions exploded in an extended, 
heated and highly theoretical debate, which led to the eventual resignation of the party 
chairman, C. A. Smith. 3 The 1945 General Election result saw Labour returned with a 
huge majority and confirmed as the 'party of the working class'. In contrast to the First 
World War, this, combined with the images of a'people's war', meant the I. L. P. received 
little retrospective credit for having opposed the war. Its votes outside of its Glasgow 
strongholds were minimal. The Party failed in its approach to re-affiliate to the Labour 
Party which led to a further decline in membership. With the death of James Maxton on 
22 July 1946 many others who had retained party membership out of personal loyalty to 
their 'beloved rebel' finally left the party. The I. L. P. was reduced to a shell of its former 
existence. This decline, finalised in the years after the Second World War, had its roots 
firmly in the 1930s and the failures of the I. L. P. in the years after disaffiliation. 
The disaffiliation decision was made in the light of the continuing disputes between the 
Labour Party and the I. L. P. in parliament and the developing arguments for a 
revolutionary policy within the smaller organisation. These differing reasons for 
disaffiliation led to contrasting assessments of the I. L. P. 's past and conflicting 
expectations for the party's political trajectory. Whilst all accepted a commitment to a 
'revolutionary policy' in name, for some this implied an endorsement and elaboration of 
the party's 'ethical socialist' past, for others it entailed a rejection of the I. L. P. 's 
'reformist' legacy. From these diverse components, the I. L. P. attempted to forge its 'new 
revolutionary policy. ' 
The I. L. P. held out great hope for this policy. It was expected first, to distinguish the 
I. L. P. from the Labour Party, second, to act as a rallying point for the working class, 
and finally, to provide the party with an effective guide to action. The struggle to create 
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this policy was far from bloodless as it was moulded against a backdrop of regional and 
factional disputes with the resultant loss of a large section of the Party's membership 
including the majority of the Lancashire Division. Then, in a process most obvious in 
the period 1933-5, but lasting throughout the 1930s, as policy was 'clarified' in the wake 
of these factional disputes so it was subtly changed. These slight but noticeable policy 
adjustments led to further disagreements and losses in membership. Yet by the later 
1930s the I. L. P. could claim to have a well defined 'revolutionary policy', based on a 
Workers' Front. 
The impact of the 'new revolutionary policy' was crucial for the internal dynamics of the 
party and for the loss or retention of some sections of the membership. However, the 
wider impact of the new policy was not obvious. Large sections of the membership, 
especially in Scotland, were ambivalent towards the new policy of the party. This was 
especially evident in electoral struggles where the detailed policy statements of the party 
were never a major feature of the I. L. P. 's Scottish campaigns. The wider voting public 
appeared even less enthusiastic about the I. L. P. 's policy. Indeed when other factors are 
considered there is no evidence that the focus placed on the 'new revolutionary policy' 
during election campaigns had any influence on the party's electoral results. Thus, 
whilst policy was an important factor in the internal instability of the party, there is little 
indication that differing policy proposals could have led to substantially differing 
outcomes for the I. L. P. during the 1930s. 
Where the I. L. P. was successful in securing political space for itself during the 1930s it 
was for reasons other than formal policy. In some localities the I. L. P. became an 
important part of the local political map. Most notably this was the case in Glasgow 
where the I. L. P. group of councillors held the balance of power on the council for most 
of the decade. There the Party's MPs and established role in local politics gave the I. L. P. 
an important presence. This was combined with the lack of a strong local Labour Party, 
which particularly in Shettleston, had been decimated by the losses to the Independent 
Labour Party at the time of disaffiliation. This gave the strong remnants of the I. L. P. 's 
pre-disaffiliation organisation the opportunity to exploit an organisational niche. 
Similar, if smaller, organisational niches in other areas where the Labour Party was 
ravaged by disaffiliation gave strong pre-existing I. L. P. branches opportunities to thrive, 
as in the Tong and East Bowling wards in Bradford. Elsewhere, absences of a strong 
Labour organisation gave the I. L. P. further opportunities for electoral success, as in 
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Barrhead or the Catton Ward iii Norwich. Where the Labour Party was dominant 
political space could be found in other ways, as in Merthyr, where by 1947 the I. L. P. 
formed the only opposition to Labour on the Town Council. 
Political space was not restricted to the electoral sphere, it could also be found in other 
organisations. As in Yarmouth, where the I. L. P. was a dominant influence in first the 
Labour club and later the Trades Council, this could sometimes be transformed into an 
electoral presence. In a related way the I. L. P. could find some political space within the 
Trade Unions where the diversity of organisational arrangements gave opportunities for 
the party to exploit. Indeed, the I. L. P. had considerably more influence within and 
contact with the Trade Unions than has been presented by the conventional 
historiography. Nevertheless, the Party was much less effective at exploiting these 
political spaces than the Communist Party. Part of the explanation for this failure 
probably rests with the focus of the I. L. P. away from the Unions during the 1920s and 
before. However, the continuing antipathy from the Party towards the Trade Unions 
combined with the lack of an effective party trade union organisation for most of the 
1930s also hampered the I. L. P. 's ability to exploit these opportunities. 
Thus, a detailed study of the I. L. P. in the localities and trade unions shows a party 
which was more influential than allowed by the conventional historiography. However, 
at national level the party failed to make a substantial impact. Such an impact could 
have been obtained either by co-operation or competition with the other major parties 
on the left, the Labour and Communist Parties. An initial strategy of aiming to 
immediately replace both and to be seen as the party of the working class was wildly 
over-optimistic and was quickly replaced. The ensuing strategy of a United Front with 
the Communist Party led to both parties briefly aiming to create a 'United Revolutionary 
Party. ' However, conflict at local level, historical mistrust, changing Comintern policy 
and eventually disputes over the Spanish Civil War led to a breakdown in relations 
between the two organisations. As relations with the Communist Party deteriorated the 
I. L. P. felt increasingly isolated. As memories of the acute parliamentary conflicts during 
the Second Labour Government receded into the past so the I. L. P. 's leadership replaced 
its initial hostility to the Labour Party with a more sympathetic attitude. By the end of 
the decade the terms and conditions for I. L. P. re-affiliation to the Labour Party had been 
agreed by the larger party's N. E. C. and the smaller organisation had arranged a special 
conference to consider rejoining the Labour Party. However, in its relationship with the 
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Labour and Communist Parties the I. L. P. never succeeded in carving out a significant 
political space. The Communist Party was at times anxious to cash in on the I. L. P. 's 
name, organisation and considerable prestige but its international connections would 
never permit a real alliance with the I. L. P. The Labour Party was more receptive to 
I. L. P. requests for joint activity than to Communist approaches. However, in some ways 
it was equally determined to prevent the I. L. P. from carving out a national niche for 
itself. Where the I. L. P. was strong the Labour Party, both in Scotland and elsewhere, 
was prepared to undertake considerable efforts to prevent the I. L. P. from transforming 
local success into national representation. Where, as in Norwich, local co-operation with 
the I. L. P. was suggested it was firmly stamped out by the leadership of the Labour 
Party. 
This national picture can be combined with an understanding of the I. L. P. at local level 
to contribute to an understanding of why, unlike the I. L. P. of the 1890s, the local and 
trade union spaces could not be transformed into a national presence. At local level the 
I. L. P. could be successful where it could find a niche for its activity or build on an 
organisational remnant of previous strength. However, in contrast to the earlier period 
the I. L. P. was not able to forge alliances with other organisations, most notably the 
trade unions and the Labour Party. Further, the nature of politics and political parties 
had changed over the first three decades of the twentieth century. By the 1930s the 
Labour Party in particular operated as a national political party with a national focus 
which had sufficient resources to override local initiative. In such an environment it was 
difficult for the I. L. P. to develop the limited political space it had found. However, the 
party itself did little to assist itself in these respects. Tom apart by factional fighting the 
party was reluctant to develop a coherent and national strategy to develop the 
opportunities it found, especially within the unions. 
The party remained attractive to some because of its cultural activities, its distinctive 
'ethical socialist' tradition, and in some areas because of its enduring local significance. 
However, the party had failed to realise its own expectations at the time of disaffiliation. 
In part, this was because the expectations were unrealistic, the political space did not 
exist to create a national party to supersede the Labour Party. In part, the I. L. P. failed to 
fully exploit the opportunities which did exist. The lessons drawn from the I. L. P. 's 
failure haiebeen remarkably consistent: 
From 1932 onwards the Left had to be in the Labour Party, if it was to avoid total annihilation, and 
if it was to have any influence at all. 5 
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This study of the I. L. P. certainly suggests that the difficulties of working outside the 
Labour Party were substantial. However, a realisation that the I. L. P. s' time outside the 
Labour Party was not a disaster in every respect, raises the prospect of alternative 
interpretations of the significance of the experience. 
The difficulties of socialist activity outside the dominant party of the working class are 
substantial but different strategies and circumstances would permit different outcomes. 
A party less divided over policy would have seen a less dramatic decline in 
membership, the problems of retaining membership would have been less acute. In a 
political space less crowded with left alternatives, without a Communist Party with the 
backing of the Soviet Union, greater prospects of independent socialist activity exist. A 
Labour Party less committed to crushing left alternatives would also give rise to the 
possibility of developing political niches. The combined effect of the attitudes of 
Labour and Communist Parties was a considerable block on the development of other 
traditions. However, whilst there may be no simple lesson to be drawn from the 
experience of the I. L. P. about the impossibility of independent socialist activity the case 
does illustrate many of the problems. The creation of a party unified on policy is far 
from straightforward. The possibilities for splits and divisions over differing 
interpretations and priorities are ever present in socialist politics. Such problems are 
particularly acute when an attempt is made, as in the I. L. P., to combine theoretical 
clarity with the apparently attractive virtue of political tolerance. Further difficulties are 
evident when one considers the importance for the disaffiliated party of organisational 
remnants and political goodwill built up during the early years of the development of 
the Labour Party. Few other organisations could ever hope to operate with such a 
favourable legacy, yet much of this legacy militated against the I. L. P. 's post-1932 
project. Such considerations suggest that, whilst there are no simple lessons to draw 
from the experience of the disaffiliated I. L. P., a study of the Party provides an insight 
into the plight of a socialist organisation attempting to develop independently of the 
mass party of the working class. The I. L. P. retained and even created some vibrant 
socialist communities throughout the 1930s, but , it was unable to translate these 
achievements to effectiveness on a national level. That the Party failed is not in dispute, 
but it is crucial to understand the manner of its decline. 
1 Thwaites, 1976,154 
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2 Although the I. L. P. performed well their performance was not as striking as some other Independents. 
The party's best result was probably that of Arthur Eaton in Bilston where the Party came within 349 
votes of winning the seat. For a review of the I. L. P. 's performance in wartime by-elections see Thwaites 
128-152 
3 Initially Smith came into conflict with parts of the I. L. P. over the Soviet invasion of Finland, stating that 
he would have been prepared to go and fight against 'Stalin's latest crime' on the proviso that he was not 
under control of'British Imperialism. ' These concerns developed into a much more expansive criticism of 
the I. L. P: s anti-war position based on a firm opposition to both Nazism and Stalinism. Smith argued his 
case without obvious support from others, under the pseudonym Philo in the columns of the New Leader 
and using his own name in the internal discussion bulletin Between Ourselves. However, his concerns 
about the nature of the war were shared by some other leading figures including Jennie Lee, John Aplin 
and even Fenner Brockway. 
Even its campaigns were relieved of much of their political content. For example, the 1950 General 
Election in Glasgow saw the I. L. P. making extensive use of the iconography of James Maxton, calling on 
workers to 'be faithful to old faithful. ' Thwaites, 197 
5 Coates, 1975,185 
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Appendix I: NAC Membership 1932-9 
1932 1933 
Chairman: Fenner Brockway Chairman: Fenner Brockway 
General Secretary: John Paton General Secretary: John Paton 
Treasurer. Fred Jowett Treasurer: Fred Jowett 
National Members James Maxton National Members James Maxton 
Campbell Stephen C. A. Smith 
Richard Wallhead Jennie Lee 
E. F. Wise Campbell Stephen 
Scotland: P. J. Dollan Scotland: John McGovern 
North East: Tom Stephenson North East: Tom Stephenson 
Yorkshire: Percy Williams Yorkshire: Percy Williams 
Midlands: Jim Garton Midlands: Jim Garton 
East Anglia: Dorothy Jewson East Anglia: Dorothy Jewson 
London: Allen Skinner London: Jack Caster 
South West: Kate Spurell South West: Kate Spurell 
Wales: Dai Jones Wales: E. B. James 
Lancashire: Elijah Sandharn Lancashire: Elijah Sandham 
Changes during year. 
National Member - CA. Smith (replaces Wise) 
Scotland - John McGovern 
Changes during year: 
Chairman - James Maxton 
General Secretary - Fenner Brockway 
Midlands - Sam Leckie 
1934 1935 
Chairman: James Maxton Chairman: James Maxton 
General Secretary: Fenner Brockway General Secretary: Fenner Brockway 
Treasurer: Fred Jowett Treasurer: Fred Jowett 
National Members Jennie Lee National Members Jennie Lee 
Campbell Stephen Campbell Stephen 
CA. Smith James Carmichael 
Alex Smillie Fenner Brockway 
Scotland: John McGovern Scotland: John McGovern 
North East: Tom Stephenson North East: Tom Stephenson 
Yorkshire: Percy Williams Yorkshire: Percy Williams 
Midlands: Sam Leckie Midlands: Sam Leckie 
East Anglia: George Johnson East Anglia: George Johnson 
London: Jack Gaster London: Jack Gaster 
South West Kate Spurell South West: Kate Spurell 
Wales: E. B. James Wales: E. B. James 
Lancashire: Elijah Sandharn Lancashire: Bob Edwards 
Changes during year. 
Lancashire- Bob Edwards 
Changes during year: 
London - John Aplin. 
337 
1936 1937 
Chairman: James Maxton Chairman: James Maxton 
General Secretary: Fenner Brockway General Secretary: Fenner Brockway 
Treasurer. Fred Jowett Treasurer: Fred Jowett 
National Members Fenner Brockway National Members Campbell Stephen 
James Carmichael Fenner Brockway 
Campbell Stephen Sam Leckie 
Wilfred Young Wilfred Young 
Scotland: John McGovern Scotland: John McGovern 
North East Tom Stephenson North East: Tom Stephenson 
Yorkshire: Percy Williams Yorkshire: Percy Williams 
Midlands: Sam Leckie Midlands: Tom Reed 
East Anglia: George Johnson East Anglia: George Johnson 
London: John Aplin London: John Aplin 
South West Kate Spurell South West: Kate Spurell 
Wales: Jim Davies Wales: Jim Davies 
Lancashire: Bob Edwards Lancashire: Bob Edwards 
1938 1939 
Chairman: James Maxton Chairman: C. A. Smith 
General Secretary: Fenner Brockway General Secretary: John McNair 
Treasurer. Fred Jowett Treasurer: Fred Jowett 
National Members James Carmichael National Members James Maxton 
Fenner Brockway Fenner Brockway 
John Aplin William Ballantine 
Campbell Stephen James Carmichael 
Scotland: John McGovern Scotland: David Gibson 
North East Tom Stephenson North East: Tom Stephenson 
Yorkshire: Percy Williams Yorkshire: Percy Williams 
Midlands: Tom Reed Midlands: Tom Reed 
East Anglia: George Johnson East Anglia: George Johnson 
London: Jack Hammond London: Jack Hammond 
South West: Kate Spurell South West: Fred Berriman 
Wales: Emrys Thomas Wales: Emrys Thomas 
Lancashire: Bob Edwards Lancashire: Bob Edwards 
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Appendix II: Parliamentary Election Results 1932-5 
By-elections 
Kilmarnock 
Kenneth Lindsay (National Labour) 12,577 
Rev. James Barr (Labour) 9,924 
John Pollock (I. L. P. ) 7,575 
Sir Alexander MacEwen (Scot. Nat) 6,095 
National majority 2,653 
Upton 
Ben Gardner (Labour) 11,998 
Macnamara (National) 8,534 
A. Fenner Brockway (I. L. P. ) 748 
Labour majority 3,464 
Merthyr 
S. O. Davies (Labour) 18,645 
Victor Evans (Liberal) 10,376 
Campbell Stephen (I. L. P. ) 3,508 
W. Hannington (Communist) 3,409 
Labour majority 8,269 
1935 General Election 
Glasgow Bridgeton 
James Maxton (I. L. P. ) 17,691 
Col. Maclnnes Shaw (Unionist) 8,951 
Samuel McLaren (Labour) 594 
I. L. P. majority 8,740 
Glasgow Gorbals 
George Buchanan (I. L. P. ) 22,860 
Maurice Bloch (Unionist) 5,824 
Alexander Burnett (Labour) 1,786 
I. L. P. majority 17,036 
Glasgow Shettleston 
John McGovern (I. L. P. ) 18,377 
Ronald Russell (Unionist) 13,802 
George Beggs (Labour) 2,610 
I. L. P. majority 4,575 
Glasgow Camlachie 
Campbell Stephen (I. L. P. ) 15,070 
James Stephenson (Unionist) 14,186 
William Reid (Labour) 2,732 
I. L. P. majority 884 
Glasgow Govan 
Neil MacLean (Labour) 15,791 
A. M'Clure (Unionist) 10,221 
Tom Taylor (I. L. P. ) 4,959 
Labour majority 5,570 
Glasgow Tradeston 
Tom Henderson (Labour) 12,253 
Dr. W. H. McLean (Unionist) 10,354 
James Carmichael (I. L. P. ) 3,423 
Labour majority 1,899 
North Lanark 
W. J. Anstruther-Gray (Unionist) 22,301 
Jennie Lee (I. L. P. ) 17,267 
William Reid (Labour) 6,763 
Unionist majority 5,034 
East Bradford 
J. Hepworth (Conservative) 11,131 
F. W. Jowett (I. L. P. ) 8,983 
339 
W. L. Heywood (Labour) 7,329 
T. D. Fenby (Liberal) 6,312 
Conservative majority 2,148 
Merthyr 
S. 0. Davies (Labour) 20,530 
Claude Stanfield (I. L. P. ) 9,640 
Labour majority 10,890 
Kilmarnock 
Kenneth Lindsay (National Labour) 19,115 
J. Crawford (Labour) 12,558 
John Pollock (I. L. P. ) 3,582 
T. W. Campbell (S. N. P. ) 2,346 
National majority 6,557 
Lanark Central 
Lord Dunglass (National Conservative) 17,759 
J. Gibson (Labour) 10,950 
William Carlin (I. L. P. ) 2,583 
National majority 6,809 
Norwich 
G. H. Shakespeare (National Liberal) 36,039 
H. G. Strauss (National Conservaitve) 34,182 
W. G. Hall (Labour) 24,670 
C. J. Kelly (Labour) 22,055 
Fenner Brockway (I. L. P. ) 6,737 
Camborne 
Commander P. G. Agnew (National Conservative) 14,826 
Sir Walter Peacock (Liberal) 7,921 
H. R. Greaves (Labour) 7,375 
Kate Spurrell (I. L. P. ) 592 
Conservative majority 6,905 
Whitehaven 
F. Anderson (Labour) 14,794 
W. Nunn (Conservative) 14,442 
Tom Stephenson (I. L. P. ) 1,004 
Labour majority 352 
Aberdeen 
G. M. Garro-Jones (Labour) 16,952 
J. G. Burnett (National) 13,990 
A. Fraser Macintosh (I. L. P. ) 3,871 
Labour majority 2,962 
Chorley 
D. H. Hacking (Conservative) 23,061 
A. Whiffing (Labour) 17,286 
Robert Edwards (I. L. P. ) 1,365 
Conservative Majority 5,775 
Clackmannan and Eastern Stirlingshire 
L. MacNeill Weir (Labour) 14,881 
J. W. Johnson (Unionist) 13,738 
G. G. Honeyman (Liberal) 5,062 
D. W. Gibson (I. L. P. ) 1,513 
Labour majority 1,143 
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Appendix III: I. L. P. Local Election Victories 1932-8 
Division Place 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 
Scotland Aberdeen 1 ] 
Airdrie ] 
Ayrshire ] 1 
Barrhead 1 1 2 2 
, Clackmannan and Eastern 
Cowdenbeath 1 1 
Crossford I 
Galston 1 
(Glasgow 4 3 5 5 2 3 4 
! Greenock I 
Kirkmuir Hill 1 
Lochgelly 1 1 
Neilston 
Shotts 2 
, Stevenston [North-East Blaydon 2 
Cumberland (County Coucil) 
Estop 4 1 
Jarrow 2 
Moresby 2 
'North Riding (County Council) 1 2 
Yorkshire Bentley 
Bradford 1 1 1 3 
Barfield 1 1 
Keighley 1 1 
, South Hemsworth ] 
Midlands A]freton 1 l 
'Derby 1 
Donisthorpe 
East Anglia Norwich 2 1 1 2 1 1 
Yarmouth I I 
London and the South , Slough ] 
Welwyn 1 1 1 
South-West Bristol 1 l 
'Truro 1 1 
Wales Bedwas & Machen 2 
, Merthyr I I I 1 1 l 
Monmouthshire (County Council) ] 
Pontypool 
Lancashire Chorley 1 ] 
, 
Manchester 1 
Swinton 1 
Total 17 11 28 16 15 ]9 ý II 
Note: These results are compiled from a range of sources, primarily the New Leader, annual conference 
reports, N. A. C. minutes and local newspaper reports. It is clear from comparison of these sources that 
the ILP centrally was unaware of all the candidates put forward under the Party label. It is thus 
inevitable that a number of ILP local election victories, especially in RDC and UDC contests are 
ommitted from the above table. Nevertheless, the above figures are a useful indicator of general trends. 
1932 results only include post-disaffiliation victories. Results have been classified by the divisional 
affiliations of the members who won the seats. Thus, Eston and North Riding County Council are listed 
as part of the North East division and not the Yorkshire division. 
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